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The Theatre of Death: the Uncanny in Mimesis (Abstract) 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore an heuristic analogy as proposed in its very title: 
how does a concept of the “uncanny in mimesis” and of the “theatre of death” give 
content to each other – historically and theoretically – as distinct from the one 
providing either a description of, or even a metaphor for, the other? Thus, while the 
title for this concept of theatre derives from an eponymous manifesto of Tadeusz 
Kantor’s, the thesis does not aim to explain what the concept might mean in this 
historically specific instance only. Rather, it aims to develop a comparative analysis, 
through the question of mimesis, allowing for different theatre artists to be related 
within what will be proposed as a “minor” tradition of modernist art theatre (that “of 
death”). This comparative enquiry – into theatre practices conceived of in terms of the 
relation between abstraction and empathy, in which the “model” for the actor is seen 
in mannequins, puppets, or effigies – is developed through such questions as the 
following: What difference does it make to the concept of “theatre” when thought of 
in terms “of death”? What thought of mimesis do the dead admit of? How has this 
been figured, historically, in aesthetics? How does an art of theatre participate in the 
anthropological history of relations between the living and the dead? In this history, 
how have actors been thought to represent the dead – not in the interpretation of 
fictional “characters” (from the dramatic canon), but in their very appearance, before 
an audience, as actors? How might (a minor history of) modernist theatre practice be 
considered in terms of an iconography of such appearances – as distinct from a 
question of actor training, still less as a question of written drama?  
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The events surrounding the historian, and in which he himself takes part, will underlie 
his presentation in the form of a text written in invisible ink. The history which he lays 
before the reader comprises, as it were, the citations occurring in this text, and it is 
only these citations that occur in a manner legible to all. To write history thus means 
to cite history. It belongs to the concept of citation, however, that the historical object 
in each case is torn from its context. 
 Walter Benjamin [Arcades Project, N11,3] 
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis 
 
Introduction: Thinking of the dead through a concept of theatre (part one) 
 
When I speak of truth, I’m not thinking of the weight of moral significance attached to 
this word, but of the formal consequences of it. Truth, for me, is the counterbalance to 
the stylisations employed in theatre and literature...  
Cricot has always had a very precise artistic-conceptual programme: a programme 
precisely defined at each stage of our investigations... 
The artist “creates” more or less within the artistic conventions dominant in a given 
period. I would cite the example of Wyspianski, who has an impeccable individuality, 
but whose art lies entirely within the period of the Secession, Art Nouveau, and 
Modernism... 
 – Tadeusz Kantor1 
 
These three observations made by Tadeusz Kantor (in conversation with Krzysztof 
Miklaszewski, in 1981) offer particular, historical instances of general, theoretical 
concerns that are addressed throughout this thesis. Principally, that the theatre in 
question, in its concept, is not one of entertainment simply, but one that explores the 
meaning of an aesthetic and anthropological truth – concerning what it is that theatre 
makes apparent, visible, or known about human being(s) within cultural memory; 
specifically, as a form of mnemotechnics that addresses the dead. Theatrical research 
in this context (as concerns a “precise artistic-conceptual programme”) distinguishes 
art from kitsch, form from mere style, and performance from simply professional 
production or the applications of technique, however effective for an audience these 
might be. The question of truth is rarely posed in a context in which success, in 
practice, is typically understood in terms of command over resources, as an 
inscription of ambition within institutionally mediated relations with audiences, and 
as conformity to prevailing “standards” of production. By contrast to these conditions 
of practice, questions of “formal consequence”, “artistic-conceptual programme”, and 
the relation between “creativity” and “convention” or “period”, will inform the 
                                                
1 Tadeusz Kantor, “On the State of Things, the Avant-Garde, Innovation, Luck, Truth, and 
Success” (1981), in Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George 
Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, p.86 and p.87. 
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thought of theatre in this thesis, as these resonate, specifically, through Kantor’s 
concern with what is avant-garde.2   
 
With respect to “professional” criteria, an art of theatre concerns the exception – not 
in an abstract sense, but as it occurs historically (as indeed a question of theatre 
history); not least, that of the modern (or so-called experimental) theatre of the last 
century, in the thought of an aesthetic avant-garde in a Europe still divided by the 
Cold War. Although it is a quarter of a century since the “fall” of the Berlin Wall, this  
– divided – European history informs much of the reception of Kantor’s theatre that 
will be cited here, a history that generated a sense of period (and of artistic 
convention) that cannot be simply relegated to a “dispensable” past for an 
understanding of what remains present of that work today. It sometimes seems as if 
the “victory” of the former West (the formerly proclaimed “end of history”) now 
extends backward to rewrite the past from the point of view of a future was not then 
part of its present.3 After all, the walls of the former Eastern Jericho did not come 
tumbling down at the blasts of the neo-liberal ram’s horn, but crumbled through the 
friability of their own mortar.4  
 
                                                
2 This could be compared with Kantor’s friend, and one of the co-founders of the Cricot 2, 
Maria Jarema (cf. Laurie Koloski, Painting Krakow Red: Politics and Culture in Poland, 
1945-1950, PhD Thesis, Stanford University, June 1998, pp.254-56). 
3 This retroactive (or revisionist) attempt to write out of history any sense of an “alternative” 
to what now appears as a universal “post”-modernity was already anticipated by such German 
writers as Günter Grass and Heiner Müller at the time of the European “reunification”; and 
has been subsequently remarked within art history, for instance, by Hans Belting (cf. chapter 
7 in Art History after Modernism, trans. Caroline Saltzwedel, et al., Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003 [esp. pp.58-61]). A contrasting sense of the post-Yalta European 
settlement as necessary for understanding the 1980s politics of martial law in Poland is 
offered by Jakub Berman (one of the Stalinist governing triumvirate, 1944-56), in Teresa 
Toranska, Oni: Stalin’s Polish Puppets (trans. Agnieszka Kolakowska, London: Collins 
Harvill, 1987, p.309). The contemporary phantom (spectre or symptom) of this alternative 
(precisely its seeming lack or absence) will be returned to in the last section of part two of this 
Introduction (Elimination). 
4 The Czech dissident Jan Urban observes of the Velvet Revolution, for instance: “It’s not that 
we won – it’s that they collapsed.” As Marci Shore, who records Urban’s reflections, 
comments: “Urban could not remember any occasion from the ‘old days’ when they [Charta 
77] had discussed the future, what would come after communism. There were no such 
expectations; the dissidents had no project, no future of their own. And this, he thought now, 
had been their great mistake.” [Marci Shore, The Taste of Ashes, New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2013, p.33.] In Poland, however, the KOR and Solidarity negotiations with the 
Party set an example before the imposition of Martial Law, under which then a virtual 
“alternative society” operated in Poland. 
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The impossibility of thinking of history through its “end(s)” remains all too evident, 
even retrospectively (always unforeseen by any so-called “intelligence agency”), 
while contemporary capitalism (still subscribing to its colonialist myths) continues to 
lay waste to its erstwhile European “home”, all the more cynically whilst advocating 
“democratic values”. Under the subtitle of “the end of Europeanism”, Stathis 
Kouvelakis remarks, for example, in his introduction to the SOAS Research on 
Money and Finance group’s analysis of the Euro zone crisis:  
 
The dark side of Europeanism has now come to the surface: blaming the 
losers, the ‘lazy’ and ‘profligate’ southerners, has now become the 
conventional wisdom of the mainstream media and politicians. It is crucial 
however to stress here that the revival of these racist stereotypes should not be 
understood as a return to the past, even if it draws heavily from an old 
Orientalist stockpile. This intra-European neo-racism is rather the purest 
outcome of the newly polarised reality created by the internal logic of so-
called ‘European integration’, the realities of which were already quite 
familiar to the inhabitants of the European Mezzogiorno constituted by the 
former Eastern Bloc countries.5 
 
Concerning aesthetic work, Jaroslaw Kozlowski, reflecting on the history of Polish 
conceptualism in 1990 (immediately after the demise of the Communist Party’s 
proclaimed “leading role”, not only in society but also in History), evokes this 
situation in comparative terms, fearful, precisely, of an incipient cultural-historical 
universalism by and for the former West: 
 
Because of the very strong Constructivist tradition in Polish art (and perhaps 
also because of the economic situation in our country), the artwork in Poland 
has never been understood as an object, a product you can sell. It has always 
                                                
5 Stathis Kouvelakis, “Introduction”, in Costas Lapavitsas (et al.), Crisis in the Euro Zone, 
London: Verso, 2012, p.xix. To be quite clear how perniciously ingrained these racist 
stereotypes are, they are propagated in defiance of the OECD’s own statistical data, which 
state that “the Greeks are the reigning champions of work at 2,119 hours a year. They ‘work’ 
52% more than the Germans (1,380 hours). The Greeks also work longer. In Greece, 31% of 
the population aged 59-65 work, compared to 23% in Germany...”, as quoted by Maurizio 
Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man, trans. Joshua Jordan, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2012, p.194.  
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been regarded as a message, a way of thinking, of investigating reality, an 
intellectual and moral process in order to decode the sense of the world... I am 
very much afraid that we will slowly lose the philosophical aspects that have 
always been essential and characteristic of Polish art in the sixties, seventies 
and eighties and which provide a different function of art in Poland compared 
to that in the West.6  
 
The point here is not whether Kozlowski’s claims about this historical situation of and 
for Polish art (beyond that of his own work, at least) are true, but simply that they 
made sense for him in trying to address the end of the “short” twentieth century7 from 
a point of view distinct from – or compared with – that of the former West.8 Here, 
Eric Hobsbawm stands for any number of critics and historians who have observed 
the “unique sense” of artists “being needed by their public” in Eastern Europe during 
the post-War period, when he writes: “Indeed, in the absence of real politics and a 
free press, practitioners of the arts were the only ones who spoke for what their 
people, at least the educated among them, thought and felt.”9 The issue here is to 
engage (however superficially in translation) with the “period” controversies and 
contestations that gave form to such thought and feeling; and to engage with the fact 
that the heterogeneity of aesthetic truth between East and West was not predicated on 
homogeneity within either bloc.   
                                                
6 Jaroslaw Kozlowski, “On Poland”, quoted by Martin Patrick in “Polish Conceptualism of 
the 1960s and 1970s”, in Third Text, Spring 2001, p.45.  
7 “The Short Twentieth Century, that is to say... the years from the outbreak of the First 
World War to the collapse of the USSR which, as we can now see in retrospect, forms a 
coherent historical period that has now ended,” Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The 
Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London: Abacus, 1995, p.5. (Hobsbawm credits the 
former President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Ivan Berend, for this concept of 
historical period, ibid., p.xii.) Alain Badiou refracts this “short century” through the threefold 
prism of the “Soviet century”, the “totalitarian century”, and the “liberal century” (in The 
Century, trans. Alberto Toscano, Cambridge: Polity, 2007). Kantor’s own lifetime – 1915-
1990 – curiously enough spans precisely the years of this “century”.  
8 This is not simply to concur with Hans Belting’s “two voices” approach (Art History after 
Modernism, p.61) to European modernism, but at least to acknowledge it. This is addressed 
by Piotrowski (below), putting in question an art history that would ignore differences in 
situation (as also “period”), as distinct from simply affirming an “alternative” historical 
perspective (undermining the project of one “universal” history only by asserting another). 
The phrase “former West” here is not simply an historical description but refers to an ongoing 
research project under the aegis of BAK (basis voor actuele kunst), in Utrecht: 
http://www.formerwest.org/.  
9 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London: 
Abacus, 1995, p.506. 
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This relation between art-culture and society evoked by Hobsbawm in the former East 
can also be compared with Zygmunt Bauman’s recent observation, echoing 
Kozlowski’s fear of a quarter century ago, that: “If artists have no great and 
momentous tasks to perform, if their creations serve no other purpose than to bring 
fortune and fame to a chosen few and entertainment and personal pleasure to their 
beneficiaries, then how are they to be judged except by the public hype that happens 
to accompany them at any given moment?”10 The question of truth in the making of 
art – distinct from professional or commercial successes – has itself to be recognised 
by theatre historians, if they are to address the creative inspiration in and of the work 
that they study. What is at stake in such work is not what may be described 
analytically, but what of its after life is to be transmitted or communicated; what it is 
that makes the thought of an artistic work significant. The question as to how (and 
why) certain works remain aesthetically challenging, even anachronistically, is of 
fundamental importance to this thesis’ exploration of a possible concept of the 
“theatre of death”. 
 
As shall be seen in part three of the thesis, Kantor’s art was constantly engaged in 
polemical confrontations with ways of making sense of the Polish context prior to 
1990; for instance, denouncing a “pseudo-avant-garde” in the visual arts – including 
theatre making – from the late 1960s on.11 That his work may be thought to 
“transcend” this former East European context typically means today that it can be 
assimilated into a “universal” art-theatre history that simply glosses its own historical 
particularity. Whilst a critical sense of the “end of the avant-garde” has been well 
established since the 1960s – not least in the appeal of and to a “neo-avant-garde”, 
which has since been subsumed within a generalised promotion of “post-modernism”, 
                                                
10 Zygmunt Bauman, Culture in a Liquid Modern World, trans. Lydia Bauman, Cambridge: 
Polity, 2011, p.15. This echoes the familiar Kantian sense of art as exemplary in its freedom 
from “values” other than its own, as essentially imaginative [pace Jacques Derrida’s close 
reading of sections in the third Critique, for example, in “Economimesis”, trans. Richard 
Klein, in Diacritics, June 1981]. It can also be compared with the mordant reflection of 
Martin Simecka, who Marci Shore quotes, commenting that: “In 1989 East Europeans had 
hoped that they would have something to teach, to give to Western Europe; they cherished the 
conviction that the experience of suffering had made them more sensitive, more inquisitive, 
more intellectual. ‘Today,’ Martin said, ‘that hope looks pathetic.’” [Shore, op. cit., p.349.] 
11 Besides the already cited Belting, Hobsbawm, and Bauman, reference concerning the “end 
of the avant-garde” will be made to essays by (for example) Peter Bürger, Donald Kuspit, 
Yves-Alain Bois, and Martin Puchner.  
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as the abandonment of any specifically aesthetic truth value in art – a sense of the 
avant-garde beyond the Iron Curtain (at least, here, in the example of Poland) must be 
recalled before Kantor’s particular position may be addressed historically, and 
therefore theoretically, “today” (in English).12  
 
In so far as the understanding of this thesis is itself historically limited by the 
particularity of translation(s) – when and why do certain materials get published in 
translation (as a question of what constitutes a field of knowledge)?13 – it nonetheless 
attempts to address “period” questions of aesthetic truth, as these themselves put into 
question such limitations of understanding through translation(s). How concepts of 
historical research inform those of aesthetics (and of the archives in which the work of 
art, including theatre, is remembered) is one of the key concerns of this thesis – not 
least, as this is already in question for Kantor himself, in the relation between the 
concepts of “the theatre of death” and of a “living archive” (which will be addressed 
in part three).  
 
The second of Kantor’s observations (cited in the epigraph above) addresses the 
conditions of and for theatre making (or research) as that of an ensemble – the Cricot 
2 – where claims of authorial uniqueness do not so much provide a means of 
explanation as stand in need of explanation themselves. Despite the referencing of 
named sources, the authorial subject in this thesis is “artistic-conceptual” rather than 
simply biographical. This thesis is concerned with the meanings implied – or 
generated – by a concept of the theatre of death, rather than with any author who may 
                                                
12 As simply one example, we might note the complex history of Fluxus East, cf. Fluxus East, 
exhibition catalogue, Berlin: Künstlerhaus Bethanien, 2007. It is conspicuous that “beyond” 
and “behind” in referring to the cultural space defined by the Iron Curtain in English are 
themselves predicated on the point of view of the former West.  
13 The paradox of English as the contemporary “lingua franca” is recognised by – for example 
– many Polish galleries and museums in their catalogue publications, as well as the work of 
the Mickiewicz Institute actively promoting literary translations since the accession of Poland 
to the EU. Crucially, however, this activity is little reciprocated by Anglophone monograph 
publishers; but, just as crucially, this concern with international “accessibility” was already 
characteristic from the late 1960s for some Polish galleries. Many of the artists’ manifestos 
and critical texts that will be referred to here were originally published, alongside their Polish 
editions, in both English and French versions also.   
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be thought to have “originally” produced such meanings.14 While the concept of the 
theatre of death is an abstraction from the research that informs it, it is not (pace the 
third of Kantor’s observations) to be understood in the abstract but contextually, 
where the conceptual is understood historically; not least, as this raises a question of 
aesthetic truth concerning the modernism to which it testifies.  
 
In the case of Kantor this question of truth – both of and for modernism, and thus of 
and for an understanding of its afterwards that is not simply “post”-modern – refers to 
an understanding of the avant-garde which is not defined by the “tacit assumptions of 
modernist artistic geography” (as Piotrowski identifies these in the October group’s 
canon, for instance15). While this “geography” has – still – to be considered in relation 
to the Cold War (“in the shadow of Yalta”, as Piotrowski discusses it), this historical 
refraction (pace Kozlowski) must itself be theorised, rather than accepted as a given 
condition of and for such historicisation. Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, observes:  
 
On the old Continent, to some extent following the American trend, which 
now inclined to associate modernism with ‘Western values’, abstraction (‘non-
figurative art’) in the visual arts and modernism in architecture became part, 
sometimes the dominant part, of the established cultural scene, even reviving 
in countries like Britain, where it had seemed to stagnate. Yet from the end of 
the 1960s a marked reaction against it became increasingly manifest and, in 
the 1980s, fashionable under such labels as ‘postmodernism’. It was not so 
much a ‘movement’ as a denial of any pre-established criteria of judgement 
and value in the arts, or indeed of the possibility of such judgments.16 
 
As noted before, this is not a question of simply reversing perspectives, but of 
considering how the former East and former West are inscribed in the historical 
reception of artistic work, including “theatre”; that is, as a question of and for a 
                                                
14 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?”, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald Bouchard, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1986.  
15 Piotr Piotrowski, “The Spatial Turn”, in Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, 
trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion Books, 2012. (Piotrowski’s critique of the Western-
oriented “vertical” history of modernist art addresses the October group’s monumental Art 
Since 1900, amongst other examples, pp.25-26.) 
16 Hobsbawm, op. cit., pp.515-16. 
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contemporary understanding, both then and now. It is a moot point, after all, how far 
the situation in Anglophone arts research (at least in theatre) has changed – despite 
the increasing availability of work in translation – since Krzysztof Wodiczko could 
observe (in 1986) that: “Poland is marginalised less by lack of information about art 
in the West than by the lack of information about art in Poland available in the 
West.”17  
 
The question of “information” here is not simply one of its availability, but of 
understanding what such information may already be thought to be. The significance 
of availability (or its lack) itself informs an understanding of what is (or may be) in 
question as, precisely, “information”. This thesis, written in English, attempts to 
outline how both the concept and context of the theatre of death may be construed, 
both historically and theoretically, as a question (in part) of reading such material as is 
indeed available in translation. Although, for pragmatic reasons, the thesis offers only 
limited comparative analysis with other European theatre artists, it attests to the 
possibility of an Anglophone construction of a concept that – even in its specific 
reference to Kantor – is not, however, defined in, or by, those of its sources that were 
written in Polish.  
 
At a fundamental level – concerning such “information” – there is the example, 
within those Polish sources, of a profound sense of dialogue between artist and 
theorist; for example, as conceptual art informed the sense of an avant-garde in the 
1960s and 1970s. Rather than Anglophone academic theatre scholars (such as Herbert 
Blau, Marvin Carlson, Joseph Roach, and Alice Raynor), this thesis draws on the 
work of such art theorists as Wieslaw Borowski, Andrzej Turowski, Artur Sandauer, 
and Jerzy Ludwinski – who not only commented on art but were “at the same time... 
locating theories as if within [art’s] enclave...” As Andrzej Kostolowski, himself a 
participant in this history, continues:  
 
In this connection, besides the activities of the critics-cum-organisers of the 
Foksal and Mona Lisa galleries [in Warsaw and Wroclaw, respectively], 
mention is due to a practice that developed from the late 1960s which 
                                                
17 Krzysztof Wodizcko, quoted in Martin Patrick, op cit., p.45.  
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consisted in the publication – after the pattern of catalogues – of limited 
editions of theoretical brochures..., performative lectures..., and art theoretical 
declarations.18  
 
This sense of theoretical production informing artistic presentation (and vice versa) 
also characterises “avant-garde” theatre in Poland at this time, with such 
collaborations as those of Grotowski with Ludwik Flaszen, and of Kantor with both 
Mieczyslaw Porebski in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and with Wieslaw Borowski 
from the mid-1960s on.19  
 
It is perhaps worthwhile to quote here, at due length, Kostolowski’s discussion of this 
phenomenon, as he evokes many aspects of what was at stake in the question of 
“information” concerning the period addressed in this thesis, which provides a context 
for considering later the theatre of death in the specific example of Kantor’s work (as 
a return, for instance, during the 1970s, to “the closed work” of art). 
 
Beginning in 1964, within this multifunctional system, almost unprecedented 
in other countries, developed radical ‘independent’ galleries of the first 
generation, run by artists and critics. (Those operating later in the 1970s are 
classified as the second generation; these, rather than the earlier ones, were 
called ‘authorial’.) The undertakings discussed were totally or almost totally 
non-commercial. Though bureaucrats were on the alert for any ‘abuse’ of 
liberties there, they were the genuine micro-worlds of those years to use Piotr 
Piotrowski’s term. They mainly deserve the credit not just for the cultivation 
of imagination but for what may be called silent though ceaseless struggle 
against the checking of imagination. Perhaps one of the reasons why this art 
grew more radical was that those concerned exerted themselves to clear a 
                                                
18 Andrzej Kostolowski, “Polish Conceptual Inventions”, trans. Joanna Holzman, in 
Experience of Discourse: 1965-1975. Conceptual Reflection in Polish Art, Pawel Polit and 
Piotr Wozniakiewicz (eds.), Warsaw: Centre for Contemporary Art, 2000, p.202.  
19 It is worth noting that Artur Sandauer was a member of the Krakow Group of artists; and 
mention should also be made of the so-called “Krakow school of criticism” that developed 
under the aegis of Kazimierz Wyka at the Jagellonian University, which included Ludwik 
Flaszen, Jan Blonski, and Konstanty Puzyna, all of whom will be referred to here; cf. 
“Returning to the Garden of Childhood: Krystian Lupa in conversation with Jean-Pierre 
Thibaudet and Béatrice Picon-Vallin,” trans. Jancis Clarke, et al., in Polish Theatre 
Perspectives 1.1 (2010), n.13, p.284. 
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passage through what offered resistance and acted as a barrier. A peculiar kind 
of ‘poverty’ or stopping at what was the phase of almost pure discourse was a 
good solution in the face of continual shortage of supplies. What in the West 
resulted from satiation and the consumer world’s attitude coming close to 
aggression, was almost practically motivated in Poland.20  
 
While Kantor’s relation to the development of conceptualism in Poland is complex 
(including associated work in the emergent field of what would be called by the mid-
70s “performance art”21), Kostolowski’s account serves to recall a context that was 
not “always already” that of a former Western academic reception (starting with the 
CNRS in Paris and the major studies of Kantor’s theatre commissioned by Denis 
Bablet22).  
 
It should be added that the galleries and related symposia and workshops were 
financed from state funds (there being no other sources) within the framework 
of activities of houses of culture, clubs, artist and student organisations, the 
opposition of which was to some extent the effect of pressures exerted by 
artists and critics. They simply had to be there, as necessary as safety valves or 
thermostats. All-embracing totalitarianism, like that in the USSR, was not 
possible in Poland. There was too much individualism here. Besides, members 
of the intelligentsia had developed too much liking for coffee, shaded tables at 
cafes, cabarets and galleries for the authorities to deprive them of the last 
meeting-places where they felt at home. Such were the caves of 
                                                
20 Andrzej Kostolowski, “Polish Conceptual Inventions”, trans. Joanna Holzman, in 
Experience of Discourse: 1965-1975. Conceptual Reflection in Polish Art, Pawel Polit and 
Piotr Wozniakiewicz (eds.), Warsaw: Centre for Contemporary Art, 2000, p.202. 
21 The institutional appearance of the word “performance” in Poland (it not being a term, in 
this sense, in Polish) in a gallery context in 1978 – and subsequently as the title of a book by 
Grzegorz Dziamski in 1984 – is discussed by Lukasz Guzek in his essay, “Above Art and 
Politics – Performance Art and Poland”, in Richard Martel (ed.), Art Action: 1958-1998, 
Quebec: Les Éditions Intervention, 2001, pp.254-6. 
22 As Elie Konigson notes, introducing the re-edition of the second of the CNRS volumes 
dedicated to Kantor edited by Bablet: “Kantor’s celebrity in the West owes a great deal, if not 
all, to the tireless work of presentation and analysis which Denis Bablet devoted to him” 
(Konigson, “Avant-propos”, in “Tadeusz Kantor 2”, Les Voies de la Création Théâtrale 18, 
Paris: CNRS, 2005 [1993], p.7). Also, “Tadeusz Kantor 1”, Les Voies de la Création 
Théâtrale 11, Paris: CNRS, 2005 [1983]. 
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conceptualism. After Piotrowski, we may see them in terms of a ‘silent 
discourse’, a ‘form of resistance against the system’...23  
 
Kantor himself played a very particular role in this post-war Polish artistic context, 
using the “privilege” of his many contacts with, and visits to, the (former) West to 
promulgate his own sense of avant-garde aesthetic “developments”, such as informel 
in the 1950s, or Happenings in the 1960s.24 It is in terms of these dialogues that the 
specificity of the Cricot 2 for thinking through theatre history takes on renewed 
meaning today – in comparison, for example, to the Grotowski legacy. Rather than 
being simply assimilated into the canon of international festival theatre presentations 
(which has, typically, informed Anglophone reception of such artists’ work), the aim 
here is to acknowledge the limitations of an Anglophone analysis without that 
acknowledgment limiting the sense of conceptual or theoretical dialogue – upon 
which Kantor himself insisted so resolutely – in addressing questions of theatre 
aesthetics. After all, the question of “resistance against the system” – against the 
“professional” pressures that limit the imagination with respect to the 
conceptualisation of theatre practice – is of no less significance in the present century 
than the past one.  
 
While Kantor is not the author of the concept of “the theatre of death” (in the terms of 
the present thesis), this specific title is nonetheless the name of a manifesto written by 
him and initially published – to accompany the Cricot 2 production of that year, The 
Dead Class – by the Foksal Gallery, Warsaw, including an English translation by 
Piotr Graff, in November 1975. The production premiered on the 15th November at 
the Krzysztofory Gallery, Krakow, a date which is significant for also being the 
anniversary of the inaugural meeting, in 1956, of the Krakow Group Artists 
Association – the organisation under whose aegis the Cricot 2 worked, at its “home” 
in the Krzysztofory.25 Subsequent English translations of Kantor’s manifesto have 
                                                
23 Andrzej Kostolowski, “Polish Conceptual Inventions”, trans. Joanna Holzman, in 
Experience of Discourse: 1965-1975. Conceptual Reflection in Polish Art, Pawel Polit and 
Piotr Wozniakiewicz (eds.), Warsaw: Centre for Contemporary Art, 2000, p.202. 
24 This aspect of Kantor’s “influence” is discussed by, for example, Piotrowski in his history, 
In the Shadow of Yalta, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion Books, 2005.  
25 The Krakow Group was formally registered the following year, May 13th, 1957 (Grupa 
Krakowska, exhibition catalogue, with an essay “Avant-garde tradition and Traditional 
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been published by (former) Western academic institutions, indicating a migration of 
the Anglophone critical reception of the related performance work from galleries to 
universities, even during its own life time – a migration that accompanied the 
concomitant international embrace of the Cricot 2 by established theatre spaces also.26  
 
The Dead Class (in three different versions) toured the world up until Kantor’s death 
in 1990, and it was even performed “posthumously” during 1991-92, alongside Cricot 
2 performances of the “last rehearsal” of Today is my Birthday, the production on 
which the company was working at the time of Kantor’s death.27 The relation between 
the terms “theatre” and “death” – especially where the meaning of performance is 
marked, in its very concept, by the mortality of an artist; where it is not simply a 
question of a play that can be “put on” through the reproductive practices of 
professional theatre – concerns the very possibility of theatre studies, addressing the 
after life of performance as both the material of a “theatre without theatre”28 and, 
indeed, the very concept of its study. The theatre of death names not only an object of 
research, therefore, but also the very possibility of that research – in the migration of 
                                                                                                                                      
Avant-garde” by Hanna Wroblewska, trans. Pawel Skalinski, Warsaw: Zacheta Gallery, 1996, 
p.21). 
26 The Polish text of the manifesto is reprinted as part of the Foksal Gallery archives 
[Malgorzata Jurkiewicz, Joanna Mytkowska, & Andrzej Przywara (eds.), Tadeusz Kantor in 
the Foksal Gallery Archive, Warsaw: Foksal Gallery, 1998, pp.302-311], and was republished 
in 1979 [ibid., pp.338-39]. The manifesto was subsequently published, in a new English 
translation by Vog and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in Canadian Theatre Review, 16 (Fall 1977), 
which was reprinted in Twentieth Century Polish Theatre, ed. Bohdan Drozdowski, London: 
John Calder, 1979; and then again in A Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Another translation was subsequently made 
by Michal Kobialka and published in his book Further On, Nothing, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2009.  
27 See the chronology of Cricot 2 performances, in Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead 
Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.304. 
Films of each of these three versions were made, respectively, by Andrzej Wajda, Denis 
Bablet, and Nat Lilenstein (cf. “Returning to the Garden of Childhood: Krystian Lupa in 
conversation with Jean-Pierre Thibaudet and Béatrice Picon-Vallin,” trans. Jancis Clarke, et 
al., in Polish Theatre Perspectives 1.1 (2010), n.24, p.291).  
28 This is the title of an exhibition held in Barcelona and Lisbon [Manuel Borja-Villel, et al., 
A Theatre Without Theatre, Barcelona: MACBA, 2007], which can be compared with a long 
history of similar exhibitions within the visual arts, to cite simply Paul Schimmel’s Out of 
Actions [London: Thames and Hudson, 1998] and Harald Szeemann’s When Attitudes become 
Form [Christian Rattemeyer, et al., Exhibiting the New Art, London: Afterall Books, 2010], 
as “primary documents” of a seemingly continually forgotten curatorial history within 
institutional cultural memory. Another recent example would be Explosion! Painting as 
Action, curated by Magnus af Petersens, at the Moderna Museets, Stockholm [London: 
Moderna Museets and Koenig Books, 2012]. 
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an idea from the avant-garde to the academic, already associated in Kantor’s own life 
time with that of an archive. The general sense of this constellation will be addressed 
in parts one and two of this thesis, and its specific “example” in part three.  
 
Analogy and aporia 
The very title of this dissertation – The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – 
itself offers a summary of its thesis, with the suggestion that something called 
(historically) “the theatre of death” may be understood in relation to something else 
called (theoretically) “the uncanny in mimesis”.29 Rather than simply a statement (in 
which one term “explains” the other) – as if, for instance, to answer the question 
“what is ‘the theatre of death?’” – this relation of terms (marked by the colon, which 
both joins and separates them) suggests rather a twofold analogy: as theatre is to the 
uncanny, so death is to mimesis; and (or) as theatre is to mimesis, so death is to the 
uncanny. With this heuristic analogy, both parts of the thesis title are to be considered 
equally historical and theoretical – where the concept of theatre is as much theoretical 
as that of mimesis is historical, and where both are addressed by an uncanny question 
“of death”.  
 
Both parts of the analogy make their own demands upon understanding and should no 
more be condensed into a metaphor (as if each term could be substituted, in 
“explanation”, for the other) than into a statement (concerning what either term “is” 
or means). Indeed, developing a conceptual understanding of “the theatre of death” –
as proposed by this thesis – would distinguish this evocative title from the numerous 
metaphorical uses to which it may be put, as though its meaning were already 
understood (examples of which will be given in a later section of this Introduction 
[Metaphor]). To qualify this analogy as heuristic might, however, seem to suggest 
that it is simply literary; a ruse, perhaps, to evade the modernist injunction that “thou 
shalt not regress” from the rational thought of distinctions into an irrational belief in 
affinities30 – as between animate and inanimate, visible and invisible, reality and 
fiction, being and appearance; or, indeed, between the living and the dead.  
                                                
29 The structure of the thesis in three parts already complicates this, forestalling the lure of the 
mimetic in theory (through which, nonetheless, the historical example of Kantor’s “theatre of 
death” is to be addressed). 
30 Isabelle Stengers, “Reclaiming Animism”, in Animism: Modernity Through the Looking 
Glass, ed. Anselm Franke and Sabine Folie, Vienna: Generali Foundation, 2011, p.183. Horst 
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There is, after all, an aporia in addressing “the dead”, whose mode of existence is, 
apparently, non-existence; who are not discernibly subject to Cartesian co-ordination 
in space and time (even theatrically), in contrast – again, apparently – to either actors 
or audiences. Despite the ubiquitous scholarly attribution of the qualities of persons to 
fictions (in the interpretation of characters) in the modern or disenchanted world – 
often, even, in the name of (literary or dramatic) ghosts – it is supposed to be known 
that the dead don’t exist; indeed, that they live on (or survive) only in superstition. In 
a sense, this thesis (concerning the art of theatre) is part of an archaeology of such a 
“knowledge”; one that jealously commands not only its adherents, but universally 
aims to define in advance “our capacity to affect and be affected – that is to feel, 
think, and imagine”31 with respect to phenomena that give form (or mediation) to 
consciousness (in and of its environment). 
 
Although the title of this thesis refers to Kantor’s manifesto (which gives its name to a 
specific development within his own theatrical research), it is neither original, nor 
exclusive, to this one example. The title phrase has been used by various researchers 
in different fields, but as part of a widespread metaphorical use of the term “theatre” 
(not least in anthropology). The aim of this thesis is, then, to offer a practice- or 
medium-specific concept – of theatre – of which Kantor can be understood 
comparatively to offer an instance, but of which he is no more the author than any one 
of the other artists whose work would also support such a conceptual understanding of 
this theatrical art “of death”. As will be discussed in chapter one, this concept of 
                                                                                                                                      
Bredekamp, for instance, notes the “foreseeable rejection” in some circles of his work 
Theorie des Bildakts (Picture Act Theory) [Berlin: 2010] in these terms: “The... aim of 
acknowledging an actively engaging force in form was programmed to be accused of 
animism long in advance of the publication” (Bredekamp, “Horizons of Picture Act and 
Embodiment”, in Horst Bredekamp, Marion Lauschke, and Alex Artega (eds.), Bodies in 
Action and Symbolic Forms, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, p.xix). The whole project of the 
College for the Study of Picture Act and Embodiment would be of particular significance for 
this thesis, where Bredekamp proposes that, following “the aims of the KBW 
[Kunstwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg]”, the College is: “interested in a reformulation 
of the theory of expression in the sense of an all-encompassing event in which mimics and 
body movement are not opposed to the conceptual but are considered as its prerequisite. In 
the concept of the pathos formula this conviction has to date found its most prominent 
formulation” (ibid., p.xvii). This could also be related to one of Bruno Latour’s major current 
projects, investigating an “anthropology of the moderns”, called An Inquiry into Modes of 
Existence [www.bruno-latour.fr/node/468]. 
31 Stengers, op. cit., p.192.  
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theatre includes amongst its many precedents Edward Gordon Craig, who makes of 
the “ghosts in Shakespeare” the very measure of such an art (as also for thinking 
through the modern culture of superstition), when he reflects ironically, at the 
beginning of the electrical age:  
 
Good heavens! Is the idea of a ghost, is the idea of a spirit, so strange? Why, 
then the whole of Shakespeare is strange and unnatural, and we should hastily 
burn most of his works, for we want nothing which can be called strange and 
unnatural in the twentieth century.32  
 
While the reading of Kantor’s manifesto, of course, informs the thesis (in both its 
analogy and aporia), the conceptual question concerns, rather, how this manifesto 
itself becomes readable; as an instance, not the instance, of a concept, to which, 
nonetheless, it gives a name. No such general concept appears, for example, in any of 
the standard dictionaries or encyclopaedias of theatre studies (a lacuna which this 
thesis aims to rectify); nor does it appear as a particular concept in any of the standard 
monographs about Kantor that are available in English (with the partial exception of 
Krzysztof Plesniarowicz’s The Dead Memory Machine) – in which, typically, 
Kantor’s theatre is theorised about, rather than addressed in terms of his own 
theorisation(s).33  
 
The separation of (aesthetic) practice and (philosophical) theory (as if between matter 
and form, appearance and truth) also produces various impasses or aporia itself in the 
study of theatre (which will be addressed in the first two parts of this thesis). “The 
theatre of death”, therefore, refers both to the object of, and the methodological 
conditions for, its own “artistic-conceptual” research. Suffice it for the moment to 
refer here to Kantor’s own declaration, in an interview at the Documenta 8 theatre 
festival:  
 
                                                
32 Edward Gordon Craig, “On the Ghosts in the Tragedies of Shakespeare” (1908), in Craig 
on Theatre, ed. Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, p.176. 
33 As, for example, Marvin Carlson, Theories of the Theatre, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993; David Krasner (ed.), Theatre in Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008; Reinelt and Roach 
(eds.), Critical Theory and Performance, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. 
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I am also a theoretician and I want to turn my adventure into a theory. My 
adventure must then be a universal adventure. That’s where the crux is. If, for 
instance, I showed only my present adventure it would be exhibitionism. But I 
do not want to be an exhibitionist. I want to turn my adventure into a universal 
problem.34  
 
This attitude resonates with the earlier discussion of a particular Polish legacy of art-
theorising in the 1960s and 1970s. The terms in which Jerzy Ludwinski refers to 
Robert Morris, for instance, in an essay from 1970, might also help us to think about 
Kantor here (without, however, suggesting that he be considered a conceptual artist):  
 
In his articles on art he held a dialogue with himself. Not only objects and 
techniques and activities which until then had not belonged to the category of 
art phenomena were ennobled but also all theoretical texts which from then 
acquired the status of generally accepted forms of artistic expression. 
Especially as regards concept and conceptual art, it is impossible to 
distinguish an artist from an art theoretician for they all in the first place write 
texts.35 
 
Pathos 
Deferring until later specific reflection on the uncanny in mimesis, what “of death” is 
to be understood here in its analogical and aporetic, distinct from metaphorical, 
appeal to – or for – “theatre” (at least, amongst certain twentieth century artists)? 
What does this concept of “theatre” name or identify (at least, for these artists) by 
way “of death” specifically? The following chapters will explore how, for a certain 
minor tradition of modernist theatre practice (such is the claim of this thesis), the 
question of an art of theatre has been formulated in terms “of death” – as the question 
                                                
34 Tadeusz Kantor, “And then I appear myself...”, interview with Marta Allendorf and 
Aleksander Mattmüller (01.07.1987), reprinted in Cricot 2 Information Guide 1987-1988, ed. 
Anna Halczak, Krakow: Cricoteka 1988, p.71. 
35 Jerzy Ludwinski, “Art in the Post-Artistic Age”, trans. Maria Wanat, in Experience of 
Discourse: 1965-1975. Conceptual Reflection in Polish Art, eds. Pawel Polit and Piotr 
Wozniakiewicz, Warsaw: Centre for Contemporary Art, 2000, p.233. 
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of a mimetic medium that is distinct from the literary (or dramatic) arts with which 
both it and its study have been (typically) identified.36  
 
The concern with what would define theatre specifically as an art practice turns upon 
what its particular medium might be (if, indeed, it has one), as this emerges from an 
earlier sense (with Wagner, for instance) of a “total art” form, offering a synthesis of 
all the arts (literary, visual, plastic, aural, temporal) beyond the (classical) dualities of 
relations between word and image, poetry and action, or even space and time.37 
Paradoxically, as the notion of medium-specificity in modern art gave way to 
conceptualism on the one hand (where the idea, rather than the medium, is the vehicle 
of the art work); and to various forms of “expanded” art practices on the other (in 
sculpture and film, for example) – or even, more generally, to concern with “other 
criteria” than medium within aesthetics (pace Leo Steinberg) – the minor tradition of 
an art of the “theatre of death” retains a seemingly anachronistic interest with its own 
medium as theatre (and with the question of its aesthetic truth), where the sense of 
                                                
36 The question of mimesis here refers not to such a classic of European cultural history as 
Erich Auerbach’s study, Mimesis, trans. Willard Trask, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974 [the text was written in Istanbul, 1942-45, and first published in its original German in 
Berne, 1946]; but, rather, its precise contemporary, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming, London: Verso, 1986 [written in Los 
Angeles, 1944, and published in its original German in Amsterdam, 1947]. In offering 
testimony to the historical conditions of (and for) cultural knowledge in (and of) the twentieth 
century, both these key texts are part of the very history that they analyse.  
37 The “total work of art” has, arguably, been reformulated many times (recently as 
“intermedial art” [cf. Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt (eds.), Intermediality in Theatre 
and Performance, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006]). The semiotic organisation of the senses of 
sound (including, but not defined by, the particular semiotics of speech), vision, and 
movement (though rarely smell or touch), were adumbrated again by Craig as the art(s) of 
theatre in 1905, calling for their synthetic unity (rather than the paratactic “unity in plurality” 
that Kantor inherits from Witkacy). One “sense” that is typically overlooked in this semiotics 
(variously understood as “avant-garde”, “intermedial”, or “post-dramatic”) is that of the 
emotions, which will be addressed here (following Didi-Huberman) through Warburg’s 
concept of pathos formulae (as distinct from psychological identification through verbal 
images expressed in written dialogue or “drama” necessarily). This gestural “repertoire” in 
cultural memory refers to modernist appropriations of popular theatre – circus and variety (to 
cite only Meyerhold, Marinetti, Moholy-Nagy, and Beckett) – rather than Classical or 
Romantic literary poetics [cf. Meyerhold, “The Fairground Booth”, in Meyerhold on Theatre, 
trans. and ed. Edward Braun, London: Methuen, 1991; Marinetti, “Variety Theatre 
manifesto”, trans. Victoria Kirby, in Futurist Performance, ed. Michael Kirby, New York: 
PAJ Publications, 1986; and Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, “Theatre, Circus, Variety”, trans. Arthur 
Wensinger, in The Theatre of the Bauhaus, eds. Walter Gropius and Arthur Wensinger, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996; Kate Womersley, “The twice-nightly 
routine: Samuel Beckett’s funny turns”, in TLS, 04.01.13, pp.14-15].  
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event, as it comes to characterise other aesthetic developments, is already inscribed in 
its very possibility as an art.  
 
Notions of appearance (as of medium) in the theatre of death are thought through the 
presence – before an audience – of an “actor” (as its aesthetic vehicle, distinct from 
the interpretation of a “character”), in a relation that is thought to figure (by analogy) 
that between the living and the dead. Paradoxically, in this theatre, as an art “of 
death”, the relation between the living and the dead offers a “model” for that between 
the audience and the actor, as also the invisible for the visible. Here anthropological 
and aesthetic research into the “self”-understanding of modernity, not least in 
reductive accounts of these fundamental relations, including also between theatre and 
theory, finds common ground in what will be called (after Agamben) the “paradigm” 
of the actor within this concept of theatre specifically.38 
 
This paradigm of human appearance is understood, in the modernist instance of an art 
of theatre, as being that of “an actor” (as persona or imago), offering a figure of and 
for an apprehension of what is visible (or rather, perhaps, memorable) within a 
cultural (and affective) “schema” of human being, in (and as) its appearance 
theatrically.39 The evidence or trace of this schema we might identify with what 
Warburg called pathos formulae – where the particular mimetic pathos here is that of 
the uncanny, and the art of its formulae is that of theatre. The heuristic analogy of the 
thesis title is, therefore, informed by a sense of what Warburg suggestively called the 
“historical concept of a psychology of culture”,40 as this characterises research about, 
as much as within, the historical period under review here: modernism – and where 
                                                
38 Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Paradigm?” in The Signature of All Things: On Method, 
trans. Luca D’Isanto and Kevin Attell, New York: Zone Books, 2009. The notion of paradigm 
here draws from the work of Victor Goldschmidt (reading Plato), as itself drawn upon by 
Foucault, whose work is then drawn upon by Agamben. The appeal to anthropology here is 
distinct from that within Performance Studies, as the latter eschews any question of aesthetic 
truth in theatre (which provides the key for the artists considered here).  
39 The relation of this to mnemotechnics and the present of a future “after” modernism, 
discussed by Heidegger and Stiegler in relation to Kant, will be discussed in chapter five. 
40 This formulation (which is the principal subject of Warburg’s “Introduction” to the 
proposed Bilderatlas Mnemosyne publication, identifying what he calls “engrams of affective 
experience” [Warburg, “The Absorption of the Expressive Values of the Past”, trans. 
Matthew Rampley, in Art in Translation, 2.1, 2009, p.278]) occurs in various texts by 
Warburg. Here it is cited from Aby Warburg, “Letter to the Directors of the Bellevue Clinic, 
12th April 1924”, in Ludwig Binswanger & Aby Warburg, La guérison infinie, ed. Davide 
Stimilli, Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2011, p.189.  
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this challenges the “knowledge” of, for example, animism as “merely” superstition, 
distinct from the aporetic. 
 
The “psychological” in this instance refers to a basic question of emotion, pathos, or 
animation (or of what Kantor calls, after Witkiewicz, a “metaphysical feeling”, and 
what this thesis calls “the uncanny in mimesis”), as these may be conceived of 
historically in terms of pathos formulae. As is discussed in part one of this thesis, this 
notion of “cultural psychology” is in complex dialogue with modern notions of 
individual psychology, evident for example in reference to superstition, where the 
understanding of mimesis has been reduced by (and to) oppositions between the 
rational and the irrational, the modern and the primitive. These oppositions even 
characterise a pre- and post-Platonic orientation towards categories of experience (as 
of mimesis), and thus a “modernity” that remains in important respects 
(paradoxically) that of antiquity.41 The question of the “psychological” in cultural 
history may also be related to the political, in terms of “symptomatic” instances of 
gesture in staging the relation between past and future (as repressive, depressive, or 
expressive), where the presence of the dead would unsettle present claims for 
legitimacy in the use of power.  
 
For Warburg, this cultural concept of psychology concerns not so much the “bi-
polarity” of individuals (with which the term has become more or less identified), as 
that of a collective memory – the potential for research into which is represented by 
his library (the Kunstwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg [KBW], now the 
Warburg Institute Library), as what might be called a “living archive”. The library is 
                                                
41 For an overview commentary on Warburg’s contribution to thinking of “culture” (as an 
object of study), we may simply cite (from amongst many other sources) Edgar Wind’s essay 
“Aby Warburg’s Concept of Kulturwissenschaft and its Meaning for Aesthetics”, and his 
review article “On a recent Biography of Warburg” (both reprinted in The Eloquence of 
Symbols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Margaret Iversen’s review of Wind’s essay in The 
Oxford Art Journal, 7.1, 1984, pp.60-62; Carlo Ginzburg’s essay “From Aby Warburg to E.H. 
Gombrich: a Problem of Method” (in Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. John 
and Anne Tedeschi, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992); Michael Diers, 
Thomas Girst, and Dorothea von Moltke, “Warburg and the Warburgian Tradition of Cultural 
History”, in New German Critique, n.65, Spring-Summer 1995, pp.59-73; and Spyros 
Papapetros, “The Eternal Seesaw: Oscillations in Warburg’s Revival”, in The Oxford Art 
Journal, 26.2, 2003, pp.169-176. Warburg’s thought is also the concern of many essays and 
books by Georges Didi-Huberman. 
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itself a cultural artefact, “providing both material and a framework of thought”42 for 
an investigation into the mimetic expression and histories (or, indeed, anthropologies) 
of the image, as itself an artefact of human consciousness (or of what Bernard Stiegler 
calls epiphylogenesis). It construes a cultural space of and for research and reflection 
(what Carlo Ginzburg has called “an engine to think with, to think about”43) 
concerning the appearance of human being(s), distinct from dividing the disciplines of 
art history and ethnography. Warburg himself “envisage[d] as a description of the 
aims of [his] library the formulation: a collection of documents relating to the 
psychology of human expression.” In a space where “primitive” thought (associative 
and animist) and “modern” thought (rational and detached) communicate, Warburg 
understood his library as a means to research such fundamental questions as: “How 
did human and pictorial expressions originate; what are the feelings or the points of 
view, conscious or unconscious, under which they are stored in the archives of 
memory? Are there laws to govern their formation or re-emergence?”44 Indeed, Edgar 
Wind (a former director of the KBW) evokes the library’s project in the name of its 
titular muse:  
 
The word Mnemosyne, which Warburg had inscribed above the entrance to his 
research institute, is to be understood in this double sense: as a reminder to the 
scholar that in interpreting the works of the past he is acting as trustee of a 
repository of human experience, but at the same time as a reminder that this 
experience is itself an object of research, that it requires us to use historical 
material to investigate the way in which ‘social memory’ functions.45 
                                                
42 Edgar Wind, “Aby Warburg’s Concept of Kulturwissenschaft and its Meaning for 
Aesthetics”, in The Eloquence of Symbols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p.21. 
43 Carlo Ginzburg, “Une Machine à Penser”, in Common Knowledge, 18.1, 2012, p.79. This 
entire issue of Common Knowledge, edited by Anthony Grafton and Jeffrey Hamburger, is 
devoted to “Warburg’s Library and its Legacy”, within the context of the present threats to 
cultural research in the name (paradoxically) of “performance”, where this term is used in the 
reified sense of the financial “costs” of research as knowledge “production”. This strange 
reversion to the “fetishism” that Warburg and his own anthropological sources (which also 
informed Marx) did so much to address critically is one of the tragic aspects of what is at 
stake in the question of what comes “after modernism” today and what might constitute any 
possible resistance to it. (See, for example, Christopher Wood’s contribution – “Dromenon” – 
to the Common Knowledge issue, op. cit., pp.106-116.)  
44 Aby Warburg, quoted by Adi Efal, in “Warburg’s ‘Pathos Formula’ in Psychoanalytic and 
Benjaminian Contexts”, Assaph, n.5, 2000, p.234.   
45 Edgar Wind, “Aby Warburg’s Concept of Kulturwissenschaft and its Meaning for 
Aesthetics”, in The Eloquence of Symbols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p.26. 
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The notion of pathos formula (translated by David Britt as “emotive formula of 
gesture”46) indicates a kind of proto-type or ready-made of (and for) cultural memory 
(a schema of human attitude, appearance, and gesture; rather than simply mimetic 
narrative or dramatic “action”), as an object of historical – critical – study, distinct 
from kitsch invocations of a universal “soul” or “archetype”.47 The pathos in and of 
forms is distinct from the bathos of spiritual feeling, just as emotion is from 
sentimentality, where the question of aesthetic truth (posed, for Kantor, in both the 
material and metaphysics of “the lowest rank”; and as evidenced in post-war art 
informel) is opposed to the aesthetics of romantic, symbolist, or even naturalistic 
expressivity. Reflecting on the “metaphysical shock” that is the affect connected with 
the essential event of the theatre of death – where “an Actor who assumes the 
condition of a Dead Man stands in front of the audience” – Kantor offers an explicit 
(modernist) caution:  
 
Warning: Let us beware and not place easily our trust in individuals who, 
misusing those metaphysical reasons [the shock of human appearance(s)], 
offer us gloomy and blunt pathos or the pretentious and empty gestures of 
shamans. A feeling of a tightrope dance, irony, sarcasm, and a sense of 
humour are a human aspect of metaphysics. They are also a manifestation of 
human intelligence. This is a positive part of our inheritance from the age of 
Reason…48 
                                                
46 Aby Warburg, “Dürer and Italian Antiquity” (1905) and “The Emergence of the Antique” 
(1914), in The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity, trans. David Britt, Los Angeles: Getty Institute, 
1999, p.553 and p.271 (for example). 
47 Carl Jung, for instance, assimilates Worringer’s aesthetic categories into his own theory of 
psychological types: “Abstraction and empathy, introversion and extroversion, are 
mechanisms of adaptation”; “Worringer’s conception of abstraction therefore corresponds to 
the introverted attitude” (“The Problem of Typical Attitudes in Aesthetics” (1921) in 
Psychological Types, trans. H.G. Baynes and R.F.C. Hull, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1977, p.297 and p.292). Jung’s (neo-Schillerian) categories of introvert and extrovert artistic 
types are further developed by Marie-Louise von Franz, proposing a whole new (twentieth 
century) metaphysics, characteristic of “the age of Aquarius”. In Walter Benjamin’s trenchant 
criticism of this trend: “Thus, the esoteric theory of art comes down to making archetypes 
‘accessible’ to the ‘Zeitgeist’” (The Arcades Project (N8,2), trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, p.472). 
48 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Infamous Transition from the World of the Dead to the World of the 
Living”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.146 & p.147. This warning might be 
thought to address Grotowski, or at least his “many followers who were in the process of 
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Tragedy 
One of the seeming paradoxes of the theatre of death is the relation between an 
ostensibly avant-garde aesthetics and a seemingly pre-modern anthropology, although 
(pace Latour) this might be seen as further evidence that modernity has never been 
quite as modern as it would have “itself” believed. As Kantor, again, observes (for 
instance, in his Little Manifesto):  
 
It is not true that MODERN man has conquered fear. This is a lie! Fear exists. 
There is fear of the external world, of what the future will bring, of death, of 
the unknown, of nothingness, and of emptiness.49 
 
The discussion of “theatre” between aesthetics and anthropology (at least in the 
writings of the artists considered here) opens up a theoretical – and modern – account 
“of death” within the history of mimesis (at least, in its concept); one that is not 
reducible to either of the terms that constitute the various oppositions informing the 
aporia of modernity and, indeed, its own mythology or superstitions.  
 
By addressing, for example, the sense of a “likeness” (a founding concept of Western 
iconology), in its distinction from the fascination of (typically anthropomorphic) 
“idols”; the sense of “animism” (a founding concept of nineteenth century 
anthropology, itself a development of earlier theoretical associations of idols with the 
thought of “fetishism”); and the sense of photography (as this changes the horizon of 
understanding concerning the animate and the inanimate in modern human 
appearance(s), not least in an evolving sense of what has come to be thought of lately 
                                                                                                                                      
forming a kind of sect, with an almost religious life” in the 1970s – as Krystian Lupa recalls 
from his own experience (“Returning to the Garden of Childhood: Krystian Lupa in 
conversation with Jean-Pierre Thibaudet and Béatrice Picon-Vallin,” trans. Jancis Clarke, et 
al., in Polish Theatre Perspectives 1.1 (2010), p.285-7). With respect possibly to Brook also, 
we might note Kantor’s observation about the danger of “end[ing] up watching a perfectly 
boring production” where the pathos of “everyday events becom[ing] symbols” in drama is 
compounded by a directorial “art” (in “Independent Theatre”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in 
Further On, Nothing, ed. Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2009, p.100).  
49 Tadesuz Kantor, “A Little Manifesto”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey Through Other 
Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.250. 
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as “live” in performance), the uncanny in mimesis offers a theoretical account of “the 
dialectic of enlightenment” that is specific to theatre history.  
 
What is the actor thought to offer a likeness “of” (or a resemblance to)? Of what does 
this corporeal – present(ed) – image offer a likeness? In what sense is the art of the 
stage – in the figure of the actor – “life-like”? Of what kind of “human” appearance is 
the actor a double? Typically, the actor is thought of in terms of a fiction, rather than a 
“presence” (or, indeed, a reality) belonging to the appearance of the human image, or 
figure, itself (with its potential “charisma”). In the theatre of death, the actor is 
thought of in terms of a “look” (as a body, or rather its schema), in an unsettling 
shock, not as revelatory (of the divine) but (of the dead) as uncanny. How, then, might 
the actor be thought of as a cultural artefact – or living effigy – of human appearance? 
What is the double “nature” (aspect or appearance) of the actor on stage, specifically, 
as distinct from his or her being “in (real) life”? How might the image (or paradigm) 
of the “actor” offer a key to understanding a (modern) schema of cultural (or, indeed, 
of emotional) memory (in its pathos formulae)? How does the “theatre of death” 
address the modernist aesthetic aporia of formalism or naturalism, abstraction or 
empathy?  
 
The sense of “emotional memory” (as of “cultural memory”) echoes here with its use, 
for example, by Ludwik Flaszen, in a commentary that would perhaps be read by 
Kantor in the (“pretentious and empty”) terms that he warned against – and yet which 
touch upon profound points of commonality in their thinking of theatre as a practice, 
or an art, of cultural mnemotechnics. While the contrast between Grotowski and 
Kantor (prefigured in that between Limanowski and Witkacy, as also between the 
Reduta and the Cricot companies) is part of the theatre history addressed in part three, 
there remains (even in its ambiguity) much that is resonant in Flaszen’s discussion 
here – not in the implicit allusion to Stanislavsky’s (individual) psychology of 
emotional recall, but with respect to Warburg’s pathos formulae.50 Even with 
                                                
50 The underlying “history of cultural psychology” here would require a reading of both 
Nietzsche and Darwin, concerning the modes of mimetic expression that are, precisely, part 
of what has been called in performance practice “muscle memory”. For Warburg, the issue is 
not the exercise of the muscles, but that of a symbolic bi-valence (or ambivalence) that is the 
measure of a cultural distance achieved from simple mimetic identification (or projection), in 
which the psychical is not reduced to the physical.  
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Grotowski’s organicism (in contrast to Kantor’s formalism), the affective – “restored” 
to the history of (concepts of) mimesis51 – concerns the archive of performance, in its 
“renewals” as cultural memory. Flaszen’s appeal is made in the context of an 
apparently modern absence of such memory (in its modern, “tragic”, impossibility 
even), as if facing a cultural present without a past in theatre (when addressing the 
truth of an encounter between actor and audience):  
 
The 1950s avant-garde proved the inability of traditional tragedy in the 
theatre. Tragedy is possible only when values have transcendental guarantees, 
when they are perceived as having substance. When the gods die, tragedy is 
replaced by the grotesque – the painful grimace of the jester facing the empty 
heavens. The avant-garde’s premises are irrefutable: today, traditional tragedy 
is dry, lofty rhetoric or trivial, sentimental melodrama. But we ask: how to 
attain a tragic dimension in the theatre which is neither a dead, picturesque 
pose, nor tomfoolery? How to achieve the ancient feeling of combined pity 
and horror, that is lost today in our emotional memory?52  
 
Metaphor 
Although reference to “theatre” is perhaps inevitably metaphorical (not to mention 
theoretical, as is discussed in parts one and two of this thesis), some sense of the 
specificity of the aesthetic practice to be addressed here (or, rather, its concept – and, 
therefore, the possibility of a “metaphorical language” specific to it) may be initially 
considered by identifying various counter examples. Given that the concept of the 
“theatre” of death does not refer to the literary canon of Occidental drama – with its 
dramaturgies of enacted or staged “death” (whether tragic or comic) – what kind of 
stage practice might such a concept refer to? What is this theatre “of”, such that it 
might be identified by, or with, “death” – if this does not refer either to the mimesis of 
a staged action with its attendant motives (such as murder and revenge), or to age-old 
metaphors of the “world as a stage” (with human life itself understood in terms of 
comedy or tragedy); or in terms of the “zombie culture” of a capitalist “experience 
                                                
51 The whole question of the “portrayal of the passions” from the ancients through to 
Descartes, Le Brun, Diderot, Darwin, Warburg, et al., is, of course, an underlying issue 
informing the question of the “uncanny” in this thesis. 
52 Ludwik Flaszen, “After the Avant-Garde” (1967), in Grotowski & Company, trans. Andrzej 
Wojtasik and Paul Allain, ed. Paul Allain, Wroclaw: Icarus, 2010, pp.117-8.  
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economy” (which its advocates gloss with such slogans as “work is theatre and every 
business a stage”)?53  
 
Although Kantor, like Craig, apostrophises the figure of death in the history of 
theatre, addressing “her” in the Janus mask of the Western canon (“Tragic Death – 
she would elevate her wretched remnants onto the plane of pathos. Mocking Death – 
she would scorn everything that was mediocre and banal with her clownish 
laughter”54), neither of these roles is what is to be interpreted here. It is not a question 
of putting Death on stage (as in Everyman); but rather a question of both these artists’ 
sense of a “partner... [as] she stood quietly backstage...”, as they theorise the presence 
of death theatrically, in that of the actor, as art. Although Kantor moves between 
personal memories and stage devices in his evocation of encounters with this figure of 
Death, it is as a figure for art in theatre that the resonances with Craig (to be 
discussed in chapter one) become significant. Before considering the curiously 
“medium” specific example of The Dead Class (in the discussion of “séance” in the 
second part of this Introduction), it is worth first reflecting on how wide the field of 
metaphorical enquiry into the relation between “theatre” and “death” can be.55  
 
Might the “theatre of death” refer, for instance, to the anatomy lesson – to its 
“theatre”, precisely, and the “performance” of autopsies? Might it refer to the 
aesthetic display (or sight) of the waxwork tableaux of, for example, Gaetano Zumbo, 
which have indeed been called “little theatres of death”; not to mention the “Body 
Worlds” exhibitions of Gunter Hagens?56 Or might it refer, rather, to theatre made 
                                                
53 This sense of “affective labour” proposed by J. Gilmore and B. Pine II (Experience 
Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage, Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1999) is discussed, for example, by Lars Larsen, in “Zombies of Immaterial Labour: 
the Modern Monster and the Death of Death”, in Are You Working Too Much? Post-Fordism, 
Precarity, and the Labour of Art, Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011.  
54 Tadeusz Kantor, “My Meetings with Death”, trans. Michal Kobialka, quoted in The 
Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, Fall 1985, p.154. (The full text of Kantor’s article 
is translated in Kobialka (ed.), Further On, Nothing, pp.406-410.) 
55 “The World as a Stage” was the title of an exhibition at Tate Modern in 2008, the premise 
of which (despite his being cited by the curators) Kantor would have despaired of. The failure 
of the curators to attend to the work of metaphor means that, rather than being thought 
through each other, art and performance become substitutes for each other (Jessica Morgan, 
“The World as a Stage”, and Catherine Wood, “Art meets Theatre”, in The World as a Stage, 
London: Tate Publishing, 2007). 
56 “Little theatres of death” is the term used by Paolo Giansiracusa in his study of Zumbo, 
cited by Jane Eade in her own essay on these wax figures, entitled “The Theatre of Death”, in 
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with or by the dying themselves, to their appearance on stage – as, for instance in 
Christoph Schlingensief’s so-called “cancer trilogy” (2008-09), a performed 
testimony to his encroaching lung cancer, of which he declared: “I am moulding a 
social sculpture from my illness”?57 Or might it refer to such necromantic 
appearances as that of the deceased Frank Sinatra “at the Palladium” (for a 
posthumous nine month run in 2006)?58 Or might this title refer to a “theatre” – the 
public “performance” or spectacle – of grieving, distinct from the interiorisation of 
grief in private rituals of mourning?59 Might it refer to the spectacle of state funerals, 
to the politics – always out of joint – of a claimed “sovereign” legitimacy transmitted 
(or inherited) through death, where power over the living is claimed in the name of 
the dead?  
 
While the question of political legitimacy is the subject of great tragedies from the 
dramatic canon, it applies also in the example of Soviet war memorials in the former 
Eastern Bloc countries – symbols of both a past sacrifice and a (former) present 
legitimation. This conflation was always problematic, offering testimony to a future 
                                                                                                                                      
Oxford Art Journal, 36.1, 2013, p.115. On Hagens, see (for instance), José van Dijk, 
“Bodyworlds: the Art of Plastinated Cadavers”, in Margaret Lock and Judith Farquhar (eds.), 
Beyond the Body Proper, Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. 
57 Christoph Schlingensief, quoted by Florian Malzacher in “Citizen of the Other Place: A 
Trilogy of Fear and Hope”, trans. Michael Turnbull, in Tara Forrest and Anna Scheer (eds.), 
Christoph Schlingensief: Art Without Borders, Bristol: Intellect, 2010, p.191. (Kantor also 
introduced “text” from his doctors’ reports into his last production Today is my Birthday.)  
58 Described by Michael Billington in The Guardian as “glitzy necrophilia, that uses all the 
resources of technology to summon up the dead” (9.3.2006), David Leveaux’s spectacular 
show reminded another reviewer, Peter Brown, of “watching the kind of automaton one used 
to see at old fairgrounds” (9.3.2006). The production company’s own press release suggested 
that: “The future is bringing the past to life: ground-breaking use of the latest digital film and 
stage technology lets Frank Sinatra duet with live musicians, and sing directly to the 
audience… Frank Sinatra, the man who was arguably the world’s greatest popular entertainer 
is back – larger than life.” (By “larger than life”, of course, is meant “dead”. One might 
wonder whether Billington would ever think of “straight theatre” as an ordinary, non-glitzy 
necrophilia? It is perhaps telling that he reserves such vocabulary for musicals rather than 
mainstream dramatic theatre; as, for example, sharing the “dismay” of his “own reaction” to 
The Bodyguard (06.12.12): “Although the show is staged with enormous technical efficiency, 
it is one more example of the necrophiliac musical morbidly attracted to a cinematic corpse.” 
Perhaps more significant is the emerging question of posthumous on-line “existence” as 
“inherited” by relatives or friends via Google, Facebook, etc. (cf. Charles Arthur, “Go gently 
into digital death”, in The Guardian, 13.04.2013, p.9). 
59 The example of performed emotion has always posed a question of an ethics of mimesis for 
aesthetics. Horace, for instance, remarks (in the first century AD) that: “Just as at a funeral 
the paid mourners are on the whole more active and vocal than those who are really suffering 
deeply, so the mock admirer shows more appreciation than the man who is sincere in his 
praise.” (On the Art of Poetry, trans. T. Dorsch, London: Penguin, 1965, p.94.) 
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past of political illegitimacy, in which the “post”-modern forgetting of the Short 
Twentieth Century was already anticipated. (The sense of the post-war occupation of 
East-Central Europe as being a period simply to be overcome, with no sense of an 
“existing” (or contemporary) alternative to the inevitability of capitalism – including 
its political aesthetic of fascism – seems to have become today not simply historical, 
but “actual” History.60) The national Communist parties, with their ties to a Moscow-
based International (potentially and, often literally, an occupying power), drew claims 
for legitimacy not only from a global conflict with the capitalist (former) West, but 
from an understanding of this conflict as a continuation of the war with, and the 
liberation from, fascism, in place of “founding” national revolutions. How the post-
1989 changes affect an understanding of the cultural memory at work in such theatre 
productions as Kantor’s The Dead Class remains an open question, one which touches 
seemingly on the anachronism (if not “impossibility”, pace Flaszen) of “emotional 
memory” in the so-called “post-modern” context of late capitalism.61 
 
Might “the theatre of death” refer otherwise to military action, where the “theatre of 
operations” aims at the killing of civilians as much as of soldiers; where war is waged 
in representation (or propaganda) as much as in reality; and whose notion of “target” 
is now shared by both private and public arts funders’ conception of audiences? The 
term “war game” has, after all, evolved its meaning in the age of the digital interface 
(not least, in the increasing robotisation of its “operations”), where military training, 
“post-traumatic” therapy, and mass entertainment all engage with claims about the 
(virtual) “reality” of a mimetic fantasy enacted within a topology of death.62 Then 
                                                
60 For instance, the recent Council of Europe sponsored exhibition Verführung Freiheit: Kunst 
in Europa seit 1945 (The Desire for Freedom: Art in Europe Since 1945), which includes a 
work of Kantor’s, presents a curious, ideological manifesto – as if proposing a continuity 
from the past into the present of its supporting EU institutions (Die Reise, the introductory 
catalogue essay by the Berlin curator Monika Flacke, Verführung Freiheit, Dresden: 
Sandstein Verlag, 2012, pp.14-19). 
61 Frederic Jameson, for instance, discusses this in relation to science fiction, as it 
“corresponds to the waning or blockage of [the sense of] historicity, and, particularly in our 
own time (in the post-modern era), to its crisis and paralysis, its enfeeblement and repression. 
Only by means of a violent formal and narrative dislocation could a narrative apparatus come 
into being capable of restoring life and feeling to this only intermittently functioning organ 
that is our capacity to organise and live time historically...” (Frederic Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, London: Verso, 1992, p.284.) 
62 Here the virtual is linked to the twentieth century drive to accelerate the conditions of 
production and experience (as if we could arrive at the future faster by destroying the past). 
These links are the subject of extensive critique in the work of, for example, Harun Farocki 
 32 
again, might “the theatre of death” refer to the “didactic theatre” of rituals of sacrifice 
or judicial execution? Or even of martyrdom or terrorism?63  
 
Or perhaps “the theatre of death” refers to religious practices of ascesis, to the “mise-
en-scène” of the memento mori – whether in the contemplation of such “props” as a 
skull, or even of a whole cadaver; of a personal, devotional object (or image), or a 
public, cultic object (or relic)? Perhaps this “theatre” is that of a philosophical ars 
moriendi?  Or perhaps this title “of death” identifies such Oriental theatre forms as 
Noh and Butoh, with their arts of the dead and the invisible? Or perhaps it identifies 
the masked and trance-state “performances” that occur in probably all pre-industrial 
societies, where “performers” embody both deities and the deceased (and where the 
“audience” is typically distinguished by degrees of initiation into multiple “real” 
worlds)?64 Or perhaps “the theatre of death” refers simply to the title of a particular 
horror film (starring Christopher Lee), with its allusion to Grand Guignol as a 
theatrical genre (albeit more Charles Ludlam than Pierre Albert-Birot)?  
 
After all, as a metonym of that “theatre” of death dedicated to the modernist Muse, 
cinema offers proof of the undying appeal of vampires, zombies, cyborgs, and avatars 
– all of which attest to a displaced (or residual) belief in the screen shadows’ doubles, 
                                                                                                                                      
and Paul Virillio. Farocki, for instance, writes: “the operative war images from the 1991 Gulf 
War, which didn’t show any people, were more than just propaganda, despite rigid 
censorship, meant to hush up the 20,000 deaths of the war. They came from the spirit of a war 
utopia, which takes no account of people, which puts up with them only as approved, or 
perhaps even unapproved, victims. A military spokesman in 1991 said, when asked about the 
victims on the Iraqi side: ‘we don’t do body counts’. This can be translated as: ‘we are not the 
gravediggers. This dirty work has to be done by other people.’” [Farocki quoted by Georges 
Didi-Huberman, “How to Open Your Eyes” (trans. Patrick Kremer), in Harun Farocki: 
Against What? Against Whom? eds. Antje Ehmann and Kodwo Eshun, London: Koenig 
Books, 2009, p.47.] 
63 St. Paul describes the Apostles as “appointed to death as a spectacle (theatron)” by God, in 
I Cor., 49:9 – where, as Ernst Curtius comments, “the idea in mind is not the stage but the 
Roman circus” (Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard 
Trask, London: RKP, 1979, p.138). Analysis of but one, more recent example can be found in 
the Retort essay on the destruction of the World Trade Centre, “Afflicted Powers”, in New 
Left Review 27, May-June 2004. The terrorist war against the state is the counter-part of the 
terror wars waged by states: “In the course of the twentieth century, wars have been 
increasingly waged against the economy and infrastructure of states and against their civilian 
populations...” (Hobsbawm, op cit., p.13).    
64 The interweaving of cultural performance and literary codes of “restored behaviour” in the 
theatre of present(ed) ancestors is powerfully engaged with by, for example, Wole Soyinka. 
Here a synchronic analysis of such theatre offers insights into what, arguably, remains hidden 
in purely historical studies. 
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as if they were cast by a present body.65 Amongst many comparative examples, this 
recalls Dante’s poetics – or theory – of the image (entering the after life in the 
company of Virgil), as defined “both in analogy to the shadow and, equally, in 
opposition to the body.”66 Or, might “death” be a way to appeal to the difference 
between (“live”) theatre and (“recorded”) cinema, as Joseph Chaikin proposed 
concerning the “presence” of the actor? In Jonathan Kalb’s précis, Chaikin suggests: 
“that theatre’s difference consists not in the living actor but in the dying actor; that it 
finds its most stable identity, its most powerful platform for expression, in the fact 
that the performer could die at any moment, is in fact dying as surely as we spectators 
are, in the same room.”67 Or, finally, might this title refer to séances – to a 
“spiritualist theatre” – in which mediums “channel” the dead in the presence of the 
living, “in the same room”?68 In the co-presence of actor and audience, in their 
“likeness”, who (or what) is being evoked, by the uncanny in mimesis?69  
                                                
65 This reappears as a recycled metaphor in Worthern’s return to Brook’s notion of “deadly 
theatre” as “the zombie theory of drama” in “Antigone’s Bones”, TDR, 53.3, 2008, p.16; and 
this is also the underlying subject of Victoria Nelson’s investigation of the survival of the 
“fantastic” in The Secret Life of Puppets (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
A different kind of “theatrical” return of this zombie double (as the nightmare of “audience 
participation”) is given by David Hasselhoff (The Guardian, 06.08.12, G2, p.9), describing 
his entering “the Greggs Bakery Christmas party” in South Wales: “Can you imagine walking 
into a room of 500 people and everybody got up and started coming at me like the Night of 
the Living Dead, holding their cell phones?”  
66 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlap, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.128. 
67 Jonathan Kalb, Beckett in Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
p.148. 
68  As practised, for example, by the Fox sisters, Mme Blavatsky, Eusapia Palladino, or Helen 
Duncan; or as the object of “psychical research” by Edward Tylor, William James, Conan 
Doyle, or W.B. Yeats. Besides William James, amongst other eminent presidents of the 
Society for Psychical Research (founded in 1882) have been Henri Bergson, Gilbert Murray, 
and the Nobel Prize winning physicist Lord Rayleigh (Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning, Cambridge: C.U.P, 1996, p.57).  
69 A bibliography on different theatrical metaphors of death would, of course, be vast. To cite 
only a few examples, therefore, information on just some of the possibilities mentioned above 
may be found in: Deborah Blum, Ghost Hunters, London: Arrow Books, 2007; Jennifer 
Woodward, The Theatre of Death: The Ritual Management of Royal Funerals in Renaissance 
England, Woodbridge: The Boydel Press, 1997; Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of 
Dead Bodies, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, 
Sites of Mourning, Cambridge: C.U.P, 1996; Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern 
Memory, Oxford: O.U.P., 2000; Georges Didi-Huberman, Être crâne, Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit, 2000; Pamela Pilbeam, Madame Tussaud and the History of Waxworks, London: 
Hambledon and London, 2003; Marina Warner, “Waxworks and Wonderlands”, in Visual 
Display, eds. Lynne Cooke and Peter Wollen, New York: Dia Centre, 1995; Vanessa 
Schwartz, “Cinematic Spectatorship before the Apparatus”, and Mark Sandberg, “Effigy and 
Narrative”, both in Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life, eds. Leo Charney and Vanessa 
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Introduction: Thinking of the dead through a concept of theatre (part two) 
 
Séance 
Kantor gave his iconic production The Dead Class the subtitle of a “dramatised 
séance”70, where it is the qualification of the séance as “dramatised” (in the name of a 
specific production by the Cricot 2 company) that is significant – in which the 
medium is that of theatre (a theatre “of death”), involving actors rather than 
spiritualists, dramaturgy rather than parapsychology. Curiously, Witkiewicz – whose 
plays the Cricot 2 worked with up until (and including) The Dead Class – had 
conducted séances of his own, “until he was eventually caught pulling the strings that 
produced the spirit rapping”.71 According Daniel Gerould, in this practice: “we can 
detect the same ambivalent attitude of belief and irony, whereby the playwright 
vouches for the occurrence, and yet at the same time (as manipulator of the strings) 
acknowledges the trick and participates in its unmasking.”72 It is this very theatre (as 
a technique of appearances) of the séance that Kantor can also be seen to be practicing 
(distinct from the typical, hagiographic description of him as a “demiurge”) in 
Andrzej Wajda’s 1976 film of the first version (1975-77)73 of The Dead Class 
production. 
 
Although, on the one hand, Krzysztof Plesniarowicz notes that “seans is the word 
ordinarily used in Polish for any scheduled theatrical performance or film showing, as 
well as for spiritualist sessions, [and that] Kantor consistently used ‘séance’ to 
describe his performances, which he elsewhere referred to as ‘the evocation of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Schwartz, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; Erhard Schüttpelz, “Animism 
meets Spiritualism”, in Animism (Vol. 1), ed. Anselm Franke, Berlin: Sternbeg Press, 2010; 
Tova Gamliel, “Performed Weeping”, in TDR, 54.2, Summer 2010; Simon Featherstone, 
“Spiritualism as popular performance in the 1930s: the Dark Theatre of Helen Duncan”, in 
NTQ, 27:2, May 2011; and Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, Pure War, trans. Mark 
Polizzotti, New York: Semiotext(e), 2008. 
70 This phrase appears on the title page of the programme for The Dead Class, trans. M. 
Dabrowski, Krakow: Krzysztofory Gallery, 1975.  
71 Daniel Gerould, “Introduction” to his translation of Witkacy’s A Small Country House, 
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997, p.xiv. 
72 Gerould, ibid.  
73 Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: 
Black Mountain Press, 2000, p.119.   
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invisible world’”;74 on the other hand, it is precisely this terminological distinction (of 
séance from spectacle or performance) that serves Artur Sandauer to make a contrast 
between the work of the Cricot 2 before and after 1975, with the production of The 
Dead Class, as this contrast informs the question (with respect to the twentieth-
century legacy of the avant-garde; for example, of abstraction, formalism, and 
conceptualism) as to whether “it is still possible for a theatrical performance to evoke 
emotions.”75  
 
Kantor himself distinguishes the audience’s openness to this “all-important sphere of 
feeling”, in the reception of The Dead Class actors’ performances, from simply a 
literary attempt to define or derive the “sources” (or “models”) of their performances 
(as characters) from Witkacy’s play Tumour Brainiowicz.76 It is the appearance of the 
actors in that of the production itself (in its formal existence) that constitutes the 
“dramatised” question of mimesis, where the play text serves “...to bring out the 
tension between theatrical reality and some other factitious reality”,77 rather than to 
define the appearance(s) of characters (or ghosts). Here we have also to distinguish 
the particular context of the question of emotion, pathos, or empathy, from (for 
example) “the inextricable life” belonging to the genres of comedy and tragedy (the 
laughter of the one and the pity of the other); not to mention the recent turn in 
performance analysis to “restore” concern with empathy and mimesis (especially in 
choreography) in terms not of aesthetic theory but of neuroscience.78 Kantor’s 
insistence (to be explored in part three) on “non-participation” in theatre (at least from 
                                                
74 Ibid., p.117. (However, the Polish word “spektakle” is the one used in the Foksal Gallery 
archives for all the Cricot 2 productions, including The Dead Class.) 
75 Artur Sandauer, “Art After the End of Art”, trans. Anna Bartkowicz, in “Dialectics and 
Humanism”, The Polish Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 1985, p.134. This aesthetic concern 
with the powers of empathy, which perhaps echoes with the emergence of bourgeois drama 
from the Enlightenment principles of “moral sentiments” (with Smith and Diderot) more than 
the ancient notion of “catharsis”, can be related to contemporary questions of the “death of 
affect” (with JG Ballard, for instance).  
76 Tadeusz Kantor, “Characters in the Dead Class”, trans. Karol Jakubowicz, in Twentieth 
Century Polish Theatre, ed. Bohdan Drzodwoski, London: John Calder, 1979, p.137. This is 
also translated by M. Dabrowski in the Krzysztofory programme in 1975. The question of 
actors and characters with respect to Witkacy and his “comedy of corpses”, as an example of 
pre-War avant-garde theatre, will be discussed (with Jan Kott) in chapter two.  
77 Tadeusz Kantor, “Dead Class, or a New Treatise on Mannequins” (1975), in Krzysztof 
Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 
2002, p.34. 
78 For example, Vittorio Gallese and David Freedberg: “Motion, emotion and empathy in 
aesthetic experience”, in Trends in Cognitive Science, 11.5, 2007. 
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the 1970s) is a premise here for thinking through the claims to aesthetic “autonomy” 
that distinguish his work from alternative appeals to “avant-gardism” in this period, 
particularly in addressing the dynamic of the encounter between audience and actor as 
both affective and, in a “degraded” or “poor” sense, metaphysical.  
 
As already observed, however, it is crucial to bear in mind that for Kantor (as for 
Witkacy) the question of emotion is not posed in terms of either symbolism or 
naturalism, as alternatives to abstraction (pace Worringer). The appeal of and to 
emotion alludes to (even if it is not defined by) Witkacy’s theatre aesthetics of a form 
“that is pure because it does not express any emotions connected with real life, but 
only the ‘Metaphysical Feeling’... that is the strangeness of existence itself,”79 as this 
is encountered through the work of art. This “strangeness of existence itself”, as 
encountered through the work of death, is what Heidegger identifies as uncanny – an 
encounter that is figured in the art of mimesis (where this is not conceived of simply 
in opposition to technique). With The Dead Class, the theatrical séance of form (of 
the human figura) makes of the actor’s embodiment an art (or an appearance) “of 
death”, as theorised by Kantor, and as informed by questions of the affective in 
aesthetics. In his essay (of 1981), that “is known in Poland and was quoted many 
times, by critics such as Krzysztof Plesniarowicz... and Jan Klossowicz...”80, 
Sandauer proposes that: “This question [of pathos and the aesthetic form of theatre] 
can only be answered after considering what Kantor created after 1975 and what 
cannot any longer be called stage productions, but what should be called ‘stage 
séances’.”81 Together with the return to the sense of a “closed work” (in rejection of a 
“pseudo-avant-garde”), this challenge to thinking through what theatre studies too 
easily historicises as simply “stage productions” is key to what “the theatre of death” 
opens up as a question of “the uncanny in mimesis” – not as an instance of 
spiritualism but of truth in art.  
 
While the sense of “séance” has a further significance today in the question of what 
counts as “live” in the theory of theatre, the title of Sandauer’s essay also offers a 
                                                
79 Artur Sandauer, “Art After the End of Art”, trans. Anna Bartkowicz, in “Dialectics and 
Humanism”, The Polish Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 1985, p.119.  
80 Leszek Kolankiewicz, “Kantor’s Last Tape”, trans. Paul Allain and Grzegorz Ziolkowski, 
in Contemporary Theatre Review, 15.1, February 2005, p.36. 
81 Sandauer, op. cit., p.134.  
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summary of its historical subject; that is, art “after” Witkacy – “a destructionist, 
convinced that art as well as all the principles of construction [as, for instance, with 
his contemporary Strzeminski] ‘are coming to an end’.”82 This view of the “ends” of 
the avant-garde from before the War (returned to in a review of the 1970s, itself made 
during the 1980s) is that of a personality “who was to weigh so heavily on Polish 
literature of the 1930s and on what was to gain fresh vigour in the 1960s” – an 
instance of that “dialectic of anachronism” with which Jan Kott identified Witkacy.83 
Indeed, the question as to what might be the “contemporary significance” of this final 
playing with Witkacy by the Cricot 2 insists as a question of anachronism. Over half a 
century since The Dead Class ceased to be performed “live”, it is in the medium of its 
photographic image, as itself a form of séance, that this work of theatre appears still 
questionable for its future audience.  
 
As will be discussed further in part three, Sandauer (whose work, in his own account, 
encompasses the “duality of Jewish themes... and the Polish language”84) is also an 
important figure in the posthumous reception of Bruno Schulz85 – and thus an 
influence on Kantor’s aesthetic vocabulary of a “reality of the lowest rank” (a variant 
of “degraded reality”), as the meeting of art and life, or of fiction and reality, in (or 
as) the found (or discarded) object viewed as “trash”.86 Here neither art nor life 
                                                
82 Sandauer, ibid., p.127. This can be compared with Yves-Alain Bois’ suggested way out of 
the historicist “double bind” of the “end of art” – the “end” that defines the history of modern 
painting – as a “task of mourning” in Painting as Model, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993, 
pp.241-2. 
83 Sandauer, ibid., p.117; and Jan Kott, “Witkiewicz, or the dialectic of anachronism”, trans. 
Joanna Clark and James McCandlish, in The Theatre of Essence, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1984. This is also suggested by Konstanty Puzyna, who writes of a “tone of 
bitterness” in Witkacy born “of being before his times, and, paradoxically, of being too late” 
(“The Genius of Witkacy”, trans. Boleslaw Taborski, in Twentieth Century Polish Theatre, 
ed. Bohdan Drozdowski, London: John Calder, 1979, p.33).  
84 Artur Sandauer, On the Situation of the Polish Writer of Jewish Descent in the Twentieth 
Century, trans. Abe and Sarah Shenitzer, Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 2005, p.97. 
85 Jan Blonski notes that “Sandauer was the only one who wrote about the Jewish roots of 
Schulz’s prose”, citing Sandauer’s 1956 article on Schulz, that identifies precisely “degraded 
reality” in its very title and which was reprinted as the introduction to the 1964 republication 
of Schulz’s “works” [Blonski, “Is there a Jewish School of Polish Literature?”, in Polin: 
From Shtetl to Socialism, ed. Anthony Polonsky, London: Littman Library, 1993, p.486]. 
(See also, Blonski, “On the Jewish Sources of Bruno Schulz”, trans. Michael Steinlauf, in 
Cross Currents, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.) 
86 On Schulz’s term tandeta (trash, junk, rubbish) see, for instance, Czeslaw Prokopczyk in 
“The Mythical and the Ordinary in Bruno Schulz”, in Bruno Schulz: New Documents and 
Interpretations, ed. Czeslaw Prokopczyk, New York: Peter Lang, 1999, pp.204-209. Kantor’s 
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transcends the other, as appearance and reality are not conceived of as exclusive, but 
rather as revealing, of each other. As Czeslaw Prokopczyk notes: “Schulz’s 
formulations at the end of his essay-interview for Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz about 
the ‘degradation of reality’, its ‘bankruptcy’, etc., have been popular among Polish 
critics ever since Artur Sandauer used Schulz’s phrase for the title of his own 
influential essay ‘The Degradation of Reality’.”87  
 
In another reference to Sandauer’s 1981 essay, Wieslaw Borowski – for whom the 
term “emotional construction” applies, however, from The Water Hen production 
(1967) on – notes that the distinction of theatrical “séance” concerns a sense (for 
Sandauer) of The Dead Class performance going beyond the earlier Cricot 2 
“experiments”.88 It is this interplay between the seemingly contradictory powers of 
the emotional and the experimental – as well as the mundane and the metaphysical – 
that characterises Kantor’s theatre of death; where what is at stake – in the sense of 
“avant-garde” – is an engagement of art in and with “reality”, where this is 
understood not simply in terms of life (as traditionally thought to be exclusive of 
death, as matter is of form) but in terms of an immanent (not transcendental) 
metaphysics (as is proposed in Schulz’s famous Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies). As 
with Schulz, the creativity of the “avant-garde” is understood by Kantor not in terms 
                                                                                                                                      
own referencing of this “reality” (which never cites Sandauer, perhaps because it is well-
known in the Polish context, albeit then lost in translations devoted exclusively to Kantor’s 
writings) is associated with the 1961 performance with Witkacy’s In a Small Country Manor 
House, presented as the “annexation” by and for the art work of a wardrobe [“Cricot 2 
Theatre”, trans. M. Dabrowski, n.p., Warsaw, Foksal Gallery Archive, n.d.]. Such neglected 
objects of household furniture are the subject of the “heresies” of the father in Bruno Schulz’s 
“Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies”, in The Street of Crocodiles and Sanatorium under the Sign 
of the Hourglass, trans. Celina Wieniewska, London: Picador, 1988, pp.44-48. 
87 Czeslaw Prokopczyk, “The Mythical and the Ordinary in Bruno Schulz”, in Bruno Schulz: 
New Documents and Interpretations, ed. Czeslaw Prokopczyk, New York: Peter Lang, 1999, 
p.179. Sandauer’s essay (Degraded Reality, with the subtitle, Reality According to Bruno 
Schulz) introduces the 1957 republication of Schulz’s major fictions (Krakow, 1957, pp.7-33) 
and was reprinted in an expanded edition in 1964 that also included Schulz’s critical essays 
and some letters, introduced by Jerzy Ficowski. Amongst the critics that Prokopczyk cites is 
Krzysztof Stala, the first chapter of whose Schulz monograph, On the Margins of Reality, 
discussing “the scope of the dispute: the crisis of mimesis”, offers a summary of Sandauer’s 
essay in English (Krzysztof Stala, On the Margins of Reality, Stockholm: Stockholm 
University Slavic Studies, 1993, pp.7-10). We shall return to this in part three, and also with 
reference to Luc Tuymans’ 2010 exhibition in Bruges, with its title of The Reality of the 
Lowest Rank: A Vision of Central Europe (Tielt: Lannoo Publishers, 2010), in chapter two. 
88 Borowski in conversation with Jaromir Jedlinski, in The Impossible Theatre, ed. Jaroslaw 
Suchan, trans. Jadwiga Piatkowska and Maciej Glogoczowski, Krakow: Bunkier Sztuki, 
2000, p.126. 
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of the latest artistic sophistication or technical innovation; but of the so-called “lowest 
rank” of the relation between form and matter, including that between the art of 
theatre and the actor. The pathos of this theatre is found not in the refined expressivity 
of aesthetised feelings, but in the poetics of the circus, in profane not religious 
mysteries. With regard to art, Kantor prefers the wrappings and remainders of 
Cinnamon Shops to the gilding and glamour of cultural temples.  
 
This particular Polish aesthetic history (in which an aesthetic interest in the “life” of 
materials of the “lowest rank” may be compared with Benjamin’s reflections on 
Surrealism) has had widespread echoes (to mention only the Quay brothers89). 
Amongst other theorists resisting the commercialised (re)production of the “death of 
art” in the 1970s, Donald Kuspit, for instance, also laments those “pseudo-avant-
garde artist[s]... who want to look as if they are... creatively challenging and 
confrontational”, and who “make a show of innovation”, where:  
 
The issue is not how convincing the show is – it will be convincing to the 
pseudo-audience – but how rooted it is in obsolete avant-garde notions of true 
selfhood and innovation. They show that there is no way forward in art today, 
only different ways backward toward a past that is only technically usable, not 
emotionally and existentially convincing.90  
 
The conditions of and for “obsolescence” in art practices (and their histories) concern 
the very claims of truth within the notion of avant-garde itself. It is with so-called 
“post-modernism” (as the end of the avant-garde) that art is no longer to be 
                                                
89 Suzanne Buchan, The Quay Brothers: Into a Metaphysical Playroom, Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 2011. 
90 Donald Kuspit, The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, p.111. Kuspit’s critique of post-modernism is continued in his 2005-06 on-line 
book, “A Critical History of Twentieth Century Art” [especially, in this context, chapter 
nine], published by the now defunct, but still accessible, artnet Magazine: 
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/authors/kuspit.asp. In his Introduction, Kuspit writes: 
“Avant-garde critique is both immanent and transcendent, to use the philosophical terms. That 
is, it is a search for what is inherent to art as such, and as such genuine art – even if that 
means, paradoxically, that genuine art sometimes seems to be extra-artistic or anti-artistic – as 
well as an attack on all socially administered definitions and conventionalised conceptions of 
art, all of which seem to conspire to crush or manipulate creativity, that is, to impede creative 
freedom or what Meyer Schapiro calls the artist’s ‘inner freedom’, for him the only kind of 
freedom possible in the modern world” (ibid., p.7). 
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distinguished from kitsch, the emotional from the sentimental, the theoretical from 
exhibitionism. These distinctions are not simply intended to be descriptive but, rather, 
to identify the values of an immanent critique by which the question of what art “is” 
have been posed within modernism.91 However, recalling the question of “resistance” 
evoked previously with Kostolowski (citing Piotrowski), the truth of art – in its 
(enduringly) anachronistic modernist appeal – continues to “remind [the individual] 
of the possibility of another kind of emotion and expressivity, of the existence within 
him of another self than the one society tells him he has.”92 Without a sense of this 
resistance within the artwork itself, its history or “study” (both of its particularity and 
of its “medium”) ceases to engage (to use the terms of Kantor’s protest at Documenta 
8, cited in part one of this Introduction) with its theorisation and becomes satisfied 
simply with exhibitionism.  
 
The question of emotion and expressivity in relation to the avant-garde also concerns 
one of the few artists of the “neo-avant-garde in Poland in the ’70s” to refer positively 
to Kantor (who had in fact been his early mentor), Zbigniew Warpechowski.93 Indeed, 
Lukasz Ronduda’s situating of Warpechowski within this historical context of Polish 
art echoes the discussion oriented by (although it is not included in) Sandauer’s essay: 
 
Zbigniew Warpechowski’s performances dealt with personal yet universal 
existential problems, such as death, the meaning of life, the absolute, good and 
evil, and faith – subjects that artists of the avant-garde circles generally 
viewed with suspicion. Warpechowski’s art might be considered an attempt to 
break through the crisis of the avant-garde and restore to art the ability to 
                                                
91 These terms famously constitute the very title of Clement Greenberg’s classic 1939 essay 
“Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (in Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. I, ed. John O’Brian, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).  
92 Donald Kuspit, op. cit., p.113.  
93 This is despite Warpechowski’s criticism of the Foksal Gallery as a bastion of an “official” 
avant-garde (Lukasz Ronduda, Polish Art of the 70s, trans. Karen Underhill, Soren Gauger, & 
Krystyna Mazur, Warsaw: CCA, 2009, pp.124-125). The “forgetting” of Kantor can be noted 
in The Impossible Theatre exhibition, where the curatorial link with Kantor is refused by all 
the artists represented, “exploring performativity” in their work (Sabine Folie (ed.), The 
Impossible Theatre, Vienna: Kunsthalle, 2005). Lukasz Ronduda is also the co-author and 
director, with Maciej Sobieszczewski, of a film, The Performer, described as “the first ever 
art exhibition to adopt the form of a feature film”, that will include “Polish performance icon 
Zbigniew Warpechowski” as himself. The film is scheduled for release in summer 2013 
[www.artmuseum.pl].)  
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grapple with basic themes relating to the human condition, themes that had 
been art’s terrain for centuries. Among the Polish artists of the 1970s, 
Warpechowski drew most fully from this subject matter; beginning with his 
participation in Happenings and theatrical activities. He was inspired by the 
peculiar existentialism of Tadeusz Kantor’s performances, Pawlowski’s 
concept of energetic communication, and Hindu philosophy, and Lao-Tzu. His 
existential and romantic performance-poetry work was an interesting 
contribution to the conceptual revolution in the art of the late 1960s and early 
’70s.94  
 
Reality 
Crucially, however, Kantor’s “peculiar existentialism” in theatre concerns an 
understanding of “themes that had been art’s terrain for centuries”, as an art not of 
Romantic transfiguration of “reality” (or, indeed, appeal to a “higher reality”) but as 
an “annexation” (or “appropriation”) of (a poor and discarded) reality in and by the 
work of art. In this, the possibility of art is premised on its autonomy – not only from 
other claims of value, whether commercial or political, but also those of “professional 
standards”. Even in his attempt to bring together Happenings and theatre in the late 
1960s (with which Warpechowski was involved), as, for instance, with The Water 
Hen, Kantor still maintained a distance between audience and actors:  
 
In The Water Hen a paradoxical situation took place. Kantor employed the 
distinctive division into a space for acting and a space for the audience, a 
characteristic of traditional theatre, and went on to break it up, by means of the 
happening structure. Even though the spectacle took place in a gallery-cum-
                                                
94 Lukasz Ronduda, Polish Art of the 70s, trans. Karen Underhill, Soren Gauger, & Krystyna 
Mazur, Warsaw: CCA, 2009, p.118. Although Kantor’s work (at least up until 1975) is 
inoculated by Witkacy against Romanticism, Ronduda’s conclusion to his discussion of 
Warpechowski is also relevant here: “His [Warpechowski’s] romantic attitude was the 
exception against the backdrop of the Polish rationalist Neo-Avant-Garde of the 1970s. He 
reconciled paradoxes, united antinomies and ruptures (post-essentialism - pragmatism), and 
decided on the creative potential of the community. He did this by planning in a very rational 
fashion, conscious of his radically expressive creative works that drew from categories of 
loftiness, truth, and authenticity. Warpechowski fought for a romantic understanding of art in 
a very pragmatic way, for a capacity to take on man’s most important existential and dramatic 
issues with the language of the avant-garde (performance, visual poetry, conceptualism), for 
giving avant-garde art something that had therefore been reserved for traditional art – the 
capacity to speak of mysteries” [ibid. p.132]. 
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café space, the artist introduced a “wooden barrier, all through the place, 
which creates divisions, organising the chaos”. The audience had not arrived 
for a happening “proper”, but for a spectacle entitled The Water Hen, directed 
by Tadeusz Kantor.95  
 
An emblematic artist of the “paradoxical situation”, Kantor (who is credited with 
introducing Happenings to Poland in the mid-60s96) describes the “impossible” 
situation of a Happening as theatre (and vice versa) as, indeed, something he “did not 
want to achieve”.97 Nonetheless, as Michalik’s description suggests, this aesthetic of 
the “unachieved” performance – with the Happening dynamic of the one-off event 
undermining, and yet undermined by, the theatre dynamic of the repeated event – 
retains its fascination; at least, by evoking a challenge to what may be expected of and 
as theatre:  
 
As it turned out, the audience’s expectation [of a performance of Witkacy’s 
play] failed to be met. Individual scenes of the spectacle, based on familiar 
actions and rituals, taking place simultaneously, were impossible to take in 
and comprehend fully. Thus, the audience was brutally deprived of its 
function, in relation to the stage plot, of passive onlooker. It was defined as 
“the audience”, but not allowed to act as one.98  
 
It is this refusal “to give the audience its rights and privileges”, where “the situation 
of the audience is questionable”,99 that characterises Kantor’s Impossible theatre of 
the 1960s (for instance, with “the cloakroom”); a situation he would come to 
                                                
95 Justyna Michalik, “A Happening According to Tadeusz Kantor”, trans. Anda MacBride, in 
Tadeusz Kantor: Painting. Theatre, exhibition catalogue, Vilnius: Lithuanian Art Museum, 
2012, p.104 (citing Kantor’s own “score” of the production). 
96 However, earlier Fluxus-associated music events had occurred in Poland (instigated by 
Boguslaw Schaeffer), and indeed Maciunas had tried to enrol Wlodzimierz Borowski in 
Fluxus the early 1960s (while collaborating later with Jaroslaw Kozlowski in the mid-1970s); 
cf Petra Stegmann, “Fuxus East”, in Fluxus East exhibition catalogue, Berlin: Künstlerhaus 
Bethanien, 2007, p.27, p.21, and p.35. 
97 Tadeusz Kantor, “Budapest Lecture”, trans. Anda MacBride, in Tadeusz Kantor: Painting. 
Theatre, exhibition catalogue, Vilnius: Lithuanian Art Museum, 2012, p.160. 
98 Justyna Michalik, op. cit. 
99 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Impossible Theatre”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Michal Kobialka 
(ed.), A Journey Through Other Spaces, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 
p.100. 
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denounce in the face of its generalised (or “pseudo”) application in the 1970s, as the 
Cricot 2 turned to an avowed framing of the separation between audience and actor, 
closed to the suggestion of participation. Sandauer’s fundamental “question” 
(concerning an avant-garde – or art – of emotion) touches upon the complex issue of 
the conditions of and for pathos or empathy (as distinct from bathos and kitsch100) in 
specifically modern art – and, precisely, what the “function” of an audience might be 
concerning the end(s) of “human” representation (of “reality”) in the last century.101  
 
Given a history from abstraction to conceptualism, the “fate” of anthropomorphic 
representation in particular – with which theatre is inevitably bound up – has been 
widely contested (not least in its supposed identity with anthropocentrism). Indeed, 
“theatre” itself has been a term of critique within the visual and plastic arts (even 
being used on occasion to distinguish between art and non-art), just as it has been 
within the history of twentieth century performance practices.102 While abstraction in 
various guises was the quasi-“official”, state-sponsored art of the former West,103 in 
Poland – uniquely amongst the former Eastern Bloc countries – it was also accepted 
as officially “representative” art after the Thaw. As Joanna Szupinska writes: “After 
1956, Stalinism – and with it, Socialist Realism – was rejected, and abstraction, for 
which, at first, restrictive quotas were introduced, was officially sanctioned and 
harnessed for propaganda, whereby politically instrumentalised avant-gardism 
became proof of national liberalism.”104  
                                                
100 For all that myself is an other (pace Rimbaud), an other is not myself. Without 
comprehending the difference between self and (as) other – not least through aesthetic 
education – there would be no question of empathy, only of emotion. (Tragically for 
Desdemona, for example, it is Iago who shows more “emotional understanding” than 
Othello.) Empathy is, by definition, a socialised “model” of and for an understanding of 
emotion (which informs the very concept of theatre).   
101 Jacques Derrida, “The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation”, in Writing 
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 1978; or Jean-Francois Lyotard, The 
Inhuman, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
102 It is conspicuous that most references to Michael Fried’s famous dicta simply ignore his 
approbation of Brecht and Artaud – as theorist-practitioners of the theatrical medium as a 
relation to an audience – in the instance of actual theatre performance. 
103 For example, Francis Frascina, “Institutions, Culture, and America’s ‘Cold War Years’”, 
in Oxford Art Journal, 26.1, 2003: “By 1959 and 1960 confidence in a legitimated American 
culture, sent abroad and returned in ‘triumph’, confirmed a sense of the possibilities of a 
particular Modernist renaissance at home; one that was to enjoy an ideological dominance in 
institutions during the following decade” (p.59).  
104 Joanna Szupinska, “Politics, Potentials and ‘Construction in Process’”, in the Journal of 
Curatorial Studies, 3.2, 2012, p.210. Also, Luiza Nader, “‘Shame!’ Socialist Realist 
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This universalism, by the late 1960s, of what had previously been marginal (even in 
the former West) was addressed at the time by Clement Greenberg, in Studio 
International, replying to a request for him to define “avant-garde”:  
 
You don’t define it, you recognise it as an historical phenomenon. The avant-
garde may be undergoing its first epochal transformation today. It has taken 
over the foreground of the art scene... Since what is nominally avant-garde has 
done this, the term and notion themselves have changed. The question now is 
one of continuity: will the avant-garde survive in its traditional form? (And 
there’s no paradox in juxtaposing ‘avant-garde’ and ‘tradition’). 105  
 
As we have seen with Sandauer and Borowski, the question of this (non-)paradox 
relates to important contextual issues (to be returned to part three) for Kantor’s 
denunciations of a “pseudo-avant-garde”, as these inform his declared return to the 
“closed work” in theatre in 1975.  
 
The question of empathy – as a register for playing out a fundamental opposition 
between the “artificial” (or “cultural”) and the “natural” (or “spontaneous”) in human 
expression (as also between the experimental or abstract and the emotional or 
representational) – is continually restaged in and as theatre’s “reality”; or at least in 
the verbal images that are supposed, traditionally, to characterise it: in Cordelia’s 
“nothing”, for instance; or that “nothing” with which the Player, in Hamlet’s 
observation, allows a “dream of passion”, a “fiction”, to be moulded by or to “his own 
conceit”. As concerns “reality”, then, it is perhaps in “nothing” that the tragedy of 
dramatic theatre touches upon the “death” of an art theatre that is not oriented by the 
interpretation of literary drama (not bound to its “ends” or its aporia) – even as (with 
the heritage of Jarry, Strindberg, and Witkacy) its stage features a play of “corpses”, 
mocking those actors who would “bring their characters to life”. (The question of 
what it might mean to “imitate” a corpse on stage will be discussed in chapter one.)  
                                                                                                                                      
Historiography in the 1980s” (and the following “Discussion”) in Rejected Heritage, ed. 
Karol Sienkiewicz, e-publication of the Museum of Modern Art, Warsaw, 2011 
[www.artmuseum.pl].  
105 Clement Greenberg interview with Edward Lucie-Smith, in Studio International, vol.175, 
n.896, January, 1968, p.5.  
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Concerning the mainstream of dramatic theatre, however, the “paradox” (after 
Diderot) is that Hamlet’s speech is so often read as offering a “realistic” point of view 
upon the “fictions” of the Player – where Hamlet professes to be moved by the 
Player’s art (anticipating thereby that Claudius will be equally moved). The situation 
is, however, quite the opposite. Hamlet is “himself” the fiction of the Player, a conceit 
of theatre. Curiously enough, as with Witkacy and Kantor – where the séance is 
indeed the “thing” – this theatre does not so much bring the dead to life, as to give 
cause for the living to remember the dead. The Hamlet character reveals to “himself” 
(and thereby to the audience) a theatrical reality of emotion – as a matter of (as 
subject to) “conceit”, of a verbal image enacted corporeally – in order to experience 
its aesthetic truth. Such “as if” emotions are no more or less fictional than real (being 
irreducible to this opposition), when to feel is to imagine, through the metaphorical 
substitutions of presence for absence (as if of act for word), in the theatrically specific 
appearance of actors as doubles of the dead. In the theatre of death, however, it is not 
a drama of emotion that is at stake – as in the long tradition of an interpretative art of 
(actors’) theatre. Rather (after Witkacy) the emotion is that of the present(ed) absence: 
a metaphysical affect, arising from a shock at the appearance of these “actors”, in an 
art of theatre where what is experienced as “life-like” in mimesis has the uncanny 
sense “of death”.  
 
The paradigm (of the) actor here is a paradigm of (and for) theatre. What 
distinguishes theatre from “performance art” is precisely the recognition of the role of 
representation in the “co-presence” of performer (artist or actor) and audience. The 
resistance to this aesthetic truth in the “performative” turn is a resistance to 
recognising the mimetic in theory; to acknowledging the distance that is inscribed in 
the relation with an audience – even in the modes of performance art that descry it in 
the name of an identity of art and life (which has been the dominant concern of 
twentieth century (anti-)aesthetics). Here the question of emotion is essential for 
considering Kantor’s return, in 1975, to the “closed work”, to the distance that makes 
emotion aesthetically meaningful or significant.106 This distance is what Warburg 
                                                
106 Although, as noted previously with Michalik, this “return” is perhaps more of a re-
affirmation of what remained essential in the relation to an audience in Kantor’s theatre. 
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called “the space of thought” [Denkraum]107 and Bion “learning from experience” 
(both in contrast to uncritical ideas of animism and what Freud called the 
“omnipotence of thought”).108 Empathy (in the experienced pathos of form) is not 
explained theoretically in terms of identification or projection simply (pace 
Worringer); but – in its appearance(s), for instance, in the arts of the human image (of 
the imago hominis109) – needs to be contextualised historically in terms of “cultural 
memory” or “cultural psychology” (pace Warburg). That the individual is not simply 
the “author” (or “origin”) of his or her experience (as of being “human”) is evident 
from a sense of the uncanny in mimesis, from the shock of (mis)recognition, where 
the impersonal “itself” appears to be animate(d), where the sense of the 
anthropomorphic includes a feeling for what is dead; where matter and metaphysics 
are not simply (“really”) opposed.  
 
Shock 
As will be discussed in the following chapters, in the history of the theatre of death 
the model (for the) actor shifts from the image (or thought) of a puppet (amongst such 
precedents as the Symbolists) to that of the dead, amongst those artists – to name only 
Craig, Artaud, Genet, Kantor, and Müller – for whom this pre-modern 
anthropological “survival” provides a key to their aesthetic interest. The dead in (or 
of) this model are not literary or dramatic characters or roles – such as “Hamlet” 
might be thought of in the interpretation of a particular actor within the dominant 
Western tradition (whether in the romantic tradition of a spirit or demonic 
“possession” or “inspiration”; or the naturalistic tradition of insight through a forensic 
psychological construction) – where, in this major tradition, one can even speak of a 
“Shakespearean actor” (or, indeed, more generally, of a “character actor”).  
 
In the theatre of death the question of “likeness” (and “presence”) touches upon an 
affect – a “metaphysical feeling” (or “shock” at, precisely, the uncanny in mimesis) – 
where the actor’s appearance figures (a “return” of) the dead for an audience (in an 
                                                
107 Aby Warburg, Images from the Region of the Pueblo Indians of North America, trans. 
Michael Steinberg, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, p.54, where, however, Steinberg 
translates Denkraum as “space for reflection” [cf Warburg, Schlangenritual, Berlin: 
Wagenbach, 2011, p.75].  
108 Wilfred Bion, Learning from Experience, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.  
109 Moshe Barasch, Imago Hominis: Studies in the Language of Art, New York: New York 
University Press, 1991. 
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art of theatre so conceived). Here there is something uncanny or “unlike” – familiarly 
unfamiliar – in the apparent “likeness” of the actor, in the unsettling of appearance as 
a “return” (from one world to another). Through the medium of the (present) actor the 
audience is touched by a sense of the threshold between the visible and the invisible, 
between “this world” and another; settled in neither the one nor the other simply, but 
rather unsettling in between, in the coming to life of a theatre of death there appears a 
shock at the uncanny.110 
 
Where the “life like” human image is limited to the visible, “another world” is 
thought of as the “next world”, as after or beyond death, as “life in the hereafter”. The 
paradigm of the actor in the theatre of death, however, provokes an unsettling of the 
sense of this world. The actor is seen to be not present as him or herself, but in 
persona, as an actor (“beside” himself111) – rather than being “in character” (as 
Hamlet, for instance). The actor is, as it were, “in” the character of “being an actor”, 
its unlike likeness to an audience; a semblance at the threshold of the recognisable. 
The “other” world of this theatre is not transcendental – the “beyond” of religion or 
traditional metaphysics – but a world still “here below”, in its “degraded reality”. The 
figure of the actor is (as if) displaced from (as if returning to) “this world”, (as if) 
already dead, in a theatre that is a double of this world.112  
 
These key questions of “world” (or stage) concern from where and to where the actor 
(really) returns in making an appearance, not simply “theatrically” but 
anthropologically. Kantor characterises this, in reflections on the “reality” of 
Odysseus’ “return” in his 1944 production of Wyspianski’s play,113 not simply in 
terms of Troy and Ithaca, but of the real and the fictional. It is not a question of 
“updating” the fiction of “here” and “there”, of “home” and “front”, to “Krakow” and 
                                                
110 This also touches upon wider cultural concerns with animism and “superstition”, as these 
relate theatre aesthetics to anthropology (to be discussed in the following chapters). 
111 The question of being “beside” oneself is of the essence of the uncanny; not least, in the 
figure of the double (pace Otto Rank).  
112 Derrida suggests something similar in reading the “subject” of Blanchot’s narrative The 
Instance of my Death, in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p.70-71 (and on the “I” of autobiography, p.53).  
113 Stanislaw Wyspianski, The Return of Odysseus, trans. Howard Clarke, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Russian and East European Series, vol.35, 1966. 
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“Stalingrad”, for example; but of returning Wyspianski’s play to the present, to the 
room where the performance is “taking place”, to where the audience finds itself.  
 
One had to discover the method. It was not merely the war and Troy that 
Odysseus had returned from. More important, he returned from ‘out of the 
grave’, from the realm of the dead, from the ‘other world’ into the sphere of 
life, into the realm of the living; he appeared among us. The return of 
Odysseus established a precedent and a prototype for all the later characters of 
my theatre. There were many of them. The whole procession that came out of 
many productions and dramas – from the realm of Fiction – all were ‘dead’; 
all were returning into the world of the living, into our world, into the present. 
This contradiction between death and life perfectly corresponded to the 
opposition between fiction and reality. From this moment on, one had to be 
consistent and draw radical conclusions about acting; one had to resist the 
temptation of psychological, questionable, and well-known methods of 
demonstrating mystical states and of the situations from the verge of ‘this’ and 
‘that’ world.114 
 
The stage for this clandestine production during the Occupation was a room shared 
with the audience, where the entrance and exit, the “on” stage and “off”, were both 
real for all the participants (actors and audience alike). The “return” signified a 
threshold – a remove of one step – not as the dressing of reality by appearances 
(decorative, illusionary theatre), but as making its reality (between reality and fiction, 
past and present) apparent or “visible”. In a later production, entitled I Shall Never 
Return (1988), Kantor reflected on a note that he had made to himself as a theatre 
maker in 1944: “Odysseus must really return. Ever since that day, I have remained 
faithful to the meaning of this sentence.”115  
 
The ruses of Penelope’s fidelity are famous and echo with the very thought of 
dramaturgy, the drama-ergon, the “work of actions” that “weave together” as “text” 
                                                
114 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Infamous Transition from the World of the Dead into the World of 
the Dead”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.145. 
115 Ibid. 
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into the form of a “plot”.116 Although the different stages of the Cricot 2 theatre’s 
researches offer changing possibilities of what the meaning of “really” might be 
(concerning what is enacted in the appearance, or shock, of this “return”), Kantor did 
indeed remain faithful to its thought, as it “signified the need to find a transition from 
the world of ‘beyond’ to the world ‘here’, from the condition of being dead to that of 
being alive”.117 This was not a question of the literary interpretation of the “character” 
of Odysseus, by and for an actor (or an audience), but the construction, or rather the 
“annexation”, of the reality of a theatrical space (as a relation between the actor and 
an audience, in effecting a shock in and of their co-presence).  
 
I would state further that theatre is the place that reveals – as some fords in a 
river do – the traces of transition from ‘that other side’ into our life. An Actor 
who assumes the condition of A Dead Man stands in front of the audience. A 
performance whose form is closely connected with that of a ritual or a 
ceremony could be equated with a treatment that makes use of a shock. I 
would gladly call it a metaphysical one.118  
 
This metaphysical shock – a tear in the weave of the familiar, a sense of exclusion or 
exile from “home”, the possibility that Ithaca does not even exist – is, after all, at the 
heart of the short twentieth century’s cultural memory, in this dramaturgy from 
Wyspianski to Kantor (not to mention in film, for example, Godard and Jonas 
Mekas).119 Producing the uncanny shock of “human” (re)appearance has been the 
concern of a minor tradition in modernist art theatre, from the symbolism of 
Wyspianski, through the formalism of Witkiewicz, to the “death” of Kantor. It is with 
                                                
116 Eugenio Barba, “Dramaturgy”, in A Dictionary of Theatre Anthropology, Eugenio Barba 
and Nicola Savarese (eds.), trans. Richard Fowler, London: Routledge, 1995, pp.68-71. 
117 Kantor, op. cit. 
118 Ibid., p.146. 
119 Kantor continually revisited the “setting” for this production in its “model” versions – 
starting, long before any thought of the Cricoteka archive, with his participation in 1952 
(including as the judge for stage design) in an Artists’ Union exhibition of design. Laurie 
Kosolski writes: “[H]e displayed a mock-up for his 1945 production of The Return of 
Odysseus... The mock-up’s overall impression was stark and enigmatic, close to an 
abstraction. Anything but socialist realist, it was not listed in the exhibit programme – but 
Kantor was nevertheless permitted to display it” (Painting Krakow Red: Politics and Culture 
in Poland, 1945-1950, PhD Thesis, Stanford University, June 1998, p.393-4). A history of the 
(re)appearance of this “scene” (or room) in Kantor’s work could be the subject of a chapter of 
its own, relatable to the subsequent model of “the classroom” (to be discussed in part three). 
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this last that the image of the actor “itself” – distinct from a character – becomes 
theorised in (and as) a practice of theatre, through its concept “of death”. 
 
Major and minor 
The complex interweaving of cultural and personal mythology in the example of 
Kantor’s Odysseus will be returned to in part three, but suffice it here at least to note 
the shock of the uncanny in what “returns” between appearance and reality:  
 
This everyday Realness, which was firmly rooted in both place and time, 
immediately permitted the audience to perceive this mysterious current 
flowing from the depth of time when the soldier, whose presence could not 
have been questioned, called himself by the name of the man who had died 
centuries ago. A split second was needed to see this return, but the emotion 
raised by it stayed much longer... in memory!120 
 
It is precisely the relation between the modern, or avant-garde, as “shock” and the 
understanding of an art of theatre in cultural memory – not simply as entertainment 
but as an encounter with metaphysics, where vision is not reducible to the visible – 
that is identified in this thesis as the “uncanny in mimesis”. The various suggestions 
above concerning the wide range of reference for a metaphorical understanding of 
“the theatre of death” are hardly exhaustive, but they serve to indicate what this title 
might name or identify both theoretically and historically, in relation to which the 
question of an art practice must distinguish itself, if it is not simply to become another 
metaphor for non-aesthetic researches. While those metaphorical examples of 
“theatre” appear as variations “of death”, each instance modifies, in its specificity, the 
meaning of its practice. Such “theatre(s)” offer modes of existence to death – for 
survivors, for worshippers, for devotees, for mourners, and (or) for audiences. In the 
particularity of their event (or taking place), the site of these different encounters with 
the dead differentiates a theatrical concept. Here, however, we are concerned with the 
relation between theatre and death, not metaphorically but as a specific art practice.  
 
                                                
120 Tadeusz Kantor, “Theatrical Place”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further On, Nothing, ed. 
Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.352.  
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In the case of theatre, the relation between the site (whether open air or enclosed, 
promenade or seated, proscenium or arena) and the event (a theatrical performance or 
“séance”) constitutes a practice of human appearance where relations between the 
visible and the invisible, animate and inanimate, the living and the dead, are staged or 
played out. As Roland Barthes notes, theatre here touches upon the fundamental 
divisions of western metaphysics, through which experience is categorised and re-
presented by cultural practices as (if) “naturalised”.121  
 
In what sense though does this theatre distinguish itself from research into the 
paranormal, for example? In what sense is “metaphysical shock” (or the uncanny) an 
alternative to “superstition” in the claims of (and for) this theatre (of death)? Does the 
relation between aesthetics and anthropology addressed by this thesis entail some sort 
of intellectual “regression” (as referred to by Stengers, above), rather than a 
conceptual exploration of human “reality”?  
 
To state the obvious, theatre is no more one thing (historically and theoretically) than 
are the practices of death, as they touch upon different cultural representations of the 
unrepresentable. As theatre, it is not death itself that is in question, but rather the 
question itself of death, of the threshold between presence and absence, of 
appearance(s) not simply opposed to reality. To attempt to articulate the specific 
concept of an aesthetic practice (or art form) is not to try to define (or prescribe) it, 
but rather to explore how it might be thought through (in) its own “theatre” of 
theory.122 That the dead exist (or that death is, indeed, a mode of existence) is as 
obvious as it is not. With respect to the impossible possibility of its representation(s) – 
including its “theatre” – this thesis will explore some of the ways in which this 
question of existence has been addressed in modernity; not least, as conceived of 
                                                
121 Roland Barthes, “Lesson in Writing”, trans. Stephen Heath, in Image-Music-Text, ed. 
Stephen Heath, Glasgow: Fontana, 1982.  
122 This further metaphorical turn in the relations between key terms here is perhaps 
exemplified by Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé’s Mimique, as it provides a model for Lacoue-
Labarthe’s reading of mimesis. (Another “exemplary” instance might be Samuel Weber’s 
translation of “entre” in his reading of Derrida’s Mallarmé, not least as this unsettles the 
question of “threshold” (pace Derrida’s Aporia essay): “...in repeating and remarking the 
ambiguity of the word entre in Mallarmé’s text, a word that can be read as both adverb 
(‘between’) and verb (‘enter’), Derrida moves from purely ‘theoretical’ discourse, describing 
an object independent of it, to a ‘theatrical’ mode of (re)writing that stages (dislocates) what 
it also recites: the theatrical movement of Mallarmé’s writing...” (Weber, Theatricality as 
Medium, New York: Fordham University Press, 2004, p.14).  
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“rationally” in terms of superstition, itself associated with, and yet distinguished from, 
the uncanny. 
 
The tension between a restricted (non-metaphorical) sense of specificity concerning 
an aesthetic practice (within the modernist art of “theatre”) and the wider, contextual 
– philosophical, anthropological, and historical – questions raised by its concept 
(precisely, “of death”) will run throughout this thesis, resisting making of theatre (as 
is so often the case) a metaphor of these cultural practices (of death).123 It is here a 
question of what distinguishes theatre as an art, not only within the various arts of 
mimesis (for instance, portraiture or photography) but also within the history of 
theatrical practice(s) themselves. By the end of part one of this thesis, it will be 
proposed that this tension between the specific (practice) and the general (concept) 
finds productive expression in the idea of an iconography (or an aesthetics) of the 
actor particular to the theatre of death, in so far as this itself specifies questions of 
theatre within the cultural memory (or, indeed, anthropology) of modernism.  
 
In death, the individual’s image participates in, belongs to, the universal: we all die, 
albeit singularly. It is in this that Kantor sees a model of and for the actor in a “theatre 
of death”, as the distinct visibility (and pathos) of human being in appearance. In 
Kantor’s words: “It is only the dead who become visible to the living at the price of 
acquiring their individuality, difference, and their Image...”124 With this image (or 
paradigm) of human being a distinct art (of theatre) may be conceived of – as that “of 
death”. The relation between the singular and the universal, the event and its concept, 
is complex. Its manifestation in the dominant thought of twentieth-century theatre 
aesthetics is as a relation between “art and life” (as also between a production and its 
performance, for instance; or the repeatable and the unrepeatable), where the 
                                                
123 For essays on the structure of metaphor (including the operation of analogy, with respect to 
the opening claims of this chapter), see On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1981. On the mutual implication of metaphor and concept (“after 
Nietzsche”), see Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology”, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan 
Bass, 1982 (although this is, of course, an interest common to all that passes for 
“deconstruction”). For a succinct exploration of theatrical metaphors in rhetoric, see Ernst 
Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard Trask, London: RKP, 
1979, pp.138-144; and, for a book length example, Jonas Barish, The Anti-Theatrical 
Prejudice, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
124 Tadeusz Kantor, “From the Director’s Notebook for ‘The Dead Class’”, trans. Michal 
Kobialka, in Further On, Nothing, ed. Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009, p.240.  
 53 
specificity or “ontology” of live performance has often been identified with an elision 
of these differences.  
 
As already suggested, the predominant (or major) tradition that would minimise, or 
even nullify, the opposition between art and life – as, for instance, to render non-
existent “the actor” (whether in the name of a naturalised presence amongst 
professional actors, or in claims to a unique presence amongst performance artists) – 
finds a contrasting minor tradition within the modernist art of theatre, one that insists 
on this very opposition, through an aesthetics (as is proposed here) “of death”. 
Crucially, as a technician of pathos, “the actor” here does not necessarily mean the 
trained professional of European academies (one of the crowned heads of modern 
individualism, in which cultural memory is reduced to claims about subjective 
interpretations). The actor in the theatre of death is as opposed to emotive or 
interpretative “acting” as any performance artist. The actor in this theatre is, rather, a 
figure of and for human appearance, or “likeness”, as a medium for experiencing the 
mimetic play (or conceit) between the body and its image as an art – of the uncanny.  
 
Although the distinction here between major and minor traditions borrows the terms 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Kafka, it is not intended as a reading of the 
theatre of death in terms of their three characteristics of such a “literature”: “the 
deterritorialisation of language, the connection of the individual to a political 
immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation.”125 What is crucial here is 
the sense that a minor tradition – as Deleuze and Guattari propose – is not separate 
from the major but belongs to it. The mark of the minor concept here is “death”, 
putting in question the major concept of “theatre” (predominantly understood as 
offering a supposed resemblance to “life”). The work “of death” is not set apart (as, 
for instance, performance art has claimed to be) from that art of performance called 
“theatre” (or from so-called live performance), but appears, rather, as its uncanny 
double. The theatre of death, paradoxically, exposes the major superstition that is 
encoded in the dominant metaphysics of the actor within the Western tradition – that 
of “bringing a character to life”. 
 
                                                
125 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan, 
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1986, p.18.  
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Indeed, although this minor concept of theatre goes by the name “of death”, its own 
question (as it insists in thinking through an art of theatre within modernism) 
concerns what is (or may be) “life like” in the appearance of the actor on stage (in, or 
as, “theatre”, precisely, rather than in life). What is it that animates this semblance 
(resemblance or dissemblance), or analogy (or even allegory), of human existence (as 
theatre)? What is it that “acts” between the body and its image (the one upon the 
other), as between an actor and an audience? How is the emotion of the one animated 
by the appearance (or pathos) of the other? How does this uncanny double of human 
being appear to stage this mimetic encounter? What gives this image of a body “life” 
theatrically for such artists as Kantor and Craig, such that they identify it with death, 
in order to gauge the aesthetic truth of its appearance in that of an actor?  
 
Elimination 
In his introduction to another tradition of twentieth century theatre practice – Brecht’s 
specifically modernist notion of an epic (as distinct from a tragic) theatre (understood 
as a relation to both mass politics and mass media, where mass signifies the contested 
representation of historical “actors”) – Walter Benjamin writes:  
 
The point at issue in the theatre today can be more accurately defined in 
relation to the stage than to the play. It concerns the filling-in of the orchestra 
pit. The abyss which separates the actors from the audience like the dead from 
the living, the abyss whose silence heightens the sublime in drama, whose 
resonance heightens the intoxication of opera, this abyss which, of all the 
elements of the stage, most indelibly bears the traces of its sacral origins, has 
lost its function. The stage is still elevated, but it no longer rises from an 
immeasurable depth; it has become a public platform. Upon this platform the 
theatre has now to install itself. That is the situation. But, as happens in many 
situations, here too the business of disguising it has prevailed over its proper 
realisation. Tragedies and operas go on and on being written, apparently with 
a trusty stage apparatus to hand, whereas in reality they do nothing but supply 
material for an apparatus which is obsolete.126   
 
                                                
126 Walter Benjamin, “What is Epic Theatre?”, trans. Anna Bostock, in Understanding Brecht, 
London: Verso, 1984, p.1.  
 55 
Here the taking place of theatre (the mimetic event) is signified by the relation 
between stage and auditorium, in a separation that has been reduced historically from 
the Orchestra to the Pit; to the footlights, or simply to the front or edge of the stage; to 
a pretence, often enough, of no separation at all (in the name of a challenge to that 
particular modernist fiction – characterising naturalism – of a fourth wall).127 The 
separation between the sacred and the profane seemingly means little today – as a 
hieratic, priestly mediation between the living and the dead (celebrated by Craig and 
Genet, although not by Kantor) has receded from cultural memory. (Similarly, notions 
of the civic have been rendered unto the Corporate, as the separation between the 
consecrated and the commercial, the temple and the market, is increasingly reduced to 
the privatised-“public” precinct of the shopping mall.) Where once theatre served to 
recall the dead, today it too is a site of forgetting, of entertaining consciousness in the 
mirror of the present – distinct from a site of politics (as Benjamin had hoped, with 
the decline of the cultic value of art). Rather than “open[ing] the world of the body, as 
a medium for transcendence”128 (or for a metaphysics of appearance), encountered in 
the mimetic shock of the uncanny, theatre typically “aspires” simply to reduce the 
experience of the visual to the world of the visible.  
 
Besides its architectural forms, theatre is the event of a dynamic separation of actor 
and audience – a practice of the space between them, in which human images may 
make their appearance. The static conceptual separation between reality and 
appearance is precisely what the theatre “of death” unsettles – where, by contrast, 
“theatre” ordinarily pacifies their dynamic relation by proposing the one as a 
metaphor for the other. As is suggested by Benjamin’s analogy concerning what 
“separates the actors from the audience like the dead from the living” in pre-modern 
theatre, what distinguishes the theatre of death (as a minor tradition within modernist 
                                                
127 The particular development of Kantor’s theatre work from the “open” structure of “zero 
theatre” and “Happening theatre” (in the 1960s) to the “closed form” of the theatre of death 
with The Dead Class (in the 1970s), with its insistence on the “barrier” between actor and 
audience, will be discussed in part three. This concerns not only a general question of 
semiotics and “authorship” (for instance, with the work of Umberto Eco or Roland Barthes), 
but also a specific Polish context, with the legacies of Oscar Hansen’s pedagogy at the 
Warsaw Academy of Art. For a contemporary example of play with this “fourth wall” aspect 
of formal theatre practice, one might cite Romeo Castellucci’s production at the Schaubühne 
in Berlin, Hyperion: Letters of a Terrorist.  
128 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlap, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.106. 
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theatre) is (the cultural survival or superstition of) an insistence upon the threshold 
that separates the actor from the audience. It is this theatrical “abyss” which, rather 
than being “filled in” (or negated), has to be thought of (as it has been, in this minor 
tradition, in the “likeness”, or figure, of death) – if theatre is not simply to reproduce 
“an apparatus which is obsolete”.  
 
For Benjamin, this means acknowledging the (quotable) gesture of the new media – 
through montage – in the appearance of the live actor, as the “progressive”, rather 
than “reactionary”, answer to the crisis of modern theatre; as a “fresh approach to the 
grand old opportunity of theatre – namely, to the focus on the people who are 
present.”129 It is precisely this return to (indeed, of) “the human being who has been 
eliminated from radio and film” that is the key to a theatre of and for “today” (where 
Brecht’s own researches look equally to the “ancient” Chinese example of acting for 
what could be contemporary in the European).  
 
Neither “deadly theatre” (Brook), nor the “death of theatre” (in the name of its 
“living” epigones), it is precisely the survival or renewal of a pre-modern (concept of) 
theatre in the twentieth century (as avant-garde) that poses the question of mimesis in 
terms of an essentially modernist concern with the possibility of its own art (as a 
question of what animates the appearance of “the actor”). This possibility is thought 
of not only in relation to theatre’s past, however, but in the name of its future – a 
future that seems as anachronistic today as does tragedy in the context of the “post”-
modern culture of late capitalism.  
 
As Benjamin wrote, on the eve of his suicide, concerning the subject of historical 
knowledge (evoking the dialectical witness that might re-imagine, or re-ignite, the 
potential of and for an historical “materialism”): “The only historian capable of 
fanning the spark of hope in the past is the one who is firmly convinced that even the 
dead will not be safe from the enemy if he is victorious. And this enemy has never 
                                                
129 Walter Benjamin, “Theatre and Radio”, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, 
vol.2.2, eds. Howard Eiland, Michael Jennings, and Gary Smith, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2005, p.585. 
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ceased to be victorious.”130 What would theatre (and theatre history) mean for a 
culture where “even the dead” were not safe from the “victory” of the living, where 
history (and the archive) had no future in the “after life” of its past?  
 
Of this contemporary “waste land”, Franco Berardi writes:  
 
In the late-modern phase of capitalism, digital abstraction adds a second layer 
to capitalist abstraction: transformation and production no longer happen in 
the field of bodies, and material manipulation, but in the field of 
interoperativity between informational machines. Information takes the place 
of things, and the body is cancelled from the field of communication... In the 
sphere of the digital economy, the faster information circulates, the faster 
value is accumulated. But meaning slows down this process, as meaning needs 
time to be produced and to be elaborated and understood. So the acceleration 
of the info-flow implies an elimination of meaning. In the sphere of the 
financial economy, the acceleration of financial circulation and valorisation 
implies an elimination of the real world. The more you destroy physical 
things, physical resources, and the body, the more you can accelerate the 
circulation of financial flows.131  
 
Despite the hollowing out of institutional commemorations (and, indeed, their cultural 
histories132), both death and the dead (as Benjamin insists) call upon memory. Their 
appeal is to be remembered, in the work of culture. This is what Warburg bears 
witness to (in both his scholarship and his psychosis) through his experience of the 
First World War. As Kurt Foster writes: “In the very subject of his study – the social 
mediation of expressive human communication and the transformation of its 
                                                
130 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, trans. Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, 
vol.4, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006, p.391. 
131 Franco Berardi, The Uprising, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012, p.104 and p.105. What 
“meaning” here means is “attention... and emotional, affective reactions” and “an ethical 
sensibility” (ibid., p.97 & p.126-7).  
132 Indeed, the commemorative has been a subject for historians under the auspices of Pierre 
Nora; while amongst historians of death the best known is perhaps Philippe Ariès.  
 58 
languages – he seized upon the failures and achievements of collective memory in 
history...”133  
 
Even after the most “modern” war in history (with which, precisely, Futurism 
famously identified itself) – inaugurating the short twentieth century – there was, as 
Jay Winter notes, a “tendency to slide from metaphors about remembering those who 
have died to the metaphysics of life after death”. The pre-modern appearance of, or 
communication with, the dead survived the demonstration (as to a mass “audience”) 
of mechanised, “rational” destruction. The mobilisation of modern technology (as the 
near “total” victory of the war machine over humanity) “did not create these modes of 
thought [including spiritualism], but neither did [it] discredit or destroy them.”134 In 
Didi-Huberman’s reading (quoting from Warburg’s Mnemosyne notes):  
 
[T]he Warburgian analysis of the Nachleben rendered possible an 
understanding, at a much more fundamental level, of the anachronistic 
coexistence of a hypermodern war with so many archaisms of social 
behaviour. The psychohistorical viewpoint associated with the Nachleben 
made such paradoxes of temporality intelligible, with Warburg showing 
himself in 1916-17 to be once again close to Freud’s analyses, in this case 
defining the indissoluble relations between psychical “evolution” and 
“regression”.135 
 
The contemporary sense of the “today” addressed by Benjamin (advocating a modern 
epic theatre) follows the first signification of “the War” to be remembered in Europe 
in the legacy of the last century. Given this context of understanding, after the second 
signification was memorialised for decades by the Cold War (from which any “spark 
of hope in the past” that it preserved has now been eliminated), what witness does the 
theatre of death still offer to a modern humanity today? How does this theatre recall 
the terror of a century in which capitalism made not only the past an exploitable 
“present”, but also the future? For if the dead do not survive, then there is no theatre 
                                                
133 Kurt Foster, “Aby Warburg’s History of Art”, in Daedalus, vol.105, 1976, p.176. 
134 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p.76.  
135 Georges Didi-Huberman, “Warburg’s Haunted House”, trans. Shane Lillis, in Common 
Knowledge, 18.1, 2012, p.76-7. 
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for the thought of death. Where the dead have no place to be (whether as actor or 
audience), neither will the living. For then they have nothing to hope for from the past 
in the future, above all in appeals – including those of the dead – for justice, rather 
than revenge.136 In this situation (in the passing from elimination through 
extermination to extinction), the question with which this thesis is engaged (by 
addressing a minor history of theatre) would, indeed, be meaningless: is it necessary 
that one die in order to be dead?   
 
How do the living live with the dead? Until the dehumanisation of society by 
capitalism, all the living awaited the experience of the dead. It was their ultimate 
future. By themselves the living were incomplete. Thus living and dead were inter-
dependent. Always. Only a uniquely modern form of egotism has broken this inter-
dependence. With disastrous results for the living, who now think of the dead as the 
eliminated. –  John Berger137  
 
 
                                                
136 A more locally specific instance of such concerns about the dispossession of cultural 
memory is expressed in a letter to The Guardian (21.11.2012) “by over 90 professors” 
addressing the coalition government’s ambitions for university education and the 
“indefensible intergenerational unfairness” of its model for the private-debt financing of 
higher education: “The privatisation of university funding risks transforming the vital 
relationship between students and educators into a cold commercial transaction between 
consumers and service providers...”; that is, a relation in which the thought of what is owed to 
the past is understood simply as a financial debt in the future; or, as the outgoing head of the 
Arts Council, Liz Forgan, declared, concerning secondary school education, Michael Gove 
“is effectively robbing a generation of its birthright and failing in the duty we all have to 
continue our culture” (The Guardian, 15.1.13 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2013/jan/15/arts-council-chief-gove-
education?INTCMP=SRCH]).  
137 John Berger, “Twelve Theses on the Economy of the Dead (Thesis 12)”, in Pages of the 
Wound, London: Bloomsbury Press, 1994 (n.p.).  
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part One 
 
Chapter 1: Precedents (Craig and Artaud, Maeterlinck and Witkacy) 
 
We do not want something beyond death for its own sake, but craftily, we desire to be 
able to see ourselves dead, to assure ourselves of our death by directing a veritable 
gaze from beyond the grave toward our nothingness, from a point situated beyond 
death. – Maurice Blanchot138 
 
It is important – in a thesis concerned with what it is “of death” that brings “theatre” 
into question specifically (quarter of a century after Kantor’s death, for instance) – to 
stress (with Blanchot) the modern, secular sense of “a life” or an “auto-biography” 
(here that of Michel Leiris). This perspective upon (and even from) “beyond” a 
certain limit or threshold in the experience of seeing, or of the gaze, concerns a 
secular, literary conceit addressing what it “is” to write, and not that, for instance, of a 
deathbed appeal of – or to – any priestly mediation between this world and the next; 
as if from the perspective of the dying rather than of the dead, as if to distinguish 
thereby being from appearance. What is vital, in terms of this thesis, is the sense here 
of the body as a “locus of images”, where the aesthetic and the anthropological 
question each other in cultural memory:  
 
From an anthropological perspective, then, embodiment in an image is a 
topos: it testifies to an age-old urge to transcend, by means of the image, the 
boundaries of space and time that confine the human body. It would appear 
then that images remain tied to the body, even in our present day virtual 
world. Which means that there is good reason to go on speaking of that body 
as a living locus of images.139  
 
                                                
138 Maurice Blanchot, “Gazes from Beyond the Grave”, in The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte 
Mandell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p.253. 
139 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlop, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.61. 
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As will be discussed later, there is a sense in which we displace into a “beyond” what 
is unsettling in the apprehension of standing before death, as this is a limit to 
understanding which gives its meaning to “reason”.140 
 
It is also important to stress that the subject of this thesis addresses a European culture 
(Blanchot’s “we”, and Vernant’s “representational enterprise” in the next chapter) of 
“impossible possibilities” in representation, as these occur in the age of an ambivalent 
modernity, in its apparent “worldly” disenchantment and desacralisation.141 A sense 
of the enduring efficacy of animism, for instance, no more entails a belief simply in 
the “irrational” than does the recognition that “rationalism” is not universal entails a 
simple relativism.142 In terms of a distinction made by Hans Belting (addressing 
Vernant) between “the medium of remembrance” and the “medium of embodiment” 
(as concerns the mimetic image), the funerary image is no longer understood as 
animated by the spirit of the deceased, but is now a memorial image (whether a stone 
stelae or a photograph), the modern sense of which (as an image) remains, after nearly 
two thousand years, curiously Platonic.143 The question of “likeness” today concerns 
portraiture rather than animation (or possession), keeping a sense of the power of 
images repressed. With the portrait, the “life” of the image and of the body inheres in 
each distinctly; while in possession each is the double of the other. This is recalled in 
the ancient Roman funeral (masked) mimes, to whose “theatre of death” Genet 
appeals, for instance, in a conception of his own in the late 1950s.144  
 
The votive image in the form of a wax effigy popular in the Renaissance, as studied 
by Julius Schlosser and Warburg, will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, 
                                                
140 The question of such “limits” will return – with Heidegger’s discussion of the uncanny – at 
the end of this chapter. This sense of the “truth” of literature (of what it “is”), as an inscription 
or testimony to the life of death, is the subject of Derrida’s several readings of Blanchot, to 
cite here only his commentary on Blanchot’s quasi-autobiographical narrative, The Instant of 
my Death, in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, both trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000. 
141 The two terms are familiar from Weber (after Schiller) and subsequently, for example, 
Keith Thomas. The cultural ambivalence concerning “enchantment” or “animism” is 
addressed by both Warburg and Freud, and underlies Latour’s more recent suggestion that 
“we” have never been modern.  
142 See, for example, the discussion by Marc Augé of ambivalence and ambiguity in the 
claims of knowledge (A Sense for the Other, trans. Amy Jacobs, Stanford University Press, 
1998, pp.30-31).  
143 Belting, op. cit., pp.84-85 (and pp.108-09).  
144 Belting also discusses the Roman pompes funèbres, op cit., pp.115-118. 
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however, it is the uncanny power of the image as the vehicle of a sense of the “after 
life” – not only of the portrayed but of the portrait itself – that concerns us. Hans 
Belting has discussed, for example, the renewal of pagan images of the dead in the 
Christian icon, as the latter detached itself from a particular place – the tomb of a saint 
(with its associated veneration of relics) – taking on an after life (or pathos) of distinct 
conventions (or formulae) which prove effective in a dispersed “locus” of cultural 
memory:  
 
Like the imperial image and the image of the gods, the funeral portrait... 
received a special cult that made possible the emergence of the icon. The cult 
of tombs promoted the cult of saints, which in turn became manifest in the cult 
of their images. Both private persons and saints were commemorated with 
their images. In the case of the saints the difference was the kind of 
commemoration that transcended the private sphere and, in the end, became a 
public cult that was sanctioned by the church. The saint’s icon was a product 
of the cult practised at the saint’s tomb. It initially resembled the private 
funeral portrait to such an extent that it was virtually indistinguishable from 
the latter. Later on, the range of types of images narrowed down when 
funerary portraits of private individuals went out of use and icons of saints 
adopted conventions of their own. Even then, they made use of the aesthetics 
that had been developed in ancient portraiture.145  
 
Such “conventions” in the relation between bodies and their image (through manifold 
aesthetic and anthropological appearances) have been explored by, for example, 
Warburg, Freud, Taussig, and Latour, and touch upon a fundamental issue of theatre 
as a civic (and secular) space for cultural reflexivity (including here the concept, or 
paradigm, of the actor within a minor theatrical tradition “of death”).  
 
This might once have gone without saying in Europe (in the “global” self-image of 
“the West”), but in a context in which the production that will be the principal 
                                                
145 Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996, p.98. (Also, David Freedberg, The Power of Images, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1989; and WJT Mitchell, What do Images Want, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2005.) 
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“example” discussed in chapter three – Romeo Castellucci’s On the Concept of the 
Face, Regarding the Son of God – had both its Paris and Milan performances (during 
2011-12) disrupted by fundamentalist Catholics, who effectively wished to see the 
work banned, the over-determined claims about rationality and irrationality 
characteristic of modernism need to be recognised in – and for – their distinct (indeed, 
historical) “reason(s)”.146  
 
This is not simply a matter of a “clash of ideologies”, but touches upon the sense of 
what it means to be mortal – as having a sense of the “limits of reason” (as of the 
reason for limits). Rather than tolerate their unsettling ambiguities, or even 
ambivalences, the fundamentalist ignores the critical sense of such limits. Not the 
least of what being “on the way to language” means – as to an inhabitable (rather than 
a transcendent) world – is a sense (for speaking, mortal being(s)) of being “on the 
way to death”, where “the essential relation between death and language flashes up 
before us, but remains still unthought”.147 In the case of fundamentalism there is no 
question “of death” in this modern sense (of the deconstruction of metaphysics148), 
and thus a spectacle may be made of death, but not (modern) art. Modernism is the 
constant point of reference in this thesis – as the horizon of significance for its 
                                                
146 See, http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2011/oct/25/romeo-castelluci-christian-protesters-
play. The “alternative theatre” of these interruptions (acknowledged by a secular audience 
who applauded the arrival of the riot police on stage) is offered in a film by an organisation 
calling itself the “French Revival” [Renouveau Francais] (that claims links not only with the 
conservative Catholic, Maurras political tradition, but also with the memory of the clandestine 
OAS), that can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOtq_k8f3js. This “political 
theatre” is seemingly far removed from that evoked by a review of a show in the 2013 
London International Mime Festival, which begins: “Religion and theatre have much in 
common. Both require their followers to believe what seems to be unbelieveable; and 
Catholicism in particular has truly fantastic costumes, not to mention a belief in 
transformations. The two are brought together in this latest, largely silent piece from Stan’s 
Café, the remarkable Birmingham-based company that often interrogates the past to better 
understand the present. It takes the form of an evangelical puppet show, performed with utter 
sincerity but marked ineptitude by three cardinals in crimson robes, with the aid of a Muslim 
stage manager...” (Lyn Gardner, The Guardian, 16.1.13). Crucially, there is no icon here, 
only prelates; no “concept of the Face”, only profane “acting”. Indeed, can theatre ever be 
sacred without then becoming religious? Is modern theatre necessarily secular, as a relation to 
public, civic space – in which images (of actions) are understood (not least by the 
unconscious cynicism of the fundamentalists) in terms of their “conventions”? 
147 Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language”, in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter 
Hertz, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1971, p.107. The modern sense of “limits” and the 
“poetic project of being” in Heidegger will be returned to the next chapter.  
148 This history, as a question of history (not least that in and of translation between German 
and French), is addressed by Jean-Luc Nancy, in “Our History”, trans. Cynthia Chase, et al., 
in Diacritics, Fall 1990 (pp.101-106 especially). 
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questions of art – precisely where what is at stake is the “pre-modern” survival (in 
terms of the distinctions by which modernism has defined itself) of a cultural concern 
with the dead, identified (as proposed in the Introduction) with the aesthetic dynamic 
between “abstraction and empathy”.  
 
Suffice it to note here, however, that none of the epigraphs to each of the chapters of 
part one of this thesis (intended to suggest its field of research) refer to theatre 
specifically. As was explained in the Introduction (with respect to theatre aesthetics), 
the theatre of death does not concern the mimesis (or theatrical representation) of 
death as a theme, or an action, belonging to a drama. The question “of death” 
concerns rather the image or thought of “theatre” itself, in the mimetic appearance of 
human beings to and for one another, as conceived of in the similitude (resemblance) 
and difference (dissemblance) between “actor” and “audience”. In its stage(d) 
representations, death is understood here (both historically and theoretically) in terms 
of the techniques of an art of theatre; as a cultural (or mimetic) appearance of the 
dead made to (and by) the living. For Kantor – as for Craig and Artaud in the present 
chapter – the “theatrical” is not thought of simply as an applied technique (as merely a 
professional practice), but as the experience of a metaphysical encounter or shock, 
which this thesis identifies as the uncanny in mimesis.  
 
Fundamentally, what the title of this “theatre” (in both its concept and practice) refers 
to is what it is “of” human beings – mimetic creatures for whom death exists (not 
least as a question of what is, or is not, representable) – that becomes evident or 
thinkable theatrically by way of “death”. It refers, both theoretically and historically, 
to what “of” the living is represented theatrically by the dead – understood to be no 
more or less metaphorical than the reverse, in the representation of the dead by the 
living. Here the imago mortui or similitudo hominis – the terms by which the 
appearance of the dead was named in the Middle Ages149 – return as a form of 
theatrical iconography. It is the sense of this shift from death to “the dead” – to the 
possibility of a sight from “beyond death” (seeing ourselves seen as dead, in 
Blanchot’s evocation) – that is the underlying subject of this thesis; not simply as a 
conceptual return to the shades or eidola of pre-Platonic understanding, or even the 
                                                
149 Jean-Claude Schmitt, Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 
2001, p.231. 
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possessed bodies consigned to “primitivism” by modernity, but as the conceptual 
return of these figura to a modern art of theatre, in the image of its “actors”. Where 
traditionally this sense of vision (from “beyond”) is to be “seen” in the realm of 
dreams, of epiphanies, or of shamanic journeys, what may be seen in theatre is today 
relatable to the modern techniques of autobiography and photography. Here the 
relation between medium and image (at least before, or resisting, the immanence of a 
digital universality) remains temporal, conveying still a sense of what exists 
“afterwards”.   
 
In an early essay on film as art [1924], Béla Balázs evokes such modern techniques of 
visibility, suggesting that “the natural thing is for us to be present when we observe 
something. However, one of our deepest metaphysical yearnings is to see what things 
are like when we are not present.”150 Here the appearance of living on, or 
“afterwards”, shows us an incorporeal image of the body in a specifically modern 
cultural medium – no longer necessarily related to funerary practices, aiming at 
recognising, or placating, the (uncanny) presence of the dead. The telematic (or 
telepresence) has been “domesticated” (or commodified) in modernity (such that we 
may say, in a debased and trivialised way, that “we are all shamans now”) – and yet 
we still dream of the dead; and photography has itself been addressed (by more than 
one writer) in terms of a “theatre” of the dead, not as a question of fictional 
characters, but as an aesthetic-anthropological question of techniques of human 
appearance(s) or images.  
 
As Anselm Franke observes, Edward Tylor’s account of the human soul as “a thin, 
insubstantial human image... capable of leaving the body far behind... appearing to 
men waking or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the 
likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body...” offers 
“a description that, with minor alterations, would be applicable in almost all its 
features to the photographic and cinematographic image.”151 These cultural practices 
provide testimony to Bachelard’s observation (resonating through all the references 
                                                
150 Béla Balázs, “The Visible Man”, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Béla Balázs: Early Film 
Theory, ed. Erica Carter, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011, p.61. 
151 Anselm Franke, in Anselm Franke (ed.), Animism (Vol. 1), Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2010, 
p.26 (citing Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol.1, London: John Murray, 1871, p.429).  
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cited here) that: “‘death was first an image, and it will ever remain an image,’ since 
we do not know what death really is.”152  
 
The dead figure as a universal possibility of the individual. We all die, albeit 
singularly. In a reflection on the paradoxes of citing “my death” (and thus the limits 
of “auto-biography”), Derrida observes, that: “if death... names the very 
irreplacability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in the place of 
the other), then all the examples in the world can precisely illustrate this 
specificity”.153 Even if explored dialectically, the relation between singular and 
universal, the event and its concept, remains paradoxical, or even aporetic, here – not 
least in its manifestation in the dominant thought of the relation between “art and life” 
within twentieth-century theatre aesthetics; as, for instance, in claims concerning the 
unique and the repeatable in the medium, or the event, of performance. As proposed 
in the Introduction, the major desire to minimise or even to nullify this relation, 
thought of as an opposition, finds a contrasting minor tradition within the modernist 
art of theatre; one that insists on this very distinction (on what is unsettling in it), 
through an aesthetics (as proposed here) “of death”.  
 
Besides any number of metaphorical references for the “theatre” of death (as 
discussed in the Introduction), this title refers – directly – to an historically specific 
practice and concept, so named in 1975 by Tadeusz Kantor. However, even in this 
instance neither practice nor theory is to be explained (through analogy) simply by 
reference of the one to the other.154 As indicated by the question of metaphor, this 
thesis makes reference to the “theatre of death”, in its theorisation, in terms of the 
“uncanny in mimesis”, proposing a comparative basis for thinking through the work 
of other theatre artists besides Kantor. Here the mimetic possibility of “theatre” finds 
a comparative concept – “of death” – in theorising an iconography of the actor; that 
is, in the aesthetic figure of an uncanny double, or appearance, of the human being. 
                                                
152 Cited in Belting, op. cit., p.4. 
153 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993, p.22. 
154 It is this very term (“the theatre of death”) to which the thesis aims to give conceptual 
content – as “the uncanny in mimesis” – rather than simply amplifying the description of an 
historical practice (based on paraphrase of an artist’s writings). The wider field of research in 
which these two parts of the title meet will be proposed in this chapter as being that of an 
iconography of the actor within such a theatre practice.  
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This also offers a basis for adducing different artists’ critique (both practical and 
theoretical) of prevailing, major conceptions of theatre practice – as illusionistic, 
naturalistic, psychological, or, indeed, as “living” – in the image of the actor as its 
principal vehicle.  
 
As also noted in the Introduction, the title of this thesis nonetheless contains a 
theoretical analogy that can be expressed in an historical proposition: that the relation 
between audience and actor has been conceived of by various theatre artists in the 
twentieth century as figuring a relation between the living and the dead. In this 
instance, the thesis addresses the historical “content” of its initial, theoretical 
proposition. For it is not simply a question of explaining that the audience-actor 
relation has been so thought of in the past, but of how it may yet be so thought of in 
the present – not least, as an understanding of various artists’ (past) practice today.  
 
It might seem paradoxical, for instance, that in this theatre (“of death”) – when 
addressing the actor’s appearance on stage – a visible relation is modelled upon an 
invisible one; that is, where the dead provide a model for the appearance of the living, 
rather than the reverse. This inversion of what might be ordinarily expected 
theatrically has thus to be explained (for what, after all, do the dead look like?), if it is 
not to be relegated simply to the realms of metaphor or mystery, symbolism or 
superstition. As will be explored in the following examples, the relation between the 
visible and the invisible – as conceived of in this “theatre” between audience and 
actor – is not one of a simple binary. The mimetic co-presence (or “reciprocity”) of 
appearance(s), particularly in the “look” (identified typically with the face), takes the 
rhetorical form (as in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis) of a chiasmus.155  
 
This fundamental relation between beholder and beheld, as modelled culturally (and 
enacted theatrically), has both ancient and modern exemplars. It is, for instance, the 
central event of “the chain of episodes” involved in the mythical (and proto-
photographic) scene of a death dealing (and death defying) encounter with the Gorgon 
                                                
155 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968 (specifically chapter four). As we shall see, it is 
precisely the unsettling of expectations concerning such “reciprocity” that characterises the 
uncanny in mimesis theatrically.  
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– as Jean-Pierre Vernant recounts it – in terms of “the eye, the gaze, the reciprocity of 
seeing and being seen”.156 Returning from “behind” the Gorgon’s mask, the gaze 
itself “lives on” in uncanny ways, haunting the living with a fear of the dead (or the 
mimetic appearance of the inanimate). A doll, a mask, or even a non-anthropomorphic 
object, may seem to be animated by a look, the strange, mimetic “reciprocity” of 
which can be profoundly unsettling (especially when not framed by – or as – the 
theatrical). The effect of the Gorgon’s gaze is to “still” the animate subject, in an 
instance of time becoming visible (an echo, or survival, of which can be seen, for 
example, in the playground game of Grandma’s Footsteps). The vocabulary of living 
“after” death in the image of the Gorgon, or more commonly that of the death mask, 
returns in that of the photograph.157 In each case, as with theatre, a question of 
mnemotechnics is posed; one that distinguishes the human image from everyday life, 
as a means of reading mimesis in – and as – a semblance of itself, through, precisely, 
the appearance of an art of embodiment.158  
 
The frontal image, or countenance, of the face as prosopon,159 the alterity of which is 
conceptualised in the techniques of the mask and the mirror, of the photograph and 
the actor’s “appearance” on stage, is a fundamental theme of this thesis – for which 
the Gorgon, capturing the gaze, provides a prototypical figure (in relation to a 
mimesis of death), requiring a research (as a question of both an aesthetic and a 
metaphysical experience) that is distinct from a sociology of theatre spectating. This 
                                                
156 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Death in the Eyes”, trans. Thomas Curely and Froma Zeitlin, in 
Mortals and Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, 
p.135. 
157 In his analysis of the photographic iconography of hysteria, Georges Didi-Huberman even 
refers to a “self-gorgonisation” in the example of Augustine (The Invention of Hysteria, trans. 
Alisa Hartz, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, p.122).  
158 “For ‘to resemble’, or Resembling, is the name for a major concern about time in the 
visible. This is precisely what exposes all photographic evidence to anxiety, and beyond it, to 
staging…” Didi-Huberman, ibid., p.65. 
159 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “In the Mirror of Medusa”, trans. Froma Zeitlin, in Mortals and 
Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, p.142: “The face 
is called prosopon in Greek; it is what one presents of oneself to the gaze of others, an 
individualised countenance appearing before the eyes of anyone who meets one directly,” 
with a double meaning of both face and mask. In this context, we might note that for 
Grotowski, for instance, an “impulse” is always a face-to-face relation with another existence 
– including the supernatural: “When Hamlet speaks of his father, he speaks a monologue, but 
he is facing his father. Impulse always exists facing.” (Jerzy Grotowski, “Reply to 
Stanislavsky”, trans. Kris Salata, TDR, 52.2, Summer 2008, p.37). (See also, Moshe Barasch, 
Imago Hominis, part one, New York: New York University Press, 1991.) 
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research appeals even less to a turn to cognitive science (in place of phenomenology), 
or even to reference to “mirror neurones” (which presuppose the very effect that they 
purport to explain).160 Through the visibility of “the stage” (as itself a technology for 
producing the visibility of the human being as other to itself), the invisible can be 
thought of theatrically (in a “mirror transforming the living into the dead”, as Vernant 
suggestively describes the effect of the Gorgon’s look161), situating this research in 
theatre history in relation to metaphysics (as, indeed, the artists involved themselves 
insist). The claim for art is precisely the space between beholder and beheld as that of 
a work, an object, an event, which (unlike the encounter with the Gorgon) is not 
reducible to one or the other. In the case of the actor (“of death”), it is the image of 
the body that presents or figures this possibility of theatre.   
 
With the Gorgon, the event of the actor-audience relation is given a mythical content 
– as a conceptual figure (or thought-image). In this “look”, the skull becomes 
apparent, revealing the cavities of the eyes – those “vaults of approaching death”, as 
Antonin Artaud identifies them in the very sight of the human face.162 In contrast to 
the withdrawn, interiorised gaze of the death mask (to which we will return, with 
Heidegger, in chapter five), here the eye sockets stare, presenting the void of the 
spectator’s own gaze. The skull has indeed provided an emblematic memento mori – 
relating, in the iconography of St. Jerome, the very site of thought to the sight of 
death. Where the Saint’s head (with its contemplative look) rests in one hand, the 
other hand rests upon a skull, the object of his contemplation.163  
 
                                                
160 For example, in essays collected in Maxim Stamenov and Vittorio Gallese (eds.), Mirror 
Neurones and the Evolution of the Brain, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2002; and 
Stein Bråten (ed.), On Being Moved, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2007.  
161 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “In the Mirror of Medusa”, trans. Froma Zeitlin, in Mortals and 
Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, p.147. 
162 In Artaud’s fantastic suggestion: “The human face as it is is still searching with two eyes, a 
nose, a mouth and auricular cavities which correspond to the holes of orbits like the four 
openings of the burial vault of approaching death,” in “The Human Face”, trans. Clayton 
Eshleman, in Watchfiends and Rack Screams, Boston: Exact Change, 1995, p.277. As evident 
from the Richard Harris collection, drawn on for the Welcome Institute exhibition Death: A 
Self-Portrait (15.11.12-24.02.13), the skull is an emblem of death (and of vanitas) across 
most periods and cultures (also Death: A Picture Album, London: Welcome Trust, 2012).  
163 Georges Didi-Huberman, Être crâne, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000, p.31.  
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In Hans Belting’s analysis (not simply of the history of art but of the ontology of the 
image) by the time of the Renaissance the painted image no longer depicted the dead, 
but only death:  
 
A painting was now a unity, subject to the laws of empirical perception, and 
there was no longer any place in such a painting for two kinds of bodies; 
namely, actual corpses and bodies depicting the dead in another world… The 
skull was introduced in the Renaissance simultaneously with the lifelike 
portrait and as its indispensable pendant. It was a perception of the immanent 
world that paintings now reproduced, as if they were painted mirrors. Death 
caught up with the portraits of the living, whose death, like their life, took 
place in the realm of the living; the artist could no longer follow them further, 
into the Hereafter. Art had lost its ability to transcend the boundaries of this 
world…164 
 
Rather than the major tradition of metaphor – most familiar in allusions to art 
“hold[ing], as ‘twere, the mirror up to nature” [Hamlet, 3.2.18-19], and of “all the 
world’s a stage” [As you like it, 2.7.139] – in which an opposition between world and 
stage is elided (in the assimilation of the represented with its representation), in the 
minor theatrical tradition explored here the question of mimesis is (paradoxically) 
posed in a literal practice, or technique, of its stage(d) appearance(s). 
 
The unsettling sense of “another world” momentarily captured, cast, conceptualised, 
or presented theatrically is occluded by the major appeal simply to the spectacle of 
“this world”. This remains the case in the digital age where – in the question of the 
interface (that is, in the mimetic relation between actor and audience, addressed 
through voguish theatrical claims for new media) – it may be said that “the scene and 
the mirror have given way to a screen and a network.”165 Indeed, in a re-writing, as it 
were, for the Internet age of Walter Benjamin’s essay on “The Storyteller” (to which 
                                                
164 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlop, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.138. 
165 Jean Baudrillard “The Ecstasy of Communication”, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Bernard 
and Caroline Schutze, New York: Semiotext(e), 1988, p.12. (See also Benjamin’s essay on 
“The Poverty of Experience”, as well as his remarks on the Epic theatre discussed at the end 
of the Introduction.) 
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we will return at the beginning of the next chapter), Jean Baudrillard uses the example 
of theatre for recalling the era of metaphysics before the “electronic encephalisation” 
of “hyperreality”.166 Baudrillard writes:  
 
[T]hat which was previously projected, which was lived as a metaphor in the 
terrestrial habitat is from now on projected, entirely without metaphor, into the 
absolute space of simulation. Our private sphere has ceased to be the stage 
where the drama of the subject at odds with his objects and with his image is 
played out: we no longer exist as playwrights or actors, but as terminals of 
multiple networks… All this destroys the stage, once preserved through a 
minimal distance and which was based on a secret ritual known only to its 
actors.167  
 
Here the question of embodied co-presence, with the representational as the 
preservation of “a minimal distance”, has been displaced by that of the “live” as an 
after effect of the digitally mediated.168 The metaphysical question arising from the 
sense that we all die singularly is displaced by a sense that, so far as representation by 
the digital media is concerned, we are all already dead – terminally so. Paradoxically, 
therefore, “the theatre of death” offers some semblance of an aesthetic resistance to 
the very “post”-modernity that gives it historical specificity, as a question of 
understanding – anachronistically – a distinctive, minor tradition in the history of 
modernist art theatre from the past century.  
 
The relation between the visible and the invisible in the technique of the stage could, 
however, be thought to apply more familiarly to that between an actor and his or her 
part or role, as when impersonating dramatically – fictionally – a particular historical 
dead person, or a particular literary-derived persona or character (one that can have 
never “lived” or “died”, or have been otherwise visible in the world). In contrast to 
the theatre of death, the invisible in professional theatre ordinarily concerns the 
textual – paradoxically, since (to use Roman Ingarden’s distinction) it is into the 
scenic register of the visible that the Nebentext (all that is presented in written 
                                                
166 Ibid., p.17 and p.16.  
167 Ibid., p.16 and p.21. 
168 This thesis is the subject of many articles by Philip Auslander. 
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description by the playwright) appears to disappear (scenically materialised rather 
than simply imagined by the reader). Furthermore, making visible all that may be said 
to take place “between the lines” in the Hauptext (all that is written to be presented as 
speech or action) became the very work of theatre director-theorists as different as 
Stanislavsky and Brecht in the twentieth century.169  
 
Indeed, the question of the invisible (as of making visible the unspoken, or more 
literally the “unwritten”, aspects of the dramatic text) has been the privileged domain 
of the specifically modernist theatrical practice of the director or metteur-en-scène.  
As concerns the bodies on stage in such a theatre, “an unseen bears upon the scene” 
(in Elin Diamond’s felicitous expression)170 – where, nonetheless, the invisible 
remains modelled upon the visible. We shall see, below, how “death” provides a limit 
case of this visibility for the Western theatre; a limit case that is transformed in and by 
the theatre of death, the concept of which allows us to recognise its comparative 
practice in such precedents as Craig and Artaud, as well as in such exemplars as 
Kantor and Castellucci (not to mention Genet and Müller, whose work will be 
addressed in a separate study).  
 
Although, as Alain Badiou proposes, the director in the twentieth century “is 
something like a thinker of representation,”171 this major theatrical tradition does not 
necessarily conceive of itself as a “visual” (still less as a “metaphysical”) theatre – 
that is, a theatre in which vision or visible experience is the subject (in which a 
Schematism of representation may be theorised in practice) – but rather as a theatre of 
the visible, in which objects and people occupy stage space as they would 
(supposedly) in (the fictions of) “everyday life”, “nature”, or “the real world”. The 
                                                
169 The categories of Nebentext and Hauptext are taken from Roman Ingarden’s study, The 
Literary Work of Art (and an article, “The Functions of Language in the Theatre”, included as 
an appendix), trans. George Grabowicz, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 
pp.208, 319, and 377. 
170 Elin Diamond, Unmaking Mimesis, London: Routledge, 2008, p.ii. 
171 Alain Badiou, Our Century, trans. Alberto Toscano, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p.40. 
For Badiou, the emergence of the director is a significant “symptom” for understanding the 
last century – “the century of the theatre as art”, which “invented the notion of mise en 
scène.” Badiou notes that: “It transformed the thinking of representation into an art in its own 
right... an independent art... that belongs neither to that of the writer nor to that of the 
performer, but... creates instead, in both thought and space, a mediation between the two. The 
theatre director is something like a thinker of representation as such, who carries out a very 
complex investigation into the relationships between text, acting, space and public” (ibid.). 
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relation between the verbal and the visual – as a fundamental question of Occidental 
aesthetics, from Horace to Rancière, which conditions expectations as to the relation 
between the visible and the invisible on stage in the dynamics of human appearance 
and gesture – has (at least, in the world of dramatic theatre) made of the actor’s work 
of representation, or of mimesis, a relation between an interior “life” (as thought or 
motive) and its exteriorised expression, above all in speech (under the theatrical reign 
of the playwright, typically modelled, in modernity, upon the novelist).  
 
The familiar binary construction eliding spoken intelligibility with what is enacted (as 
its performed, or visible, expression) characterises what can be called (in the title of a 
study by Marvin Carlson) “the haunted stage”. The contrast of this (seemingly 
associated) idea of a “spectral” theatre with the theatre of death is manifest in the 
thought of the actor’s presence. It is not characters that haunt the theatre of death but 
actors themselves – where the roles played by their apparition(s) are not conceived of 
metaphorically but metaphysically. The appearance of the invisible occurs not in the 
expression of a literary, fictional, illusionistic character (as opposed to a real, 
material, or embodied actor); but in an unsettling of this binary distinction, as an 
uncanny “theatrical” event in which the living appear as “the dead”.172 Such an 
appearance of the actor is addressed specifically by Craig, for whom the 
“supernatural” on stage (“in the twentieth century”) provides an index for the 
successful theatrical understanding of Shakespeare, distinct from that of the reading 
imagination; for a production to “be fulfilling the poet’s intention instead of turning 
his majestic spirits into sepulchral-voiced gentlemen with whitened faces and robes of 
gauze”.173 
 
                                                
172 Roland Barthes identifies this as a “fundamental antinomy” in Western metaphysics (to be 
discussed below). Here we have a crucial instance (in relation to creative work with actors) of 
why the theatre artists discussed in this thesis are not “directors” in the usual sense (as this 
latter has been privileged in academic study of modern theatre history). The scenario of “the 
haunted stage”, furthermore, has been much in vogue of late, addressing what we might call a 
literary “theatre of ghosts”. The condition of “theory” in which this ghostly concept speaks of 
and to theatre will be the subject of critique in what follows (not least, in terms of the 
“theatre” identified theoretically by – and with – deconstruction, as highlighted for instance 
by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Mimesis and Truth”, in Diacritics, vol.8, n.1, Spring 1978, 
pp.20-21).  
173 Edward Gordon Craig, “On the Ghosts in the Tragedies of Shakespeare” (1908), in Craig 
on Theatre, ed. Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, p.176 and p.171.  
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As noted before, the specifically theatrical sense of the actor-audience relation might, 
more usually, be thought to model that between the living and the dead (as also that 
between the visible and the invisible) – a relation that has, indeed, been written for by 
many modern playwrights (to mention only Maeterlinck, Ibsen, Strindberg, 
Wyspianski, Pirandello, Ionesco and Beckett). For the theatre artists to be discussed 
here, however, the modelling of these relations is not simply reversed (where the dead 
and the invisible provide a model for the living and the visible in “the theatre of 
death”), but rather that something (already) unsettling in the order (or rationality) of 
these relations is theorised in the theatrical appearance of human being(s). What is 
“uncanny in mimesis” – distinct from the settled metaphysics of the “haunted stage” 
in major theatre histories – concerns not only what is strange in the appearance of the 
actor (that is, in the theatre “of death” specifically), but also the theoretical possibility 
of the analogy which informs the concept of appearance (or iconography) articulated 
in the very title of this thesis.174  
 
This is not then a metaphorical “theatre” engaged, for instance, with sacralising the 
thought “of death”. The possibility of the analogy condensed in the thesis title – in the 
aesthetic question of mimesis, as of a “likeness” or a comparison – is not given but 
has itself to be theorised. The theatre of death does not reproduce what is visible as 
theory (in its metaphor), but has first to construct it. This is, indeed, the topic of parts 
one and two of this thesis, as may be drawn from the indicative suggestion of Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe that: “[W]e can be installed in the visible realm: we do theory. All 
of which seems, in fact, since we’re speaking of theatre, to force itself upon us...” 175 
It may be then that the making of propositions in this thesis will prove to be the 
unmaking of its analogies (if “the uncanny in mimesis” is a model for “the theatre of 
death”), while trying to resist the lure of its metaphors.  
 
What precedents are there for theorising what kind of body the actor has (or is) in “the 
theatre”, at least in that “of death” specifically? For the naturalistic (Western) theatre 
this question is manifestly present following a fictional death or murder on stage, 
                                                
174 As chapter two will explore, considering Lacoue-Labarthe’s reference to the mirror (and 
the Gorgon), “the theatre of death” stages an image, or appearance, of what the concept of the 
uncanny in mimesis might be thought to refer to, as an “example” of that thought. 
175 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography”, trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Lacoue-Labarthe 
Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p.91.  
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concerning both the removal of the “corpse” and the curtain call. In the classic fifth 
act of tragedy, for instance, the taking up of the bodies is a convention for dealing 
with the actor who is supposed to die as (or with) his or her character. Significantly 
(as it points to what the theatre of death shows), the reality is precisely the opposite: 
the actor appears, in the all too “living” role that his or her body plays on stage, as the 
remainder of its representative character, without the fiction of its invisibility, without 
the alibi of its double’s “life”.176  
 
Within the conventions of the literary-interpretative theatre, these “inanimate” bodies 
are supposed to represent those of the dead – albeit confined to their “death” – as 
characters still belonging to the world of the fiction on (indeed, of) the stage (distinct 
from, and yet identified with, the world of the audience). Until they are carried off, or 
until the curtain falls, they “act dead” – lying immobile, typically with eyes closed or 
faces averted, whilst pretending not to breathe, as if impersonating their death. It is 
here that the theatre proves most “deadly”, in the sense famously despaired of by 
Peter Brook. The presence of the body becomes a limit case for the theatrical “mirror 
held up to nature” as precisely a question “of death”. It is not simply that the concept 
of the theatre of death offers a different answer to the question of what these bodies 
are doing on stage (acting “dead”); but that the question of their appearance is itself 
posed differently – as a question of the nature (or conceit) of that mirror and its 
promising mimetic reflections.   
 
Amongst innumerable affecting examples of this mirroring fiction one might think of 
the dead Cordelia, where the theatrical concept of the “mirror held up to nature” is 
made into both a verbal and a physical image of this character’s death, with its 
“invisible” breath. The actor-Lear declares: “I know when one is dead and when one 
                                                
176 The inverse of this is expressed by Herbert Blau, who makes this the index of the body’s 
“actuality” within a scene of signs (cited by Stanton Garner): “When Blau points out that the 
performer ‘can die there in front of your eyes; is in fact doing so,’ he is asserting only the 
most extreme formulation of the body’s radical actuality in performance. ‘Of all the 
performing arts, the theatre stinks most of mortality’.” (Garner, Embodied Spaces, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994, p.44.) As noted at the end of the Introduction, this suggestion 
in fact comes from Joseph Chaikin; but, as Garner goes on to suggest: “Theatre, of course, 
draws this mortality into itself, ‘ingests’ it (to borrow States’s term) in order to animate its 
fiction; for such contingency to intrude in something as extreme as the actor’s actual death 
would involve the ‘breaking’ of illusion. But, unlike the represented body in film, the body’s 
living presence on stage asserts a physiological irreducibility that challenges the stability (and 
the separability) of representational levels.” (Ibid.) 
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lives;/ She’s dead as earth. Lend me a looking-glass;/ If that her breath will mist or 
stain the stone,/ why then she lives” [V.3.258-261]. Itself an intimation of what the 
theatre of death acknowledges (concerning the “reality” of the actor’s image), it is 
perhaps because this literal metaphor points precisely to the fiction of this moment “of 
death” that it is so poignant theatrically. The body, like the mirror, is present 
physically rather than psychologically, as Lear, holding her in the fiction of frail 
embrace, haltingly attempts to comprehend the tragedy of his daughter’s transformed 
appearance, appealing still to who it is that the “cadaver” resembles. “Cordelia, 
Cordelia, stay a little…” [V.3.269], he implores, wanting to find in her being a 
moment of continued recognition of his own existence. The question of whose this 
body “is” now (whose life regained would “redeem all sorrows/ that ever I have felt” 
[V.3.266-67]) – that gives the pathos of Lear seeing his own end in outliving his child 
(and his Fool), as precisely the event of its image (as Blanchot evokes it, in his essay 
concerning “two versions of the imaginary”177) – is the very theatrical (and 
theoretical) question of the actor’s speech (or reflection) in which the (breath of) the 
audience is held.  
 
In contrast to this verbal image of classical drama, the inspiring mirror of metaphor – 
with its manifold illusions – is already cracked in the “theatre of death”. Here the 
question of mimesis addresses the presence of bodies, rather than characters; not least 
“after” the popular culture example of dummies, effigies, and mannequins (which will 
be returned to in the next chapter). Indeed, Jan Kott (in a collection of essays on what 
he calls “the Theatre of Essence”) identifies this as a “break” in the history of Western 
theatre, although not in his discussion of the dead within Kantor’s theatre, but in an 
earlier essay on Witkiewicz and Artaud. Citing the use of mannequins to figure the 
dead on stage (in the examples of Witkacy’s The Madman and the Nun and Artaud’s 
The Philosopher’s Stone), Kott writes that: “The theatricalisation of corpses is very 
important in the history of the contemporary, avant-garde theatre; the centuries-old 
convention of portraying the return of the dead in European theatre was completely 
broken.”178  
                                                
177 Maurice Blanchot, in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989. 
178 Jan Kott, “Witkiewicz, or the dialectic of anachronism”, trans. Joanna Clark and James 
McCandlish, in The Theatre of Essence, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1984, 
pp.71-2. This “portrayal of the dead” can be compared with the contemporary use of 
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In chapters four and five, we will critically examine how the enduring, Lazarean, 
sense of “bringing characters to life” informs a metaphysics governing theatre 
research – as a further variation of the “fundamental antinomy” (Barthes) that 
distinguishes the living from the dead, as the spirit from the letter of performance, the 
ephemeral from the enduring (or the actor from the archive) – in an example of Erika 
Fischer-Lichte’s, describing the “nightly resurrection of the dead” on stage distinct 
from this “theatricalisation of corpses”. As we shall see, however, understanding “the 
theatre of death” is not simply a question of the reversal of these possibilities (as if 
turning this metaphysics on its head), as if this minor tradition consisted simply in a 
return of these precedents in Kott’s “history of the contemporary, avant-garde” from 
the 1920s.179 Didier Plassard also remarks of this avant-garde’s turn from a mise en 
corps to a mise en effigie, in an aesthetic of “dehumanisation”, that: “were it to be 
realised [it] would overturn the meaning of dramatic art”.180 As we shall see, for 
Kantor (as for a concept of the theatre of death), this history involves the realisation 
that such a “mise en effigie” may serve as a model for the actor’s “mise en corps” 
(rather than its replacement), in working – “after” this break (Kott) or overturning 
(Plassard) – towards a new possibility, at least conceptually, in and for this mimetic 
art. 
 
While Kott’s observation holds for a view of twentieth century European art theatre, 
including the impact upon it (as he notes) of the conventions of oriental theatre 
(although it would be important to note that Artaud’s point of reference is not only the 
                                                                                                                                      
mannequins to satirise the living in, for example, Bruno Jasienski’s The Mannequins’ Ball 
(1929) [trans. Daniel Gerould, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000], part of a 
tradition of the “life” or animation of the inanimate figure taking revenge on the human 
manipulator (as the matter or material of the “lowest rank”, subject to such “manipulation”, in 
Schulz). Harold Segel comments on Jasienski’s play: “The mannequins are typical headless 
tailors’ dummies. Their bitter remarks about the cruelty of humans, which denies them the 
liberty to move about freely, recalls the theme of puppets, marionettes, and other inanimate 
figures that eventually rebel against their creators and masters. Needless to say, the 
mannequins’ complaints about their lot in life, the success or failure of their strikes, and that 
more and more they are being replaced by mannequins with heads, reflect Jasienski’s views 
on capitalist exploitation of workers” (Harold Segel, Pinocchio’s Progeny, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.254).  
179 Such a discussion is provided by Harold Segel, in Pinocchio’s Progeny, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1995 (which will be returned to in the next chapter) and by Didier 
Plassard, in L’Acteur en effigie, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1992.  
180 Didier Plassard, in L’Acteur en effigie, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1992, p.12. 
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“Oriental theatre” but also Alfred Jarry); the minor tradition of the theatre of death 
offers rather a revaluation of the “dramatic” distinction between the living and the 
dead, as not reducible to the distinction between character and actor. What Kott 
suggests is the opening up of a possibility, not its conclusion (in the theatre of death), 
when he writes of the Western tradition:  
 
The actor acts the role of a character, but it is impossible to act the role of a 
corpse; at most it is possible to simulate it. But to simulate a corpse means, in 
theatrical language, to pass from the technical devices of ‘acting’ to 
‘pantomime’. The only difference is that it is a pantomime with no gesture.181 
 
It is this impasse or aporia – of the “end of acting” – that the precedents of the theatre 
of death (such as Craig and Artaud, Maeterlinck and Witkacy) already address. To act 
without “acting”, to take as a model a mannequin or tailor’s dummy; this fundamental 
potential concerning the appearance of the actor (in effigie) in Western theatre – in 
Kott’s own avant-gardist vocabulary, of a “complete break” in that tradition – is 
indeed the index of the art (or essence) of theatre for Craig in his modernist 
discussion of Shakespeare’s ghosts, for instance. Not to act “like” a mannequin 
(which is not to act at all); nor to act “like” a dead person (in a “pantomime with no 
gesture”) – but rather as (or “like”) an actor, which Craig calls an über-marionette; or 
which Artaud calls an “animated hieroglyph”. The distinction between empathy and 
abstraction (pace Worringer) has an illustrious (albeit also minor) tradition within 
avant-garde experiments (such as the Bauhaus theatre). But it is in looking beyond 
this distinction that Kantor is the heir to both Craig’s aesthetic, and Witkacy’s 
Dadaist, anti-aesthetic, versions of an appearance of the dead on stage (which will be 
explored specifically in part three). 
 
The theatre of death (as its concept is given an outline in the relation between 
“precedents” and “survivals” in this chapter and the next) concerns the relation 
between the body and its image or representation; as a technique of the “flesh of the 
gaze” (Merleau-Ponty), concerning that “aspect” or “look” (Heidegger) of the dead 
(of the cadaver even), that appears in the actor – at least, in such an art of theatre that 
                                                
181 Kott, op. cit., p.72. 
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finds its concept in that “of death” (as distinct from its merely deadly simulation or 
impersonation). This appearance is not that of the corpse itself, but of its image; more 
particularly, that aspect of its image figured in its “look”, as this returns to the 
spectator from that of the actor, separated from the auditorium, on stage. How the 
actor “looks” is the practice of theatre and not that “of death” itself; for these “dead” 
have living bodies, after all – they are, indeed, “actors”, even “in effigy”. 
 
In the particular art of theatre that is called “of death”, the model for the actor is not 
then the life of a character – and the fiction of (its) death(s) – as if the theatre’s double 
were simply another representation of the living, paradigmatically in the major, 
dramatic (literary-interpretative) theatre’s cast of famous ghosts (not to mention such 
famous corpses as Hamlet or Cordelia). In the theatre of death, the actor’s model is, as 
it were, “no one” but rather a mimetic technique – for which the doll or the puppet has 
long been a figure – of effecting the uncanny look or aspect of the body in effigy, 
through gesture, mask, and make-up; to present a “likeness” of, or resemblance to, the 
sight of the dead, in both a seemingly inanimate (or automatic) gesture and a 
withdrawn (or withheld) gaze. It is as if the eyes of the mask had a vision of their 
own, disturbing the sense of what is visible, of what is to be seen, in theatre.182  
 
The fundamental issue – as it threads through this thesis (particularly with discussion 
of the photograph and of the Kantian Schematism in chapter five) – is the relation 
between the individual and the universal, the event and the concept, as it pertains to 
the appearance of the human actor on stage. In seeking to make a modern art of the 
actor’s appearance, the puppet is often evoked as its exemplar. As Sergei Obraztsov 
remarks, identifying what (in his view) is specific to an aesthetics of puppet theatre:   
 
                                                
182 In a series of telling, personal vignettes exploring “what is real in theatre”, Jan Kott offers 
the following example from Marcel Marceau, as an “allegory of theatre”: “Marceau takes 
invisible masks out of a basket and puts them on his powdered clown face. One follows 
another: tragic and comic masks, dignified and grotesque masks, and scary and tearful masks. 
The last of these is the powdered face of a clown with a red nose and gaping mouth. He 
cannot tear this last mask from his face. It has stuck and refuses to come off. Finally Marceau 
does tear it off and, under this last mask, finds his own face of a clown with white cheeks and 
a red nose. The mask is just one of his faces and his face is just one of his masks. This is why 
in that other Renaissance paradigm of theatre (which we find in Shakespeare), the theatre is 
not an image of the world, it is the world that is an image of theatre” (Kott, “The seriousness 
of theatre”, trans. Lillian Vallee, in Kott, op. cit., p.212). 
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It is needed as a unique and irreplaceable genre of the performing arts. No 
actor is able to create the representation of a generalised human being, because 
he is himself an individual. Only the puppet can do this, because it is not a 
human being.183  
 
It is the aesthetic and expressive possibility of what is “generalised” that the art of the 
puppet approaches – animate only when on stage, its “acting” is defined simply by its 
performance.184 The individual actor, within the major theatrical tradition, is thought 
to approach this quality only in “acting dead”, in the negation of his or her creative or 
expressive work. In its constraint, rather than potential, as a problematic reminder of 
the artifice of naturalism, “death” is an impossibility of and for the major tradition of 
acting. Obraztsov’s aesthetic nonetheless echoes the Constructivist ambitions for the 
actor (as a modernist rewriting of Kleist’s romanticism), as Kantor evokes these in his 
Milano Lessons:  
 
The constructivist theatre replaced Individual Figures with Types,/ who were 
the carriers, and even symbols of,/ Ideals, Modes, Conditions, that is, elements 
grounded in/ deeper layers of matter of life./ These types were stripped of their 
individual, private, petty problems/ and confusions so as to disclose the 
elements of/ Existence; the Principal Elements of/ Existence, that is,/ the pre-
matter of life.185 
 
For Kantor (as for Craig and for Artaud), the question of “theatre” is precisely to learn 
to recognise its “ur-matter” in the appearance of the actor through the distance 
between body and image (distinct from their identification “in character”), in order to 
be able to make of it an art, both mimetic and metaphysical.  
 
This art is not that of the major schools of actor training (such as the Stanislavsky-
Grotowski heritage), but a relation to an embodied thought – its “flesh” (pace 
                                                
183 Sergei Obraztsov quoted in Henryk Jurkowski, Aspects of Puppet Theatre, ed. Penny 
Francis, London: Puppet Centre Trust, 1988, p.24.  
184 Henryk Jurkowski, Aspects of Puppet Theatre, ed. Penny Francis, London: Puppet Centre 
Trust, 1988, p.3-4. 
185 Tadeusz Kantor, “Milano Lessons 6”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey Through Other 
Spaces, trans. & ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.231. 
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Merleau-Ponty) – in the relation between visible and invisible (that makes no appeal 
to individual psychology). Of his “discovery” of a relation between theatrical space 
and narrative time, of presence and absence on stage, as a place for the work of 
memory and repetition, Kantor writes (in 1988): 
 
The past exists/ in memory. Dead!/ Its inhabitants are/ Dead too. They are 
dead, but, at the same time,/ alive,/ that is, they can/ move, and they can even/ 
talk. These poor/ symptoms of life have, however, no/ purpose or/ 
consequence./ Pulled out of a three-dimensional,/ surprisingly flat/ practice of 
life,/ they fall into the hole of – / allow me to say this word –/ Eternity./ They 
lose their life’s functions/ and all their earthly privileges/ acquired during their 
earthly passage/ (one should not, however, belittle the value of this passage),/ 
to become Eternal./ Let me make this ominous sounding word/ more human/ 
and say: they become art./ They become a Work of Art.186 
 
This work of art – the actor’s body presenting an image of the invisible (as 
metaphysical rather than psychological, concerning the shocking “appearance” of 
existence rather than a character’s motives or interpretations); a “representation of a 
generalised human being” (Obraztsov187) – is that “transformation of the human body 
into representation” (Michaud188) which is identified by (and as) the theatre “of 
death”. This minor tradition addresses what Stanton Garner identifies as the theatre’s 
ongoing dealing with the “paradox of corporeality”, where “theatre displays a 
subjectivity always liable to objective framing and a visuality internally vulnerable to 
the body and its perceptual horizons,”189 with a modernist sense of the difference that 
art makes to the “life” of the body’s representation(s).  
 
For the theorists of a “theatre of death”, what is at issue is not another representation 
of the living – as a fiction (including “death”) – but of the dead for the living, as a 
look or appearance of – and from – “beyond” this world (as the stage stands to the 
                                                
186 Tadeusz Kantor, “Memory” (1988), trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further On, Nothing, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.413. 
187 Obraztsov, op. cit. 
188 Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, 
New York: Zone Books, 2004, p.236. 
189 Stanton Garner, Bodied Spaces, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, p.51.  
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auditorium); an appearance that permeates, or emanates from, the actor’s body in its 
theatrical “attitude”, through its movement, gesture, or technique. Distinct from 
naturalism, this attitude is suggestive of the automatic (as identified by Bergson and 
Kantor) or of the hieratic (as identified by Craig and Artaud). The actor offers an 
uncanny mimesis (and in its mimicry, a mockery even) of the spectator, as a body that 
appears possessed by a look that does not belong to it, that is not its own; in which the 
“I” would not recognise “itself” (as in the Gorgon’s mirror); as if seen from that 
“other space” (in Foucault’s account of the mirror190) of imagined (dis-)identification 
that we call the stage (the site of what, before shadows on a screen were set in motion 
as cinema, were called “phantasmagoria”). As Maeterlinck observes (much as Craig 
and Obraztsov):  
 
It is possible that we have to remove the living being from the stage. I do not 
deny that in this way we would return to the art of ancient times, in which the 
masks of the Greek tragic writers were the last remains. Perhaps someday a 
sculpture will be used in this respect, for people begin to ask some strange 
questions about sculpture. Or perhaps the human being will be replaced by a 
shadow, a reflection thrown on the screen, by symbolic forms or by some 
being that has the appearance of life but which is lifeless. I do not know: but 
the absence of the human seems to me essential. When a man enters into a 
poem, the great poem of his presence dims everything around. A man can 
speak in his own name only; he has no right to speak in the name of the whole 
world of the dead.191 
 
The great drama(s) (or “poem(s)”) of the major theatre’s history obscure(s) what may 
be seen in theatre itself – an evocation of the “whole world of the dead”. The aim of 
this thesis then is to elaborate the conceptual content of such an appearance – that of 
the actor as that of the dead – which is historically identifiable with various theatre 
artists’ practice, in terms not only of what is specific to the stage (or to theatre) but 
also of what is identified here as “the uncanny in mimesis”.  
                                                
190 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, trans. Jay Miskowiec, in Diacritics, 16.1, Spring, 
1986. 
191 Maurice Maeterlink, “Menus Propos” (1890), quoted in Henryk Jurkowski, Aspects of 
Puppet Theatre, ed. Penny Francis, London: Puppet Centre Trust, 1988, pp.12-13.  
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Craig’s concern with the artifice (as opposed to the nature) of the actor, in his 
visionary theatre of the über-marionette, echoes Bergson’s interest in the comic 
(addressed in the next chapter). However, rather than the cultural (mnemonic) 
“survivals” evident in the comic effect (not to mention the history of “lower strata” 
cultural spectacles of mental hospitals, waxwork displays, or films), Craig appeals to 
an image of ancient temple rites to address the future art of theatre.192 Neither a doll 
nor a puppet in imitation of the human, Craig’s model actor – the über-marionette – 
offers an image or semblance of what in and of the human actor is more than human, 
more than simply “living”. It presents an image of the human – theatrically – that 
evokes an appearance of what is absent from it, “death-like”. For Craig, the key test 
for the actor – or rather for the theatre as an art – is the appearance of the supernatural 
on stage, the evocation of what is “beyond” simply the appearance(s) of “this world”. 
Kantor also, in distinguishing theatre’s “everyday” practice from its possible art, 
identifies (with Witkiewicz) this potential of present absence as metaphysical – as, 
indeed, did Artaud (who even entitles an essay “metaphysics and mise-en-scène”). 
While metaphysics itself has a history, read today through its deconstruction, it 
remains (even if anachronistically) a key to this minor history – that “of death” – 
within modernist art theatre. 
 
Craig writes: “I pray earnestly for the return of the image – the über-marionette to the 
theatre”; to a theatre in which “homage [is] paid to existence – and divine and happy 
intercession made to death.”193 This “image”, this “figure, or symbolic creature”, of 
“ancient theatre” does not simply “replace the actor” (as even Kantor mistakenly 
repeats194), but rather provides a model for re-thinking both the puppet’s and the 
actor’s presence on stage, in an unsettling of the apparent dichotomy between the 
animate and the inanimate, between the visible and the invisible. Nonetheless, Craig 
still echoes a Platonic tone of “educating” the mimetic, when he proposes that:  
                                                
192 This is also the subject of the first “Prologue” to Craig’s Drama for Fools (cf. Le Theatre 
des Fous, eds. Didier Plassard et al, Montpellier: L’Entretemps, 2012, pp.66-73). 
193 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-marionette”, in Craig on Theatre, ed. 
Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, p.87. 
194 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Voy and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in 
Kantor, A Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993, p.108: “Craig’s idea of replacing the live actor with a mannequin – an 
artificial and mechanical creation…”  
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Then shall we no longer be under the cruel influence of the emotional 
confessions of weakness which are nightly witnessed by the people and which 
in their turn create in their beholders the very weaknesses that are exhibited.195 
To that end we must study to remake these images – no longer content with a 
puppet, we must create an über-marionette. The über-marionette will not 
compete with life – rather will it go beyond it. Its ideal will not be the flesh 
and blood but rather the body in trance – it will aim to clothe itself with a 
death-like beauty while exhaling a living spirit.196 
 
Here we return to the question, in reflecting on what death might be “like”: how 
might we envisage death theatrically? How does the body offer a semblance of death; 
or death “become” the body? How does the question of mimesis become theatrically 
specific in terms “of death”? What resemblance is possible between the actor and the 
dead, as the unsettling of that between the actor and the audience? How does the 
representative aspect of the dead become that of the actor – precisely as distinct from 
death (the corpse or cadaver)? These questions have a long history in terms of the 
mask, the effigy, the photograph (addressed throughout parts one and two of this 
thesis) – and also the iconographic gesture or (what Warburg calls) the “pathos 
formula”.197 It is not simply a question here of the culturally and historically various 
portrayals of death theatrically (as these “haunt” the stage), but of a concept of theatre 
(of theorising its aesthetics, both historically and anthropologically, rather than the 
reverse) that is culturally specific.   
 
The “theatre of death” (at least, as it is proposed in this thesis) is a concept of that 
theatre to which Craig’s reformation appeals (at the beginning of the twentieth 
century), as also Artaud’s appeal to theatre’s “double”. But this is a concept that has, 
in a sense, always still to be theorised, just like that “art of the theatre of the future” 
which Craig evokes – again, at the beginning of the last century – even as it may have 
                                                
195 This is the decline of the cathartic into pale imitation, the audience being no longer 
“tent[ed] to the quick” [Hamlet, II.ii. 593]. 
196 Craig, op. cit., p.86. 
197 It should be noted that Craig rejected the photographic comparison, just as Baudelaire had 
half a century earlier, cf. Craig, op. cit., pp.84-5, and Régis Debray, Vie et mort de l’image, 
Paris: Gallimard, 1992, p.367.  
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been already practiced in the past. Here we touch upon what is perhaps the 
fundamental aesthetic trope of modernism, precisely its concept of history, 
interrupting notions of tradition and cultural inheritance, in which the art of the past is 
to be understood in terms of the present – where, at least in terms of those fragments 
of the past that are found to survive, it is the art of the present that “explains” or 
“legitimises” that of the past.  
 
As Eliot remarks, in a line cited approvingly by Duchamp: “The past should be 
altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past.”198 The artist, 
Eliot writes, “is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is not 
merely the present, but the present moment of the past.”199 What Eliot calls here “a 
principle of aesthetic, not merely historical criticism,”200 resonates with what Walter 
Benjamin later calls a Copernican revolution in the concept of history.201 More than a 
reversal of values, the past “now” ceases to be a settled point of reference for the 
present (of influence, example, tradition, or legitimation). Any consideration of a 
concept of “the theatre of death”, belonging to this history of modernism, is engaged 
therefore with various artists’ sense of “the present moment of the past” as it speaks 
of and to a future of theatre that it thereby evokes. This sense is fundamentally what is 
meant by a concept of theatre practice here, where (as Adorno notes) its critical 
potential has the sense of a manifesto (in terms of which, indeed, it is often explicitly 
expressed): 
 
By turning toward their truth content, aesthetics is compelled – as philosophy 
– beyond the works. The consciousness of the truth of artworks is, precisely as 
philosophical truth, in accord with the apparently most ephemeral form of 
aesthetic reflection, the manifesto. The principle of method here is that light 
should be cast on all art from the vantage point of the most recent artworks, 
                                                
198 T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent”, in T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London: 
Faber and Faber, 1951, p.15. (Cited by Marcel Duchamp in his lecture, “The Creative Act” 
(1957), in The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, edited by Michel Sanouillet and Emer Peterson, 
New York: Da Capo Press, 1973, p.138.) 
199 Ibid., p.22. 
200 Ibid., p.15. 
201 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknapp Press, 1999, (K1.2) pp.388-89. 
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rather than the reverse, following the custom of historicism and philology, 
which, bourgeois at heart, prefers that nothing ever change.202  
 
As noted in the Introduction, the theorisations by the artists we are concerned with 
here appear to provide descriptions of a particular theatrical practice (at least of their 
own, now in the past); but these theorisations also offer (even if implicitly) a critique 
of prevailing professional practices (in terms of which they still address the present). 
Kantor, for example, knew precisely what he was being critical of, through direct 
experience of work as a set designer within the professional theatre apparatus of his 
time. 
 
The theatre “of” this title (death) has different exemplars, whose theorisations then 
propose ways of working in and for the future – even as they appear present in the 
past. As theorists their past lies ahead of them – their work makes a demand upon the 
understanding of “theatre” that has always to be rethought, as it is not given, where 
the past is a question of the present. While Craig and Artaud, Maeterlinck and 
Witkacy, are cited here as precedents, they are addressed not as part of a 
chronological history, in terms of their “influence”. As is evident in this chapter from 
the interchanging of reference between them, all these artists are (under the concept of 
the theatre of death) in a sense “contemporaries”. An aesthetic concept, if it aims not 
simply to reproduce the past, but to think truly the practice of an art, is also (pace 
Benjamin) a concept of history. As Adorno proposes: “It is in the dimension of 
history that the individual aesthetic object and its concept communicate.”203 The 
conceptual challenge of and for the writing of theatre history is, therefore, already 
proposed in the aesthetic practice(s) that it would address – if indeed its subject is an 
art of theatre and not simply its (professional) reproduction(s), as if the past was 
simply distinct from the present and its history a given of its archive. (The critique of 
such historicism is the very subject of “survivals” in the example of Warburg’s 
research project, exemplified by his library.)  
 
                                                
202 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: The Athlone 
Press, 1999, p.359. Adorno’s “lesson” concerning Aesthetic Theory underlies the whole of 
this thesis. 
203 Ibid., p.358. 
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Fundamentally, for a “theatre of death” what is at stake is how – maintaining the 
ambiguity of its active and passive senses – the actor “looks”, in relation to a model; 
not in the sense of casting (or indeed of the way that theatre typically advertises itself 
professionally through images of its exponents or stars), but of how an actor is “seen” 
(at least, theoretically); of what an other’s image, or appearance, looks like at all204; of 
how human presence signifies being on stage – in what can be called its living effigy, 
or double, as an actor; of how this figure or image “acts upon the eyes of the 
spectators”.205  
 
This phrase of Jean-Pierre Vernant’s addresses statues of gods, in the context of 
discussing the “public” existence of a figure that only exists “to be seen”, with the 
changed city architecture of the temple: “the task is to act upon the eyes of the 
spectators, to translate for them in a visible way the invisible presence of the god...”206 
This turn to a specifically anthropomorphic image (a fundamental question of and for 
human culture) is distinct – as an image, fashioned in a material – from the divine 
force that earlier animistic belief attributed to a material itself, often without an iconic 
form. Here the question of the “look” is fundamental for a concept of the “theatre of 
death”. In a discussion of the misconception of the “anthropomorphism” of the Greek 
gods, Heidegger addresses this key term as precisely “what is decisive for the 
appearance of the uncanny”.207 
                                                
204 Rather than “Spotlight” and “Central Casting”, the question of the “look” (Anblick) here 
draws upon Heidegger’s commentary on Kant’s analysis of the possibility of imagining 
concepts (of giving an image to a concept, or of the concept’s relation to experience), in the 
so-called “Schematism”: “The pure making-sensible occurs as a ‘Schematism’. The pure 
power of imagination gives schema-forming in advance the look (‘image’) of the horizon of 
transcendence” (in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, Bloomington: 
Indiana U.P., 1997, p.64; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1973, p.91). The question of the “look” is not simply one of translation, but the 
fundamental, underlying issue of this thesis; i.e. that of a concept of the “theatre of death”. 
The discussion of this in chapter five will also draw on Jean-Luc Nancy’s commentary on 
Heidegger (in The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham U.P., 2005, 
together with Nancy’s essay Le Regard du Portrait, Paris: Galilée, 2000).    
205 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “From the ‘Presentification’ of the Invisible to the Imitation of 
Appearance”, in Mortals and Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991, p.159.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, p.109. A proper discussion of this theme 
(which will be returned to at the end of the following chapter, as well as that of chapter five) 
would constitute a new thesis in its own right, for which the present document serves only as 
a prolegomenon. 
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The ambiguity in the sense of “look” or “appearance” – whether active or passive, as 
verb or noun – runs throughout this thesis, as characteristic of the concept of a 
“theatre of death”. This concept does not discriminate or decide between these 
meanings, settling for neither one nor the other, but oscillating between them. In this 
way the concept echoes the ambiguous sense of the ancient mimos as “both the 
performer and what is performed, just as ‘mimesis’ describes both the activity of 
representing and the result of it...”208 It is in this sense that theatre is a mimetic event. 
Despite appearances, the actor in the theatre of death is neither a character nor a 
puppet – although there is a long tradition amongst actors of protesting about the 
latter (despite its being a key trope of modernist aesthetics). Harriet Walter, for 
example, evokes this in a London rehearsal room, working with Yuri Lyubimov:  
 
The process was infuriating at times and very confusing, but if at worst we 
were puppets, so what? We could do the stuff we normally did for the rest of 
our lives. I had little sympathy for those who dug in their Method-acting heels. 
Why work with a director from another culture only to block his path with 
“That’s not how we do things round here?”209  
 
                                                
208 Elin Diamond (citing Göran Sörbom, Mimesis and Art) in Unmaking Mimesis, London: 
Routledge, 2008, p.v. 
209 Harriet Walter, Other People’s Shoes, London: Penguin Books, 2000, p.151. Still less is 
the actor an epileptic or hysteric – despite the interest in simulation (“malingering”) in the 
latter case. The fear of “unseen forces” taking possession of the body – “turning something 
frightening into something uncanny” – nonetheless makes people wary of these symptoms, in 
which we speak, not only of inanimate figures, but of “a living person as uncanny”. Freud 
notes that: “The uncanny effect of epilepsy and of madness has the same origin. The layman 
sees in them the working of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-men, but at the same 
time he is dimly aware of them in remote corners of his own being.” (Freud, “The Uncanny”, 
trans. James Strachey, in Pelican Freud Library, vol.14, ed. Albert Dickson, London: 
Penguin, 1985, pp.365-6). This also the fundamental dynamic in the play of appearance(s) in 
Genet’s play The Blacks and in Jean Rouch’s film Les Maîtres Fous (first shown in Paris, to 
much controversy in 1955), the “parallels” with which Genet insists upon in a letter to his 
Anglophone translator, Bernard Frechtman (in Théâtre complet, Michel Corvin & Albert 
Dichy, eds., Paris: Gallimard, 2002, p.913). In a curious phrase, Genet suggests that what he 
calls the “theatre of exorcisms” (associated with these “parallels”) is dead; while his then 
current project, The Screens, will offer an indication of the new direction in which he is 
already headed. Although Genet is a key figure in the history of the concept of the theatre of 
death, the focus of this thesis is only on Kantor, as the “author” of its title. The notion of a 
“theatre of exorcisms” is evocative but runs counter to the distancing (the “verbal 
architecture”) that Genet’s own theatre so carefully maintains, which means that one should 
also be wary of the lure of such “parallels”.  
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Indeed, as we shall see, Kantor explicitly formulates the theatre of death as a way of 
issuing from the impasse or aporia of this major antinomy in theatre history: “The two 
possible solutions [for the question of an art of theatre in the twentieth century] – 
either autonomous art and intellectual structure or naturalism – ceased to be the only 
ones…”210 Here we see a fundamental conceptual issue being addressed in aesthetic 
practice, being tested in a work of theatre as that “of death”. This is precisely the 
interest of a concept of the theatre of death for a critical history of modernist theatre, 
in its relation to techniques (or theorisations) of mimesis that appear – 
anachronistically in the “post-modern” – to be pre-modern survivals.211  
 
                                                
210 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Voy and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in 
Kantor, A Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993, p.108. (This key point will be developed in part three.) 
211 The suggestion of anachronism here is itself testimony to the survival of a critical 
modernism, since such a concept would be meaningless in the context of a universal “post-
modernism”.  
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part One 
 
Chapter 2: Survivals and the uncanny  
 
Figure of the gods, figure of the dead. In each case, the problem is the same: by 
means of localisation in an exact form and a well-determined place, how is it possible 
to give visual presence to those powers that come from the invisible and do not belong 
to the space here below on earth? The task is to make the invisible visible, to assign a 
place in our world to entities from the other world. In the representational enterprise, 
it can be said that at the outset, this paradoxical aspiration exists in order to inscribe 
absence in presence, to insert the other, the elsewhere into our familiar universe. 
Whatever the avatars of the image may have been, this impossible quest is one that 
perhaps continues to remain valid to a large degree – that of evoking absence in 
presence, revealing the elsewhere in what is given to view. – Jean-Pierre Vernant212 
 
While thought of the dead is typically excluded from the sense of modern “reality”, 
whether addressed in its material or psychical expressions (relegated to the realm of 
superstition or projection), the minor tradition of an art of theatre (“of death”) attests 
to the survival of the dead (at least, in appearance) within contemporary cultural 
practices. Modern science (and technology) supposedly replaces what it defines as 
superstition – for instance, in animism – just as the “rational” redefines the 
“irrational”.213 However, both the ambiguity and ambivalence of relations between 
the living and the dead (identified by psychoanalysis and anthropology) persist, 
evident in the fact that the question “of” the dead – their place in society – is 
continually re-addressed culturally. The public “disappearance” of both death and the 
dead, since nineteenth century developments in urban planning and medical science 
(part of the bio-political project of modernity), has a history after all. Significantly, 
for the cultural practice of modern art theatre, one of the most prominent historians of 
                                                
212 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “From the ‘Presentification’ of the Invisible to the Imitation of 
Appearance”, trans. Froma Zeitlin, in Mortals and Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991, p.153.  
213 This is not the least of Warburg’s concerns in the so-called “Serpent Ritual” lecture. 
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death – Philippe Ariès – characterises the modern era as, indeed, that of “invisible 
death”.214  
 
In a profound reflection on modernity, entitled The Storyteller, Walter Benjamin 
observes the corollary of this invisibility in the lost transmission of communicated 
experience (in the form of remembered stories) between the generations: “In the 
course of modern times, dying has been pushed further and further out of the 
perceptual world of the living”; and with dying the image, the look, of the dead 
also.215 In a review of a new book by Cees Nooteboom, Alberto Manguel also writes, 
as if it were self-evident:  
 
We have no patience with death these days. The idea of letting our every third 
thought be the grave seems inadmissible in a society that values above all a 
paradoxical mixture of speed and immortality. The stories we prefer must be 
told quickly, and allow for little pause and less reflection. Our preferred 
condition is foolishness.216  
 
The dead do not cease to exist, however, and the question remains (or survives) as to 
their place in modern society (or in life). In an art that is defined neither by public 
                                                
214 Coincidentally, Ariès’ work was published in the same years as Kantor’s “theatre of death” 
project, the mid-1970s. (Philippe Ariès, The Hour of our Death, trans. Helen Weaver, New 
York: Viking, 1981, and Western Attitudes Towards Death, trans. Patricia Ranum, London: 
Marion Boyars, 1994.) Derrida offers a critical reading from the point of view of philosophy 
– that is, as a question, rather than an anthropological-historical explanation, of death in 
Aporias (trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp.25-26). 
Concerning the historicity of instances of “my death”, however, we may note that the medical 
“professionalisation” of terminal care has changed the meaning of a “good death” from one 
concerned with conscience (related to a “good life”) to one purely of the mitigation of pain 
(related to pharmacology), which becomes “newsworthy” in the context of health service 
economics (see, for example, articles by Ian Wylie and Eve Richardson in The Guardian, 
18.01.12, “Social Care” section, p.3). The “legal right” to one’s “own death” – when made 
explicit in the case of assisted suicide – remains one of the most contested of relations 
between state and individual (as if this history, since the “example” of Socrates, was 
constantly being forgotten). The sense of individual death overtaken by mass death is 
characteristic of an understanding of the twentieth century, in which colonial genocide 
occurred in the heart of modern Europe itself.  
215 This latter is the “subject” of many of Samuel Beckett’s late prose pieces (of which Ill 
Seen Ill Said is exemplary). (Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller’, trans. Harry Zohn, in 
Selected Writings, vol.3, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.151.) 
216 The Guardian, 22.7.2011 [http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/jul/22/foxes-come-at-
night-review?INTCMP=SRCH]. 
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commemoration, nor by private remembrance, the dead have not yet disappeared from 
theatre – as the very question of modes of human visibility (including that of civic 
space, the ambiguities of which were touched on in the Introduction with Benjamin’s 
discussion of epic theatre). Here the (re)appearance of the dead theatrically is what is 
to be researched; as a concept, rather than a metaphor – as the uncanny in mimesis, 
rather than the recent vogue for celebrations of “the haunted stage”.217 In terms “of 
death”, the space – or rather the event – of “theatre”, its modes of visibility (in the 
modern interplay of public and private), takes on a critical specificity of its own, the 
possible concept of which it is the aim of this thesis to develop.  
 
While the “theatre of death” is essentially a twentieth century art theatre practice 
(associated with the modernist appeal to the aesthetics of puppetry and to the 
“Oriental” turn, for both of which Craig and Artaud appear as precedents), its concept 
also draws historically on forms of popular culture, which themselves draw on 
funerary and votive practices. The art historian Julius Schlosser noted, for instance, 
such survivals of cultural practice once associated with votive rites in both ancient 
times and in the Renaissance amongst the “lower social strata” of early twentieth 
century “fairground booths, barber shops, tailor shops”.218 Famously evoked by 
                                                
217 The question of the “material and the psychical” appearance, or return, of the dead will be 
discussed below with the uncanny in Freud. While the history of the dead and their literal 
exclusion from the modern urban environment is perhaps most trenchantly analysed by 
Philippe Ariès (which may be compared with a “bio-political” reading in Foucault), the terms 
constituting the field of research for theatre practice here – reality, superstition, and survival – 
are particularly those of Georges Didi-Huberman’s reading of Aby Warburg, and will be 
returned to throughout part one of this thesis, in which the “theory” of theatre and its possible 
“objects” are discussed critically in the light of a concept “of death”. (“The Haunted Stage” is 
the title of a study by Marvin Carlson [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003] that 
addresses the dramatic canon and the literary-interpretative theatre practice(s) that “bring it to 
life”.) 
218 Julius Schlosser, “History of Portraiture in Wax”, trans. James Loughridge, in Ephemeral 
Bodies: Wax Sculpture and the Human Figure, ed. Roberta Panzanelli, Los Angeles: Getty 
Research Institute, 2008, p.173. The use of the term “survivals” (and the corollary 
“superstition”) in Schlosser is examined in the reading by Georges Didi-Huberman, 
“Viscosities and Survivals”, trans. Jane Todd, in Ephemeral Bodies, ed. Roberta Panzanelli 
(pp.159-163), and as part of his critique of the “history” of Art History in Confronting 
Images, trans. John Goodman, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005, as 
well as such articles as “Artistic Survival: Panofsky vs. Warburg and the Exorcism of Impure 
Time”, Common Knowledge, vol.9, n.2, Spring 2003. On the most familiar of “modern” 
waxwork exhibitions, see Pamela Pilbeam, Madame Tussaud and the History of Waxworks, 
London: Hambledon & London, 2003, and Marina Warner’s history of Mme Tussaud, 
“Waxworks and Wonderlands,” in Visual Display: Culture Beyond Appearances, eds. Lynne 
Cooke and Peter Wollen, New York: The New Press, 1998; and on the tableaux of the Musée 
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Alexander Blok and (here) by Bruno Schulz, these survivals offer the “lowest rank” 
of man’s image (imago hominis) as seen, or represented, “in the shape and semblance 
of a tailor’s dummy”; or of a waxwork that “belonged to this world only in 
appearance”.219 Kantor himself speaks of the popular gestus preserved by the circus 
(not least in its celebration by twentieth century painters such as Maria Jarema and 
Pablo Picasso): “The circus, like the waxworks show, always existed on the periphery 
of institutional culture... And this despised gestus has remained in our art and our 
society until today.”220 Indeed, the very name of Kantor’s theatre company “Cricot 2” 
reaffirms the Francophone anagram (read backwards) of the Polish to cyrk meaning 
“it’s a circus” that was coined by the first Krakow artists’ group for their theatre 
“Cricot” in 1933.  
 
Besides such “lower rank” appearances of the human in effigie (with its popular 
metaphysics of a revenge of matter over form) – to which we might add the spectacle 
of the plastinated dead in Gunther von Hagen’s contemporary “Body Worlds” shows 
(which also remain outside of the hallowed gallery space) – there is the appearance of 
the actor him- or herself.221 The question of an iconography of the actor in its 
                                                                                                                                      
Grévin, see Vanessa Schwartz, Spectacular Realities, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998, and “Cinematic Spectatorship Before the Apparatus”, in Cinema and the 
Invention of Modern Life, eds. Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwartz, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995. Mike Kelley gathered an exhibition of everyday, non-aesthetic objects 
evoking “the uncanny” (shown at Tate Liverpool), with a catalogue book, The Uncanny, 
Cologne: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2004. 
219 Bruno Schulz, “Tailors’ Dummies” in The Street of Crocodiles and “Spring” in 
Sanatorium under the Sign of the Hourglass, trans. Celina Wieniewska, London: Picador, 
1988, p.41 and p.185.  
220 Tadeusz Kantor, in Encounters with Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 
2002, p.108. Maria Jarema was the sister of Jozef Jarema, co-founder (with Wladislaw 
Dobrowolski) of the original Cricot artists’ theatre in Krakow in 1933; and was herself one of 
the co-founders, with Kantor and Kazimierz Milkulski, of the Cricot 2 in 1955 (cf., 
Miklaszewski, p.1 & pp.5-6). In an interview with Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, for instance, 
Kantor notes the association of the “circus” with the Cricot theatre: “I remember that the pre-
war Cricot 1 theatre had been… built on Blok’s Balaganchik (Fairground Booth),” in The 
Journal of Dramatic Criticism, Fall 1995, p.224. In 1938, while a student of Karol Frycz at 
the Academy of Fine Arts in Krakow, Kantor translated Blok’s “Balaganchik” together with 
Wanda Baczynska (see the biographical “chronology” in Miklaszewski’s Encounters (trans. 
Barabara Herchenreder), op. cit., p.156; and Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory 
Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.26). On 
Kantor’s own contact with the original Cricot whilst a student in Krakow during the 1930s, cf. 
also Plesniarowicz, pp.25-26 and pp.48-49. 
221 In the nineteenth century medical museums also had a great vogue. Besides the major 
hospitals, Didi-Huberman cites the example of “the travelling museum of the [quack] Doctor 
Spitzner, who would go from fair to fair, with his exhibit number one hundred: a life-size 
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associated “moral” terms, may be anticipated here, as the debased, degraded (or even 
degrading) image of the human being in “society” has all too often been furnished by 
that of “the actor” him- or, more especially, herself.222 Only in the twentieth century 
has the profession of acting been made socially or institutionally respectable, 
precisely to the exclusion of the newly degrading example of mannequins or puppets, 
as a metaphor now impugning a professional “art” or technique.223 It is, however, this 
very example (or model) of and for the actor’s appearance that nonetheless survives 
aesthetically through the minor theatrical tradition “of death”.  
 
Such expressions of the thought of human appearance – or of mimesis – from the 
“lowest rank” of cultural practice provide a key for Kantor’s theatrical imagination 
(as they had for Meyerhold also, himself an important precedent for Kantor224). This 
particular historical sense of cultural survivals in the encounter of reality (of material) 
and art (metaphor) within the “degraded” endures, for example, in Luc Tuyman’s 
2010 exhibition, in Bruges, of Central European art “today”, which was 
conceptualised – with explicit reference to Kantor – under the title of The Reality of 
the Lowest Rank.225 The existing potential of this aesthetic idea (as also of Bruno 
                                                                                                                                      
group representing a ‘Lecture of Professor Charcot’!” (in The Invention of Hysteria, trans. 
Alisa Hartz, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, p.30). The “Body Worlds” website also 
features a reproduction of Rembrandt’s Anatomy Lesson painting and a citation from Kant: 
http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/gunther_von_hagens/life_in_science.html. Equally on the 
“outside” of the legitimate(d) history of human representations are such examples of “dolls” 
as that created by Oscar Kokoschka in the wake of his affair with Alma Mahler and by the 
“asylum inmate” Katharina Detzel (Colin Rhodes, Outsider Art, London; Thames & Hudson, 
2000, pp.58-59). 
222 Jonas Barish devoted a whole study to this widespread phenomenon under the title of The 
Anti-Theatrical Prejudice, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. See also, Erika 
Fischer-Lichte, “Theatre and the Civilising Process: an Approach to the History of Acting”, in 
Interpreting the Theatrical Past, eds. Thomas Postlewait and Bruce McConachie, Iowa: 
University of Iowa Press, 1991. 
223 Besides Craig’s laments at being misunderstood in his account of the actor and the über-
marionette (in the 1924 Preface to On the Art of the Theatre, ed. Franc Chamberlian, London: 
Routledge, 2009, pp.xxii-iv), see the example from Harriet Walter, observing others resisting 
their work with Lyubimov, cited at the end of the previous chapter. 
224 “Kantor always acknowledged Meyerhold as the greatest theatre artist of the twentieth 
century. He introduced the theme of Meyerhold’s martyr-like death into Today is my 
Birthday,” (Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, 
Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.26). 
225 The curators of this exhibition cite Kantor’s 1978 Rembrandt Prize speech, a reflection on 
the artist’s relation to mortality, in referencing his “choice to use ordinary objects, the stuff of 
everyday life, of meaningless rubbish for the making of his art…” (Luc Tuymans, Tommy 
Simoens, and Edwin Carels, in Luc Tuymans, The Reality of the Lowest Rank: A Vision of 
Central Europe, Tielt: Lannoo Publishers, 2010, p.28). In this they echo the theme of the 
 95 
Schulz’s writings, with which it is essentially associated – to mention only the work 
of the Quay brothers) offers a practical refutation of the curious conclusion offered by 
Harold Segel’s commentary on Kantor’s “theatre of death”, in the context of 
discussing modernist puppet theatre. At the end of his description of several of 
Kantor’s later productions, Segel proposes that:  
 
Kantor’s obsession with death and pastness, with the urgencies and fragilities 
of memory, are rooted in his Polishness. Extrapolating, therefore, from his 
own unique use of mannequins and dummies in his ‘theatre of death’ to any 
broader post-modern literary or theatrical interest in the puppet cannot be 
justified.226  
 
Whilst one might accept the suggestion that the elision of a contemporary notion of 
the “post-modern” with a survival of pre-war modernism (concerned with the truth of 
aesthetic realities), indeed, “cannot be justified”, Segel’s claim concerning “Kantor’s 
obsession” surely cannot be justified either. If it is possible to extrapolate from 
Kantor’s work (and such is, after all, the present thesis) – not least, with respect to a 
“theatrical interest” in the actor – it is because Kantor’s practice involves its own 
                                                                                                                                      
father’s lecture to the seamstresses in Schulz’s Treatise on Tailor’s Dummies: “We are simply 
entranced and enchanted by the cheapness, shabbiness, and inferiority of material” (in The 
Street of Crocodiles, trans. Celina Wieniewska, London: Picador, 1988, p.41). The key of 
Schulz’s work (Kantor refers to his “kinship” [Miklaszewski, op. cit., p.35]) will be returned 
to in part two. Interestingly, in the dialogue between Alison Glass and Paulina Pobocha about 
the Bruges exhibition, the notion of “the reality of the lowest rank” is identified as a 
“sculptural concept”, expanding (or perhaps amplifying) an aspect of its sense in Kantor 
(ibid., p.116; also, p.62-64). Yet more contemporary evidence of the valence of this term is 
given in its citation by the curators of the 2011 The Power of Fantasy exhibition of 
contemporary Polish artists, presenting (in the introductory words of the Polish Minister of 
Culture) “a unique meeting of two generations of artists: recognised masters and artists who 
began their artistic journeys after the fall of communism”, at the Bozar Gallery in Brussels, 
accompanying the beginning of the first ever Polish presidency of the EU, cf. David Crowley, 
Zofia Machnicka, and Andrzej Szczerski (eds.), The Power of Fantasy – Modern and 
Contemporary Art of Poland, Munich: Prestel, 2011, p.16 and p.11. 
226 Harold Segel, Pinocchio’s Progeny, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995, 
p.331. Segel’s sense of Kantor being a “dead end” in the context of modernist puppetry 
contrasts with (for example) Didier Plassard and Henryk Jurkowski. Comparison might also 
be made with Pawel Althamer, amongst those represented in an exhibition considering 
“performativity” in works by Kantor and contemporary Polish artists: Sabine Folie (ed.), The 
Impossible Theatre, Nuremberg: Verlag für Moderne Kunst, 2005. That Althamer himself is 
not interested in the comparison (ibid., p.42) does not obviate the wider context in which it 
has a bearing, particularly as it may be explored through the paradoxes of what is and is not 
“visible” in the art work (cf. Roman Kurzmeyer, Adam Szymczyk, & Suzanne Cotter: Pawel 
Althamer, London: Phaidon Press, 2011).  
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conceptual articulation, above all in relation to the history of twentieth century, avant-
garde art (including puppetry).227 In complete contrast to Segel’s suggestion, for 
instance, Roger Planchon – reflecting on the Cricot 2’s visit to the Théâtre Populaire 
in Lyon (with Let the Artists Die), in June 1986 – suggests that: “The realm of 
Tadeusz Kantor’s apparitions is the realm of our past, the pasts of such citizens of the 
world as ourselves, and perhaps these old-fashioned Polish pictures are the ironic 
harbingers of our future.”228 In so far as this thesis has a “manifesto” interest of its 
own, it is precisely to advocate the anachronism of a future (“after”) modernism that 
is not “post”-modern.   
 
Kantor’s use of the mannequin (other than in a pleonastic sense) is neither “unique”, 
nor simply “rooted in Polishness”, in so far as it is theorisable and therefore 
“extrapolable” – not least as it resists siren appeals towards the cultural reefs of the 
“post-modern”. Kantor’s insistence on the sense of the avant-garde, for instance, 
situates his work against the claims of “post-modernism” by definition (precisely in 
its particular Central European, indeed Polish, context).229 Here, however, we must 
beware of simply abstracting Kantor’s theatre – especially in translation – out of his 
“Polishness”. The tension between Romanticism and Modernism, for instance, has a 
specifically Polish history to which Kantor belongs (which will be discussed in part 
                                                
227 Although this is indicated in the exhibitions already referred to, the concept of “the reality 
of the lowest rank” is in one sense “rooted in Polishness” – with its specifically Jewish 
heritage, in Bruno Schulz (where this is a pre-war “Polishness” that is multiethnic). However, 
it is also explicitly related by Kantor to international concern with the art object, the material 
work of art, after such precedents as Dada and Surrealism (especially Duchamp), as well as 
his engagement with post-war art informel, in such contemporaries as Fautrier and Matta. 
228 Roger Planchon, quoted in Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, op. cit., p.288. Planchon’s text is 
reproduced in the Cricot 2 Information Guide 1986, ed. Anna Halczak, Krakow: Cricoteka, 
1986, pp.72-73. 
229 Here we might note the curious example of some of Michal Kobialka’s essays about 
Kantor that often suggest the pertinence of such a “post-modern” reading as they inscribe 
Kantor’s “example” into the discourses of philosophers such as Deleuze, Lyotard, and Badiou 
– as if this “example” was rendered contemporary by such a transcription, rather than finding 
in its resistance a “minor” reading, as it were, of the very pertinence of these thinkers. It is my 
impression that these instances concern a question of Kobialka’s own academic situation 
rather than Kantor’s: see, for example, Kobialka’s “Tadeusz Kantor’s Practice: A Post-
Modern Notebook” (in Performing Arts Journal, 28.1, January 2006), where, for example, 
Deleuze is cited as if he were ventriloquising Kantor (p.23). For a critical discussion of the 
enduring interest of the avant-garde in the context of claims concerning “post-modernism”, cf. 
Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp (especially chapters 5 and 8), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1998.  
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three) – a history that itself belongs to European cultural memory.230 His commitment 
to aesthetic autonomy, furthermore, expresses a consciousness of the political history 
of modernism – allied to an avant-garde all too aware of what the fate of a Meyerhold, 
or a Witkacy, represents, both politically and artistically, in the terror of revolutionary 
“freedom”; that is, of a political “emancipation” intolerant of appeals to the autonomy 
of either art practice or its history.231  
 
After all, the term “avant-garde” derives from a military-political context, as echoed 
by Jakub Berman (one of the triumvirate of Stalin’s representatives in the post-war 
Polish communist government) in his replies to Teresa Toranska’s questions about the 
party’s monopolisation of power by 1948, in the face of widespread popular 
opposition:  
 
You can accuse us of being in the minority, and yes, we were. And so what? 
Nothing! That doesn’t mean anything! Because what does the development of 
mankind teach us? It teaches us first of all that it was the minority, the avant-
garde, that rescued the majority... That’s simply the way that history is 
made.232  
 
                                                
230 Kantor himself relates the “universal” emotional impact of his two “theatre of death” 
productions (The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole) to the context of Polish Romanticism 
(with Mickiewicz and Wyspianski), given that, for him: “a national art only begins to matter 
when it manages to cross its national frontiers” (cf. Miklaszewski, p.105). 
231 The limitations of this position in the situation of the 1970s, as the example of art informel 
gave way to conceptual art, is fundamental to the reading of East European art history by 
Piotr Piotrowski (see, for example, “How to Write a History of Central-East European Art?” 
in Third Text, 23.1, January, 2009, p.12). It is noteworthy that Meyerhold’s murder figures in 
Kantor’s final production, Today is my Birthday; but the nearest “contemporaries” of the 
situation of the artist presented there are still Kantor’s friends connected with the inter-war 
period, Maria Jarema and Jonasz Stern. (Kantor had access to Meyerhold’s ideas from 1920s 
publications whilst still a student during the 1930s. New editions of Meyerhold’s work were 
not published until after his “rehabilitation” in the late 1960s, cf., Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, 
op. cit., p.26.). It would be important to remember in this context also the Polish author Bruno 
Jasienski, who had first hand experience of the Soviet revolution (like Witkacy), and who was 
murdered in Moscow during the purges, whose play The Mannequins’ Ball (1927) received 
its first Polish production in 1957, directed by Jerzy Jarocki in Katowice.    
232 Jakub Berman, in Teresa Toranska, Oni: Stalin’s Polish Puppets, trans. Agnieszka 
Kolakowska, London: Collins-Harvill, 1987, p.257.  
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In this ruthless, Darwinist sense of the way that “history is made” not only the living, 
but even the dead are condemned in the name of a future in which millions were not 
expected to survive.  
 
Besides the fairground sideshows, or exhibitions of the human in effigy (survivals of 
pre-modern cultural practices “of death”), so celebrated by Kantor, there are also the 
“lower social strata” practices of spiritualist theatre represented by so-called 
“materialist mediums”, whose performances – making of the body a double of itself 
through trance or possession (often with the curious “relic” of ectoplasm) – 
accompany the rise of mass photography, and which offer a fascinating comparison 
with claims for the now institutionalised culture of “live art”.233 An earlier 
formulation of this (gendered) evidence of forms of possession, with its implied 
evocation of the “little death” of orgasm, occurs already in Rabelais who describes the 
“hysterical” throes of the female body as offering “a real semblance of death”.234 
Didi-Huberman (quoting Rabelais) does not dwell on what might be meant by a “real 
semblance” here, but we may note how death becomes (in both senses) the living in 
the uncanny appearance of the automatic within the animate (female) body, as if 
possessed by an organic double (distinct from the mask or photograph) in the spasms 
induced by a variety of techniques (in which culture masquerades as nature).  
 
It is important to remember here that the theatre of death refers to representation 
rather than the “real” – to tailors’ shops and not to butchers’ shops, to circuses and not 
to bullrings. In his commentary on proto-cinema, Philippe-Alain Michaud takes up 
the same thread concerning survivals that appears in Schlosser’s study (through its 
association with Schlosser’s contemporary, Aby Warburg). Indeed, Michaud offers 
the keynote of comparison between the media of all these diverse practices of the 
human in absentia and in effigie by referring them to the “transformation of the body 
                                                
233 The “reality of the lowest rank” – as informe [or informel], to give it its post-war aesthetic 
designation (itself a key point of reference for Kantor) – is, as Schulz’s “father” reminds us, 
“the ectoplasm of mediums” (Bruno Schulz, op cit., p.46). On materialist mediums, see, for 
example, Simon Featherstone, “Spiritualism as popular performance in the 1930s: the Dark 
Theatre of Helen Duncan”, in NTQ, 27:2, May 2011.  
234 Didi-Huberman, The Invention of Hysteria, trans. Alisa Hartz, Cambridge, Mass.: 2003, 
p.69.  
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into representation”.235 The reappearance of the ancient Roman funerary custom of 
displaying wax facemasks of the deceased during the Renaissance interested both 
Warburg and Schlosser and is also appealed to by another key representative of the 
“theatre of death” (whose work will, however, only be discussed briefly in chapter 
five), Jean Genet.236 As Kurt Foster summarises Warburg’s development of themes 
broached in Burckhardt’s essays on the art of the Renaissance:  
 
He set the prominent appearances of local patricians among the saintly actors 
in the frescoes of Florentine chapels in connection with the almost totally 
forgotten practice of placing life-size wax figures as votive images in 
churches. The implication of these examples for cultural history is in their 
interplay of past and present, in an evolving “cultural psychology”...237 
 
As is suggested by the fascination of the mirror, the human body is imagined through 
the existence of its double, and haunted by the anxiety that this double may have a life 
of its own, not only in the modernity of cinema but in the “primitivism” of the 
shaman; not only in the magic of theatre but also in the clairvoyance of dreams.  
 
In his “anthropology of images”, Hans Belting notes “how the image has lost its 
symbolic power, how death has become an abstraction and the analogy between the 
                                                
235 Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, 
New York: Zone Books, 2004, p.121. That this concerns the survival of votive practices in 
aesthetic ones specifically should not hide the ways in which such issues arise in the wider 
frame of the Capitalist “theatre of death” in the (big) business of “everyday life”. In an article 
in The Guardian (21.4.12, p.46), Susie Orbach writes: “A demand that from the age of five to 
our dotage, we should not simply be concerned with how we look, but how our image can 
mimic the limited range of digitally manipulated aesthetic possibilities that we see too many 
times a day to count. Indeed, in a survey for Girl Guiding UK, only 5% of teenage girls said 
they wouldn’t change any aspect of their appearance. The beauty companies, the fashion 
houses, the diet companies, the food conglomerates (who also of course own the diet 
companies), the exercise and fitness industry, the pharmaceutical and cosmetic surgery 
industries combine, perhaps inadvertently, to create a climate in which girls and women come 
to feel that their bodies are not OK. We have moved from a position in which the joys of 
decoration have turned into a command of transformation and the production of a body that 
can fit.”  
236 Cf. Jean-Claude Schmitt, Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 
2001, p.231; also Richard Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence, New York: 
Academic Press, 1981, pp.61-62. 
237 Kurt Foster, “Aby Warburg’s History of Art”, in Daedalus, vol.105, 1976, p.172. 
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image and death, which seems as old as image-making, has fallen into oblivion.”238 In 
this context he cites a discussion of Louis Marin’s that echoes Michaud’s, reflecting 
on the use of images (or effigies) in rituals that include the dead amongst the 
community of the living. Marin speaks of an “ontological transformation” of the body 
into an image, whereby (as Belting comments): “the social realm is expanded, for 
dead members remain present in their image.”239 
 
The terms for this “transformation” of the body – in absentia and in effigie – are taken 
(in this thesis, rather than in Michaud, Marin, or Belting) from Freud’s critique of the 
dynamics of transference, as both the practice and the theoretical object of 
psychoanalysis. By forestalling the promise of the reciprocity of the look, the 
psychoanalytic “mise-en-scène” induces its fictions (in the life of phantasy).240 
Indeed, psychoanalysis offers an example of a fundamental research at the threshold 
of the relation between the living and the dead in the twentieth century. In contrast to 
the strange attempts to use photography to “verify” the powers of mediums, Freud 
developed a new science of this relation, in which precisely a “psycho-analysis” 
would transform the suggestive powers of the séance. While the Freudian “dialectic of 
enlightenment” affirms the sense of votive cultural practices as everyday 
superstitions, it theorises the capacity of psychic life – for the most modern of human 
subjects – of maintaining communication with imagos of the absent; not only the 
dead, but those who have never existed other than as the phantasy of the subject (in 
the constellation of the super-ego). Freud even suggests that the play of fictions in 
which the therapeutic endeavour is caught may be interrupted by a “theatrical” 
production of reality, the very shock of which attests to the lures of these 
phantasmatic sirens.241  
 
The anthropological phenomenon of the king’s “two bodies”, of the shaman’s two 
bodies, or of the divine’s two bodies, also attests to the fundamental capacity of 
human consciousness to address the dead (the metaphysical “theatre” of which is the 
                                                
238 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlop, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.128. 
239 Ibid., p.130. 
240 Sigmund Freud, The Dynamics of Transference, trans. James Strachey, vol. XII, Standard 
Edition, London: Hogarth Press, 1978, p.108. 
241 Sigmund Freud, “Transference-Love”, quoted by Georges Didi-Huberman, The Invention 
of Hysteria, trans. Alisa Hartz, Cambridge, Mass.: 2003, p.257.  
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counter-part to its modern art). The power of the body’s “transformation into 
representation” endures furthermore in the fascination with the cave paintings of pre-
historic human beings (celebrated, for example, in Werner Herzog’s 2010 film, 
oscillating between matter and metaphor, Cave of Forgotten Dreams), with the sense 
that the handprints at Chauvet address us, or “speak” to us, from the other side of 
history.  
 
Like art, death also has a history – it is not simply an accident, but is the point at 
which the values of social life are most radically exposed. Here one might make an 
inversion of the classical motto (eloquently recalled by Beckett in A Piece of 
Monologue) and say that “death was the birth of him”. For, as Artaud remarks so 
acutely: “No one has ever been born by oneself. No one dies by oneself either.”242 
That death has its history is due not simply to its historians, but to the fact that death 
has (in both literal and metaphorical senses) its “theatre” – in a variety of cultural 
practices, which include (in the modernist sense) its art – by which it can be 
conceptualised from “beyond” itself, in its (seemingly paradoxical) “after life”, in its 
concept as an event. We appear before death, because we exist after it. Or, rather, we 
exist before the threshold between life and death; only images exist beyond it. Images 
populate the realm of the dead, the presence of which used to demand techniques of 
initiation, to inscribe degrees of “reality” within communal belonging. Today we find 
but a faint echo of these in the concept of a particular art theatre practice.  
 
In this “theatre”, as an event of human appearance(s) – which each of the theatre 
artists discussed here calls that of an “image” (rather than simply a body) – the dead, 
in their representation, have many comparative histories: whether of ancient statuary 
studied by Jean-Pierre Vernant, of votive effigies studied by Julius Schlosser, of 
represented gesture studied by Aby Warburg, physically manifested symptoms 
studied by Sigmund Freud, of exhumed corpses in state funerals studied by Katherine 
Verdery; or of actors, studied under the concept of the “theatre of death” (with the 
example of, amongst others, Tadeusz Kantor).  
 
                                                
242 Antonin Artaud, “Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society”, trans. Helen Weaver, in 
Selected Writings, ed. Susan Sontag, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p.511. 
(The Beckett citation will be returned to below.) 
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Besides the practice of appearance(s) concerning the corpse, such as those of clinical 
death or of funerary death (both associated in modernity with the authority of the state 
over the body, where “death” must be legally ratified), we can identify a minor 
history of “theatrical death” – that is, a history of how the dead appear, or look, 
theatrically. This is neither necromancy nor the spectacle of commodity fetishism (by 
which capitalism produces a global “theatre of death”243); but a particular historical 
aesthetics of stagecraft, of entrance and exit, of an “unseen bearing upon the scene” – 
all concerning the image of an “actor”. With respect to the theatrically specific 
appearance – or theoretical apparition – of the actor as a figure, or image, those other 
cultural practices or survivals of mimesis would be referred to as “theatrical” only 
metaphorically.244 Unlike other forms of visual representation in such cultural or 
anthropological practices “of death” in effigy – whether in wax, wood, or stone; in 
portraiture; in symbolism, whether ritualised in gesture or memorials; in photography 
or video – the medium of this mimetic encounter in theatre specifically is the co-
presence of living bodies, separated by the threshold between “this world” (to which 
the dead return) and that “other world” (from which the dead return), signified by the 
difference between stage and auditorium (understood not simply architecturally but, 
as we shall see, metaphysically).245  
 
“After all”, writes Patrice Pavis (considering the “temporal ‘event’ aspect unique to 
the theatre”), “the theatre is always the presence of a living being in front of me, the 
actor who lives in a time and a space that are also mine”246 – while “also” being, of 
                                                
243 This is itself critically related to mimesis by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their 
study of the dialectics of magic, myth, and enlightenment (contemporary with Erich 
Auerbach’s study of literary culture under the title of “mimesis”). Here we might associate 
the unemployed with the actors and consumers with the audience in such a fundamentally 
depressing metaphorical “theatre”, or spectacle, of capitalism’s production of death. 
244 It is important to note that throughout this thesis the term “appearance” is deliberately used 
ambiguously between both its temporal and spatial aspects – to signify the “present” in time 
and the presence in space of the actor’s image; what Stanton Garner calls the presencing of 
the body “on stage” (Garner, Bodied Spaces, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, p.43), as 
this may include the “apparition” of a character. Indeed, we may call reference to the actor 
itself an apparition, as an abstraction from actual actors “in favour of the representation (or 
signifying) body” (as Garner argues against, in favour of “the phenomenal (or lived) body”, 
ibid., p.13).  
245 Here it is precisely a question as to what “live”, on stage, might mean – a question that has 
been addressed both in terms of the marionette (Craig, Genet, Kantor) and the animal 
(Castellucci).  
246 Patrice Pavis, “Avant-garde Theatre and Semiology”, trans. Jill Daugherty, in Languages 
of the Stage, New York: PAJ Books, 1982, p.188.   
 103 
course, precisely not “mine”. Pavis’ account of this co-presence is contrasted with the 
representation of a time and space that is imagined (or simply said) to be not mine – 
as fictional rather than, precisely, as presenting its absence. The major theatre 
tradition offers the fiction of “character”, rather than that of the “actor”. The minor 
tradition (“of death”) offers, in the image of the actor him- or herself, the presence of 
what is intangible but corporeal; of what we might call a theoretical (rather than 
spectral) “apparition” of the theatrical body.  
 
Despite the much vaunted distinction between “performance” and “theatre”, this sense 
of co-presence is basic to both – evident in the paradoxical opening declaration of 
Babette Mangolte’s film of Marina Abramovic’s Seven Easy Pieces: “performance, 
time-based art, features the physicality of the artist’s body in front of a live 
audience.”247 This paradox of the film itself – of its claims about “a live audience” in 
support of its documentation – will be returned to below. Here let us note that, with 
rare exceptions in performance art (not least from Abramovic herself) – prior to the 
recent vogue for one-to-one performances, at least – the index of performed mimesis 
(distinct from painted, sculpted, filmed examples) is (like the eidolon to be discussed 
in the next chapter) the intangible. The injunction associated with most art in public – 
“do not touch” – applies even when this is, precisely, permitted; for the question of 
“intangibility” touches upon that of the materiality of the artwork, including its 
possible placing in an archive. With rare exceptions (where this is precisely the 
concern of the performance), touch the “performance artist” and his or her image (its 
illusion) of “presence” disappears, just as with the actor and his or her “world” (its 
fiction) – for this body is an apparition that is not reducible to the performer him- or 
herself, but rather appears (as an image) in the space between performer and audience.  
 
                                                
247 This is quoted by Amelia Jones in her essay, “The Artist is Present”, in TDR 55.1, Spring 
2011, pp.31-32. The catalogue of Abramovic’s “seven easy pieces” includes a hagiographic 
essay (on the “experiences of a viewer”), by Sandra Umathum, entitled (pace Pavis) “Beyond 
Documentation, or the Adventure of Shared Time and Place”, which concludes with a trite 
mystification concerning these “experiences”: “These cannot be documented; they are stored 
only in the memories of those who committed themselves to the adventure of sharing the 
same time and place with Abramovic, in bodily co-presence” (Umathum, in Marina 
Abramovic, Seven Easy Pieces, Milan: Edizioni Charta, 2007, p.55). It is as if the spectator 
were now blessed with the aura once reserved for the art(ist) and the erotics-heuristics of 
Socrates (Phaedrus) were reduced to a pornographic fantasy of “being there”.  
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Traditionally, “distance” has been inscribed in aesthetic mimesis (as a distance 
between art and life),248 which the major traditions of the twentieth century have 
sought to minimise (or to blur) in the name of an authentic co-presence of art(ist) and 
audience (as if aesthetic “reality” could be thought immanently, without 
representation). It is the absence in presence, however, that the actor’s “appearance” 
in the theatre of death works with, or at least evokes. The actor’s appearance makes 
visible a threshold, an opposition between the space of his or her body and the 
spectator’s, together with the ambiguity of a fictional non-reciprocity in the 
specifically theatrical look (given mythical form in the Gorgon’s mask) – which is 
effective precisely because its basic premise (indeed, its promise) is a real reciprocity 
(here suspended, as in the psycho-analytical mise-en-scène). The dead take on an 
existence that is not their own, just as the actor is not simply “himself”. In the theatre 
of death, this unsettling relation between reality and fiction is sustained not by simply 
pretending, but by the show(ing) (rather than the dissimulation) of technique – of 
what Craig called “symbolical gesture” in place of “impersonation”.249  
 
Here we enter into further paradoxical terrain for the study of this theatre (“of death”) 
and its specific (minor) sense of the visible and the invisible, generating a sense of 
what is “touching” or affective in what Merleau-Ponty evocatively called the “flesh of 
the gaze”. After all (pace Pavis), for a written thesis this “co-presence of live bodies” 
is itself a theoretical fiction – the discussion of which leads us back at least as far as 
the dialogue between Phaedrus and Socrates, addressing the speech of Lysias in its 
material (physical) presence and absence, as a desired (psychical) object. (Here the 
erotic and the heuristic, as significant conditions of and for research, famously 
supplement each other.) Amongst contemporary references, crucial for considering 
what the material (the evidence of and for the theatrical event), or even the subject 
(as, at least, conceptualisable), of this research could be, we may note another version 
of the cultural anthropology of “two bodies”.  
 
                                                
248 This distance (between) is what allows for empathy, and is what Aby Warburg (who 
experienced the “passion” of the collapse of this distance) called the space for thought 
(Denkraum), cf. the concluding paragraphs of the “Serpent Ritual” lecture. (The concept of 
Denkraum is also discussed by Mark Russell in Between Tradition and Modernity, New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2007, pp.46-7 and pp. 80-81.)  
249 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-marionette”, in Craig on Theatre, ed. 
Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, p.84. 
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This is to be found in the contemporary culture of performance art, attested to in 
Amelia Jones’ account of the “supplementarity” operative between performance art 
and the photographic document. “The body art event needs the photograph to confirm 
its having happened; the photograph needs the body art event as an ontological 
‘anchor’ of its indexicality.”250 It is curious how this seemingly modern concern with 
the aesthetic object of performance (with how its event can be thought of distinct 
from its document) reprises questions of mimesis whilst largely avoiding the term – 
almost as if the medium-related vocabulary of indexicality had replaced it in 
contemporary theory (and as if theory had itself replaced aesthetics). Paradoxically, 
the question of indexicality here could be seen as reprising the Aristotlean account of 
mimesis as methexis, and offering but the most recent variation of a history of 
“participation” in Christian apologia for the human image in the divine icon (Ecce 
Homo), from which the “presence” of performance (against the “pretence” of theatre) 
draws its pseudo-sacralising pathos. 
 
Philip Auslander has summarised a thesis (relatable to the concepts of media in Kittler 
and of archive in Preziosi) concerning the “live” from examples of the performing 
arts, concluding that “the act of documenting an event as a performance is what 
constitutes it as such”; that the aesthetic category of the “live” event is itself the 
product of a culture dedicated to the recorded, or mediated, performance.251  While 
this discussion in theatre studies goes back to its founding by Max Hermann (to be 
returned to in chapter four), we might wonder to what extent, today, the notion of the 
“live” is itself an emerging form of what will become a new historical survival in 
cultural practice (which, in a sense, “the theatre of death” has already theorised). In 
recognising the historicity of what is “live”, the theatre discussed in this thesis may 
appear then as something of an anachronism today, as it resists the thought of the 
“post”-modern. Indeed, it already offers a critique of how the term “live” has come, 
lately, to qualify the art of so-called “performance” (with its supposedly “real” or 
                                                
250 Amelia Jones, “‘Presence’ in absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation”, in 
Art Journal, 56.4, Winter 1997, p.16. 
251 Philip Auslander, “The Performativity of Performance Documentation”, in PAJ 84, 28.3, 
September 2006, p.5. Crucially, the issue here is the inversion of relations between time and 
space – the “live” becomes the mediated in “real time”, a professed “simultaneity” of 
production and reception that is nonetheless “remote” (hence the pleonasm of “live 
performance”, not to mention the seeming oxymoron of the “live recording”). 
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authentic sense of the body) distinct from that of “theatre” (with its supposedly 
“fictional” or representational sense of the body).252  
 
Before reflecting further on what reference to “the dead” might mean in theatre 
specifically, one might hesitate concerning what is meant by reference to “the actor” 
in this discussion – as itself perhaps another, albeit linguistic (or even conceptual), 
superstition. Is this not simply to hypostatise the multiple meanings of “acting” into 
an abstract figure, one that has in fact no actual or meaningful existence (whether 
visible, tangible, or otherwise)? In his classic essay “on acting and not-acting”, 
Michael Kirby proposes that “to act means to feign, to simulate, to represent, to 
impersonate”; and that an actor – as distinct from a performer in his argument – is a 
person who does these things,253 as typically involving the representation (pace Pavis) 
of a “time and place different from that of the spectator”. In this case, “to see an 
actor”254 means to understand a situation (through what Kirby calls its “matrices”) in 
which “behaviour of the type that defines acting appears,”255 an “appearance” that is 
understood as being “for an audience”; that is, “to be ‘on stage’”.256 Given the major 
fascination with “blurring” the boundaries between art and life in twentieth century 
aesthetics, it is perhaps worth adding here that this sense of  “actor”, as summarised 
by Kirby, refers specifically to rehearsed aesthetic performances, and not to either the 
accidental or the reiterative senses in which one becomes, metaphorically, an “actor” 
for an “audience” in everyday life, with examples of social analysis from Irving 
Goffman to Judith Butler (and where the “networked society” aims at blurring still 
further the distinctions between private and public space). 
 
What the actor “does” is complex, especially in the relation between preparation and 
performance, in all that makes an “appearance on stage” a particular mode, or art, of 
action or gesture. This complexity has been the subject of varied researches in modern 
                                                
252 The point here is not to identify a distinction between performance and theatre with that 
between the real and the representational (just as the “theatre of death” is not to be confused 
with its own object of critique, the “deadly theatre” (pace Brook)). The seeming paradoxes of 
“the theatre of death” address fundamental notions of what is seen, or thought, to be “living” 
in theatrical representation, as an art of mimesis. 
253 Michael Kirby, “On Acting and Not-Acting”, in Acting (Re)Considered, ed. Phillip 
Zarrilli, London: Routledge, 2000, p.43. 
254 Ibid., p.45. 
255 Ibid., p.43 
256 Ibid., p.47. 
 107 
theatre history, from Stanislavsky to Grotowski (to cite but two who have given their 
names to “schools” of actors’ practice257). Although this thesis will discuss a 
theorisation of the actor (as a vehicle of theatrical aesthetics) offered by Kantor 
specifically (an artist without disciples or a school, although not without his 
imitators), this is in the context of an underlying question concerning the type of 
behaviour (historically and culturally various) that has been thought to define acting. 
The theatre of death – as it names a minor strand within the twentieth century’s many 
and varied attempts to revive or to reanimate theatre, to make it “live” in contrast to 
the “deadly” sclerosis of its professional practices – sees its practice of acting as 
involving (as already noted with Craig) a critique of “impersonation” (pace Kirby), 
without resorting to claims about the body (for example, “incarnating”) beyond (its) 
representation(s).  
 
The actor’s appearance, after all, is not simply an attribute of “the actor” alone but is, 
rather, a relation to an audience; it is a theatrical event. The actor’s entry on stage –
whether or not preceded by an entrance of the stage itself, marked by a dimming of 
auditorium lights, the raising of a curtain, or by a threefold striking of the ground – is 
acknowledged by an anticipatory hush or, conversely, the demonstrative sound of 
applause. The corollary of this is the actors’ acknowledgment of the audience’s 
presence at the end of the performance, in the ritual of the curtain call – of which 
there are many variations, including the negative one of simply not “returning” to the 
stage, of not “re-appearing”; or, again, staging the sometimes uncanny tableau vivant 
of lining up and applauding the audience also. Both these extremes offer possibilities 
for thinking the theatre of death in terms of the opposition between stage and 
auditorium, between actor and audience, as it is signified in such practices, in what 
might be called their theatrical “after images”. While there will be no particular 
discussion of the audience side of this relation in the following chapters (distinct from 
artists’ theorising what they themselves “see” in theatre), applause does offer 
ritualised testimony to the audience’s part in this mimetic practice (or event) of 
theatrical appearance(s).  
                                                
257 It is important to remind ourselves that “schools” rarely represent the real legacy of those 
they are named after, preferring “doctrine” to “discovery”. As Grotowski insists, against 
claims for “method” with respect to Stanislavski, “his attitude of discovering anew each phase 
of life was in a way a foundation” (Jerzy Grotowski, “Reply to Stanislavsky”, trans. Kris 
Salata, TDR, 52.2, Summer 2008, p.31). 
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This event will be discussed then in terms of the image of the actor, in the potential 
iconicity of this apparition (as conceived of by its artist-theorists), rather than as an 
event comprehending its audience (as might be studied by a sociology of theatre-
going), except as it concerns a metaphysical encounter (as an instance of the 
mimetic). What mediates this event of theatrical appearance(s) is a question of the 
model of “the dead” for the actor, as also of the threshold (or demarcation line) 
between actor and audience, between stage and auditorium (pace Walter Benjamin’s 
reflections on epic theatre in the Introduction). This is, again, the particular subject of 
the thesis: how the appearance of “the actor” may be understood in or by the concept 
of the theatre of death, as this addresses how the relation between the living and the 
dead is conceived of in that between audience and actor – in the concept or thought of 
this relation to which “the theatre of death” gives a name. 
 
In a short essay identifying “two versions of the imaginary” (in which the image of 
the cadaver figures as the very question of human likeness or (re)semblance), Maurice 
Blanchot offers a way to think of this theatrical relation (that of a “co-presence” 
haunted by absence), as a relation between event and image:  
 
To live an event as an image is not to have an image of this event, nor is it to 
give it the gratuitousness of the imaginary. The event, in this case, really takes 
place, and yet does it ‘really’ take place? What happens captures us, as we 
would be captured by the image; that is, we are released, from it and from 
ourselves; it keeps us outside, making of this outside a presence where ‘I’ does 
not recognise ‘itself’.258  
 
This account of image and event (as a rethinking, perhaps, of the Schematism in 
cognisance of the unconscious) prefigures precisely Derrida’s evocation of the ghost 
in an association of the psychoanalytic critique of memory and the modern 
mnemotechnics of film: “To be haunted by a ghost is to remember something you’ve 
never lived through. For memory is the past that has never taken the form of the 
                                                
258 Maurice Blanchot, “The Two Versions of the Imaginary”, in The Space of Literature, 
trans. Ann Smock, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989, p.262 [translation modified]; 
L’Espace Littéraire, Paris: Gallimard, 1955, p.275. 
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present.”259 Here memory is evoked as a blind spot in and of mimesis, as a gap in the 
mirroring of thought and perception. With the “I” that does not recognise “itself”, we 
find an echo of that uncanny alterity of the prosopon met with in the ancient 
mnemotechnics of the mask, in the haunting look of the Gorgon, through which what 
Artaud calls the “mortal architecture” of the face becomes visible. As Vernant, again, 
evokes it: “It is your gaze that is captured in the mask. The face of Gorgo is the Other, 
your double... yourself in the world beyond.”260  
 
As with the mirror, reference to “the actor” here (as to the mask of identity, to the “I 
(‘I’)” of mimesis, as Lacoue-Labarthe writes it261) evokes an image that reflects the 
captivating event of appearance, as it may be conceived of as the uncanny not simply 
in, but of, mimesis. It is with this reflection (in the mirror “of” thought) that, as 
Lacoue-Labarthe proposes, a certain image of the mimetic becomes representable, 
“installed – theorised”, in an “apparatus for gorgonising Medusa”.262 Writing after 
Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe explores the question of the relation between mimesis and 
model, copy or imitation and original, as already caught in a play of doubling. The 
question “of” mimesis here is “itself” mimetic, where “of” has the double sense of a 
question posed by the very topic about which it asks.  
 
It is here that the thought “of death” – beginning with a question of mimetic practice 
as “theatre” – returns to the look of human appearance (as the theatre of death). The 
theatre offers an idea of, and an apparatus for, “seeing” seeing, a scene for the seen, a 
technique for thinking the very practice it produces – and of which it is itself the 
product. In the “perceptual duality of performance” the non-coincidence of “the 
embodied I of theatrical spectatorship” and “the embodied eye” is staged, a “gap 
                                                
259 Jacques Derrida in Ghost Dance (directed by Ken McMullen), and taken up in 
Echographies of Television, with Bernard Stiegler, trans. Jennifer Bajorek, Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007.   
260 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Death in the Eyes”, trans. Thomas Curely and Froma Zeitlin, in 
Mortals and Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, 
p.138. 
261 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography”, trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Lacoue-Labarthe 
Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p.47, p.89, 
and p.138. An everyday example of this from Freud’s experience, broaching a question of the 
theatre and its “double”, will be discussed in chapter five. 
262 Ibid., p.92. (We may relate this paradox of “undecidabilty itself” to Foucault’s discussion 
of the mirror as a heterotopia, in “Of Other Spaces”, trans. Jay Miskowiec, in Diacritics, 16.1, 
Spring 1986, p.24; and on cemeteries, p.25.)  
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which we ourselves are” (in Stanton Garner’s paraphrase of Merleau-Ponty).263 Here 
mimesis is both what needs to be explained, and a primary source of such 
explanation. 
 
While the discussion in this thesis implicitly refers to the actual work of actors (who 
could be individually named, and some of whom are still living264) – as their work is 
reflected upon by Kantor specifically – it takes as its subject the sense of “actor” as 
various theatre artists have theorised it (rather than simply described it) in terms of 
“the dead”. This is not then to speak of (still less from) the point of view of the actor, 
about which so much has been thought in twentieth century theatre research, but a 
point of view on the actor, on the appearance of “the actor” – thought in its concept or 
paradigm, as distinct from any particular actor’s qualities. There is no “iconic” actor 
in Kantor’s theatre (apart, perhaps, from himself) – no Ryszard Cieslak, for instance, 
as Ludwik Flaszen evokes him:  
 
One of the emblematic icons, often reproduced in books on the history of the 
theatre, presents a young man with white bands of material wrapped around 
his hips, kneeling, with a naked chest, open to the space, with a radiant face 
and the expression of a yogi in rapture or a Christ-like holy man. This is 
                                                
263 Stanton Garner, Embodied Spaces, p.31 (citing Merleau-Ponty, p.207). This is played out 
in Garner’s analysis (this time citing Harry Berger) in the non-mutuality of the gaze between 
actor and audience: “When the actor is ‘in character’, according to Berger, his or her outward 
gaze is always directed at a virtual or fictional spectator, necessarily other than the actual 
individual whose gaze he or she meets. To the extent that the spectator perceives this gaze, he 
or she responds either by assuming the role of a fictional auditor in the dramatic 
representation or by rendering himself or herself absent, invisible. But if this analysis (what 
Berger calls the ‘textualisation of the audience’) has the virtue of implicating the audience in 
the perceptual duality that characterises performance as a whole (like the actor, I become 
other than myself, to the point of rendering myself the absent or fictional correlative of the 
actor’s performance), it does so at the expense of the actuality that constitutes the ground and 
the other side of theatrical fictionality. If this actuality can only fully manifest itself at the cost 
of the illusion it sustains, the real proximity of performer to spectator nonetheless makes itself 
felt throughout the actor’s performance and the audience’s response. Aware of our sustaining 
presence to the performance we witness – the fact that this spectacle is set into motion by our 
gaze – we sanction this being-present through our applause, our laughter, even the 
attentiveness of our silence.” (Garner, ibid., pp.48-49). 
264 Amongst these is Andrzej Welminski who (besides other roles in earlier productions) 
played Kantor’s “self-portrait” in the last Cricot 2 production Today is my Birthday. The role 
included being one of the pall bearers for the plank that represented Kantor’s coffin in the 
production, a role taken on actually only a few weeks after the staging of this “last rehearsal” 
(cf. Leszek Kolankiewicz, “Kantor’s Last Tape”, trans. Paul Allain and Grzegorz Ziolkowski, 
in Contemporary Theatre Review, 15.1, 2005, p.29).  
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Ryszard Cieslak, Teatr Laboratorium actor, performing his legendary role in 
The Constant Prince based on Pedro Calderon de la Barca, in a famous Polish 
version by Slowacki, staged by Grotowski and presented for the first time in 
1965 in Wroclaw.265 
 
By contrast, in the Cricot 2 the particular qualities of, for instance, the Janicki twins 
are recognised as “annexed” realities, as “ready-made” appearances, not as the 
personal research of “the actors’ dramaturgy”, which offers a late echo of 
Romanticism (at least in the Polish context), rather than a modernist formalism.266 
 
The reality of this “iconic” appearance, of the actor’s art of mimesis, is addressed in 
the theatre of death in terms of a metaphysical effect rather than of its “realism” or its 
being (or appearing) “true to life”. While this is explicitly the concern (discussed in 
chapter one) of Craig’s account of the über-marionette, as also of Artaud’s image of 
the “Balinese dancer”, it proves (paradoxically) the case even when, in fact, it is a 
particular physicality that makes for the choice of performer – not necessarily a 
professional actor – in this theatre. For in the theatre of death the actor offers a 
material equal to the stage, where neither serves as a surrogate for the other (nor for 
“the text” in any “impersonations” or “settings”). It is only by developing its artists’ 
theorisations (in terms of “the uncanny in mimesis”, for instance) that the concept of 
this theatre may be more than the inevitable paraphrase of its sources, and even 
perhaps propose some semblance of the thought of mimesis – as of “theatre” – as it 
has been figured, historically, by “the dead”.  
 
As with “the actor”, so “the dead” offer a figure of – and for – thought. It is important 
to stress, again concerning both “the dead” and “the actor”, that the theatre of death is 
concerned with representation, with the figure of the dead rather than with the reality 
of death – with the stage, rather than the mortuary or the anatomy “theatre”. Jean-
Pierre Vernant notes that culture is concerned with the symbolic representation of the 
body (“the dead”), rather than with the corpse (“death”) itself.267 Culturally, it is “the 
                                                
265 Ludwik Flaszen, Grotowski and Company, trans. Andrzej Wotjtasik and Paul Allain, 
Wroclaw: Icarus Publishing, 2010, pp.43-4.  
266 Ibid., pp.126-27. 
267 There is, however, a sense in which this distinction is itself questionable, in that it is the 
means by which one of terms is distinguished from the other – as culture from nature in its 
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dead” that are opposed to the world of the living – classically, as disembodied, 
immaterial instances of “spirit”, or image, that can “return” to this world, to haunt the 
living (or even, indeed, to possess them) – rather than the ongoing organic life of 
decomposition, of maggots and flies,268 as given a frame and a title, for instance, by 
Damien Hirst’s installation (whether understood as a sculpture or a concept) One 
Thousand Years (at the Hamburger Bahnhof in Berlin). The body as cadaver or 
carrion – as consumed by its wound in Kafka’s Country Doctor description – is not 
the concern of the theatre of death. Here the question of the wound – or of mortality – 
is metaphysical (as it is evoked by Kantor, and by both Craig and Artaud), rather than 
medical or forensic.  
 
As Evans-Pritchard emphasises (introducing Robert Hertz’s classic essay on mortuary 
rituals), the issue “of death” concerns collective representations of value and feeling, 
which are not reducible either to explanations in terms of “utility” (concerning 
hygienic dealing with the cadaver) or to a psychology of horror at the cadaver’s 
“dissolution”.  
 
Again, the easy explanation of social procedures after death is horror at the 
passing, the rigor mortis, and the onset of dissolution, but Hertz shows very 
clearly that in many cases there is a minimum of reaction at death, an almost 
entire lack of concern, so that this cannot be the right interpretation. On the 
contrary, the more repulsive features of dissolution, far from being shunned or 
secreted, are often emphasised for all to see, for they exhibit objectively the 
passing of the soul to its happy home. The changing condition of the body 
signifies changing mental states in the survivors.269 
 
                                                                                                                                      
own terms. The distinction is only partial therefore; after all, the “natural causes” of death are 
of pre-eminently cultural definition, as being both medical and legal.   
268 See, for example, Vernant, “La Mort ou les Morts”, in Autour des Morts: Mémoire et 
Identité, eds. Olivier Dumoulin and Françoise Thelamon, Rouen: University of Rouen Press, 
2001, pp.7-8; and “Psuche: Simulacrum of the Body or Image of the Divine?”, trans. Froma 
Zeitlin, in Mortals and Immortals, ed. Froma Zeitlin, Princeton: University of Princeton 
Press, 1991, pp.186-192. On occasion, of course, the body itself – usually as a question of its 
“(re)burial” – becomes a symbolic medium (a “relic”), as a question of the writing (or 
naming) of memorials in the service of political legitimation (cf. Katherine Verdery, The 
Political Lives of Dead Bodies, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
269 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, “Introduction”, to Robert Hertz, Death and The Right Hand, trans. 
Rodney and Claudia Needham, Aberdeen: Cohen and West, 1960, pp.19-20.  
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If the theatre of death echoes the transformations in both “the changing condition of 
the body” (its representation in and as its image, look, or appearance) and “changing 
mental states” (with a sense of metaphysical shock) amongst the living, it does so in 
terms of the restricted example of an art practice (indeed, as a question of a mimetic 
practice restricted to that of its art) in modernity. As proposed in the Introduction, this 
is not a metaphorical “theatre” – as, for instance, in the understanding of ritual in 
performance studies (following the methodological dialogue between Victor Turner 
and Richard Schechner). The point here is not to turn away from aesthetic theory, but 
to develop a sense of how art has been understood in terms “of death” in theatre 
history (as, paradoxically, a “live art”).270 This raises a question of mimesis in the 
understanding of modernity – and therefore a thinking of aesthetics with anthropology 
(in consideration of animism, for instance); not as a study of shamanism or of “ritual”, 
but of cultural survivals manifest in the practices addressed by theatre history.  
 
With respect to Kantor, this thesis would not therefore follow Amos Fergombé, for 
example, in eliding the theatre of death with a question of funerary rites – where both 
categories are generalised to a point of equivalence (or, at least, to a point of 
metaphorical association). Fergombé writes, in a way that occludes what might be 
specific to either theatre (aesthetics) or to processes of grieving (psychology or 
anthropology): “Like all funerary ritual, Kantor’s theatre allows us to participate in a 
staging of death [assister à une mise en scène de la mort (to attend, to be an audience 
of, a scene of death)], in a sublimation made possible by the presence of laughter and 
emotion through that of a master of ceremonies.”271 To attend a funeral or a theatre 
performance is not the same – at least if one is concerned with a truth value that is 
specific to an aesthetic practice, with its own history of research questions; not least in 
that appeal to the circus or cabaret figure of a “master of ceremonies”. Fergombé 
elides the nature of this “performance” (or “ritual”) event with the work of memory 
(which might relate it to story telling), as of mourning (in which it might gain its 
                                                
270 This apparent oxymoron has widespread contemporary usage in the advertising with which 
major venues promote themselves in relation to their filmed performances – the National 
Theatre, for instance, calls its cinema presentations “NT Live”.  
271 Amos Fergombé, “Le Rituel kantorien comme poïétique de dépassement de la mort”, in 
L’Âge d’or du théâtre polonais, eds. Agnieska Grudzinska and Michal Maslowski, Paris: 
Editions de l’Amandier, 2009, p.234. (This volume offers an interesting survey of 
contemporary French scholarly reception of Kantor, amongst the generation after Bablet, 
Banu, and Scarpetta, within their particular construction of Polish theatre history.) 
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modern specificity as funerary ritual). This leads him to offer a curiously moral 
conclusion: “The ritual celebrations established by Kantor allow for the rebirth of 
drama, especially where human beings are confronted with massacres, with the 
procession of the dead and with bodies broken by unspeakable dreams. They oblige 
us, finally, to have our ‘eyes wide open’ in preparing for a passage beyond death.”272  
 
In a theatre of death understood without any such ritual “obligation”, but rather with 
its own insistence on aesthetic autonomy, we have to do with actors not with corpses; 
with a work of art not with a work of mourning. The question of “mental states” with 
respect to theatre is one of cultural – aesthetic – survivals (between actors and 
audiences), rather than of analogy with personal or familial rituals surrounding a 
particular deceased individual. The image of the dead – on sarcophagi, in death 
masks, in legends, in statistics, and even “theatrically” – reveals society to itself. The 
work of cultural memory (or commemoration) is a communication between 
generations, in speaking of – and to – an image of a “beyond” (or an “after life”) that 
belongs to the present; that is, the image of a future as a collective understanding of 
the past – in the figure of the human being as it “returns” in public space (as a 
revenant). But while an understanding of this mimetic “after life”, from shamanism to 
bureaucracy, offers the most profound evidence of what human culture will have 
been, it is articulated here as a question of and for aesthetic theory specifically; that is, 
as a concern addressed by various artists themselves with respect to their theatrical 
work.  
 
Funeral rites are not, after all, universal in either their form or content – differing 
crucially in the question of appeasing the dead, whether to propitiate their return or, 
on the contrary, to preclude it (although in either case as a question of the well-being 
of the living).273 As Levi-Strauss observes:  
 
Concern for the dead – whether fear or respect – is universal. It sometimes 
manifests itself, however, in practices aimed at removing the dead, who are 
                                                
272 Ibid., pp.237-8. 
273 The “irrational” votive value of the photograph (as offering a tactile image of the 
deceased), despite the descralisation of material life supposed in and by modernity, will be 
discussed at the end of chapter five specifically. 
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considered dangerous, once and for all from the world of the living; and 
sometimes, on the contrary, by actions aimed at holding onto the dead, at 
constantly involving them in the struggles of the living.274  
 
While the anthropological reality offers a model for understanding the theatrical, the 
latter is not explained by supposing it as a given model of and for the former, as 
though providing a modern metaphor for “ritual”, for instance. The mimetic question 
of the actor’s appearance, as it concerns a space between past and present (or between 
absence and presence), is a question of where the actor “returns” from and to in social 
or public space, as theatre. While the concept of the theatre of death relates to 
fundamental anthropological practices, it does so precisely in terms of a (modernist) 
question of its aesthetic “autonomy”.  
 
As already suggested, the conjunction of the uncanny and mimesis is in a sense 
pleonastic. Rather than identifying the uncanny in mimesis, it might be better 
identified simply with mimesis. In so far as it is a “human” attribute, the mimetic 
always has something uncanny about it – as death exists for the living, not simply as 
an untimely event, but as a relation to being.275 As already noted, Beckett offers a 
startling reminder of this, in the opening line of A Piece of Monologue (commissioned 
and performed by the actor David Warrilow): “Birth was the death of him.” In 
contrast to Lear’s or Hamlet’s “ends” (or exit), here the actor’s very appearance (or 
entrance) on stage is meta-theatrically announced as being “the death of him”. This 
commemorative conceit has a long history. Rudolph Wittkower, for instance, cites the 
sixteenth century poet Franco van Est, whose strophe “death proceeds right from the 
time of birth” itself renders the sense of the first Century author Manilius’ motto, 
widely quoted in the Renaissance, “we die with birth, and the end depends upon the 
                                                
274 Claude Levi-Strauss, “The Anthropologist and the Human Condition”, trans. Joachim 
Neugroschel and Phoebe Hoss, in The View From Afar, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1987, p.35.   
275 Claude Levi-Strauss notes the extreme example of human cultures relegating “strangers” 
to the status of “others” – beyond degrading them as “animals” – when they are regarded as 
apparitions: “One often goes so far as to deprive the stranger of this last shred of reality by 
making him a ‘ghost’ or an ‘apparition’.” (“Race and History”, in Structural Anthropology 2, 
trans.  Monique Layton, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987, p.329.) 
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beginning” (nacentes mormur, finisque ab origine pendent)276 – which is itself most 
famously echoed, in the twentieth century, by Eliot. (Indeed, the commemorative 
plaque to the poet’s remains in East Coker church reads: “In my beginning is my 
end... In my end is my beginning.”277) With a similar resonance, Derrida begins a 
reflection on photography, as the paradigmatically modern memento mori (whose 
relation to the stage we will return to in chapter five, in discussion of Barthes and 
Heidegger): “We owe ourselves to death.”278 Kenneth Gross, meanwhile, cites the 
playful example of Felix Klee, animating two of the hand puppets made for him by 
his father – Dr Death and a puppet of the artist himself – with the former whispering 
to the latter “in an insinuating, cackling, high-pitched, childlike, self-amused, voice: 
‘Death is life and life is death’.”279  
 
Of the post-Christian (or even post-Humanist) return to this unsettling self-knowledge 
(as the experience, in life, of another), Heidegger proposes that it is intimately related 
to a sense of the uncanny:  
 
But this uncanny that banishes us once and for all from everything in which 
we are at home is no particular event that must be named among others 
because it, too, ultimately happens. It is not only when he comes to die, but 
always and essentially that man is without issue in the face of death. Insofar as 
man is, he stands in the issuelessness of death. Thus his being (Dasein) is the 
uncanny happening. (For us this uncanny happening must be initially 
grounded in human being (Dasein).) With the naming of this force and 
                                                
276 Rudolph Wittkower, Allegory and the Migration of Symbols, New York: Thames and 
Hudson, 1997, p.165. 
277 A photograph of the church and the plaque appears accompanying an article about building 
“development” at East Coker in The Guardian, 23.08.2011, p.12.  
278 Jacques Derrida, Athens, Still Remains, trans. Pascale-Anne Brant and Michael Naes, New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2010, p.1 (Nous nous devons à la mort). This is echoed in 
terms of cultural memory – or of historical irony – in the title of one Heiner Müller’s 
interviews with Alexander Kluge, loosely translated as “I owe the world a death”, or more 
properly, “I owe the world a dead person”, which gives the title to a collection of these 
interviews: Ich schulde der Welt einen Toten, Hamburg: Rotbuch Verlag, 1996. (The question 
of the dead person here alludes to the sacrifice that founds political community, with its 
repressed questions of political legitimacy.)  
279 Kenneth Gross, Puppet: An Essay on Uncanny Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011, p.149. As concerns an anthropology of the image, to which we will return at the end of 
this chapter, Régis Debray similarly begins his discussion of the genesis of images under the 
title, “Birth through death” (Régis Debray, Vie et mort de l’image, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 
pp.23-57). 
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uncanniness, the poetic project of being and human essence sets its own limit 
upon itself.280   
 
Such “issuelessness” (as addressed by Blanchot in the epigraph to the previous 
chapter) means a fundamental revaluation of any sense of an “after life” in secular 
understanding. While this will be discussed again in chapter five, through Heidegger’s 
reading of Kant in relation to both the death mask and the photograph (where the 
question of the uncanny in mimesis is addressed as that of the relation between the 
image and concept of human being, or “presence”), we might note here that it also 
occurs in early theories of cinema. As noted previously, Béla Balász, in his reflections 
on this pre-eminently modern medium of human visibility, comments that: “One of 
our deepest metaphysical yearnings is to see what things are like when we are not 
present,” an undoing of the normal conditions of and for our observation of things in 
(and of) the world (in and of light) that we have to be present (even in dreams).281  
 
Here the relation to the human image – as of seeing “the dead” – takes material, 
mnemotechnical form; but it is equally attested to in records of “immaterial” – oneiric 
and phantasmatic – cultural (embodied) mediums, as found for instance in the archive 
of the Inquisition. The attempted extirpation of the pagan past in the Christian (and 
later scientific) European present has a long history, the “reason” of which is perhaps 
better addressed by anthropology than by philosophy.282 Carlo Ginzburg reflects on 
the motives of those claiming intercourse with the dead in 1581, for instance, in terms 
that translate easily into those of Balász (writing in 1924), referring to:  
 
An extremely common but also insatiable desire, the longing to know 
something about the fate of a departed loved one (and linked with the hope of 
life beyond the tomb), mingled inextricably with the instinctive inability to 
                                                
280 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1959, p.158. 
281 Béla Balász, The Visible Man [1924], trans. Rodney Livingstone, Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2011, p.61. 
282 As, for instance, Marc Augé, A Sense for the Other, trans. Amy Jacobs, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998.  
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think of a dead human being without restoring it to the life it no longer 
possessed.283 
 
The “poetic project” of human being, in its “issuelessness”, as evoked by Heidegger 
in the thought of death, is famously the subject of Rilke’s Duino Elegies, where this 
project of (and for) Dasein is associated with the modernist image of puppet theatre 
(related neither to Guignol grotesque nor Witkacy’s “comedy of corpses” (pace Kott), 
but rather (pace Kleist) to the grace of angels). In Rilke’s poetic “theatre”, the child’s 
play with a doll – “when alone, we entertained ourselves/ with everlastingness”, when 
“what lay before us/ was not the future!” – is transformed by an impossible art of 
being. “Angel and doll! Then there’s at last a play./ Then there unites what we 
continually/ part by our mere existence,” where “death,/ the whole of death, before 
life’s start, to hold it/ so gently and so free from all resentment,/ transcends 
description.”284  
 
“Everlastingness” then is possible only “before life’s start” (where “birth was the 
death of him”), before the “issuelessness” of “our mere existence” in which, 
paradoxically, what is “afterwards” becomes both culturally vital and empty (as is the 
tomb in language). The fragile thought of what has been, constituting the possibility 
of what might be, becomes manifest in a future to which it cannot know how it 
belongs. Kantor, in his acceptance speech on receiving the Rembrandt Prize (of the 
Goethe Foundation, Basel) in 1978, insists that modern man is not liberated (by 
medical science, for instance) from the knowledge (or the fear) of death. Death 
remains the existential horizon of the visible “in” this world, in and of the mundane. 
When the image finally takes leave of its corporeal, mortal medium, the body 
“remains”, as the “refuse” that it is always becoming. Amongst Kantor’s images of a 
transformation of this “poor” and “degraded” existence by art is the sculpture he made 
two years previously for his gravesite (shared with his mother, who had already died) 
                                                
283 Carlo Ginzburg, The Night Battles, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1992, p.34. This “reason” is the subject of dialectical critique in 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of “enlightenment” in the darkest of times. 
284 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, trans. J. B. Leishman, London: Chatto & Windus, 
1981, pp.51-53. 
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of a child sitting at a school desk, whose feet do not reach the ground.285 In this quasi-
votive work, as in the twentieth century art-theatre practice and theory called (after 
Kantor’s proposal) “the theatre of death”, we recognise the re-appearance – or the 
survival – of a pre-modern mode of thought286, as precisely a “superstition” in 
Edward Tylor’s use of this term.  
 
                                                
285 A facsimile of the typescript of Kantor’s anti-Promethean speech – in its English version – 
is included in Luc Tuyman’s exhibition on “the Reality of the Lowest Rank”, op. cit., p.87.  
286 As Adorno and Horkheimer declare, opening their analysis of the “dialectic of 
enlightenment” (in the age of commodity fetishism): “the human mind, which overcomes 
superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted nature... [as] the extirpation of animism... 
Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It does not work by concepts and images, by the 
fortunate insight, but refers to method, the exploitation of others’ work, and capital” (Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming, 
London: Verso, 1986, p.4 and p.5). A “theory of ghosts” is also what Adorno and Horkheimer 
entitle their reading of Freud’s essay on the uncanny (ibid., pp.215-16).  
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part One 
 
Chapter 3: Superstition and an iconography 
 
The rituals of knowledge are a response to the enigma of the individual in the world 
of man. They are not the explanation (there is no explanation) but the emphatic 
repetition of the place where the paths of knowledge and of identification merge. Like 
the doll dancers in the Kachina ritual, the researcher gives meaning to something that 
has no meaning – not in understanding but in reproducing the world in the closed 
universe of representations. – Philippe-Alain Michaud287  
 
The sense of “superstition” as it appears in Julius Schlosser’s study of wax 
portraiture, drawn from Edward Tylor, is examined in a reading by Georges Didi-
Huberman, linking it with the key theme in Warburg (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), that of the “survival” of forms of emotional expression from pagan antiquity 
into the Renaissance, and hence into the understanding of modernity.  
 
In 1865, Tylor gave a first definition of survival, inferred from the Latin word 
superstitio: ‘[A survival is] the “standing over” (superstitio) of old habits into 
the midst of a new and changed state of things.’ That definition was taken up... 
and discussed for several chapters in Primitive Culture, the fundamental 
anthropological work Tylor published in 1871... Tylor went on to extend that 
mode of observation to every dimension of culture from clothing styles... to 
the behaviours associated with sneezing... profoundly chang[ing] the 
relationship between anthropology and the historical sciences.288 
 
                                                
287 Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, 
New York: Zone Books, 2004, p.236. 
288 Georges Didi-Huberman, “Viscosities and Survivals”, trans. Jane Todd, in Ephemeral 
Bodies, ed. Roberta Panzanelli, p.162. (For a commentary on the votive waxwork as 
discussed by Warburg himself, cf. Robert Maniura, “Ex Votos, Art and Pious Performance”, 
in Oxford Art Journal, 32.3, 2009.) (Cf. also Didi-Huberman’s remarks on Gombrich’s re-
writing of Warburg in “Artistic Survival: Panofsky vs. Warburg and the Exorcism of Impure 
Time”, trans. Vivian Rehberg and Boris Belay, in Common Knowledge, vol.9, no.2, Spring 
2003 (n.11, p.276).) 
 121 
Concerning the more familiar sense of superstition, as that which modern or 
enlightened (rational) consciousness distinguishes itself from, Freud remarks – 
analysing, or rather constructing, a sense of the uncanny beyond the simply literary – 
that: “All supposedly educated people have ceased to believe officially that the dead 
can become visible as spirits, and have made any such appearances dependent on 
improbable and remote conditions...”289 
 
From Tylor to Taussig, through Frazer and Freud, superstition concerns the relations 
between animate and inanimate, the living and the dead, and is typically identified 
with animism – a projection of thoughts from the former onto the latter. But in “the 
theatre of death” these relations, as with the visible and the invisible also, appear in an 
inversion, theatrically, with the living body figured in terms of the dead; of the 
animate gesture as a sign of the inanimate; the visible experience understood in terms 
of the invisible. Indeed, the conjunction of the animate body with the inanimate sign 
(in a corporeal “hieroglyph”, as proposed by Artaud290) offers what Barthes calls (in a 
discussion of Bunraku) a “lesson in writing”, concerning what we might call the 
actor’s second body (or “theatre’s double”). Fundamentally, this lesson offers a 
revaluation of the metaphysics underpinning the literary-interpretative, dramatic 
theatre and the work of its actors, as this is organised by “a fundamental antinomy, 
that of the animate/ inanimate”.291   
 
This antinomy provides a model for further binaries between the soul and the body, 
between intelligence and technique, the internal and external; indeed, the living and 
the dead, as it constitutes “the driving link between character and actor which is 
always conceived by us as the expressive channel of an interiority.”292 The antinomy 
                                                
289 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. James Strachey, in P.F.L.14, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1985, p.370. 
290 Such terms as “animated hieroglyphics” (p.54), “veritable living, moving, three-
dimensional hieroglyphics” (p.61), and a “concrete conception of the abstract” (p.64), are 
fundamental to Artaud’s vision of the “Balinese Theatre” (in The Theatre and its Double, 
trans. Mary Richards, New York: Grove Press, 1958). In terms of the focus here on 
iconography, the discussion will be limited to these plastic references to the hieroglyph, rather 
than the physical (“affective”) exercises of a “hieroglyph of breath” (in the later “Affective 
Athleticism” essay, ibid., p.141).  
291 Roland Barthes, “Lesson in Writing”, trans. Stephen Heath, in Image-Music-Text, London: 
Fontana, 1982, p.171. 
292 Ibid., p.173. The whole question of the difference between “thought” and “action” is basic 
to any concept of Occidental theatre practice, whether in Stanislavsky, Artaud, or Brecht, to 
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“makes sense” through all these comparable instances – masking the way in which it 
is the antinomy itself that is producing this sense, the sense of which has then to be 
rethought rather than merely reproduced. In the theatre of death, it is not a question of 
a simple reversal of terms in such instances, of dead objects endowed with the 
appearance of life, as is the key of “animation” in most thinking about puppet theatre. 
The mimesis “of death” (as an art of theatre) figures rather the oscillation of, or 
ambiguity between, the identities of these antinomial terms. As we shall note later, the 
uncanny is not an ambiguity of one identity substituting for the other – the animation 
of the inanimate – but an ambiguity about the distinction itself, as it draws its power 
from the very insistence upon it, that a phenomenon must be either animate or 
inanimate. Freud maintains the rationalism of this insistence for the most part of his 
celebrated essay on “the uncanny”, but finally questions the fiction of reality as a 
reality of fiction, “beyond” their erstwhile division, as between art and science. The 
lesson or “learning experience” (concerning metaphysics) in this theatre is, indeed, 
that of a living object (the actor, the actor’s body) endowed with the qualities of death 
(in its image) as one of the most fundamental concerns of human cultural practice.  
 
For Barthes, Bunraku provides a distinct model of performed expression, as itself a 
corporeal writing (or semiotics) – where the visible gesture of the puppeteer is 
manifest alongside that of the puppet body, and where the voice of the narrator (in the 
paradoxical “corporeality” of its sound) is understood in terms of its physical (rather 
than psychological) gesture or expression. The corporeal act and its “expression” each 
have their own register of “writing” in such a performance, rather than being 
condensed – as expression and intention – into a semblance (or rather a dissemblance) 
of a unity as embodied “meaning”. Expression itself becomes legible alongside its 
gestures; it accompanies the action (just as the manifest quality of a brush stroke in a 
painting is not reducible to the “subject” which its application is thought to realise), 
being no longer the expression of an intention, of a “psychical” interiority (in which 
the theatre’s double would disappear). In a pertinent distinction made by Michal 
Kobialka, commenting on the “zero” condition of acting espoused by Kantor in the 
                                                                                                                                      
name but three distinct approaches to the same problematic, which is also fundamental to 
Occidental art history, as will be discussed in the context of a production by Romeo 
Castellucci, below.  
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1960s, this allows for a “paratheatrical” rather than a “metatheatrical” relation to the 
actors’ expression (or work of interpretation).293  
 
In professional practice, however, these concerns with the metaphysics of 
performance are typically reduced to a sense of “bad acting” opposed to “good”, of 
“artificial” acting opposed to “natural” – as if “quoting” a role (its “lesson in 
writing”), rather than “living” it, was a failure of technique.294 This is, indeed, the 
fundamental “superstition” – paradoxically – of the major tradition of twentieth 
century theatre. Maintaining the two bodies of the actor, however, rather than their 
appearing as one, forestalls this theatrical illusion – wherein metaphors speak for 
practice(s), as if in theory. An explicit contemporary example of this non-
metaphorical practice (as its theoretical embodiment) would be the Wooster Group’s 
production with (rather than of, as Kantor would say) Racine’s Phèdre, where the title 
character was split between an actor who spoke her lines and another who performed 
her movements. Indeed, this technique characterised the whole production, for all the 
parts were played with reference to the frame of the stage for a “life” (or animation) 
of the passions; where the lesson in “writing” was played out in terms of a de-
synchronisation of gesture and image, of action (or imitation) and its model, no longer 
elided with the expressivity of speech (as the cadence of breath). The Wooster Group 
offered not so much a “new interpretation” of the play (as if reproducing the text’s 
invisibility on stage, pace Ingarden), but rather a change in the sense of the 
theatrically visible through an understanding of the expressive possibilities (or means) 
of theatre concerning human appearance(s) on stage. For all that this technique was 
viewed by critics as a “radical” departure, it has a long history. Besides the example 
of Bunraku, Samuel Foote offered precisely such a double mode of appearance at the 
Haymarket theatre in the late eighteenth century, citing the authority of ancient 
Roman actors’ practice.295 
                                                
293 Michal Kobialka, “The Quest for the Self/ Other: A Critical Study of Tadeusz Kantor’s 
Theatre”, in Tadeusz Kantor, A Journey Through Other Spaces, trans. & ed. Michal Kobialka, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.290. 
294 It is not unusual to find English actors eschewing the demands of Gestus even in 
performing Brecht’s plays for fear that these undermine the “believability” of their 
appearance on stage – which is already an indictment of the production’s failure to establish 
the visibility of that stage in the first place.  
295 Samuel Foote, quoted in Henryk Jurkowski, Aspects of Puppet Theatre, ed. Penny Francis, 
London: Puppet Centre Trust, 1988, pp.4-5.  
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A rather different “example” of theatrical superstition (in its major and minor keys) 
may be seen in a recent work by Romeo Castellucci (already cited at the beginning of 
chapter one), the very title of which proposes the key theme of “the look” (to which 
we will return in chapter five): On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of 
God. The question of “regard” here is key, as it signifies a “drama” of beholder and 
beheld with respect not simply to the visible but to a concept (as an incarnation of the 
word). Presenting an object (or a question) of the gaze, a huge reproduction of the 
fifteenth century painting, Salvator Mundi (1445) by Antonello da Messina, vertically 
dominates the stage in this production, as itself a representation of the gaze – in the 
contemplation of (in both senses) the “man of sorrows”. On the white canvas of the 
horizontal plane in front of this image of “Man” occurs what we might call the “action 
painting” of the staged performance. Here two actors present the characters of a 
father, distressed by his rectal incontinence (whether due to disease or to old age), and 
of his son, responsible for the old man’s care. The actors perform “expression” – of 
voice or breath, with simple, minimal, repeated refrains such as “excuse me”, “I’m 
sorry”, and the invocation “Jesu” (in which the sound or intonation of the human 
voice is itself the “meaning” of the words); as well as of “tears”; and of “excrement”.  
 
Within this play, they each enact the suffering of an impossibility of communication 
concerning the body, as they traverse the horizontal stage picture from left to right 
(from the audience’s point of view), in three scenes – following literally the direction 
of Occidental legibility. The action unfolds temporally in the imitation of reading, and 
resists, through being essentially repeated in each scene, any transcendence or 
sublimation within the timelessness or unconditionality of the vertical, devotional 
image that it appears to address. Indeed, the horizontal, staged performance refutes 
any descent of the image of the Saviour – that ideal of (and for) imitation (as an image 
of Man) – into that of a contemporary, theatrical “Ecce Homo”.296 The modes of 
expression here concern men, not “Man”; and the pity (as, indeed, the passion) of 
humanity is represented in the work of the actors, rather than by the (represented) icon 
(since this is, after all, an event of theatre).  
 
                                                
296 This may be compared with the discussion of “the frontal icon” in Moshe Barasch, Imago 
Hominis, New York: New York University Press, 1991, pp.24-5. 
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It is, nonetheless, iconography that provides criteria for “regarding” the performance.  
Juxtaposed in the two images, in their distinct axes, are the themes “of state” and “of 
action”, as evoked by Meyer Schapiro in an analysis of the relation between “words 
and pictures” in the example of European art.297 In Castellucci’s production, the 
apparent story, action, or narrative – the visible istoria – of the performed image 
refuses to give the icon intelligibility as an “imitation”; as if the visible could be 
substituted for, or could make sense of, the invisible. The human actors remain 
excluded from the transcendent or divine image of man. Symbol and symbolised – 
man in the image of Man – are not unified, but remain temporally counter-posed in 
the gaze of, distinct from that upon, the audience. This is the fundamental “concept” 
of the production – precisely as theatre – addressing the phenomenology of the gaze 
(although both hearing and smell are significantly addressed by the performance 
also), as if the uncanny in mimesis could be sublimated without remainder (or, 
indeed, “excrement”).  
  
Refusing “to see” this, the juxtaposition of action and image is noted (but curiously 
separated out) in the one review to be found in Theatre Record, which addresses the 
two axes of the image narratively, sequentially (rather than as a “cross”), declaring 
that “what makes the show perverse rather than profound is the sudden leap from 
mundane medical realism into apocalyptic iconoclasm.”298 Typically, Michael 
Billington is not at his best when the presence of the audience informs the concept 
and structure of a performance; but while I would agree with his review concerning 
the second part of the production, not to see its iconoclasm within the “mundane” first 
part (in the very “elevation”, theatrically, of the theme of state against that of action) 
is itself, it seems to me, “perverse rather than profound”. Billington’s criticism 
regards the iconoclasm as itself the subject of visible, narratable action (like the 
                                                
297 Meyer Schapiro, Words and Pictures, The Hague: Mouton, 1973. Schapiro’s study is of 
the scriptural and pictorial example (from Exodus 17) of Moses praying, supported by Aaron 
and Hur, for the victory of the Israelites over the Amalekites. 
298 Michael Billington, in Theatre Record, Vol.XXXI, Issue 8 (9-22April), p.416. Quite how 
much this professional theatregoer, Michael Billington, disliked the production is evidenced 
by his recalling it 6 months later, in an article discussing reviewers walking out of shows (The 
Guardian, 25.10.11, pp.21-22): “...shows like the one staged by Romeo Castellucci at the 
Barbican earlier this year, obsessively concerned with bowel movements” are amongst the 
categories of shows that, as a reviewer, he would “tend to avoid”. 
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“mundane... realism”), rather than as presenting a question of the theatre itself, of the 
invisible action – occurring between stage and auditorium – of the gaze. 
 
For the gaze, the look – the “regard” – is the drama here: the relation between 
beholder and beheld, as the performance opens up the question as to who embodies 
these related terms, in the image of the actors, facing the audience and/or the Saviour. 
The image of the gaze (suggesting its action) permeates the theatre (as later does the 
smell of “excrement”). The countenance, in its supposed “spotless”, “uncorrupted” 
exemplum, with its aura of sorrowful (but redeeming) contemplation, is – in being 
untouched – already stained by the actors’ representation (muted, almost impassive) 
of expressive suffering, suggestive of the body’s resistance to any possible empathy. 
As Billington notes, the second part of the production (in my view, unnecessarily) 
literalises the staining of the image by making directly visible its attack upon the icon, 
as if there was some residual “moral” character to excrement, as though the survival 
or superstition (amongst the twenty-first century audience) of a corporeal analogy 
with souls was being tested.  
 
The drama of contemplation, between self and Other, I and You – being the idiom of 
the frontal face (verticality) – is distinguished from the profile (horizontality), in 
which action is represented in the third person (following Schapiro). The 
contemplative is confronted with the actors’ expression, in the “literal” sense of 
representing what is pressed out of the body (as the site of thought) in the voice or 
breath, tears, and excrement. All these expressions are theatrical, of course – that is, 
they are real in the sense of presenting the signs of mortality, “of death”, occurring in 
the time and place of a performance (juxtaposed with the reproducibility, and thus the 
temporality, of an image of the transcendent or “eternal”).  
 
To judge by the shuffling and sniggering in the audience, for some, the expressive 
repetitions (the verbal incantations, the excremental staining) were too many – and the 
longed for “redemption” (“the end” of the performance) too late. Indeed, it was 
curious how no one I spoke to after the performance offered any regard for its title – 
“On the concept of...” The question of contemplation (by and of the image) was left 
unspoken in that of narrative; what was shown was seen only in terms of what was 
told (reducing the staged speech simply to what was indicative of its “action”). I was 
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particularly taken aback by the artistic director of one London theatre (which declares 
itself to be dedicated to “performance art”) offering a reading of the production in the 
most conventional of representational terms, as if (with Billington) there was no 
question of the “imitation” (or iconography) of the human, or of “man” (announced, 
after all, in the work’s very title). The potential difference between the icon (or its 
“character”, as the “emanation” of the image, not least in the age of its 
“reproducibility”) – with its suggested participation in the invisible – and the symbol 
(or its narrative or story) – with its apparent relation to the visible – seemed to be 
disregarded entirely. Everyone I spoke to referred simply to the performance having 
to do with the “Catholic” culture of the director – in some touristic association with 
his being Italian – as if the relation between word and image, or icon and story, were 
not fundamental for thinking about Occidental aesthetics, including the production of 
meaning through theatre practice(s). Rather than as an experience of the gaze, of its 
contemplation (and imitation even) – as that of its very questioning – the theatre here 
was reduced to a story concerning the artist, to a biographical condition of 
intelligibility (which has, nevertheless, deep roots).299 
 
Displacing audience satisfaction with what is enacted or performed as a domestic – 
“mundane... realistic” – scene, Castellucci’s production proposes a dissatisfaction 
with the experience of seeing (as typically identified with what is seen). Addressing 
the intelligibility of our own presence as an audience – staging seeing (its scene), 
making the stage its subject – the production frames the “work” of theatre. The 
“empathetic identification with what is represented”300 – supposed to characterise the 
devotional image in religion, as much as the audience’s relation to the protagonist’s 
“action”, or “passion” even, as defined by the dramatic plot within theatre history – is 
here fractured by Castellucci. The elevated, vertical image is, as it were, refuted by 
the horizontal, in a thanatoscopic event of theatre – in which the emblem of the 
body’s afterlife is neither the eternal countenance nor the skull that it hides, but 
excrement (as a metaphor of literal, human expression or suffering).  
 
                                                
299  One might think of Giorgio Vasari’s Lives, for instance, as a founding example of the 
biographical within the “modern” history of art. 
300 Moshe Barasch, op. cit., p.23. 
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Emanuel Levinas famously makes the face speak of and for the Other, of and for a 
relationship that is not reducible to the things of the world – the “mundane” – but 
which, like light (as, indeed, the word), makes the thought of such relationships 
conceivable. “Is not the face given to vision?” Levinas asks. And, “How does the 
epiphany as a face determine a relationship different from that which characterises all 
our sensible experience?”301 (We will return to this question of light and the face in a 
discussion of photographs and death masks, with Heidegger, Barthes, and Nancy – the 
latter speaking of Oedipus – in chapter five.) While Castellucci’s theatre is 
iconoclastic in the sense of an “epiphany” (not least in its appeal to the sense of 
smell), it nonetheless holds to Levinas’ phenomenological iconography (in place of 
the mythical Gorgon) – in which the relation between seeing and seen becomes 
ethical. In contrast to the Catholic fundamentalists who would prefer that we did not 
“see” it at all, we might ask, with regard to the event (or art) of theatre specifically: 
how do we envisage death? In the second half of Castellucci’s production the image 
of the face – that, supposedly, of compassion – is “exposed”, as it is torn down like a 
huge advertising hoarding revealing simply the scaffolding that held it up.  
 
With this “example”, it is hardly to be supposed that an audience need read the theatre 
through such iconographic distinctions as that, for instance, between “His image” and 
“the image of God” proposed by Origen; or the Arianic Debate concerning whether – 
or not – Christ belonged to the created world302; or even, the humanist revaluation that 
Kantorowicz adduces from Dante, concerning the political implication of the 
“reflexiveness of ‘man’ and ‘Man’, of homo and humanitas, of Adam mortalis and 
Adam subtilis...”303 However, one might hope that the eternal countenance is 
recognised as being – paradoxically – a portrait of the death of (an incarnate) god, 
reproducing in human guise the relation between appearance and being (as if of 
transcendence) that conditions pre-modern (pre-Kantian) thought of intelligible 
experience, as it may be thought of theatrically.  
 
                                                
301 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969, p.187. 
302 Moshe Barasch, concerning Origen and the Arianic controversy, Icon: Studies in the 
History of an Idea, New York: New York University Press, 1995, pp.142-3. 
303 Ernst Kantorowicz (tracing the lineage of “the body corporate of Man”), The King’s Two 
Bodies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p.492. 
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What this example seems to offer is evidence of how little the sense of “theatre” is 
thought of aesthetically (theoretically), even today, in terms of the visual – other than 
as making visible “the story” (of a supposed “drama”). Castellucci stages “the scene” 
of looking (of, precisely, theatre), with the human figure understood in terms of its 
image (whether that be visual, verbal, aural, olfactory, or conceptual). As Hans 
Belting remarks, in terms that are basic for this research (albeit here as concerns the 
image as essentially visual): 
 
At a fundamental level, the question of what an image is requires a two-fold 
answer. We must address the image not only as a product of a given medium, 
be it photography, painting, or video, but also as a product of our selves, for 
we generate images of our own (dreams, imaginings, personal perceptions) 
that we play out against other images in the visible world.304  
 
It is this event of an image-medium relation, played out as an audience-actor relation 
– rather than the story of a drama (its narrative plot) – that is conceptualised 
theatrically in Castellucci’s work, offering a contemporary instance of what is 
proposed in this thesis as (the concept of) the theatre of death. What is staged here is 
the end of a religiously oriented theatrical metaphor of the face as a mask (the very 
opposite of the Catholic concern ascribed by some of the audience). For there is no 
“real face” behind the countenance – simply the bare stage, the empty place of what 
remains (after or beyond the curtain call).305 The iconoclasm is already at work within 
the reproducibility of the image(s), which serves to highlight the non-identity of the 
iconic image and its medium-support. The assault in Castellucci’s production on the 
hoarding-sized image of the Christ-man cannot touch its iconicity (despite the 
anxieties of the protesting Catholic fundamentalists). More pertinent here, however, is 
the expressive role of the iconic (or symbolic) excrement in disturbing the assumption 
that medium and image are one and the same, in “the body” of the actors at least.  
 
                                                
304 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlap, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.2. 
305 This emptiness finds scarcely imaginable parody in a story such as that reported of 
adolescent pop singer (“the world’s most famous seventeen year old”) Justin Bieber having 
an image “of Jesus Christ’s face” tattooed on the back of his left leg (report by Elisabeth Day, 
The Observer, 08.01.2012, p.32).  
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The limited reception of Castellucci’s production in the UK seems to suggest that the 
theoretical space of and for such an art of theatre remains bound up with antimonies 
of mimesis that remain deeply settled, even in a contemporary “performance” culture 
that would distinguish itself from “theatre” (not least amongst those who even make 
this distinction their profession outside of academia).306 One often hears it said – with 
pride – from devotees of performance art that they “never go to the theatre”, as if their 
possible theorisation of the difference (theatre or performance) was not actually a 
question of (and for) their own practice(s). In an interview, Marina Abramovic 
declares, for instance:  
 
To be a performance artist, you have to hate theatre. Theatre is fake... The 
knife is not real, the blood is not real, and the emotions are not real. 
Performance is just the opposite: the knife is real, the blood is real, and the 
emotions are real.307 
 
The naivety of this opposition between what is “real” and what is not (or what is 
representational), as giving content to an opposition between performance art and 
theatre, has garnered strange institutional support. The supposedly anti-theatrical 
ambition to bring “performance art to life” – to perform pieces of and from the past – 
becomes absurd in Abramovic’s recent appeal to the notion of a musical score in 
legitimating her claimed “re-enactments” of “seminal works that had been performed 
by [her] contemporaries in a prior time and space”, during the MOMA marketing 
“event”, Seven Easy Pieces.308 Here a seeming lack of interest in the performance 
history of music (as of theatre) is evident. A play, after all, is no more the same thing 
in the case of Peter Handke, Valère Novarina, or Anton Chekhov, than is a score in 
the case of John Cage, Luigi Nono, or Mauricio Kagel. In each case the explorations 
of notation are diverse and pose the question of (its) performance in equally diverse 
ways – in so far as the work has aesthetic truth, rather than being merely a stylistic 
reproduction or pastiche of accepted, institutional conditions of and for its 
performance. It is also as if, furthermore, such precedents of a concept of the theatre 
                                                
306 By contrast, fundamentalist Catholics staged their own “iconoclastic” assault on the theatre 
in Paris, when Castellucci’s production was shown at the Théâtre de Ville in 2011. 
307 Marina Abramovic, interview with Sean O’Hagan, in The Observer, 3.10.2010.  
308 Marina Abramovic, Seven Easy Pieces, Milan: Edizioni Charta, 2007, p.11. 
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“of death” as Craig or Artaud had not written at all, and as if the possibilities of 
theatre and performance lacked a history of (and within) aesthetic theory.  
 
The effect of this situation, in which aesthetic theory has been almost withdrawn from 
performance art (if not entirely from its studies), can be further seen in critics’ 
reception of Robert Wilson’s 2011 production, The Life and Death of Marina 
Abramovic at the Manchester International Festival. (The citation of critics here 
serves to indicate the extent to which theatre research does – not – inform public 
discussion about theatrical practice(s) amongst its professionals outside of the 
academy.) Widely reviewed this time, Wilson’s chocolate box surrealism (or Wizard 
of Oz pastiche) makes of the eponymous performance artist the corporate icon (a Judy 
Garland in “performance art” drag) of an aesthetics that, far from being engaged in 
the problematics of spectatorial “emancipation” (of the thought of images, in and as 
theatre), offers little resistance to its own image-as-institutional-self-advertisement.309  
 
With Barthes’ “lesson” (drawing out the sense of writing from the deconstruction of 
metaphysics), let us note the literal sense of “character” in mimesis (and 
mnemotechnics), as it alludes to both ideograms and movable type, where the visible 
appears as if legible, and the conditions of and for this very legibility – such as 
spacing – appear as if invisible. As Lacoue-Labarthe, in addressing “the theorisation 
of mimesis – from the Republic to the ‘Mirror Stage’”, proposes:  
 
Things begin, then – and this is what ‘imitation’ is all about – with the 
‘plastic’ (fashioning, modelling, fictioning), with the impression of the type 
                                                
309 Given that one might think Wilson’s aesthetic comparable to “the theatre of death”, it 
would be interesting to contrast his take on “the Marina Abramovic story” with Kantor’s final 
production, Today is my Birthday. For now let us note that one reviewer (Richard Dorment, in 
the Daily Telegraph, 12.07.2011) condescendingly repeats the “performance art” line for his 
readers, that “what happens in the theatre is essentially a deception, a way of making the 
audience believe something is real when it isn’t” (in Theatre Record, 2-15.07.2011, p.793), as 
if anyone has ever thought of its art otherwise. The interest of both performance and theatre, 
as an art, is not this given separation between what is or is not “real”; but rather the 
engagement of an audience in the very question of the distinction, in the between that admits 
(an occasionally uncanny) space of – and for – thought. The “drama” of beholder and beheld 
– as a question of the theatrical in aesthetic theory – revalues the post-Kantian question of 
subject and object in theatre aesthetics, without, precisely, needing to adopt the curious 
current vocabulary of an “aesthetics of the performative” (pace Erika Fischer-Lichte), which 
supposes rather than questions what is “visible” in theatre, as well as the tradition of thinking 
performance “after” life (pace Kleist, Craig, Didi-Huberman, et al.).  
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and the imposition of the sign, with the mark that language, ‘mythic’ 
discourses (whether they are true or not matters little; this becomes a relatively 
secondary and subordinate question when the essential thing, as is said 
explicitly, is that such discourses are fictive), originally inscribe in the 
malleable – plastic – material of the infant soul...310  
 
Barthes’ lesson concerning such “impression(s)” and the soul (contrasting with 
Rilke’s evocation of the “original”, at the end of the previous chapter) is as 
fundamental for the concerns of this thesis as is Craig’s appeal to the art of theatre as 
a plastic rather than a literary art – whilst precisely resisting the reduction of an 
understanding of the one to the other. What is a sign for the theatrical, when a 
theatrical sign is equally a sign of the theatrical? How does it make its “impression”, 
as gesture (or “type”), in the medium of corporeal co-presence – between actor and 
audience? How is this “imitation” to be theorised when its “model” (or “type”) is 
what becomes (of) the theatrical itself? How does this undo the opposition between 
“real” and “representation” that Abramovic, for instance, sees in both blood and 
emotion, as though act and motive were identical?  
 
Barthes, like Craig, draws from the example of puppetry (itself significant for a 
conceptualisation of the theatre of death) to question the “presence” of the Western 
actor on stage, as a speaking being, its body thought of as animated by an “interior 
life” of meaningful intention. Besides the reception of the Castellucci performance, 
we may consider the effect of Barthes’ “lesson in writing” in another example, where 
again it has seemingly still to be learnt. An article published in a recent issue of 
Critical Inquiry (Spring 2010), perhaps surprisingly, addresses puppetry – opening 
with a (perhaps equally surprising) claim to address what its author, Tzachi Zamir, 
calls “the new focus on performance and theatre within contemporary aesthetics”.311 
With respect to “contemporary aesthetics”, then, this article is intriguing for pointing 
out the space that the concept of the theatre of death addresses – at least, as it might 
                                                
310 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography”, trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Lacoue-Labarthe 
Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, pp.126-7.  
311 Tzachi Zamir, “Puppets” in Critical Inquiry, vol.36, n.3, Spring 2010, p.386. 
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be drawn from Barthes (that is, as concerns puppets as a model for actors) – without, 
however, offering any such concept itself.312 
 
The puppet is anthropomorphised in this inquiry by reading its agency in terms of 
categories, such as inside and outside, which, for Barthes, it precisely allows us to 
critically re-examine. Zamir writes:  
 
The puppet... is internally dead and externally alive. The imagination in this 
instance does not merely fill out a missing picture but rather allows itself to be 
affected by what it acknowledges to be a void shrouded by expression. The 
amusement and laughter that puppets typically invoke can point to the 
uncanny nature of the content of this art form, playing as it does on the 
boundaries between lifelessness and life...313 
 
While this reproduction of the antinomy of internal and external (albeit through a 
reversal of their standard values) identifies a challenge to prevailing conceptions of 
mimesis in “performance and theatre”, it does not develop what this challenge might 
be: to explore what is unsettling in the very possibility of such a reversal as it might 
apply, paradoxically, to the “live” actor (as to human agency), whose “death” after all 
is never – as an actor – “lifeless” (except metaphorically). For Zamir (unlike Barthes), 
the question of “contemporary aesthetics” in “theatre and performance” addresses the 
difference (or boundary) between lifelessness and life simply, and not that between 
the dead and the living. Even so (at least, in theory), the issue is not so much a 
question of the boundary between one and the other – to recall the misting of Lear’s 
mirror – as the uncanny oscillation between them, the unsettling of their mutual 
determination in and by their opposition, in the theatre “of death”. Indeed, this will 
return in discussion (in part three) of Kantor’s unsettling place “in” the performances 
of the Cricot 2, as this transcribes the experience of the look (of being seen seeing) as 
that “of death” – in terms of theatre. The modernist segregation of inner and outer, of 
                                                
312 The article uses puppetry, rather, as a suggestive tool for a theoretical account of the 
human subject and its agency in terms of the psycho-dynamics of object-relations; that is, as 
itself a psychological model rather than an aesthetic one, and as distinct, for instance, from 
the ancient “drama” of the power of the created over the creator, the manipulated over the 
manipulator. 
313 Ibid., p.409 (also p.402).  
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animate and inanimate, is also exposed by Bruno Latour with precisely the example 
of Bunraku in addressing the iconoclash over the “life” of fabricated figures, as if they 
are “either made or real”. This false choice “is as impossible as to request a Bunraku 
player to have to choose, from now on, either to show his puppet or to show himself 
on stage.”314 
 
A sense of the dissociation of the living, or animate, body from itself (as its double 
conceived of in theatre aesthetics, distinct from a spiritual separation from the cadaver 
conceived of in religion) is familiar within modernist thought – not only in relation to 
its “Oriental” turn and to puppetry, but also through an association of psychiatric 
studies with reflection on a range of popular entertainments, including early 
cinema.315 Henri Bergson, for instance, identified the comic effect (or “character”) 
corporeally in the conjunction precisely of animism and automatism, in what might be 
called (with Lacoue-Labarthe) a form of embodied “typography”. (We might note 
here the ambiguities of theatrical spectatorship evident in the laughter that at first 
greeted Tommy Cooper’s dead body on stage, as though it was “acting” 
automatically.) Indeed, Bergson’s formula for the comic, in an intimation of the 
effects of the new mimetic medium of film (in itself emblematic of the mechanisation 
of movement, satirised by Chaplin, characteristic of Taylorist “modern times”), is 
precisely that of “the mechanical superimposed onto the living”,316 of the animate 
“signed” by the automatic; or, even, as might be said – this time with Craig – of the 
actor’s body “clothed with a death-like beauty while exhaling a living spirit”.317 In a 
note “after a showing of The Circus”, Walter Benjamin speaks of Chaplin in terms 
that weave all these themes together, noting of one scene that “the mask of non-
involvement turns him into a fairground marionette”.318 It is here, precisely, that the 
former theatrical “superstition” is revealed in its specific iconography, recalling the 
                                                
314 Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010, p.81. 
315 As addressed, for example, in both Rae Gordon, Why the French Love Jerry Lewis, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001; and Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and 
the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, New York: Zone Books, 2004. 
316 Bergson, “[D]u mécanique plaqué sur du vivant”, quoted by Rae Gordon, op. cit., p.15.  
317 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-marionette”, in Craig on Theatre, ed. 
Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, pp.86-7. 
318 Walter Benjamin, “Chaplin” [1928-29], trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Selected Writings, 
vol.2.1, eds. Michael Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2005, p.200.  
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heuristic analogy of this research (discussed in the Introduction): as theatre is to the 
uncanny, so is mimesis to death.  
 
As has been suggested throughout the thesis, a comparison may be made here with 
Warburg’s “anthropology of the visual”, in terms of its pathos formulae. Georges 
Didi-Huberman emphasises the anthropological basis of Warburg’s art historical 
concept, not only as emotionally expressive, but as gesturally performed (as by an 
“external prompting”):  
 
The Pathosformel gave art history access to a fundamental anthropological 
dimension – that of the symptom. Here the symptom is understood as 
movement in bodies, a movement that fascinated Warburg not only because he 
considered it ‘passionate agitation’ but also because he judged it an ‘external 
prompting’... as visible expression of psychic states that had become 
fossilised, so to speak, in images. Here it is possible to think of the 
iconography of hysteria as Charcot might have recreated it by following the 
same threads of a history of styles. But Warburg went beyond the 
‘iconographic’ notion of the symptom found in nineteenth-century mental 
hospitals. He understood that symptoms are not ‘signs’ (the semeia of classical 
medicine) and that their temporalities, their clusters of instants and durations, 
their mysterious survivals, presuppose something like an unconscious 
memory.319 
 
Relating an iconography of the actor (as a cultural or anthropological “symptom” of 
human appearance) to Warburg’s “nameless science” allows for a research into an 
embodied archive of an unconscious memory of theatre practice(s), of “types” of 
“movement in bodies” that “demand to be understood” as Fischer-Lichte proposes, 
(cited in the next chapter), as instances or “symptoms” to be translated (pace Freud’s 
“dynamics of transference”) into concepts (addressing their repression, enacted by the 
                                                
319 Georges Didi-Huberman, “Foreword – Knowledge: Movement”, in Philippe-Alain 
Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, New York: Zone 
Books, 2004, p.13, & pp.15-16. Charcot described the Salpêtrière as a “living museum” of 
“attitudes passionelles”, evidenced in its purportedly nosological photographic iconography 
(Didi-Huberman, The Invention of Hysteria, trans. Alisa Hartz, Cambridge, Mass.: 2003, 
p.17). See also, Sigrid Schade, “Charcot and the Spectacle of the Hysterical Body,” trans. 
Aileen Derieg, in Art History, vol.18, n.4, December 1995. 
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metaphors of realism, denying the motive powers of both animism and allegory). 
Crucially, the question of what “demands to be understood” in theatre studies is not 
reducible to documentary materials, but touches upon what Witkacy calls 
“metaphysical feeling”,320 in the mimetic question of and for aesthetics (at least, in 
theory). Indeed, this is perhaps the principal theoretical claim of this thesis (after that 
of claiming the historical existence of a minor tradition within the aesthetics of 
modernist theatre and theorising the potential meaning “of death” for it) – that there is 
more to the theatrical sign or gesture than the mere appearance of “life”.  
 
If the dead exist only in so far as they live on amongst the living, from where do they 
“return”? How do the living testify to the existence of the dead? How do the dead 
bear witness to the living? In what sense do the dead offer a mimetic model for 
(living) actors, as then these actors do for an audience? Although the focus here has 
been on the “theoretical scene” of the stage (as distinct from the auditorium), the 
relation between the living and the dead broaches a wider historical context – 
particularly as modern theatre is associated with the political community, with the 
development of cities, and with the place of the dead in both.  
 
Before turning to the question of an iconography of the actor specifically, let us note 
some further instances of the material and psychical “life” of the dead. Analysing the 
psychological claims of superstition, for instance, Nicholas Abraham writes (in his 
“notes on the phantom”):  
 
It is a fact that the ‘phantom’, whatever its form, is nothing but an invention of 
the living... The phantom is therefore also a metapsychological fact: what 
haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others.321  
 
In a public context, the dead give their name to political “secrets” (which is, after all, 
the story of Hamlet322), as they touch upon the sovereignty of the state in its use of 
                                                
320 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “Pure Form in Theatre”, in the The Witkiewicz Reader, trans. and 
ed. Daniel Gerould, London: Quartet Books, 1993, pp.149-50. 
321 Nicholas Abraham, “Notes on the Phantom”, in  Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The 
Shell and the Kernel, trans. and ed. Nicholas Rand, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994, p.171. 
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violence against the body. This “biocratic” (distinct from an earlier theocratic) 
condition of modern political life finds emblematic expression in Walter Benjamin’s 
compelling reminder that “even the dead” are not safe from “the enemy” in the 
understanding of history.323  
 
As a theatre practice of the twentieth century, the theatre of death may be 
contextualised historically in terms of that “disturbed relationship with the dead 
today” (no less true of the realities of this century than of the last), that characterises 
modern capitalism (not least in its dialectical relations with mimesis), about which 
Adorno and Horkheimer remark (in 1944):  
 
In reality, the dead suffer a fate which the Jews in olden days considered the 
worst possible curse: they are expunged from the memory of those who live 
on. Men have ceased to consider their own purpose and fate; they work their 
despair out on the dead.324 
 
This global “theatre of death”, in the perpetual world war of capitalism,325 produces 
nonetheless some symptoms of its own cultural resistance in the name of history, as 
evidenced in the truth content of particular aesthetic practices. This is profoundly the 
                                                                                                                                      
322 This is analysed, for example, by Carl Schmitt in Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of 
Time into the Play, trans. David Pan and Jennifer Rust, New York: Telos Press, 2009.  
323 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, trans. Harry Zohn, Benjamin, Selected 
Writings, vol. 4, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2006. The development of the “biocratic” is explored, for instance, in Eric 
Santner’s study of the modern survival of the political theology of the king’s two bodies (The 
Royal Remains, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
324 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming, London: 
Verso, 1986, p.216. As an expression of imperialism, the genocide of a specifically Jewish 
“sub-humanity” lies at the heart of modern European cultural history (the illumination of its 
so-called “darkness”). This is a topic with innumerable tragic contemporary ramifications, to 
mention only the so-called “restitution” politics in Europe and the “right of return” in 
Palestine. The literature addressing the effects of these “phantoms” is vast and various, to cite 
only a few (besides the work of Hannah Arendt): Enzo Traverso, Understanding the Nazi 
Genocide, London: Pluto Press, 1999; Schlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, 
London: Verso, 2010; Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, London: Verso, 2001; 
and David Grossman, See Under: Love, London: Vintage, 1999.  
325 Where the “value” of work, for instance, is abstracted into a purely monetary equivalence 
the ubiquitous presence of the dead in modern societies is as the unemployed. Paradoxically, 
as the dead have been removed from the city since the beginning of the nineteenth century, so 
also has the city become an open cemetery for the living through the development of aerial 
warfare. 
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case for another artist whose work could also be compared here (that is, under the 
concept of the theatre of death), Heiner Müller. 
 
With respect to this wider context for thinking through the concept (as the history) of 
the theatre of death, the “event” of theatre in this thesis (as that of its theorisation) 
concerns principally the concept or figure of the actor, as distinct from the 
significance of performance practice, or of interpretative acting. In this sense, the 
temporal aspect of “performance” is considered in its plastic dimension, as this is 
embodied in the theatrical question of the co-presence of actor and audience. As has 
been suggested throughout these first three chapters, we are concerned here – in the 
vocabulary of Aby Warburg – with the “survival” of forms, or conventions, of 
mimetic (or “pathetic”) expression rather than with any particular actor training, 
associated with (or indeed named after) a particular theatre director. This is so not 
least as “performance”, in the institutionalisation of its “studies”, has been theorised – 
in distinction from aesthetics – in association with an anthropology focused upon 
examples of “ritual” and (metaphorically) “drama”, rather than the concept of 
mimesis.326  
 
Concerning the “live”, the temporal aspect of theatre – as “performance” – has 
recently been the focus of such study, or theorisation, to the exclusion of the plastic or 
empathic (even as the “presence” of the body has been fetishised). Constructing a 
conceptual figure of the actor in the theatre of death – distinct from addressing any 
specific performer (as, for instance, Jean-Louis Barrault in Artaud’s writing, or 
Etienne Decroux in Craig’s327) – is to address the question of how the human being 
“looks” when on stage, asking: what is it “of” human appearance that appears there? 
What is human in this appearance “of death” as theatre? (Or, indeed, what is theatrical 
in this appearance “of death” as human?) What is it that the human being looks like 
                                                
326 Rather than working through this well established discourse from Turner and Schechner 
(for example, by discussing, in contrast, Boas and Warburg, not to mention Augé and 
Belting), this thesis will simply work around it – touching upon it only by addressing Erika 
Fischer-Lichte (in the next chapter), whose enduring fixation on the “liminal” has been one of 
the constants of such theorising over the past thirty years. 
327 Antonin Artaud, “Autour d’une Mère: a Dramatic Action by J.-L. Barrault”, in The 
Theatre and its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards, New York: Grove Press, 1958; and 
Edward Gordon Craig: “At Last a Creator in the Theatre, from the Theatre”, in “An Etienne 
Decroux Album”, Mime Journal, eds. Sally and Thomas Leabhart, Claremont: Pomona 
College, 2000/2001. 
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on stage, in such a theatre? What is it of human appearance that the actor (that of “the 
theatre of death”) offers theatrically a semblance? What is this theatrical appearance 
that simultaneously assimilates spectators to its image and yet distinguishes itself 
from them? What is it (with the example of Blanchot’s “two versions of the 
imaginary” in mind) that returns as an image on stage, but under a prohibition of 
touch? Is it perhaps in this very prohibition, between audience and actor, that (this) 
theatre comes closest to the anthropological dimension of its concept, as it addresses 
materially – in practice – the phantom or spectre (the “symptom”) of the presence 
“of” the dead? 
 
It might be said, in conclusion of this chapter that the theatre of death offers, both 
historically and conceptually, a contribution to a discipline that seems as yet to exist 
only in outline: an iconography of the actor. Such an iconography might already 
address the representation of actors historically, exploring how portraits of actors in 
any given period, for instance, are distinguished in particular ways from other 
subjects of portraiture. It might also trace the symbolism that attends the 
representation of actors specifically, exploring how this has changed historically.  
 
While the sense of iconography is widely contested within its principal domain, the 
history of art, the limited sense of “a mere technique of deciphering” (or more 
waspishly, “rote cryptography”) is certainly not what is intended here.328 Besides 
Preziosi, Georges Didi-Huberman in particular has made the case for a “return to 
Warburg” as an undoing of Panofsky’s categorisations, offering a profound critique of 
the “ends” of an iconography that would shelter from the knowledge of Freud, 
limiting its questions concerning the intelligibility of images to the purportedly 
conscious reason(s) of their “history” as art.329 WTJ Mitchell, meanwhile, taking up 
the second of Panofsky’s categories, has made a case for “a revived iconology” – 
“beyond the comparative study of verbal and visual art” – taking it “into the basic 
construction of the human subject as a being constituted by both language and 
imaging.”330 Here, in a sense, iconography (holding to the suffix “writing”) would 
                                                
328 Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p.112.  
329 Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images, trans. John Goodman, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. 
330 WTJ Mitchell, Picture Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p.24 and p.25. 
(Also, Iconology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.) Curiously, a letter from 
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turn from philology to philosophy (or to a philosophical anthropology), addressing the 
truth content of its aesthetic object(s), rather than the textual deciphering of images as 
cultural artefacts.331  
 
Fundamentally, the sense of iconography intended here touches upon Warburg’s 
research into pathos formulae, as mimetic symptoms or “survivals” of cultural 
memory; or, rather, of the embodied practices of a cultural unconscious (as this is 
understood anthropologically rather than mythically), in addressing their aesthetic 
truth content. The understanding of such knowledge (or research) of culture in 
English already has a contested history of its own – not least in Edgar Wind’s critical 
review of Gombrich’s biography of Warburg. All this concerns the terms in which a 
research such as this into various theatre artists’ own theorising is (or may be) 
thinkable. Suffice it for the moment to cite Fritz Saxl (from an essay, written shortly 
after Warburg’s death, on “the expressive gestures of the fine arts”):  
 
The kind of psychology that is needed in our science of art and culture cannot 
be merely a psychology of expression that interprets expression and image as 
fixed formulations of the psyche that have taken on form, but rather a 
psychology of expression that understands the stamp and continuing life of 
                                                                                                                                      
Cassirer to Warburg concerning the development of what became the “philosophy of 
symbolic forms” is kept in a box marked “problems of iconology” (Ikonologie Probleme) in 
the Warburg Archive (cf. John Krois and Donald Verene, “Introduction”, in Ernst Cassirer, 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Volume Four), trans. John Krois, eds. John Krois and 
Donald Verene, New Haven: Yale U.P., 1996, p.xiii, n.18). The very first of the lectures 
published in the collection of the Warburg library (after an introduction to the library and its 
aims by Fritz Saxl) was by Cassirer on “the concept of symbolic form in the construction of 
the humanities” [Geisteswissenschaften] in Vortrage der Bibliothek Warburg 1921-22, ed. 
Fritz Saxl, Leipzig: Teubner, 1923. Cassirer’s own development of “cultural science” 
research would be another thesis topic. His encomium to Warburg, on the occasion of the 
latter’s sixtieth birthday (13th June 1926), however, includes the inspiring suggestion that 
Warburg’s library (on the eve of its move into its new building) itself constituted an “organon 
of intellectual-historical studies”, representing “in its organisation and in its intellectual 
structure... the idea of the methodological unity of all fields and all currents of intellectual 
history” (“Letter of Dedication”, in The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance 
Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963, p.xv). This speaks of an 
age when “inter-disciplinary” was the practice of research understood between intuition and 
concepts, rather than a word for simply a form of the institutional administration of research. 
331 As Adorno writes: “The truth content of works must be rigorously distinguished from all 
philosophy that is pumped into them by authors or theorists... On the other hand, aesthetics 
brusquely repudiates the claim of philology – however useful it may be in other contexts – 
that it assures the truth content of artworks...” (Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: The Athlone Press, 1999, p.341). 
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expressive values retained in social memory as meaningful, quasi mental-
technical functions, and which does not classify the symbol as a final product 
of inner energy, but rather sees it within the psycho-physical process and 
clarifies the significance particularly of the repercussions of the symbol for 
psychic life.332  
 
Leaving aside questions of art history, however, considering the appearance (and re-
appearance) of certain gestural idioms, postures, poses, and attitudes, amongst actors; 
such an iconography (whose “images” are not limited to pictures after all) might turn 
to theatre anthropology, which studies these in corporeal practice – albeit to 
distinguish the “pre-expressive” possibilities of and for the performer from any 
culturally specific (indeed, iconographic) forms of embodied expression. (This is 
distinct from the moralised iconography that has dominated questions of 
“appropriate” casting, which curiously survives into the mimetic conventions of 
naturalism still today.) Considering the image of the actor within modernity (in the 
examples of Craig, Artaud, Castellucci, and Kantor), this study would be (as Warburg 
proposed) both iconographic and anthropological in its approach to what is 
specifically theatrical or aesthetic. It would address the image given to – or that 
admits of – a figure of human appearance, as that, specifically, of “an actor”, as this 
has been conceived of by these different theatre artists; that is, of the actor (a living 
body) presenting, for an audience, a figure of – and even, perhaps, for – the dead.  
 
That the theatre “of death” is not representational in the sense usually conveyed by 
“of” has, hopefully, been made clear. This theatre is not simply the employment of 
means or devices (not least, of actors) to give a (realistic) representation “of”, or to, 
death, as it exists or occurs elsewhere than as theatrically. And yet it is also nothing 
but representational, as already discussed concerning the “transformation of the body 
into representation” (Michaud). The question of the representational here applies to 
the theatre (to a mimetic art) as it occurs in relation to “death”; not as a momento 
mori, nor as the staged death of tragic characters, but rather as the thought of death as 
it is theatrically specific (in the event of the actor’s appearance) – as death is already 
                                                
332 Fritz Saxl, “The Expressive Gestures of the Fine Arts”, quoted in Sigrid Schade, “Charcot 
and the Spectacle of the Hysterical Body”, trans. Aileen Derieg, in Art History, vol.18, n.4, 
December 1995, p.501. 
 142 
inscribed within representation. The critique of the prevailing naturalism in “theatre”, 
signified by way “of death”, follows this inscription in a minor aesthetic tradition of 
what theatre is or could be. As we have already seen, the effigy or mannequin plays a 
significant role in this aesthetics – as part of a twentieth century (modernist) legacy of 
both practice and polemic, technique and theory, in which both Craig and Artaud (and 
Maeterlinck and Witkacy) are important precedents.  
 
This concept of theatre is not, then, to be understood simply in terms of professional 
practices, or prevailing ideas of actor training. It concerns, rather, how such practices 
may be re-imagined, or re-thought, within the history of mimesis, understood in terms 
of a possibility of a broadly anthropological and aesthetic research, to which Moshe 
Barasch, for instance, alludes when he writes (in Imago Hominis) that: “the human 
figure is an emblem of what may be described as ‘the human world’. In a true sense 
of the word, the body of man is a symbolic form.”333 While a discussion about the use 
of this term (“symbolic form”) within the history of iconography would merit a 
chapter of its own, suffice it to note here that this theatrical iconography – that of 
Craig’s “figure, or symbolic creation”, the “image” of human being;334 Artaud’s 
“animated hieroglyph”335; or Kantor’s “live effigy of man”336 – concerns, in this art 
theatre practice understood in its anthropological dimension (pace Philippe-Alain 
Michaud’s epigraph to this chapter), “a response to the enigma of the individual in the 
world of man.”337 The points of orientation from Michaud, Barasch, Vernant, and 
Didi-Huberman referenced in this chapter find further echo in Hans Belting’s project 
for an “anthropology of images”, where he writes (with specific regard to the relation 
between images and death): “Here we grasp the roots of that very contradiction which 
                                                
333 Moshe Barasch, Imago Hominis, New York: New York University Press, 1994, pp.18-19.  
334 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-marionette”, in Craig on Theatre, ed. 
Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, pp.86-87. 
335 Antonin Artaud, “Balinese Theatre”, in The Theatre and its Double, trans. Mary Richards, 
New York: Grove Press, 1958, p.54. 
336 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Vog and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in A 
Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993, pp.113-14. 
337 Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, trans. Sophie Hawkes, 
New York: Zone Books, 2004, p.236. 
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will forever characterise images: images make a physical (a body’s) absence visible 
by transforming it into iconic presence.”338 
 
The iconographic actor (or the concept or paradigm of the actor) in the theatre of 
death offers such a cultural “response” (Michaud) by evoking the uncanny appearance 
or aspect of human being(s): the universality of death (in which a collective 
representation, as an already existing “after life”, haunts the individual). This is 
distinct from a moral aspect, for instance, as it might be addressed by both a classical 
iconography of the actor (as this survives in the Commedia figures or types) and by a 
modern naturalism (albeit with its quite different sense of the representative attitude 
or gesture concerning character or motive). In genre terms, echoes of the good or 
noble figure in tragedy, and the stupid or coarse figure in comedy, have oriented the 
guises (or masks) of the actor up until modernity; including elevated speech (verse) 
for the tragedian (in “high art”), and vulgar speech (prose) for the comedian (in 
“popular culture”). In such an iconography, the “character and physiognomy” (to use 
the title of an essay by Barasch) of the prosopon – as the type, or mask – would 
indicate two sides of that naturalising of moral ideologies (analysed by Barthes as 
“mythology”) which still resonates in the prejudices of casting to “type”. While 
Carlson, for example, cites “one of the earliest extended treatises on the art of acting, 
Sainte-Albin’s ‘Le Comédien’ in 1749”, the same terms apply in contemporary 
advertising. In the eighteenth century it could be remarked that: 
 
[A]lthough many physical types were acceptable on the stage, actors, 
whatever their ability, could not depart far from audience expectations of the 
type of roles they were playing – heroes must have imposing bodies and lovers 
attractive ones; actors must look the proper age for their roles and have the 
natural vocal qualities suitable for their characters.339  
 
Such claims about the appropriate moral likeness of “models” have been applied in 
painting also, and inform the curious (pseudo-)mimetic judgment of actors by casting 
                                                
338 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images, trans. Thomas Dunlap, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p.3. 
339 Marvin Carlson, The Haunted Stage, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, 
p.53. 
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directors, supposing the “right look” for a part (which is after all but a fiction) and 
also for association with a particular product (or brand) in advertising.340  
 
In contrast, furthermore, to the mainstream of theatre theory in the twentieth century 
(from Stanislavski to Grotowski, for instance341), the concept of the actor in the 
theatre of death is not the foundation of a school, with a practice to be transmitted and 
reproduced. Although this concept – through its theorisation – records different 
artists’ practice, as the object of study, it has itself to be thought through in the very 
terms of this study (that is, as a concept of “the theatre of death”). What may be 
described historically has already been theorised in practice, as it attests to what is 
thought of theatre in and by this concept. But this theory has then to be identified, just 
as a possible iconography of the actor has also to address its own possibility – it is not 
an historical given. As with the relation between aesthetic theory and its object(s), this 
research is also its own object (heuristically), as it concerns different artists’ 
testimony as to what may be seen in theatre. (This will be expanded upon in the 
following two chapters, as indicated by their very titles: “What do we see in theatre – 
in theory?” and “A question of appearance – enter the actor”.) As Adorno insists, 
aesthetics is not simply a question of elaborating a concept by which an historical 
object (a set of art practices, which involve their own theorisation) becomes thinkable. 
It is also a question of exploring the determination of such a concept, as it is – or 
becomes – itself thinkable historically; that is, in terms of its truth content, rather than 
simply in terms of reflection on historical change within aesthetic categories, such as 
genre or medium-based technique, still less as a question simply of style.  
 
In his much cited reflections on the photographic testimony to death, Roland Barthes 
notes that such reflections must be understood as part of an enquiry into “the 
anthropological place of Death”: “For Death must be somewhere in a society; if it is 
no longer (or less intensely) in religion, it must be elsewhere...”342 The issue here, 
again, is not “death” as such but its representation, or rather those “representatives” 
                                                
340 The sense of the body as itself a vehicle for corporate “brands” is a major topic of the 
“fictions” of JG Ballard.  
341 Cf. Philip Auslander, “Just be yourself”, in Acting (Re)Considered, ed. Phillip Zarrilli, 
London: Routledge, 2000, p.60. Krzysztof Miklaszewski cites Kantor, suggesting that: “He 
was the ‘Kantor school’, he said; his imagination, his unconscious, his performance, and... 
chance.” (Encounters with Kantor, p.153).  
342 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, London: Flamingo, 1984, p.92.  
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(that become the image) of the dead – of their way of being or appearing amongst the 
living, as a testimony to (and by) the practice of an art. One such place for evoking – 
indeed, of staging – this “elsewhere” (besides religion) has always been, as Barthes 
himself notes, theatre. The presence of bodies – the condition of the visible as theatre 
– remains bound up with this elsewhere of the stage (distinct from the social nowhere 
of the digital, with its so-called avatars that allow people to role play the desire to be 
another). The fantasy (un)fulfilment of a “second life” is testimony to a post-theatrical 
illusionism – with its associated research field of the so-called “uncanny valley” – in 
which the art of the theatre of death may simply appear anachronistic. But it is this 
very anachronism – a resistance to the digitalisation of questions of semblance – that 
is not the least part of its fascination and appeal. As Carlo Ginzburg writes of the 
Pathosformel in Warburg: “The representations of the myths inherited from antiquity 
were conceived as ‘evidence of mental states transformed into images’ in which later 
generations... sought out the permanent traces of the most profound emotions in 
human existence.”343  
 
To explore its subject, then, this thesis is not confined to theatrical reference (to an 
aesthetic practice, rather than a metaphorical one), within the discipline of “theatre 
studies”. Rather, with the example of the interdisciplinary field of Aby Warburg’s 
“nameless science”,344 as this explores the cultural memory of affective images of the 
human (the imago hominis) in its “living archive” of pathos formulae, the thesis seeks 
to draw the outline of certain “survivals” of European cultural practices, from an 
ancient sense of the votive to a modern sense of the performative, in giving content to 
the concept of a “theatre of death”. As indicated by the concept of “survivals”, this 
“from...to...” is not chronological. The history of the votive and performative within 
modernity is not that of a passing from one to the other, but rather the refraction of the 
one in and by the other. Kantor’s reflections on the medium of his own “discoveries” 
                                                
343 Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992, p.20 and pp.28-29. 
344 Warburg’s work is, of course, in dialogue with anthropology (quite literally with Franz 
Boas), and this is also the case here – with the work of Michael Taussig, however, rather than 
Victor Turner. Intriguingly for this study, Louis Marin also suggests that “figurability is a 
concept stemming from the interval or space between art history and psychoanalysis”, rather 
than as belonging simply to art history (alluding to a dialogue with Pierre Fédida, which 
would also make for the topic of another thesis), On Representation, trans. Catherine Porter, 
Sanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p.54.  
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attests to this, responding to criticism that he was neither a “genuine” painter nor 
theatre professional: “I realised that the conventional thinking about art needs to be 
corrected; that the rigid boundaries between the arts must be erased... always 
limit[ing] and restrict[ing] thought and its capricious and unpredictable course.”345  
 
Following the course of such thought takes one beyond the confines of art history or 
theatre studies, anthropology or iconography. It demands, rather, what Warburg 
called “a workbench in the laboratory of the iconological science of civilisation”;346 
or the “laboratory of cultural-scientific picture-history” [Laboratorium 
kulturwissenschaftlicher Bildgeschichte].347 To address the aesthetic truth content of 
this concept of theatre – that “of death” – requires a field of enquiry that, in Giorgio 
Agamben’s characterisation of Warburg’s research, “aims to diagnose Western man 
through a consideration of his phantasms,”348 amongst which – it is proposed by this 
thesis – the figure of the actor may be included.349 Here the living body of the actor is 
understood as uncannily modelled by the artificial body of the effigy, as a medium for 
the transmission of an image of the dead. It is with the actor’s appearance on stage (at 
                                                
345 Tadeusz Kantor, “My Work, My Journey”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further On, 
Nothing, p.7. We may compare this with Warburg’s own sense that: “Not until art history can 
show... a few more dimensions that it has done so far will our activity again attract the interest 
of scholars and of the general public...” (letter, quoted by Gombrich and cited by Schade, 
“Charcot and the Spectacle of the Hysterical Body,” trans. Aileen Derieg, in Art History, 
Vol.18, N.4, December 1995, p.513). 
346 Aby Warburg, “Pagan-Antique Prophecy in Words and Images in the Age of Luther”, 
trans. David Britt, in The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity, Los Angeles: Getty Institute, 1999, 
p.651. 
347 As Horst Bredekamp notes, the usual translations of this term of Warburg’s is 
“misleading” in assimilating the question of “Kulturwissenschaft” into the established (or 
supposed) term “iconology” (Bredekamp, “A neglected tradition? Art history as 
Bildwissenschaft”, in Critical Enquiry, vol.29, n.3, Spring 2003, p.423). This is part of a 
larger debate about the claims of and to knowledge in the understanding of images as 
pictures. 
348 Giorgio Agamben, “Warburg and the Nameless Science”, in Potentialities, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.98. Warburg himself refers to his 
own sense of the embodied “diagnosis” of cultural forms in a journal entry shortly before his 
death: “Sometimes it looks to me as if, in my role as psycho-historian, I tried to diagnose the 
schizophrenia of Western civilisation from its images in an autobiographical reflex” (quoted 
by Michaud, p.238). Cf. also Edgar Wind’s critique of Gombrich’s biography of Warburg 
(“Appendix”, in The Eloquence of Symbols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) and Georges 
Didi-Huberman, L’Image Survivante, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2002. 
349 As has been suggested with reference to Vernant, Michaud, Barasch, and Belting, this 
would be to include theatre studies within the scope of a research that has indeed been 
identified as an “anthropology of images”.  
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least, in its concept) that we encounter that specific aesthetic practice which remains 
to be theorised as the theatre of death.  
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part Two 
 
Chapter 4: What do we see in theatre – in theory? 
 
1. To establish, as is necessary for every art, that theatre thinks. – Alain Badiou350 
 
With this declaration of purpose Alain Badiou opens his ten “theses on theatre”, with 
a challenge concerning the very presuppositions of this challenge itself, addressed to 
those who profess to thinking about theatre. What kind of thought would be specific 
to theatre, if indeed theatre is an art?351 Badiou follows his initial proposition 
immediately with the reflexive question: “What has to be understood by ‘theatre’ 
here?” Theatre then becomes a term – naming an aesthetic practice – to which the 
question of, and not simply for, thought returns. (In the present thesis, this concerns 
what it is “of” theatre that has been thought – and which remains to be thought – 
through “death”, both historically and theoretically.) What is thought in and by theatre 
specifically, as an art, distinct from what is thought about theatre in and by criticism, 
in its “study”? Badiou accepts the modernist prescription that an aesthetic practice 
raises medium-specific questions – that the expression of the work touches upon the 
potentials (not least the constraints) of its materials, as of its very subject (or idea), 
distinct from these being simply the means to immaterial ends, of and for expression 
as art. This modernist aesthetic has always been paradoxical for theatre (when, 
precisely, it is no longer identified by – or even with – the dramatic text), even when 
its materials (for example, the bodies of performers) are abstracted through a research 
identified with the potentials of and for “performance” (as distinct, supposedly, from 
representation in the question of its art).   
                                                
350 Alain Badiou, A Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005, p.72. 
351 It is important to note that the notion of specificity itself signifies a position within the 
modern history of art, highlighting a relation between medium and thought in the work of art, 
as constitutive of its own practice. Badiou’s particular twist on the notion of aesthetics – the 
“inaesthetic” – insists that philosophy or theory is not applied to art but thought through it: 
“...a relation of philosophy to art that, maintaining that art is itself a product of truth, makes 
no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy. Against aesthetic speculation, inaesthetics 
describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects produced by the independent existence of 
some works of art” (the exergue to Badiou, op. cit.). How this general proposition relates to 
the particular art – theatre – is what is explored throughout this thesis, not least in the 
temporalities involved in testimony to an intensity (or “shock”) of experience or encounter, in 
the embodied reception of aesthetic forms.  
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If the thought of theatre means that theatre “thinks” (not simply that it is an object of 
thought or aesthetics), then how does it think (in theory, “theatrically”)? Of what does 
it think specifically – what is it that specifies this thought as theatrical? For Badiou 
thought is properly evental – where time is inscribed in the relation between being 
and thought (pace Parmenides and Heidegger) – as is the performance by which the 
theatrical is defined (even when repeated night after night). A theatre-idea “occurs in 
and by the performance. It is irreducibly theatrical and does not pre-exist its 
occurrence on stage,” not even in “the text” (that is, as text written for performance, 
distinct from that written about, or after, it).352 The event of thought – as of 
performance – is “exceptional”, an interruption in the continuities of time and place 
that ordinarily provide the limiting conditions for thought about an object or 
phenomenon. “Truth” – whether “artistic, scientific, amorous, or political”, as 
“registers of work-producing thought” – is what “pierces a hole” in “knowledge”, not 
least in what is thought to be known of theatre (and its aesthetics).353  
 
For Badiou the categories of a question of thought are “immanence and singularity”: 
“Is truth really internal to the artistic effect of works of art?” and “does the truth 
testified by art belong to it absolutely?”354 Badiou’s questions point to the sense that 
the truth in question is not defined by philosophy (nor by a disciplinary study, such as 
performance or theatre studies), but is immanent to an aesthetic practice itself (in its 
idea) – if, indeed, its realisation is “truthful” (or “exceptional”) rather than simply the 
reproduction of an established professional practice. Crucially, this concerns what 
does “not pre-exist its occurrence on stage” – including then the theoretical terms in 
which it might be appraised – as precisely Craig and Artaud address the work of 
Decroux and Jean-Louis Barrault respectively (as discussed in chapter one). This is 
                                                
352 Badiou, op. cit., p.72 (translation modified, from Badiou, Petit Manuel d’Inesthétique, 
Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998, pp.113-4). It should be noted that this only really concerns 
“exceptional” theatre; that is, where it is the value of the “exceptional” that is to be thought, 
rather than the exercise of reproducing the conditions of and for a “professional” practice of 
theatre performance: “to throw light on the value of exception. The value of the event. The 
value of the break. And to do this against the continuity of life, against social conservatism” 
[cf. Badiou, “Thinking the Event”, in Badiou and Zizek, Philosophy in the Present, trans. 
Peter Thomas and Alberto Toscano, Cambridge: Polity, 2009, p.12].  
353 Badiou, A Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005, p.10 and p.9. 
354 Ibid., p.9. 
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not reducible to an ontology of “the present”, as Phelan’s much cited polemic would 
have it, but rather (as will be discussed in the next chapter, with Heidegger), a 
temporal dynamic of “presencing” that involves the retention and protention of both 
past and future as these condition experience. With this temporality, the idea of a 
work – in its mode(s) of address to a prospective audience, especially in its 
anticipated “afterwards” – may be transferred between mediums, renewing in each 
instance the thought of its specificity (as a question of the ontology of its 
performance).  
 
As proposed in the Introduction, what is to be thought in (or by) “the theatre of death” 
is the uncanny appearance of a human likeness; of the actor as a figure – of and for 
human being – in “its occurrence on stage”, as distinct from (or excepting) the 
ordinary social (spatial and temporal) conditions for such appearances. As the event 
of his or her appearance, the actor’s physical presence on stage offers an image of 
(and for) a concept of being, mimetically, for the spectator (and, indeed, for a political 
community). The relation between performance and thought (or between theatre and 
theory) “in the event” addresses mimesis not as the descriptive representation, or 
imitation, of something (its reproduction in another medium, as being “acted” for 
example); but as a dynamic relation between actor and audience, which both is and is 
not identifiable in time and space. As with the private theatre which psychoanalysis 
“stages” in (and as) transference (as well as in Freud’s discussion of animism), “souls 
and demons”, “projections”, “superstitions”, and dreams, offer evidence of an 
enduring pre-modern experience (or conception) of the relation of thought to the 
world, as of the individual to its environment – starting, precisely, from “the problem 
of death”.355  
 
Following Wundt, Freud notes that: “Originally souls were pictured as very similar to 
persons and only in the course of a long development have they lost their material 
characteristics and become to a high degree ‘spiritualised’.”356 As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, this is addressed by Jean-Pierre Vernant in similar terms, as he 
                                                
355 Sigmund Freud, “Totem and Taboo”, trans. James Strachey, in Pelican Freud Library, 
vol.13, ed. Albert Dickson, London: Penguin, 1985, p.133 and p.145. Here the question is 
what difference does it make to add theatre to this evidence of the ambivalence of modern 
thought concerning human appearances?  
356 Freud, op cit., p.133. 
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examines the historical development of mimesis in his account of a “pivotal point” in 
the work of Xenophon and Plato for the emergence of a notion of the “image properly 
speaking” (distinct from earlier “archaic” notions of the figural, including the 
anthropomorphic): “that is, the image conceived as an imitative artifice reproducing 
in the form of a counterfeit the external appearance of real things”, which “enters into 
the general category of the ‘fictitious’ – that which we call art.”357 While the minor 
tradition of the theatre of death contests the major history of what “we call art”, it 
does so precisely (as an example of modernism) in the name of art – at least, in the 
name of an art of the theatre of the future, as Craig proposed it.  
 
This montage of references – to Freud and Plato, Badiou and Vernant, Augé and 
Craig – in order to return to a theatre-idea, to discuss how theatre thinks (as a 
question “of” aesthetics and mimesis), might seem arbitrary. Drawing psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, and anthropology into a theatrical aesthetics (of mimesis) in this way – to 
propose an iconography of the actor, as the comparative subject of a distinct concept 
of theatre – might appear to render the event of thought ahistorical (and without 
“discipline”); even as it indicates that the present (of) thought is already an act of 
cultural memory. This attempt to give content to a concept of the theatre of death is, 
then, an attempt to recall a set of aesthetic practices belonging to the history of 
theatre, identified in and by their demand to be thought – through the theory that they 
propose – and not simply described. To adduce this theory (already at work, 
immanently, in this art of theatre) – rather than applying some extraneous or 
transcendent “theory” to it – is the task demanded of the theatre historian by the 
question of what is true in and of this aesthetic practice specifically.  
 
The theatre “of death” (in reading Vernant as addressing Freud’s presuppositions, for 
instance) engages in an unsettling of the (post-Platonic) conditions for understanding 
                                                
357 Vernant, “From the ‘Presentification’ of the invisible to the Imitation of Appearance”, in 
Mortals and Immortals, ed. Froma Zeitlin, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, 
p.152. In several essays, Vernant investigates the possible meanings of “the notion of figural 
representation”, as “not a simple immediate fact that could in some way be defined once and 
for all. The notion of figural representation does not just come from itself. Neither univocal 
nor permanent, it is what might be called an historical category; a construct elaborated, not 
without difficulty, through very different routes in different civilisations” [ibid.]. For a recent 
anthropological account of the culturally contested sense of images, see Marc Augé, The war 
of Images, trans. Liz Heron, London: Pluto Press, 1999.  
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“theatre” as a “counterfeit” distinct from an “event of the image” (Blanchot). “Death” 
evokes within mimesis that which had been suppressed in the thought of Plato – that 
which Vernant identifies as “presentification”. Here the discussion of modernity and 
survivals broaches the question of appearance as engaged by Heidegger’s reading of 
the Kantian Schematism – constituting “the central core of the whole voluminous 
work” of the Critique of Pure Reason – in so far as it concerns “the fundamental 
question regarding the transcendence of the finite creature”358 (which will be 
addressed in the next chapter), and of being able to see oneself (rather than of simply 
being seen) after death (pace Blanchot, Balász, and Augé).  
 
But this sense of “presentification” in Vernant (or “presencing” in Heidegger) barely 
affects the more recent suppression of imitation or representation, as this characterises 
contemporary discourse about performance – which relegates the body as 
representational to an idea of “theatre”, rejected in favour of a claim that “the artist is 
present”. To return to what distinguishes the “theatre-idea” in Badiou’s proposal, 
there is the sense – indeed, the shock – of an encounter (which “death” names as that 
“of” this “theatre”), where “theatre is concerned explicitly, almost physically, with the 
encounter of an idea”.359 Here the “exceptional” encounter with the mimetic (“almost 
physically”) – its uncanny shock – is what “of” death appears theatrically, where the 
spectator is “tented”, touched to the quick, by the very thought of theatre “itself”; by 
the momentary intimation that theatre, like death, exists – on stage – in the register of 
the mimetic event experienced by (or as) the “I” unsettled in (not) recognising 
“itself”, in “the look” of an other. This (“exceptional”) experience concerns equally a 
theatre “of death” in the afterwards of its concept.  
 
2. What is mediated in art, that through which the artwork becomes something other 
than its mere factuality, must be mediated a second time by reflection: through the 
medium of its concept. – Theodor Adorno360  
 
                                                
358 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p.63.  
359 Badiou, op cit., p.77 [translation modified, pp.119-120]. 
360 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: Athlone Press, 
1997, p.358. For both Adorno and Badiou, the relation of thought – or of theory – to aesthetic 
practice, to the work of art (to its “process” rather than its “product”), is not neutral but is 
engaged in the political conditions of modernity. 
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The very title of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory orients reflection towards a theoretical 
aesthetics, as distinct from an investigation into aesthetics and theory, or even a 
theory of aesthetics, as if the one term applied to the other (or as if the one was a 
given of the other). “Critique is not externally added into aesthetic experience but, 
rather, is immanent to it,” Adorno writes,361 where the possible identification of the 
one term is dialectically conditioned by that of the other. Here the relation between 
concept and object is not given. “The theatre of death”, for instance, is not a fact of 
theatre history; to address this title (or its reference) is not to describe something that 
already exists, but rather to conceptualise it, to make this reference thinkable, 
historically, in its very historicity as a possible concept of theatre.  
 
For the conceptualisation of an aesthetic work, as Adorno notes, is itself necessarily 
historical: “It is in the dimension of history that the individual aesthetic object and its 
concept communicate.”362 In order to recognise the artwork in its truth – how (and 
even why) it appears historically – as itself a “critique of past works”363 (distinct from 
pastiche or kitsch), it is necessary to acknowledge not only that: “History is immanent 
to the truth content of aesthetics,”364 but that this involves the question of a concept of 
history. The theatre that appears under the concept “of death” (the theatre that is 
conceived of in these terms) is not a style that can be imitated (one might think, with 
respect to Kantor, of Janusz Visniewski or Andrzej Woron), but a research in terms of 
which theatre artists (in their ostensible differences rather than similarities) may be 
compared. As already discussed in chapter one (with Duchamp’s approving citation 
of Eliot): “The principle of method here is that light should be cast on all art from the 
vantage point of the most recent artworks, rather than the reverse, following the 
custom of historicism and philology...”365 
 
Before considering an example of such “historicism and philology”, constraining the 
question of method within theatre studies, let us return to the “didactic schema” of 
                                                
361 Ibid., p.347. 
362 Ibid., p.358. It may well be, for instance, that the “time” of the theatre of death is past, or is 
now anachronistic; that this attempt to recover a sense in and for its concept is “only” 
historical. This does not mean, however, that its concept is unproductive for thinking through 
what “of” human appearance the art of theatre affords.  
363 Ibid., p.359. 
364 Ibid., p.357. 
365 Ibid., p.359. 
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aesthetics that Badiou’s “fourth schema” (of “immanence and singularity”) proposes 
as limiting the work of art to its own (“theoretical”) conditions of intelligibility, as its 
concept distinct from its event (in space and time), or as the memory of its thought 
distinct from the ephemerality of its “performance” – in the impossibility of a 
consciousness that is not self-conscious, of an immediacy that is not mediated, which 
is often uncritically invoked in the name of “live art”. The relation between theory 
and aesthetics, addressed for instance by Badiou and Adorno, is not abstract 
(“theoretical”) but is entailed when considering a particular theatre practice (“the 
theatre of death”) in its belonging to theatre history (and thus to theatre studies). In 
the following paragraph from Erika Fischer-Lichte – who, after all, writes with the 
experience of a career devoted to a problem which she nonetheless constructs 
seemingly to avoid – we may see how the relation between universal (“theory”) and 
particular (“aesthetic”) instances of the object of study (“theatre performances”) can 
be formulated by the discipline of theatre studies to exclude the question of aesthetics.  
 
While I can look at paintings that are centuries old, and read novels that were 
written in the far distant past, I can only see theatre performances that are 
taking place now, at this very moment. Thus, I am only able to regard past 
theatrical events from a theoretical aspect, not an aesthetic one.366  
 
These four sentences are rich with problematic presupposition. That I can look at an 
historical painting, for instance, that it endures through time, does not explain how I 
may do so – as if the aesthetic experience were anymore historically transcendent than 
its object. The indexing of “theatre performances” to the visual, and of the visual to 
the “present moment”, is to fail to “theorise” the “past” historically; it is to seem to 
describe the object of study, not to explain the relation to it. Here the “past” is simply 
distinguished from the “present”, as the theoretical is from the aesthetic.  
 
In the exclusion of each term from the other – the aesthetic from the theoretical, the 
past from the present – any meaningful sense of either (or of the present) is excluded 
from its own designation. (This appeal to a pre-Kantian sense of the “aesthetic” in its 
“literal” sense, as theorised by Baumgarten, will be discussed in section four of the 
                                                
366 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Show and the Gaze of Theatre, trans. Jo Riley, Iowa: University 
of Iowa Press, 1997, p.187. 
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next chapter, with Heidegger’s reading of the Schematism.) Theory here does not, 
then, mean that which is intended in and by the existence of an art work, its material 
form and its memory (as its mnemotechnics), but rather an applied analysis or 
semiotics – through the abstraction of the aesthetic into significative elements or 
units, organised into “sign systems” by and for a “performance analysis”.367 The 
question as to how the changing signifying structures of artworks themselves might 
inform those of their analysis, in considering how any “present” performance is 
historically conditioned, is posed by another (erstwhile) theatre semiotician, Patrice 
Pavis: 
 
Avant-garde theatre has brought about a crisis in the semiotic and referential 
relationship of the sign with the world. It has lost all confidence in a mimetic 
reproduction of reality by the theatre, without having invented a semiological 
system and an autonomous theatrical language capable of taking its place. 
Semiology no doubt owes its rapid development to this calling into question of 
the mimetic nature of art and the refusal of the stage to presume to imitate a 
pre-existent exterior world.368 
 
Where Fischer-Lichte broaches this “refusal”, she tries to maintain a sense of analogy 
between the art work (whether as object or performance) and its analysis (where the 
art work is reconstructed in the non-aesthetic terms of “scientific” analysis), even as 
this implies an impossibility in the claims to “knowledge”.369  
 
One can see how this impasse opens the door to subsequent interest in so-called 
“performative analysis”, as if to elide the contradictory terms of “performance” and 
“analysis”. However, the “present” of a performance is always in truth that of its 
“past” future – not least, as it may prove to be “exceptional” and thus continue to exist 
outside the supposed order of temporal exclusions. The possibility of “an autonomous 
theatrical language” – the modernist ambition for any “thinking” art practice – 
                                                
367 Ibid., p.188. Paradoxically, this also informs Fischer-Lichte’s discussion of the 
impossibility of separating theatre historiography and performance analysis as disciplines 
(within an argument seemingly addressed to a particular historical moment of German 
academic organisation of the field) [ibid., pp.344-346]. 
368 Patrice Pavis, “Avant-Garde Theatre and Semiology”, trans. Jill Daugherty, in 
Languagesof the Stage, New York: PAJ Publications, 1982, p.185. 
369 Fischer-Lichte characterises this in terms of a “futility”, op cit., pp.347-8. 
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remains historically ambiguous, especially for theatre, but it remains an aesthetic 
challenge for theory. As already noted, the aesthetic-theoretic conjunction has more 
recently been revalued in terms of a generalised sense of the “performative” (distinct 
from the constative, as Auslander, for instance, uses the term to address these issues 
in relation to the “live” and the “documented”). Whether (or not) this is simply to 
displace the aesthetic challenge of its “object(s)”, into an untheorised and non-
aesthetic schema of possible analysis, remains problematic for the question of the 
truth of its “object” within theatre studies.  
 
In terms that would be significant for limiting the readings of Kantor later (in part 
three), Fischer-Lichte continues (from the previous citation):  
 
A performance is indivisibly bound to the actors who perform it and exists 
only in the brief moment of its creation.  Although single elements, such as 
costume, props, and set may last beyond the process of performance and can 
even be accessible centuries later, all that remains are single elements ripped 
from their original context, and never the performance from which they are 
derived. The performance itself can never be handed down to us.370  
 
Any simple reference to “the performance itself” is, of course, precisely what a 
concept of theatre would render complex. Beyond a merely tautological reference, 
defining “the performance itself” simply in terms of such use – as meaning “the 
ephemeral” in an abstract or formal opposition to “the enduring” – the “performance 
itself” remains an aesthetic challenge to any attempt to render it as an event in some 
other medium – such as, for instance, writing – which might admit the performance’s 
affective sense through the temporality of its concept and thus its demand for 
“testimony”. In so far as we can conceive of – let alone imagine – what reference to 
“the performance itself” might mean (as it is supposed by Fischer-Lichte’s use of the 
phrase), its implied concept necessarily mediates this reference to what is 
“untheoretically” aesthetic. For it would be meaningless even to say that it “can never 
be handed down to us” unless, in some more significant sense than the merely 
tautologous, this was untrue of what is identifiable in the artwork. Reference to the 
                                                
370 Ibid., p.187. What is missing here is any sense of “the show and the gaze” as mediums – 
the very subjects, indeed, of a theatre of death (pace Heidegger on Kant). 
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“performance itself” signifies both the abstract concept and the abstract content that it 
supposedly excludes; which merely defines it as “exist[ing] only” in the brief 
“moment” of its (aesthetic) apprehension, as if without (its theoretical and historical) 
comprehension.  
 
In Fischer-Lichte’s account, “the performance” is defined in terms of an aesthetic 
temporality that has no material content, other than the merely formal possibility of its 
being experienced or simply perceived. The possible “material content” of the 
performance is reduced to the “props, costume, and set” that may endure – and which 
are therefore distinct from “the performance”. However, the supposed impossibility of 
reference to a performance does not preclude a great deal of referring to performances 
throughout her essays – typically, of course, in terms of what they are declared, 
theoretically, not to be (documents, materials, or even unattributed descriptions of 
“what happened”).  
 
This is a consequence of understanding theatre “theory” separately from its 
“aesthetic” object – making of this critical relation one of supplement, with the value 
of each term supposed as what is lacking to the other. Here the contradictions 
immanent to the appeals of theory to theatre or performance are thought to be avoided 
by separating out the categories by which these are defined, rather than thinking them 
through dialectically. The sense in which theatre (or art) is itself a theoretical practice 
has then still to be explored in such studies – which perhaps explains why the writings 
of theatre artists themselves are rarely referred to for their theoretical (distinct from 
descriptive) testimony. As Susan Melrose writes of the “notorious ephemerality of 
performance” it “has only ever been specific to spectating’s experience of a given 
performance, and [is] not at all appropriate to an understanding of performance 
practitioners’ own ‘knowledge engagement’ in performance production.” 371   
 
Before turning to a second example from Fischer-Lichte – one that appears to suggest 
an understanding of the theatre of death, albeit in descriptive terms (even in 
metaphorical, rather than conceptual, terms) – let us consider how this failure to think 
                                                
371 Susan Melrose, “‘Constitutve Ambiguities’: Writing Professional or Expert Performance 
Practices”, in Contemporary Theatres in Europe, eds. Joe Kelleher and Nicholas Ridout, 
London: Routledge, 2006, p.121. 
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through performance in theatre studies informs another researcher’s question – “must 
it die?” – in one of the very few discussions to address directly the after life of 
“Kantor’s Theatre of Death” in its very title. Jan Klossowicz, who posed this question 
concerning the concept of a theatre of death in Kantor’s presence (for the temerity of 
which he was duly chastised372), reproduces the same distinctions as Fischer-Lichte – 
ranging Kantor’s paintings, on the one side, as “eternal” objects; and his theatre 
projects, on the other, as “ephemeral”. Interestingly, Guy Scarpetta notes (in 2000, ten 
years after Kantor’s death) the paradox that it seems to be the “ephemeral” work of 
the theatre performances that retain an aura of fascination, more than the paintings (at 
least, for the time being).373 Here it is not a question, however, of the ephemeral 
opposed to the enduring, but rather of what endures in and of the ephemeral – a 
question already raised by Kantor in the example of his so-called “Anti-Exhibition” 
held in 1963. Unlike Fischer-Lichte’s account of this disciplinary distinction (between 
the ephemeral and the enduring), Klossowicz does acknowledge that the “ephemeral” 
work represents a choice by Kantor, as a theatre artist, one that is informed by “his 
theory of theatre” – characterized by its “two most important notions”, identified by 
Klossowicz as “Death and Memory”. Here, at least, there is the beginning of an 
attempt to think the (aesthetic) reference to performance specifically; that is, in the 
possibility of its own theory. 
 
Given the choice to make such “mortal” work as theatre productions (despite Kantor’s 
own claims for its immortality!), Klossowicz proposes – perhaps more by word 
association (or metaphor) than by the terms of the artist’s theory to which he has 
nevertheless alluded – that it is a paradox that Kantor then goes to such lengths to 
“preserve” these works. He details the various types of object that document the 
performances within the archive of the Cricot 2’s activities – the Cricoteka – as a 
                                                
372 In his later reflections on the presentation of this paper, “The Theatre of Death, must it 
die?”, Klossowicz notes: “With my closing words a roar was heard. Kantor rose, strongly 
gesticulating, and shouted in French with his very Polish pronunciation of ‘r’: ‘Mon théâtre 
ne mourira pas! Mon théâtre est immorrrtel! Immorrrrrrtel!’” (Jan Klossowicz, “Kantor’s 
Legacy”, in Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, Fall 1995, p.189.) Jan Kott’s 
description of the same occasion – at which Kantor addressed him as a “Stalinist oppressor of 
art and free speech” (Klossowicz, ibid.) after Kott had cut short Michal Kobialka’s talk – 
offers the following observation: “He screamed at every speaker during the symposium the 
way he used to scream at his actors and technicians and everybody else during his 
rehearsals… He was unique, a theatre unto himself” (Jan Kott, Still Alive, trans. Jadwiga 
Kosicka, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp.274-5).  
373 Guy Scarpetta, Kantor au présent, Arles: Actes Sud, 2000, p.203. 
 159 
catalogue of all those “single elements” that Fischer-Lichte identified as only what 
“remains” of theatrical performances (having separated them from their expressive 
“uses”). In the archive of “the theatre of death”, there are even what Klossowicz calls 
Kantor’s “scores” of the performances. Crucially, however, these were written up 
“long after the first performances”, as the performances were “born on the stage” 
rather than following from ‘scores’ “written for” them. Paradoxically, Klossowicz 
even calls these documents (professedly after Kantor himself) “plays”. 374  
 
This choice of legitimating noun is unfortunate as it implicitly undoes the work of the 
Cricot 2 in de-legitimating the history of theatre as that of its playwright “authors”. In 
the separation of theory and practice, operating thereby a false aesthetics, the objects 
of each cease to be the means of recognition for – and by – the other. For the plastic 
“writing” of the event – its thought, or idea, as its theatre (as “born on the stage”) – is 
again reduced to its (pre-supposed) literary “model” (even if written afterwards), 
referring the work back to very aesthetic criteria of which Kantor’s practice offers a 
critique. It is as if such precedents as Craig and Artaud had left no legacy “in theory”, 
itself associated with the near universal critical disparagement of their own legacy of 
“practice”. The sense that Kantor’s “scores” make the performances accessible 
beyond their documentation – through their possible “re”-performance by other 
“directors” (as if this was the key to a “living” archive) – misses the point that Kantor 
was not himself simply another director, but the artist-theorist of an aesthetic practice 
that offered a critique of theatre as the interpretation of a pre-existing written (or 
textual) artefact.375 
 
                                                
374 In his reflections on the Paris conference, Klossowicz comments on the written versions of 
the Cricot 2 performances (in contrast to other “documentation”): “Much more important are, 
in my opinion, his scenarios of the performances, partitions or ‘plays’ as he calls them. Part 
of his theatre is preserved in texts that may be performed in the future by other directors, even 
by those with ideas contrary to Kantor’s…” (Klossowicz, “Kantor’s Legacy”, op cit., p.189). 
The whole question of the “re”-performance of Kantor’s “scores” (rather than “plays”), even 
by surviving members of the Cricot 2, is profoundly problematic. Michal Kobialka, 
meanwhile, glosses the term “score” (partytura) as follows: “Kantor wrote partyturas while 
working on his productions. Partytura here means a collage of various texts, notes, and 
descriptions of terms and concepts that were created and used by him during the process of 
putting on a production. Sometimes the partytura was amended by Kantor many years after 
the first performance of a piece” [A Journey Through Other Space, p.390 (n.9)].  
375 This can be compared with the curious example of Abramovic’s Seven Easy Pieces project 
referred to in chapter three. 
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In this strange elision of aesthetic specificity with the standard form of writing 
associated with theatre practice (as ostensibly written for rather than about 
performance), Klossowicz nonetheless suggests that these “scenarios” contain the 
“idea of the show”. Unfortunately, this “idea” has taken us away from the “theory” 
mentioned before – as the traditional separation is maintained between the written 
scores (the page), which remain their durable medium (distinct even from their 
“ideas”), and the theatrical work which “lives and dies on the stage”. The question of 
the immanent “birth [that] was the death of him” is eschewed by a disciplinary 
method that would have birth and death occur in parallel worlds. With this separation 
of aesthetics and theory, it is the concept of the theatre of death – as that through 
which one thinks of particular performances, to understand not simply their “life and 
death” on stage but their immanent afterlife, as their concept – that is precluded. The 
very possibility of addressing the object of study (or its reference) as “theatre” (even 
when, in Kantor’s presence, it is still “alive”) is here forestalled. To address the 
theatre artists of this minor tradition (“of death”) historically requires first to address 
the possibility of representing or thinking of their work, in which the practice of the 
“theatre” (its existence) is the practice of its (mimetic) concept – as that “of death”.  
 
Let us now return to Fischer-Lichte who appears to offer an excellent précis, or 
evocation, of the “theatre of death” – at least, as it might be thought of in terms of 
metaphor, or of “the ghost in the theatrical machine”, which ignores that “break” in 
the Western tradition identified by Kott and Plassard (not to mention Craig, Artaud, 
and Barthes) discussed previously, in which the appearance or apparition of the actor 
on stage is made questionable in effigie.376 In her introduction to a collection of essays 
ostensibly addressing “the show and the gaze of theatre”, Fischer-Lichte writes:  
 
Theatre in contemporary Western culture serves as a place of mediation 
between past and present. The bodily presence of the performer, in this sense, 
is endowed with a particular historical signature.377 For when plays of the 
occidental tradition are staged, from Aeschylus to Samuel Beckett, figures 
appear on stage whose history forms part of our cultural memory. However, 
                                                
376 This questioning will be the “scene” of the first section of the next chapter.  
377 Here we might note the “exceptional” instance of Kantor’s own presence on stage – in 
contrast with its imitation by, for instance, Visniewski. 
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they do not appear as in our dreams, imaginations, and memories or as in the 
new media – rather, they adopt a bodily appearance. The performance takes 
place as a nightly resurrection of the ‘dead’.378   
 
This appeal to the “plays of the occidental tradition” obscures the theatrically specific 
question of aesthetic theory – and not only in the theatre of death – as its supposition 
concerning the mediation of cultural memory translates into that of a metaphor 
substituting for a specific practice of actors. As so often happens in theatre studies, 
the metaphorical “nightly resurrection” of (literary) characters replaces thinking 
through the “bodily presence” of the actors. The suggestive Christian idiom of a 
“nightly resurrection” glosses a possible theatre of death in a way that makes its 
concept, or idea as theatre, literally unthinkable.379 As the actor is represented (or 
negated) by these “figures” (or characters) so is their “death” negated by a nightly 
“resurrection”. Here the “dead” are not apparitions; their “bodily appearance” is that 
of a fiction (in – metaphorically – theory) rather than of an actor (in – materially – 
practice). The return of (and from) cultural memory here is purely literary; it is not 
that of the stage, of “the body of man [as] a symbolic form” (Barasch), “the 
transformation of the body into representation” (Michaud), or the “representation of a 
generalised human being” (Obraztsov) – as these inform the sense of a theatrical 
iconography or “cultural memory” (in the theatre of death); a figure of which, for 
Kantor’s own life time – and with which this thesis will conclude – is Odysseus.  
 
Paradoxically, theatre studies cannot stop remembering “theory” in the image of the 
ghost, haunted as it is by what it excludes from its study – the body, in its theatrical or 
plastic, as distinct from literary, appearance(s).380 Fischer-Lichte, indeed, introduces 
the “dead” (the quotation marks are her own) into her theorizing about theatre, as 
witnesses to her attempt to distinguish between theatre (as a “live” event) and the so-
                                                
378 Fischer-Lichte, The Show and the Gaze of Theatre, trans. Jo Riley, Iowa: University of 
Iowa Press, 1997, p.22. 
379 This scenario offers an interesting way to reflect back upon the Parisian objectors to 
Castellucci’s production discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the uncanny (with 
Heidegger) at the end of chapter two.  
380 This “repressed” element – moralised, as we have seen in chapter three, by Abramovic, as 
a question of “reality” and “deception” – “returns” in the field of “performance art” and its 
“studies”, as if separated from an art of performance that is theatrical. 
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called “new media”.381 Already under the sign of an older sense of “medium” – such 
as it interested many early twentieth century playwrights (for example, Maeterlinck, 
Yeats, and Strindberg) – theatre is always concerned, in its very mode of production, 
with relations between past and present. In common with many writers on theatre, it 
seems, Fischer-Lichte likes to think simply in terms of a “medium” – as identified 
with the actor’s body, with a corporeal presence – rather than an aesthetic technique 
of its image, in its iconographic or anthropological study.382 Rather than asking how 
that corporeal presence defines what kind of “theatre” particularly (within the major 
or minor traditions identified here), it is as if a spiritualist theatre “of death” (to return 
to an example mentioned in the Introduction) had invited only Mme Blavatsky and 
not William James to its study.    
 
Although the thought – as the remembrance – of the “dead” is curiously alienated 
here by Fischer-Lichte’s quotation marks, we might imagine that their “resurrection” 
(as distinct from their “return”) is informed by work such as Grotowski’s, imbued 
with a romantic conception of the “Occidental tradition”. It is as if Fischer-Lichte had 
gone back a century (past a forgotten Brecht, for instance) to Mickiewicz’s Lectures 
on Slavic Drama, for her sense of a “contemporary” medium specific to theatre.383 
Whilst concern with a “metaphysical” theatre resonates here, the basic break (pace 
Kott and Plassard) in the modernist relation of body and image on stage is ignored 
and it is no accident that the key reference in her essay is indeed to Grotowski and not 
Kantor (who simply does not feature in her history of European theatre). More 
importantly, however, what is missing here is the sense of mediation of and by the 
                                                
381 “The dead”, albeit unnamed as such (displaced here into the category of the political in 
theatre), play a fundamental role, however, in a later volume which develops the basic point 
made in this essay here: Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual, London: Routledge, 2005. 
382 In her essay contributing to the “institutional effect” of Abramovic’s Seven Easy Pieces 
project, Fischer-Lichte translates this “nightly resurrection” of the theatre into the “presence” 
(printed in capital letters) of performance art – as “whenever the performer brings forth his 
body as an energetic body that releases energy and allows it to circulate in the space and to 
energise spectators so that they sense the performer as well as themselves not only as 
intensely present, but as embodied minds…” (Fischer-Lichte, “Performance Art – 
Experiencing Liminality”, in Abramovic, Seven Easy Pieces, Milan: Edizioni Charta, 2007, 
p.42). 
383 In Fischer-Lichte’s History of European Theatre and Drama, trans. Jo Riley, London: 
Routledge, 2004, Mickiewicz is cited simply as a precursor to Grotowski’s “redemptive” 
theatre (pp.333-34), in which the “truth” of the actor’s presence, before that of any 
“character” or “role”, is the key to what theatre “is”. It is perhaps worth noting that Kantor 
does not get a mention in either this “history” or the essays collected in The Show and the 
Gaze.  
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concept – not the ghost or spirit – of theatre, in order to recognise its modes of 
appearance, or performance, as aesthetically specific; and thereby broaching the 
question of an iconography of the actor in terms of what is uncanny in human 
appearance.  
 
Fischer-Lichte sees in Grotowski a “redemptive theatre”, with Mickiewicz as its 
precursor;384 where, by contrast, the minor tradition of a “theatre of death” reads 
Mickiewicz, with Kantor, after Witkacy (not to mention Duchamp). Indeed, in 
Kantor’s writings any notion of “resurrection” associated with theatre as the staging 
of cultural memory appears under the sign of “impossibility”. This has to do with a 
fundamental historical sense of the difference it makes to be thinking about art in the 
twentieth century specifically. Here precedents and survivals are not understood in 
terms of an historicist concept of the past’s “influence” on the present, but in terms of 
a modernist concept of the past’s revaluation in and by the present.  
 
The point here is to consider what makes the thought of a theatre of death possible – 
or not – in the discipline of theatre studies, insofar as its concept already addresses (or 
translates) the possibility of own historical practice. The “nightly” presence of the 
“dead” on stage – understood as the “bringing to life” of a play, as the “nightly 
resurrection” of literary characters or “historical figures” – is not the concern of this 
theatre (“of death”), even when it deals with “plays of the Occidental tradition”, such 
as Witkacy’s or Genet’s (not to mention Mickiewicz or Shakespeare). The theatre of 
death offers an unsettling of Fischer-Lichte’s order of categories (“in theory”) 
between fiction and reality, figure and body, the psychical and physical. The barrier 
between the living and the dead is not suppressed in this theatre (as is suggested by 
Fischer-Lichte’s appeal to a “nightly resurrection”), but is made visible, as apparent 
as the opposition between stage and auditorium. The return of the dead to the theatre 
is a way of seeing the living – as an appearance of the uncanny in (rather the 
transcendence of) mimesis.  
 
                                                
384 Erika Fischer-Lichte, History of European Theatre and Drama, trans. Jo Riley, London: 
Routledge, 2004, pp.333-34. 
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3. Often what a word expresses is distorted and suppressed by its ‘meanings’ – Martin 
Heidegger385 
 
Reflecting on the fate of words (in this instance, the “demoniacal”) as they pass – or 
are “translated” – from Greek into Latin, and then into the philosophical vocabularies 
of Christian and modern scientific cultures (informing any contemporary attempt to 
engage with the Greek “roots” or “origins” of “Western thought”), this ambiguous 
observation of Heidegger’s speaks of the kernel of all his work to recall the 
expression(s) of Being from within their historical meaning(s) in metaphysics. Here, 
the further translation of Heidegger’s “Destruktion” of metaphysics through the 
French of Derrida’s “deconstruction” already constitutes the text of its own history, 
not least as it is translated into “English”.386 As Derrida remarks, it is not that 
deconstruction is a word that simply “exists” in, or “belongs to”, French (any more 
than Destruktion to German). The word concerns, rather, what “belongs” to (a) 
language “in translation”, as this unsettles claims for identity (for self-present, and 
“self-evident”, modes of being).387  
 
For if the difficulties of translation can be anticipated (and the question of 
deconstruction is also through and through the question of translation, and of 
the language of concepts, of the conceptual corpus of so-called Western 
metaphysics), one should not begin by naively believing that the word 
‘deconstruction’ corresponds in French to some clear and univocal meaning. 
There is already in ‘my’ language a serious problem of translation between 
what here or there can be envisaged for the word and the usage itself, the 
reserves of the word.388 
 
                                                
385 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, p.109.  
386 On this history see, for example, Jean-Luc Nancy “Our History” in Diacritics 20.3 (Fall 
1990) and also (echoing Heidegger’s own example) Derrida’s “Letter to a Japanese Friend” 
(trans. David Wood and Andrew Benjamin, in Psyche II, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth 
Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp.1-6).  
387 This unsettling is the very work of philosophy for both Heidegger and Derrida, not least as 
it touches upon questions “of death”.  
388 Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend”, trans. David Wood and Andrew Benjamin, 
in Psyche II, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008, p.1.  
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Lest this discussion seems a little abstruse in the context of theatre studies, it is worth 
wondering why it is that such concerns about translation, or translatability, rarely 
register within disciplinary histories of theatre which themselves continually plot a 
linear chronology from ancient Greek to modern drama.389 It is curious that the pillars 
of this history – from Aeschylus to Artaud, from Aristotle to Appia – remain standing, 
despite the continual rearrangements of academic archaeologies. In dialogue with 
Gregory Ulmer (for whom “theory” is a question of “curiosity”), Susan Melrose refers 
to the all too familiar “etymological fallacy” that characterises the modern (and, one 
might say, “unoriginal”) turn from theatre to theory.390 
 
The question of “meanings” in the citation from Heidegger addresses the modern 
German of his texts and seminars, as these have in turn been translated into other 
modern languages pursuing the tradition of philosophy (even into English!), as much 
as it does the Greek words whose “translations” – in the very work of addressing 
those “meanings” – become the medium (or memory) of and for this thinking. Such 
thought pertains to the word “theatre” also, not least as its “etymology” – particularly 
in its “shared root” with “theory” – is so often cited in theatre studies, as if this 
offered direct, rather than “distorted”, expression of its “meanings”. While the idea 
that “etymology can serve as a category of objective cognition” goes back at least to 
Plato’s Cratylus within the philosophical tradition,391 it also serves as what we might 
call, after Freud, a “screen memory” in the construction of modern theatre studies. 
The relation between theatre and theory is not to be found in etymology but in artists’ 
practice – including, as Adorno reminds us, their manifestos: “By turning toward their 
truth content, aesthetics is compelled – as philosophy – beyond the works. The 
consciousness of the truth of artworks is, precisely as philosophical truth, in accord 
with the apparently most ephemeral form of aesthetic reflection, the manifesto.”392 
The question of truth in theatre theory – drawn from, rather than applied to, a 
                                                
389 This touches on the critique of historicism that characterises modernism (pace Adorno and 
Benjamin, as well as Duchamp and Eliot).  
390 Susan Melrose, “‘Constitutive ambiguities’: writing professional or expert performance 
practices and the Théâtre du Soleil, Paris”, in Contemporary Theatres in Europe, eds. Joe 
Kelleher and Nicholas Ridout, London: Routledge, 2006, pp.129-30.  
391 Moshe Barasch, Icon, New York: New York University Press, 1995, p.73. 
392 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, London: Athlone Press, 
1997, p.359. 
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theatrical art practice – is a question of aesthetics, as distinct from a history or a 
sociology of professional practices.  
 
The thought of “theatre-theory” (as distinct from Badiou’s “theatre-ideas” with which 
this chapter began) has often evoked the “scene” of deconstruction in philosophy, as a 
play of reading(s) “after” (or in the wake of) Derrida. In the most thoughtful of these, 
theatre, or the theatrical, becomes a trope for theorising the questionability of the very 
subject of theory (just as the theory immanent to theatre proves the undoing of the 
identity of the traditional dramatic subject). In this context, the supposed etymological 
interest of these words’ “root” (or “radical”) meanings may be contextualised in terms 
of Platonic readings (as already discussed with Vernant). To cite only two such 
instances, Samuel Weber (broaching the fundamental question of “theatricality as 
medium” within the history of metaphysics) writes that: “To understand what is at 
stake… one need only return to a well-known and often-discussed fact: the term 
theatre has the same etymology as the term theory, from the Greek word thea 
designating a place from which to observe or to see...”393 And, secondly, in another 
study with similar relevance to this thesis, Johannes Birringer (appealing to the ghost 
of theory, counter-pointing Baudrillard and Blau) writes (concerning examples of the 
“forgetting of theatre”): “In fact, the two words – theatron, theoros – are of the same 
root; the Greek theorein derives from the coalescing of thea and horao, thea meaning 
the outward look, the aspect, in which something shows itself, and horao meaning to 
view closely...”394  
 
Besides the indexing of “theory” with the visible, it is the appeal in even such 
examples to a sort of Archimedean linguistic arbitration – a “fact” as both authors call 
it – that is problematic. Indeed, it is at odds with the very claims being made 
concerning theatre-theory, perhaps because – unlike Heidegger – the question of the 
Greek is set apart in these examples from the (modern) language in which the 
                                                
393 Samuel Weber, Theatricality as Medium, New York: Fordham University Press, 2004, 
pp.2-3. This reference is preparatory to introducing Plato’s parable of the cave, addressing the 
question not simply of what we know, but how we know it. This example is “translated” by 
Weber into a quite distinct set of terms. Instead of an apparently fixed perspective on 
visibility in Plato, Weber introduces the spatio-temporal conditions for the “staging” of such a 
concept of visibility, as an event that “takes place” (p.7).  
394 Johannes Birringer, Theatre, Theory, Postmodernism, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991, p.83. 
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question of theatre (in, and as, theory) is being posed. It is as if this instance of 
translation – as apparent transliteration – provided the terms with which to pose the 
question of the relation between theatre and theory, rather than this relation 
(including, precisely, what is not translated in it) being an instance of how each term 
may be already in question with respect to the other. The appeal to etymology is made 
as if one were to think about words simply, rather than to think with them.  
 
While the judgment of “distortion and suppression” in the Heidegger epigraph 
(above) might appear to depend upon a similar sense of arbitration concerning “facts” 
of language, Heidegger does not apply etymology to the question of meaning; rather 
he resists the ways in which it is already at work in language, exploring how it 
conditions the “use” (or meanings) of the words by which (rather than simply about 
which) the question of meaning – in this case of “theatre” – is posed “theoretically”. 
As noted before, Weber (like Lacoue-Labarthe), writing after Derrida (himself writing 
after Heidegger), is part of a tradition in which the question of mimesis is that of its 
own (theoretical) specificity – where the question of meaning (in and of theory) is 
posed theatrically; that is, in an awareness of the double identity of any representation 
– not as a distinction simply between the represented and its representation, but as the 
representation is itself represented (as representing “itself”). Distinguishing the 
representation from the represented displaces a distinction that pertains to 
representation in and of itself. (This is precisely the Duchampian turn in the history of 
art that is a key point of reference for Kantor.) In this “deconstruction”, the theatrical-
theoretical etymology is unsettled, together with the series of distinctions that it has 
traditionally informed, such as that between appearance and reality, illusion and truth, 
copy and original, replica and model, secondary and primary.395  
 
Concerning etymology specifically (not least, in the curious mimesis of 
transliteration), Heidegger cautions that:  
 
                                                
395 An exemplary instance of this undoing occurs in Weber’s discussion of – and thereby as – 
the translation of the word entre as it “appears” between entrances in Derrida’s “Double 
Session” with Mallarmé’s Mimique, introducing the question of “presence” (Weber, op cit., 
pp.14-15). 
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What is decisive is the way in which this happens. The mere identifying of old 
and often obsolete meanings of terms, the snatching up of these meanings with 
the aim of using them in a new way, leads to nothing if not arbitrariness. What 
counts, rather, is for us, in reliance on the early meaning of a word and its 
changes, to catch sight of the realm pertaining to the matter in question into 
which the word speaks. What counts is to ponder that essential realm as the 
one in which the matter named through the word moves. Only in this way does 
the word speak, and speak in the complex of meanings into which the matter 
that is named by it unfolds throughout the history of poetry and thought.396 
 
Despite this, the etymological rhetoric (“fact”) of theatre “theory” is typically 
presented as if what it expressed was already given, as if citing it simply restated 
something that actually stated itself, as if the history of this thought remained, as it 
were, unaffected by that of its “poetic” memory.  
 
In his introduction to a collection of essays evocatively entitled Mimesis, Masochism, 
and Mime (a relation of themes with which few of the essays themselves seem 
concerned!), Timothy Murray, for example, expands on this unoriginal “fact” of 
language, offering a citation from the very essay of Heidegger’s that includes this 
caution concerning etymology. Murray writes that Heidegger, in posing the question 
of “representation” with respect to “the real in relation to theory [science]... positions 
the science of knowledge in relation to the theoretical procedures of visibility and the 
phenomenological conditions of perception,” which (according to Murray) are 
“shared with theatre”.397 He then cites Heidegger’s text directly:  
 
The word ‘theory’ stems from the Greek verb theorein. The noun belonging to 
it is theoria. Peculiar to these words is a lofty and mysterious meaning. The 
verb theorein grew out of the coalescing of two root words, theatricality and 
horao. Theatricality (cf. Theatre) is the outward look, the aspect, in which 
                                                
396 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection”, trans. William Lovitt, in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p.159. The 
history (or memory) of a poetics of thought, as the thought of poetics, is a fundamental 
concern of Heidegger’s “destruction” of metaphysics.  
397 Timothy Murray, Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, p.11. 
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something shows itself, the outward appearance in which it offers itself. Plato 
names this aspect in which what presences shows what it is, eidos. To have 
seen this aspect, eidenai is to know [wissen]. The second root word in 
theorein, horao, means: to look at something attentively, to look it over, to 
view it closely. Thus it follows that theorein is thean horan, to look attentively 
at the outward appearance wherein what presences becomes visible and, 
through such sight – seeing – to linger with it.398 
 
By abstracting this paragraph from Heidegger’s wider discussion of “truth” (or 
“essence”) here – as if, again, the text simply offered an etymological “fact” – Murray 
then makes a strange use of it to affirm a “meaning” that for Heidegger is in question 
(even, Heidegger says, “uncannily”); that is, “to recognise what is new in the essence 
of modern science as a theory of the real”.399 According to Murray: 
 
The theoretical subject is here authorised by procedures of perspective and 
specularity through which the subject stands at the ontological centre, as the 
maker of the presence of absence, as the locus of meaning. Fundamental to 
modernist concepts of mimesis, I cannot stress too strongly, is this conflation 
of theatre as outward appearance and of theatricality as the subjective 
performance of attentive gathering.400 
 
How this “conflation” may have been variously understood as fundamental to  
“modernist concepts of mimesis” is part of what is in discussion with the uncanny in 
the theatre of death. The reduction of theatre to certain modernist theories of the 
visible – not least, Panofsky’s claims concerning “perspective as a symbolic form” 
(alluded to in chapter three), and its framing of what the experience of visibility (as 
that of a “spectator”) might be – is one that the modernist art theatre “of death” 
resists. In this minor tradition of modernist theatre, “appearance” is not an outward as 
opposed to an inward reality, as an “undeconstructed metaphysics” would posit – as, 
                                                
398 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection”, trans. William Lovitt, in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p.163; quoted 
in Timothy Murray, op cit.  
399 Heidegger, op cit., p.166. Here Heidegger also raises the question of the uncanny, as the 
undoing of claims of modern science of being “disinterested” (p.167).  
400 Murray, op cit. 
 170 
indeed, this is foundational for the main line of twentieth century actor training, from 
Stanislavsky to Grotowski (and the many epigones of each). The metaphysics of 
subject-object relations that are fundamental to this conception of theatre are, 
precisely, what the uncanny in mimesis unsettles. The actor in “the theatre of death” 
is not “the maker of the presence of absence,” the creator of signs on stage, as if what 
was absent was present elsewhere, off stage, requiring only to be re-presented, as with 
prevailing varieties of naturalism and its conventional fictions. It is rather the very 
presence of this absence on stage – the “issuelessness of death” (recalling Heidegger, 
cited in chapter two) – to which the actor’s appearance (in the image of a body) offers 
its mimetic testimony, as its “medium” in effigie.  
 
The contrast between the theatre of death and, so to speak, the “living theatre” could 
not be clearer than here “in theory”. As Philip Auslander writes:  
 
Theorists as diverse as Stanislavsky, Brecht and Grotowski all implicitly 
designate the actor’s self as the logos of performance; all assume that the 
actor’s self precedes and grounds her performance and that it is the presence 
of this self in performance that provides the audience with access to human 
truths... An examination of acting theory through the lens of deconstruction 
reveals that the self is not an autonomous foundation for acting, but is 
produced by the performance it supposedly grounds.401  
 
Absence is an effect of the actor’s presence in the theatre of death (where the actor’s 
“model” is not the living but the dead). This “death” belongs to the stage (as opposed 
to “life”), rather than being represented as if existing in a parallel reality off stage, as 
if “the actor” (distinct from a “character”) were not already its sign, as a double of its 
own representation. (Not as a representation “of” something else, elsewhere; but as an 
“actor”, a representation of him or her “self”.) Again, it is in the appeal of “popular 
culture” forms that modernist art theatre shows this evocative, uncanny, emptiness of 
representation – with examples drawn from the circus, such as the white face of the 
clown and the glitter of the aerialist, which offer a mimetic “theorisation” 
                                                
401 Philip Auslander, “Just be yourself”, in Acting (Re)Considered, ed. Philip Zarrilli, London: 
Routledge, 2000, p.60.  
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(theatricalisation) of the beholder beheld (suspended or stilled), of an audience 
“acted” upon by the “look” of the actor, in an echo of the Gorgon’s mask.   
 
It is noteworthy, furthermore, that in Murray’s citation of Heidegger the key word 
thea – key because it links to Heidegger’s reading of aletheia (as “the unconcealment 
from out of which and in which that which presences, presences”), which links to his 
reflections on (or with) Parmenides – is translated out of the text.402 (It is after all to 
Parmenides here, to the thought of being in time, rather than to any modernist sense of 
“theatre” that Heidegger turns to explore the resonances of “theory”, as they touch 
upon pre-Platonic conceptions of mimesis, in a poetics of thought that eschews 
etymological “statement” or “fact”.403) Where Heidegger’s text writes thea, Murray’s 
writes theatricality, as if to prove the point perhaps that it is not so much a question of 
what authors mean as of what languages themselves have to “say”. Here the 
“essential” relation between the theatrical and the theoretical (as the presencing of 
what is not simply visible404, as testimony [theoria]) – explored in deconstruction – 
reverts to being thought simply in each term’s supposed “applicability” to the other 
(in what is forgotten rather than remembered of the one in and by the meanings of the 
other). 
 
Heidegger’s reference to “theory” (rather than “theatricality”, after all) occurs in his 
questioning the meaning of “essence” in relation to “science”, especially by invoking 
a consideration of how the (German) noun “wesen” (“essence” or, as it may also be 
translated, to evoke its temporal conditionality, “coming to presence”) is conditioned 
by the prefix “an-” (in “das Anwesende”, “presencing”, for instance). For Heidegger, 
the question is not understood in terms of a Greek “answer” through etymology, but 
through the German in which the question is posed (as already a question of 
translation, or rather of translatability; that is, in the thought of language). In 
Heidegger’s text, the concluding line in Murray’s quotation (above), concerning 
“outward appearance”, is engaged not so much in an etymological demonstration 
                                                
402 Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection”, trans. William Lovitt, in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p.164; quoted in 
Timothy Murray (ed.), Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, p.11. 
403 Heidegger, op. cit., pp.164-5. 
404 As, for instance, a goddess (ibid.). 
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from the Greek as an exploration of what Heidegger’s translator, William Lovitt, calls 
“the force” of the German prefix an-, as it conditions these phenomena of 
philosophical reflection – “outward appearance” (Anblick), “presencing” 
(Anwesende), and “becoming visible” (ansehen).405 Lovitt cites Heidegger’s 
suggestion (in What Is Called Thinking?) that “the German preposition an [unto] 
originally means simultaneously ‘toward’ [auf] and ‘into’ [in]”, in relation to which 
the double sense of the German noun Gegenwart as “both ‘presence’ and ‘the 
present’” is glossed as a “tarrying over against and toward”,406 as an enduring 
(presence) in and of the present (as that which is in and of the present).407  
 
By making the question of “outward appearance”, “look”, or “aspect” [ansehen] 
already (or “essentially”) one of “theatricality” rather than “truth”, Murray quite 
literally makes this “knowledge” of “theory” tautological (as we have seen also in 
Fischer-Lichte’s understanding of aesthetics “in theory”). The sense of testimony in 
(or toward) presencing (an event of thought in time) becomes eclipsed by reference to 
a transcendent present (a statement). The claimed etymology (as a “fact of language”) 
allows for the substitution of the theatrical by the theoretical, rather than the 
appearance of an ambiguity between them, as that which is not identifiable with either 
one separately (as is opened up in the question of the uncanny in mimesis). The 
“force” of this German prefix [an], as conditioning the thought of what is in question 
(“what is ‘theatrical’?”408), does not “translate” simply into English (as if it were to 
disappear in what it “expresses”), but thereby insists (in its appearance) as a question 
of translatability, as the thought of language(s). It is such resistances that constitute 
                                                
405 Ibid., n.14, p.163. 
406 Ibid., n.6, p.159. 
407 As Lovitt writes, in the very first “translator’s note” in this volume of Heidegger’s essays 
(ibid., p.3): “Wesen [essence] as a noun derives from the verb wesen, which is seldom used as 
such in modern German. The verb survives primarily in inflected forms of the verb sein [to 
be] and in such words as the adjective anwesend (present). The old verbal forms from which 
wesen stems meant to tarry or dwell. Heidegger repeatedly identifies wesen as ‘the same as 
währen [to last or endure]’” (citing here “The Question Concerning Technology”, ibid., p.30). 
Evidently, this is not a question of “definition”. A concept of “theatre” is already a question 
of a “concept” of theatre; in this instance, specifically, as that of its art, understood as that “of 
death”.  
408 This question is posed, precisely, by the curators of an exhibition that took as its subject “a 
theatre without theatre” (Manuel Borja-Villel, et al., (eds.) A Theatre Without Theatre, 
Barcelona: MACBA, 2007, p.20). 
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the very memory of thought with which translations of Heidegger are engaged (not 
least as concerns, in this “example”, the relation between theatre and theory).  
 
For Heidegger, in the passage that Murray cites, the issue is not one of identifying 
these terms – “theory” and “theatre” – through a supposedly shared etymology, but of 
considering what is (or becomes) apparent (or “visible”) to and as thought. What is 
Anwesende is what “endures into reflection or presencing”, suggesting (as noted 
above, in the association of the verb wesen with währen) what lasts or endures, rather 
than thinking of what endures as, with Plato, the idea opposed to appearances (a 
“text” opposed to performance, or theory opposed to aesthetics). What demands to be 
thought theatrically (pace Fischer-Lichte) is not reducible to an opposition between 
the enduring and the ephemeral, the archive and the actor, but addresses the very 
conditions of temporality in its theatrically specific appearance (as this resembles, or 
dissembles, what is “life like” in its mortality).  
 
The opening lines of Heidegger’s lecture “concerning technology” are apposite here 
(if we substitute “technology” with either “theory” or “theatricality”):  
 
In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology [theatre/ 
theory]. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all 
to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and 
topics. The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less 
perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall 
be questioning concerning technology [theatre/ theory], and in so doing we 
would like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it 
opens our human existence to the essence of technology [theatre/ theory]. 
When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the 
technological [theatrical/ theoretical] within its own bounds.409  
 
Crucially, the question of coming to presence alludes to a pre-Platonic concern with 
what it may mean to think (which is associated, as discussed at the end of chapter 
                                                
409 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, trans. William Lovitt, in The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp.3-
4. 
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two, with the uncanny). This sense of appearance (thea) unsettles the dichotomy 
between transient phenomena (“mere appearance”) and transcendental ideas, which 
(as we have already seen with Fischer-Lichte) is “how metaphysics in its most varied 
interpretations thinks an essence”,410 and which has conditioned aesthetics within the 
understanding (for instance) of theatre. How does the thought of performance make 
itself appear (otherwise than by its suppression or distortion)? How does the 
“afterwards” of a performance give testimony to its event, or taking place, 
theatrically? To “open our human existence to the essence of [theatre]” is what theatre 
artists aspire to – as this may be apprehended through an “anthropology of images”, 
understood not from a “Panofskian perspective” but as a “Warburgian symptom”, in 
the example of the theatre of death; as a “transformation of the body into 
representation” [Michaud] which bears witness to an uncanny sense (or presence) of 
the imago hominis.  
 
Besides Heidegger’s “return” to Parmenides (in a reading that entails a 
“deconstruction” of the post-Platonic vocabulary of metaphysics), in the next chapter 
we will consider Jean-Pierre Vernant’s studies of Greek thought in which he identifies 
the suppression of what he calls “presentification” by representation. As discussed in 
the Introduction, it is curious, however, how few theatre “theorists” (or academics) 
draw their references from reflections on “seeing” by theatre artists themselves – 
whose writing about what they see in theatre (not least, in theory) offers testimony to 
the work of mimesis (to its aesthetics) in a concept of theatre. Academic theatre 
theorists refer typically to each other’s writing, using “examples” – often in 
paraphrase – drawn from artists’ work. The latter is not cited as the theoretical source 
of (academic) questions (where Auslander’s explicit reference, above, to directors as 
theorists is a rare exception), but as “examples” of what has been “theorised” 
separately, in terms of reading (rather than “seeing”); as if an example such as 
Castellucci’s On Regarding the Face of God (in chapter three) becomes theoretical 
(distinct from theatrical) when thought of, or addressed, only in such writing. 
(Paradoxically, most theatre discussed in its “studies” has not been seen, or is not 
discussed as a question of seeing, of a practice of seeing, as an aesthetic question in 
and of its theory.) It is as if the aesthetic question (of the visible, the theatrical, or the 
                                                
410 Ibid., p.30. 
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mimetic) was not itself theoretical; as if the thought or concept of appearance (of 
“look” or “aspect”) was not itself theatrical (pace Badiou); as if “the actor” was a 
given and not the very question of an appearance of “art” theatrically, as this concerns 
the unsettling “co-presence” of actor and audience; or, rather, the unsettling of co-
presence between actor and audience.    
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part Two 
 
Chapter 5: A question of appearance – enter the actor 
 
1. Thou art a scholar, speak to it, Horatio – Question it... (Hamlet, 1.i) 
 
The opening scene of Hamlet offers an example of scholarship attempting to question 
theatrical appearances – a meta-theatrical attempt to address the “apparition” (the 
image) of the actor in the figure of the ghost. As an actor, how does “the ghost” 
appear “this night” – as a figure that is “more than fantasy” and which “looks... like” a 
messenger from “beyond” this world? After all, what does one returning from the 
next world look “like”, on stage at least? What “of” human being (in its appearance) 
does this apparition resemble, such that its difference from the living may still be 
recognised? Freud – a “scholar” who (alongside Edison) developed a specifically 
modern way of communicating with the dead (with the figures in absentia and in 
effigie who people the psychoanalytic transference) – seems, at first sight, clear that 
theatrical appearances (being confined to fiction or to “poetic reality”) are not 
uncanny. As a modern rationalist, engaged in the demystification of superstitions, he 
observes that:  
 
The creative writer can also choose a setting which though less imaginary than 
the world of fairy tales, does yet differ from the real world by admitting 
superior spiritual beings such as daemonic spirits or ghosts of the dead. So 
long as they remain within their setting of poetic reality, such figures lose any 
uncanniness which they might possess. The souls in Dante’s Inferno, or the 
supernatural apparitions in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth, or Julius Caesar, 
may be gloomy and terrible enough, but they are no more really uncanny than 
Homer’s jovial world of gods. We adapt our judgment to the imaginary reality 
imposed on us by the writer, and regard souls, spirits, and ghosts as though 
their existence had the same validity as our own has in material reality. In this 
case we avoid all trace of the uncanny.411  
 
                                                
411 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. Angela Richards, in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, p.373-4. 
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As concerns the supernatural, a theatre of the marvellous or the magical (conceived 
without a grounding in a “material” practice other than reading) would here be 
distinct from the metaphysical theatre envisaged by Freud’s contemporaries, Craig 
and Artaud, Maeterlinck and Witkiewicz, precisely while remaining within a “setting 
of poetic reality”. For these theatre artists, it is the very presence of the actors before 
an audience (rather than the literary fiction of characters) that will serve to unsettle 
judgement as to the seeming distinction between “imaginary” and “material” reality. 
Indeed, Freud himself (as will be returned to, below) comes to reflect on the 
undecidability of this very opposition as his essay progresses, where the thought of an 
image distinct from its medium or material (in this case a body) becomes ever more 
complex (rather than simply irrational) in his account.  
 
Literary reference, in Freud’s essay, to “daemonic spirits” (distinct from today’s 
digital-game avatars) indicates a culture that granted even modern science a 
connection to antiquity during the last century. Like the archaic eidolon, the stage 
figure of Hamlet’s ghost – so the narrative fiction would have it – is both visible and 
audible, but not tangible. The scholar, in the play, might refer the ghost’s appearance 
to the “sheeted dead” of ancient Rome, but the theatrical image in question (one that 
appears after death) would speak to the conscience, rather than to the knowledge, of 
history.412 The question of the past that haunts the present (besides the ghost’s 
familial tale of regicide) concerns the inheritance of Fortinbras, providing, in the first 
scene, a screen for that of Hamlet (his potential disinheritance) – for what will have 
become of it (“the rest is silence”) in the last scene. Theatrically, the bodies may 
finally be taken up; but theoretically there remains the mote to trouble the scholarly 
mind’s eye, concerning all that reason “shall have cause to speak” of. At stake is an 
understanding of “appearances”, and the communication to be had, in theatre, not 
only about them but also with them.  
 
                                                
412 Besides the example of regicide in the Scottish play, Julius Caesar’s bloodied clothes are 
also made to speak in Anthony’s oration (Act III) and Caesar later appears as a ghost to 
Brutus (Act V). The political questions of murder at Court and the legitimacy of “sovereign” 
rule in England are the very issues of “History” in Shakespeare’s plays (as analysed in the 
case of Hamlet by Carl Schmitt, for example, in his monograph Hamlet or Hecuba, trans. 
David Pan and Jennifer Rust, New York: Telos Press, 2009).  
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In his essay on the ghosts in Shakespeare’s plays, Edward Gordon Craig makes the 
appearance of the ghost the very measure of theatrical specificity,413 contrasting this 
with the apparent sufficiency for understanding of simply reading the plays. 
Addressing the kind of rationalisation offered by Freud, Craig asks what does 
performance bring to the play more than reading, when the experience of 
performances so often proves to be much less? “What is it makes the ghosts of 
Shakespeare, which are so significant and impressive when we read the plays, appear 
so weak and unconvincing on the stage?”414 The question addresses precisely the art 
of theatre and its “material” (or medium) – which, in Craig’s theorisation of the 
theatrical in terms of the visible and the invisible, concerns a relation that is at the 
“origins” of the concept of mimesis (at least, in following the analysis of Jean-Pierre 
Vernant).415  
 
In the exchange between Theaetetus and the Stranger in Plato’s Sophist, for instance, 
two versions of the “imaginary” are already at play – an archaic sense, in which the 
image is its own reality (a “double”); and a Platonic sense in which the image (eikon) 
is only the simulacrum of something real. Vernant addresses Plato’s discussion in 
terms of a broader philological question: “To what extent did the ancient Greeks 
recognise an order of reality corresponding to what we call image, imagination, and 
the world of the imaginary?”416 For Plato, the image is thought of as but an illusion or 
unreality, a “mere semblance”, a “representation” of reality.417 This marks a change 
from an earlier notion of the archaic eidolon, a “real semblance”, as it were, of which 
Vernant gives three examples (all associated with Homer): a “dream image (onar)”, 
                                                
413 “[T]hey carry us to the clearest statements we can ever receive as to Shakespeare’s 
thoughts about the stage” (Craig, “On the Ghosts in the Tragedies of Shakespeare”, in Craig 
on Theatre, ed. Michael Walton, London: Methuen, 1999, p.170).  
414 Craig, ibid.  
415 Hans Belting too follows Vernant here, in theorising his own project for an “anthropology 
of images”: “My aim is to generalise Vernant’s configuration and to propose a triangular 
interrelation in which image, body, and medium would be three poles” (Belting, “Toward an 
Anthropology of the Image”, in Anthropologies of Art, ed. Mariët Westermann, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2005, p.44). This is also the basis of Monique Borie’s discussion of 
much the same issues as addressed here, in Le Fantôme, ou le Théâtre qui Doute, Arles: 
Actes Sud, 1997. 
416 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “The Birth of Images”, in Mortals and Immortals, Froma Zeitlin ed., 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, p.164. 
417 Ibid., p.166. 
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an “apparition sent by a god (phasma)”, and the “phantom of a deceased (psuche)”.418 
Curiously, all three are invoked in Hamlet’s reflection “for in that sleep of death what 
dreams may come” – wherein the question of what it means “to be or not to be”, on 
stage, becomes the very cause of the actor’s speech. Are these dreams (or phantoms) 
mere superstition, “only” theatre, or something real? How do they affect the spectator 
(which is the very test of the play-within-the-play)? How are these images of bodies 
(“actors”) “brought before the spectator’s eyes”? Here the question of mimesis, as that 
of metaphysics, unsettles the distinction between the “realities” within which Freud 
would have it played out. Yet, as Freud himself analyses as well as anyone, mimesis – 
as it haunts theory – is here addressed not simply in the metaphorical “mirror” of the 
stage, but as the uncanny “double” of theatre.419  
 
In Homer, according to Vernant, the eidola of the deceased “incarnate an actual 
presence that stands before the particular hero, who addresses them and converses... 
as though speaking to a real” person.420 The only proof that this appearance belongs to 
the soul and not to the body is that, in the living person’s desire to embrace it, “all 
[one] can grasp is empty and insubstantial air.” These are, as it were, the “living” 
figures of those who are known to be dead (and are thus not the image of their 
cadavers). With them, the look that evokes presence is reciprocated, neither 
withdrawn nor withheld (although, while seemingly embodied, intangible). Vernant 
comments that:  
 
The eidolon manifests both a real presence and an irremediable absence at the 
same time. It is this inclusion of a ‘being elsewhere’ in the midst of a ‘being 
here’ that constitutes the archaic eidolon, less as an image in the sense in 
which we understand it today than as a double.421  
 
                                                
418 Ibid., pp.167-68. 
419 In this respect, Belting cites Augé who “speaks of the ‘dreams’ the individual has, against 
the ‘icons’ of the public realm that live on in the dreams. Their give and take make the 
collective imaginaire a highly contested area that also attracts the desire of political control” 
(Belting, op. cit., p.51).  
420 Vernant, op. cit., p.168. In Kantor’s invocation of Odysseus (with which this thesis will 
conclude), the “actual presence” and “particular hero” become – uncannily – one and the 
same, where for a moment the theatre’s double appears on stage. 
421 Ibid. 
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This sense of “a double”, as if the image had a life of its own, suggests for the modern 
subject – the theatregoer in Craig’s Dialogues, as also the addressee of Freud’s “new 
science” – the realm of superstition. As discussed in chapter three, these appearances 
are referred to only in order to affirm that they are such things as are not believed in; 
the “primitive” (or “infantile”) belief in spirits having been – as Freud declares – 
“surmounted” in the modern adult’s consciousness.422 However, if no one believes in 
ghosts today, how and why is credence still given to these actors? How might the 
scholar question them still (these semblants, doubles, and apparitions), in whose 
appearance the “I” does not appear to be simply “itself”?  
 
In contrast to the fiction he identifies with the stage (or, more precisely, the page), 
Freud offers an example of such a “modern” double, or eidolon, from the experience 
of everyday life – addressing the sense of the uncanny in a case of mistaking “the 
material reality of the phenomenon” of appearance(s). In a long footnote (adding 
rationalist credentials by citing also the experience of his eminent contemporary, the 
physicist and philosopher of science Ernst Mach), Freud writes:  
 
Since the uncanny effect of a ‘double’ also belongs to the same group it is 
interesting to observe what the effect is of meeting one’s own image unbidden 
and unexpected.423 Ernst Mach has related two such observations in his 
Analyse der Empfindungen (1900, p.3). On the first occasion he was not a 
little startled when he realised that the face before him was his own. The 
second time he formed a very unfavourable impression about the supposed 
stranger who entered the omnibus, and thought: ‘What a shabby-looking 
school-master that man is who is getting in!’ – I can report a similar 
adventure. I was sitting in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than 
usually violent jerk of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing-
cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing gown and a travelling cap 
came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing-cabinet, which lay between the 
two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and come into my 
                                                
422 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. Angela Richards, in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, pp.371-2 and pp.374-5. 
423 This can be compared with Otto Rank’s discussion of Heinz Ewer’s “film-drama” The 
Student of Prague, in chapter one (“The Statement of the Problem”) of his study The Double, 
trans. Harry Tucker, London: Maresfield Library, 1989. 
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compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I 
at once realised to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own 
reflection in the looking glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I 
thoroughly disliked his appearance. Instead, therefore, of being frightened by 
our ‘doubles’, both Mach and I simply failed to recognise them as such. Is it 
not possible, though, that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace of the 
archaic reaction which feels the ‘double’ to be something uncanny?424  
 
What is uncanny in this momentary failure of recognition between “here and there” – 
a shock of (non-)recognition that nonetheless bears a charge of affect (in which the 
“self”-image is “thoroughly disliked”, as that of an other)? From where and to where 
does the “other” return to shock the “I”? Imagine, further, the affective charge were 
the “I” not even to recognise in another the sense of self, “like” its own? Although the 
modern question of superstition and of survivals (from Tylor and Frazer, for example, 
through to Augé and Taussig) is fundamental to that of the uncanny in mimesis, what 
kind of theatre (or “actor”) would be possible where such spirits or doubles are indeed 
recognised and believed in? This would be the metaphorical “theatre” of 
anthropologists (or psycho-analysts), reporting on the rituals of spirit possession and 
shamanism (or of hysteria and transference). Rather than the suspension of disbelief 
even in the presence of a deceased character on stage, we “moderns” find no cause to 
believe – as Freud specifies425 – in such ghosts or spirits. In the theatrical séance, we 
do not believe, as Hamlet has it, in “nothing!” As discussed in previous chapters, we 
understand such anthropological possession as but a conceit: “That this player here,/ 
but in a fiction, in a dream of passion,/ could force his soul so to his own conceit/ that 
from her working all his visage wann’d,/... and all for nothing!” [Hamlet, II.ii, l.545-
551] This meta-theatrical lament of the actor – for whom “nothing” remains the very 
“cause” of speech – addresses a literary theatre of ghosts, rather than that “of death”.  
 
Locating the question of mimesis in a situation or event of performance, that is, in the 
relation between actor and audience (as will be seen with both Kantor and Genet in 
the next sections of this chapter), is part of a modern return to a “pre-Platonic” 
                                                
424 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. Angela Richards, in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, p.371. 
425 Ibid., pp.373-4. 
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concern with the double, not least as a question of “theory”. As we have seen, with 
Craig, this relates the question of the ghost’s appearance (“mere semblance”) to that 
of the actor (“real semblance”). Vernant, indeed, discusses the notion of eidola in 
these terms:  
 
In this way, [Plato] seems to have modified the orientation of this semantic 
grouping [of image and imaginary] and to have upset the balance among the 
three terms implied in the act of mimeisthai – that is, the model, the imitator, 
and the spectator – to the advantage of the first two (model and imitator), 
which, from now on, are established as the operative pair in the mimetic 
relationship. In the fifth century, mimos and mimeisthai had placed less 
emphasis on the relation of the imitator to what he imitates than on the one 
between imitator-simulator and the spectator who observes him...426  
 
To return to an earlier discussion, what is “at stake” here (as this same history is given 
by Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of Platonic mimesis in – and, indeed, by – Heidegger) 
is: “to deliver mimesis from imitation (which is the derivative interpretation, 
deforming and, historically, all the more active and powerful the more reductive, 
spontaneous, and easy it is) and consequently to wrench mimesis away from the 
classical problematic of (in)adequation in order to back away from the bi-millenial 
erring for which philosophy has become responsible.”427 
 
In the context of anthropology or psycho-analysis, this “erring” between rational and 
irrational (in the sense of “superstition”) is marked by an absence (a phantom) that 
has material presence, as it affects the body to which it returns. As already discussed 
in the previous chapters, in the relation between animism and automatism, the 
question of “acting” – in the eye of the beholder – is both unsettled and unsettling in 
this “theatre”. Indeed, as Freud admits in the conclusion of his Uncanny essay, the 
distinctions between material and psychical realities428 – as between science and 
                                                
426 Vernant, op. cit., p.165. 
427 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography”, trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Lacoue-Labarthe 
Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p.119. 
428 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. Angela Richards, in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, p.372. 
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fiction, or between “the uncanny that we actually experience and the uncanny that we 
merely picture or read about”429 – “are not always sharply distinguishable”.430  
 
This unsettling ambiguity between what is “actually” experienced and what is 
“merely” imagined is lost when the scene or the event of these appearances (or 
apparitions) is thought of only metaphorically as theatre. This is the lesson of Craig 
and Artaud (in chapter one), as also of Kantor and Genet (in the present chapter): that 
the theatre “of death” is not that of a relation between a present actor and a 
represented, or fictional (absent), “death” – but the very intangibility of the relation 
between actor and audience. Giving representation to the dead as theatre makes them 
present in appearance. It is with a possible “science of ghosts”  (as Adorno and 
Horkheimer, and later Derrida, call it), or with what we might call a “science of 
theatre” – of mimesis in the “material and psychical reality” of (rather than opposed 
to) its own fictions – that we can begin to address what is affecting, haunting, or 
unsettling in the theatre of death.431  
 
2. It is necessary to recover the primeval force of the shock taking place at the 
moment when opposite a man (the viewer) there stood for the first time a man (the 
actor) deceptively similar to us, yet at the same time infinitely foreign, beyond an 
impassable barrier. – Tadeusz Kantor432 
 
This proposal for an understanding of theatre comes from the manifesto that gives the 
concept of “the theatre of death” its title. Written to accompany Kantor’s 1975 
production The Dead Class, it identifies the event of theatre as an encounter between 
two persons, actor and spectator, where – in the appearance of the one to the other – 
                                                
429 Ibid., p.370. 
430 Ibid., p.372. 
431 To anticipate the last section of this chapter, this could be imagined in the event of what 
Jean-Luc Nancy, in a reflection on (the mask of) the face, calls “the oscillator” – where “the 
mouth and the look are turned forward and are parallel, turned into the distance, toward an 
infinite perpetuation of their double and incommunicable position. Between mouth and eye, 
the entire face oscillates” (The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005, p.73). This could also be “that imperceptible tremor unworthy of true 
plaster,” which Beckett suggests is the “ill seen ill said” of the other in one’s own eye (Ill 
Seen Ill Said, London: John Calder, 1997, p.57).  
432 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Voy and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in A 
Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993, p.114. 
 184 
each appears at once similar, and yet dissimilar, to themselves. The mark of this 
dissembling resemblance – of an uncanny recognition of similarity in difference – is 
the separation between the two (“when opposite...”), as formalised by theatre as the 
event of a “barrier” between them (as an instance of the thought, or “theatre-idea”, of 
the relation between audience and actor). Crucially, this complex signification of the 
theatrical – as “opposition”, as “barrier”, as appearance or apparition, as resemblance 
and dissemblance, as aspect, “look”, gesture or attitude – concerns not only the 
explicit appearance of the actor but also the implicit disappearance of the spectator.  
 
Although the separation between these two bodies is asserted rather than analysed by 
Kantor, we may note its resonance with, for example, the conclusion of a pioneering 
study of “the collective representation of death” by Robert Hertz (remarking on the 
occurrence of “second burials”) that: “for collective consciousness, death is in normal 
circumstances merely a temporary exclusion of the individual from human society. 
This exclusion effects his passage from the visible society of the living into the 
invisible society of the dead.”433 The dead depart twice – firstly, corporeally (or 
materially); and secondly, culturally (or psychically). There is a twofold leave-taking 
even in its minimal, enlightened or rational, modern version of a passage from clinical 
death to memorial (or “spiritual”) death; the latter in fact offering a return to the 
community, in which a place is found for the dead in some cultural variation of “here 
lies”.434 Theatre offers, precisely, a play with the understanding (or memory) of this 
“second” possibility.435  
 
We have already seen how the “birth” of the actor – as an “intercession made to 
Death” – was associated by Craig, at the beginning of the twentieth century, with a 
fantasy of “the ancient theatre” along the Ganges, in contrast to the contemporary 
                                                
433 Robert Hertz, “A Contribution to the Collective Representation of Death” in Death and 
The Right Hand, trans. Rodney and Claudia Needham, London: Cohen and West, 1960, p.86. 
434 As Evans Pritchard notes in his introduction: “We do not understand what the double 
disposal of the dead in Indonesia means until we know also the beliefs held about the ghosts 
of the dead and also about the rules of mourning, but once we have grasped the three sides to 
death – corpse, soul, and mourners – we see that each expresses the same idea of transition” 
(in Hertz, op. cit., p.15).  
435 The political dimension of this has already been noted with Schmitt (in this chapter) and 
Verdery (in chapter one). As will be discussed in section four of this chapter (below), 
photography disturbs an insistence on a clear-cut distinction between the material and the 
psychical, the visible and the invisible, the living and the dead, the rational and the 
superstitious – as theatre has always unsettled the identity of these terms in their opposition.  
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manifestation (a survival of such symbolic forms or cultural practices) of the 
mannequin on stage after Jarry, for instance (with its after life celebrated in Dada and 
surrealism). It might well be that the idea of a “first time” for anything (such as that of 
the actor’s appearance) necessarily entails an “as if” speculation; but we can, at least, 
distinguish the estrangement of the habitual (the “exceptional” in Badiou’s account) 
from the appeal to an “original” in Kantor’s theatrical (and theoretical) evocation of 
the imago hominis.  
 
Crucially, the essential “foreignness” in the presence of the actor, according to 
Kantor, finds its “model” in that of the dead.436 The shock of this appearance is 
registered as “metaphysical” where the human presence – “whose real meaning and 
threat appear to us only in dreams”437 – is encountered “as if for the first time”. The 
ancient separation of the “actor” from the community, making of appearance an act or 
an event (an “apparition”), survives – for Kantor – in the modern “tragically 
circuslike Image of Man, as if [“those who had remained on this side”] had seen him 
for the first time, as if [they] had seen their very selves. This was certainly a shock – a 
metaphysical shock, we might even say. The live effigy of Man emerging out of the 
shadows, as if constantly walking ahead of himself…”438  
 
Kantor’s vision of this imago hominis in that of the actor – the “live effigy of man… 
as if constantly walking ahead of himself” – is profoundly resonant. With its appeal to 
the profane mysteries of the circus and the fairground (echoing in the very name of 
the Cricot 2 company) we find again a theatre recalling popular cultural survivals in 
modernist art practice (of human appearances seen “as if for the first time” in 
performances of “the lowest rank”). Death is thought “of” theatrically (in a 
metaphysical shock, as the uncanny in mimesis) in the figure of the “live effigy of 
Man” – as an “actor”. While Kantor’s reference to the metaphysical is specific to his 
own question of this “model” actor, it also draws upon the Cricot 2’s twenty-year 
engagement with the work of Witkiewicz, whose plays provided a ready-made 
                                                
436 This is what Blanchot characterises as “ambiguity” (Maurice Blanchot, “The Two 
Versions of the Imaginary”, in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989, p.263; L’Espace Littéraire, Paris: Gallimard, 1955, 
p.276). 
437 Kantor, op. cit., p.113. 
438 Ibid., pp.113-14. 
 186 
element (as Kantor identified it) in each of the company’s productions up to and 
including The Dead Class.439  
 
In Witkiewicz’s conception, the art of theatre (conceived of in terms of “pure form”) 
is grounded in the possibility of and for “metaphysical feeling”, which is opposed to 
the “mechanisation” of modern life: “Art is the expression of what I call faute de 
mieux metaphysical feeling... the expression of the directly given unity of our 
individuality in formal constructions of any elements (complex or simple), in such a 
way that these constructions affect us directly, and not through cognitive 
understanding.”440 From this sense of “unity in plurality” (which is occluded in the 
everyday banalities of the “problem play” and the dramaturgy of “realism”441), 
Witkacy declares that: “On leaving the theatre, the spectator ought to have the feeling 
he has just awakened from some strange dream, in which even the most ordinary 
things had a strange, unfathomable charm…”442  
 
In a later essay, Witkacy comments on the “thoroughly falsified” accounts of his 
theories that critics constructed for themselves in reaction to the term “metaphysical” 
– lamenting that apparently “not everyone knows that there is a vast abyss between 
the concepts ‘metaphysical’ and ‘mystical’.”443 For Witkacy, the aesthetics of pure 
form are the corollary of the experience of (self-)consciousness – a unity of 
apperception that accompanies the plurality of perceptions, to which art gives 
existence through form. Most commentary on Kantor’s relation with Witkacy focuses 
                                                
439 Besides Witkacy, Kantor’s Cricot 2 – whose first production, in 1955 (the first post-war 
Witkacy performance in Poland), was The Cuttlefish – also paid homage to the original 
Krakow artists’ company “Cricot”, which had first performed this same play in 1933. (This 
will be returned to in part three.) 
440 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “Pure Form in the Theatre” (1921), trans. Daniel Gerould, in The 
Witkiewicz Reader, ed. Daniel Gerould, London: Quartet Books, 1993, p.147.  
441 “Who cares what goes on at 38 Wspólna Street, Apartment 10, or in the castle in the 
fairytale, or in past times? In the theatre we want to be in an entirely new world in which the 
fantastic psychology of characters who are completely implausible in real life, not only in 
their positive actions but also in their errors, and who are perhaps completely unlike people 
in real life, produces events which by their bizarre interrelationships create a performance in 
time not limited by any logic except the logic of the form itself of that performance...” 
(Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “On a New Type of Play” (1920), in The Mother and Other 
Unsavoury Plays, eds. & trans. Daniel Gerould and C.S. Durer, New York: Applause Theatre 
Books, 1993, p.235). 
442 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “On a New Type of Play” (1920), ibid., p.237. 
443 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “Metaphysical Feelings” (1931), trans. Daniel Gerould, in The 
Witkiewicz Reader, ed. Daniel Gerould, London: Quartet Books, 1993, pp.285-6. 
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on the dramaturgy of a particular play associated with a particular Cricot 2 
performance, rather than the aesthetics of performance that is Kantor’s concern (and 
for which the plays offer but a pre-text to explore). The neo-Kantian associations of 
Witkacy’s aesthetics (as well as their relations with the theories of Leon Chwistek) 
have yet to be addressed (as far as I am aware) in Anglophone discussion of 
Kantor.444 It is however precisely such concerns that Kantor’s work opens up to 
comparative analysis (in aesthetic theory), rather than closing down to theatre-studies 
“disciplinarity”.  
 
In terms that themselves provide a basic orientation for thinking through Kantor’s 
own subsequent performances “with” (rather than “of”) his plays, Witkacy writes, 
concerning the creation of “a theatrical idiom capable of expressing metaphysical 
feelings within purely formal dimensions”:  
 
What is essential is only that the meaning of the play should not necessarily be 
limited by its realistic or fantastic content, as far as the totality of the work is 
concerned, but simply that the realistic element should exist for the sake of the 
purely formal goals – that is, for the sake of a synthesis of all the elements of 
the theatre: sound, décor, movement on the stage, dialogue, in sum, 
performance through time, as an uninterrupted whole – so transformed, when 
viewed realistically, that the performance seems utter non-sense. The idea is to 
make it possible to deform either life or the world of fantasy with complete 
freedom so as to create a whole whose meaning would be defined only by its 
purely scenic internal construction, and not by the demands of consistent 
psychology and action according to assumptions from real life.445 
 
Here Witkacy addresses directly the terms of Freud’s construction of “the uncanny”, 
offering a contemporary (rather than a Romantic) example of the relation between 
fiction and reality in this “border concept” (as Witkacy calls his concept of pure 
form). As Jan Leszcynski notes, it is a moot point whether Witkacy’s plays 
                                                
444 A similar historical discussion could contrast here Leon Chwistek (pre-war Polish theorist, 
and advocate, of formism) and Michel Tapié (post-war French theorist and advocate of 
informel) in relation to Kantor’s aesthetic “discoveries”.  
445 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “On a New Type of Play” (1920), op. cit., p.234.  
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themselves realise his own aesthetic criteria, being written with linear exposition and 
recognisable stage directions and settings (however bizarrely “painterly” these often 
are).446 It is the particular distinction of Kantor’s productions to have explored the 
challenge of this formal aesthetic theatrically (qualified variously as “impossible”, 
“informel”, and “zero”) – especially as this concerns the reality of the actor.  
 
As already suggested in previous chapters, the “barrier” which Kantor identifies in his 
Theatre of Death manifesto between stage and auditorium, as between death and life, 
is not simply to be thought about theatrically (as if it were given); it is itself a marker 
of and for theatrical thought. It evokes the traditional (if not ancient) separation of 
auditorium and stage by the orchestra – whether as a site of sacrifice (overtaken by 
modern technology, as Walter Benjamin describes), or as a condition for aesthetic 
(indeed, for empathetic) thought (creating a space for thought or reflection, as Aby 
Warburg describes). As a theatre-idea (pace Badiou), this “barrier” also offers a limit 
case for the actor’s appearance within European naturalist theatre – as discussed in the 
first chapter (for instance, in the actor’s exit from the stage when his character has 
“died”; or, again, in his return to the stage, the bodies having been taken up, for a 
“curtain call”). Crucially, for Kantor in 1975 (at the end of his working with 
Witkacy’s plays) “the theatre of death” indicates a way to think – through the work, 
over twenty years, of the Cricot 2 – beyond the dichotomy of “naturalist” or “art” 
(and abstract) theatre (as proposed by Witkacy in the 1920s); that is, beyond 
Stanislavsky or Craig (and Schlemmer), where “the two possible solutions – either 
autonomous art and intellectual structure or naturalism – cease to be the only ones”.447  
 
A fundamental aspect of this theatrical thought, however (which will be explored 
further in part three of this thesis), is what Kantor precisely does not address in this 
manifesto: his own presence (as a “theatre artist”) on stage, as an “act” or appearance 
that unsettles and renders ambiguous (or “undecidable” as Lacoue-Labarthe would 
have the question of mimesis) the “impassibility” of this barrier as theatre. In the 
hagiographic commentary that wishes to surrogate itself for Kantor’s point of view 
                                                
446 Jan Leszcynski, “Witkacy’s Theory of Art”, trans. Lech Petrowicz, in “Dialectics and 
Humanism”, The Polish Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 1985, pp.63-4.  
447 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Voy and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in A 
Journey through other spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993, p.108.  
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(mistaking his play with, or even parody of, the director), the role of the two 
“supervisors” of the dead class of actors – the Beadle and the Charlady (who belong 
to the “other side” of the barrier) – is never discussed. The ambiguity of Kantor’s 
position becomes visible in its contrast with theirs, rather than his role being simply 
identified with “this side” of the barrier (as with the endlessly repeated metaphor of 
the scenic “conductor”).448 The particular relation between Kantor and Stanislaw 
Rychlicki, the actor playing the Charlady, is affecting both within the scenario and, as 
it were, “in person” – as this can be glimpsed in Andrzej Wajda’s film, made at the 
time of the first version of this production. His relationship with Krzysztof 
Miklaszewski, who played the Beadle, on the other hand, is commemorated in the 
latter’s book of “encounters”, recorded over many years.  
 
In his notebooks accompanying the production of The Dead Class, Kantor writes of 
his realisation of a “model” for the actor (at least, in this new stage of his theatre) 
derived from the dead:  
 
If we agree that one of the traits of living people is their ability and the ease 
with which they enter into various relationships, it is only when encountering 
the body of a dead person that we realise that this essential trait of the living is 
possible because of the lack of differentiation between them, because of the 
sameness and... the ‘invisibility’. It is only the Dead who become visible to the 
living at the price of acquiring their individuality, difference, and their 
Image...449  
 
While the most obvious modern instance of such an “image” would seem to be the 
photograph (at least, in its pre-digital form) – as, indeed, it becomes an object in 
                                                
448 In the cringingly awful films documenting the Norwich Sainsbury Arts Centre Kantor 
exhibition (in 2009), one of the curators even describes Kantor as the conductor in the famous 
Sea Concert Happening – a role in fact “played” by Edward Krasinski. (The films can be 
viewed on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXPLUjADwEU&feature=relmfu; 
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yhgw9cKvF7U.) By contrast, the book in which the 
contributions to the associated symposium are published is excellent: Kantor was here, eds. 
Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius and Natalia Zarzecka, London: Black Dog Publishing, 2011. 
449 Tadeusz Kantor, “From the Director’s Notebook” [for The Dead Class], trans. Michal 
Kobialka, in Michal Kobialka, Further on, Nothing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009, p.240. (This is exactly the view expressed also by Genet in (amongst other texts) 
Prisoner of Love, trans. Barbara Bray, London: Picador, 1990, pp.261-3.) 
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Kantor’s productions (to which we will return in part three) – in The Dead Class there 
is also the return of such “popular culture” survivals as “fairground booths, barber 
shops, tailor shops” (Schlosser) and of waxwork displays (Schulz). The dead find 
their own image in this production in the actors’ child doubles (who are unaffected as 
the photographed adult class descend into their “immaturity”), a motif drawn from the 
example of both Gombrowicz’s Ferdydurke and Bruno Schulz’s story The 
Pensioner.450 In one of his conversations with Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Kantor offers 
“a theatrical image” of these doubles as the material replicas of the “second 
childhood” to which old age is said to return (and which, for Schulz, opens up the 
world of adulthood to the lost “age of genius”): 
 
...[Y]es, although my work is proceeding in a slightly different direction 
towards “degraded reality”. I was drawn to this by my experiences of the 
sixties: which is to say, by a series of insights related to an understanding of 
death. Allow me to translate those experiences into an image I can present to 
you in terms of my theatrical “séance”. In come some human beings in the 
twilight of their lives, dressed in rustic mourning clothes, who have become 
“ingrown” with the corpses of children. These child-corpses, growing in some 
kind of an extra-biological dimension, are like parasitical excrescences on 
their bodies. They are actually the same person in a larval form which contains 
the entire memory of their childhood, discarded and forgotten out of 
insensitivity because of the mindless drudgery of everyday life, which strips 
us of the capacity to grasp the bigger picture. It is the facticity of everyday life 
which kills our ability to imagine the past. This is the basis for all my thinking 
on this subject. This is consistent with what I said in my Anti-Exhibition of 
1963. In my “séance” I try to demonstrate how our past becomes a forgotten 
element, where feelings, photographic images, and likenesses we once felt 
close to lie scattered, together with clothes, faces, accidental things. Their 
“dead” state, however, is deceptive, as it only takes a slight shift for them to 
begin living in memory and interacting with the present. Images like these are 
                                                
450 Witold Gombrowicz, Ferdydurke, trans. Danuta Borchardt, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000 (particularly chapter four, “Preface to ‘The Child Runs Deep in Filidor’”); and 
Bruno Schulz, “The Old Age Pensioner”, in The Street of Crocodiles and Sanatorium Under 
the Sign of the Hourglass, trans. Celina Wieniewska, London: Picador, 1988.   
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not the by-product of boredom or middle-aged sentimentality; they bear 
witness to the urge to discover a full, rich life, the life of the past, present, and 
future.451 
 
This doubling of “likeness” (between the living and the dead) offers a specific 
instance of the general point made by Didier Plassard, introducing his study of the 
“actor in effigy” in the modern theatre (specifically in the avant-garde of the 1920s): 
“the play with effigies, as practised by the futurists, Dadaists, surrealists or the 
Bauhaus, thus redoubles the fiction, introduces on the stage the imitation of an 
imitation, a kind of simulacrum to the second degree.”452  
 
This unsettling of the mimetic relation supposed of the model-copy antinomy453 
reminds us that the fundamental theatrical question “of death” concerns the “likeness” 
between them, a relation between art and life for which “the actor” is a figure. It is the 
“live effigy”, the sense of the living actor seen in (or as) the image of its replica – in 
the “look” of its prosopon – that evokes the uncanny presence of “dissembling 
resemblance”. The mimetic is not “dramatic” here (it does not consist of the doubling 
or imitation of “action”, in the performance of a narrative art); rather the mimetic 
itself “acts” in the uncanny power of this doubling, or imitation, in the “person” (or 
image) of the actor (through the automatism that appears to animate its body, through 
its technique).  
 
In Kantor’s example, the question of human visibility – of theatre – occurs with 
death, in the appearance or “look” of the actor. To echo the terms of portraiture, this is 
a life “after” death, as its image. The metaphysical shock of seeing a human being “as 
if for the first time” returns the subject to the uncanny question “of” mimesis – in the 
figure of a “return of the dead”, the presence of an eidolon or double of the human 
being (which appears here as that of “the actor”).454 The iconography of the actor’s 
                                                
451 Tadeusz Kantor, “Dead Class, or a New Treatise on Mannequins”, in Krzysztof 
Miklaszewski, Encounters with Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, p.36. 
452 Didier Plassard, L’Acteur en effigie, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1992, pp.11-12. 
453 This antinomy was addressed by Vernant in part one of this chapter and, in terms that will 
re-appear in part four, are named, in his “rather unusual German”, by Conrad Fiedler Vorbild 
and Nachbild [Moshe Barasch, Theories of Art, vol.3, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p.128]. 
454 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny”, trans. Angela Richards, in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, p.370; and Kantor’s preparatory 
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body as image, or as symbolic form, concerns its appearance as an event, including 
Kantor’s prosopon, as “an act” (of autobiography) rather than a (descriptive) portrait. 
Kantor’s manifesto records his self-reflection, as a theatre artist-theorist, on the 
production of stage images (including the image of his own “presence”). His gesture 
on stage is not so much interpretative, as it enacts a form of address to those who are 
not (co-)present. It suggests that “desire to see ourselves dead” evoked by Blanchot 
(in the epigraph to chapter one), as the trace or figure of an autobiographical “after 
life”, and exposes the paradox of theatrical (co-)presence in “speaking” (as an art) of 
and to those who are not there – in a form of address to an audience who are 
nonetheless apostrophised as if present. This is the very condition of the work of 
theatrical art – that it is conditioned, not defined, by co-presence; that it “exists”, even 
as do the dead, for the living.  
 
3. Theatrically, I know of nothing more effective than the Elevation of the Host. When 
this appearance appears finally before us… – Jean Genet455 
 
Although Genet, as another key artist of the theatre of death, will be the subject of a 
subsequent study to this thesis, suffice it here to introduce some significant aspects of 
his comparative interest. In 1954, Genet wrote a “letter to the publisher” that would 
serve as an introduction to Jean-Jacques Pauvert’s single volume edition of two 
versions of The Maids. Rather than comment specifically on the play – or on the 
differences between the two versions of it that were being published together – Genet 
offers instead to “say a few words about theatre in general”, beginning with the 
remark: “I do not like it”.456 This commentary about “theatre in general” is distinct 
from his later commentary on “how to play The Maids” (published with the 1963 
republication by Marc Barbezat), which addresses quite specifically the stagecraft 
necessary (at least in Genet’s own view) for an effective performance.457 Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                                      
notes for the Dead Class production, translated by Kobialka in his collection Further On, 
Nothing (op cit.).  
455 Jean Genet, “Letter to Jean-Jacques Pauvert”, in Théâtre complet, Michel Corvin & Albert 
Dichy eds., Paris: Gallimard, 2002, p.817.  
456 Ibid., p.815. For an account of the various versions of the play text, see Corvin and Dichy, 
pp.1043-1060; summarised, pp.1080-81.  
457 It is noteworthy that publication of Frechtman’s English translations of Genet has largely 
kept his plays separate from his own reflections on their dramaturgy. While the more 
“theoretical” texts have been published separately in new translations by Charlotte Mandell 
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these later remarks – informed especially by having worked, in the meantime, with 
Roger Blin (a former collaborator of Artaud’s) on the first production of The Blacks458 
– remain infused with the vision already given in the Pauvert commentary.  
 
After his opening provocation in the letter, Genet immediately contrasts the “coarse 
format” of Western theatre with the “ceremonies” of Oriental theatre, a contrast that is 
made explicitly in terms of his experience – as a playwright – of (Western) actors. He 
writes, for example, of what he calls the “insolent stupidity of actors and theatre 
people”, “their triviality... [and] lack of culture”, and of their “choice of livelihood... 
motivated by [the] mistaken idea that the world is not demanding but easily 
pleased”.459 Of course, the majority of theatrical productions, working simply to the 
demands of professional practice, are not “demanding” in Genet’s sense. But his 
diatribe is not merely an excoriation of those who had, nevertheless, facilitated some 
degree of success (even of scandal) for The Maids – especially the celebrated actor 
(indeed, the “celebrity”) Louis Jouvet, whom Genet disparages by simply referring, 
without name, to “an actor who was famous in his day”.460 Jouvet, who had died a 
few years before, was also famous as a director and both versions of the play 
published by Pauvert had been instigated by him in preparation for the first 
production (in 1947), which he had directed. One version was a second draft of the 
original text, which had been promoted to him by Cocteau amongst others, which 
Genet preferred (and was subsequently performed in a second Paris production of the 
play by Tania Balachova in 1954); and the other version was the final performance 
script as used by Jouvet for the premiere.  
                                                                                                                                      
(Fragments of the Artwork, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), they are again 
presented as if without connection to the plays. (The volume does not include either of 
Genet’s articles “How to play The Blacks” or “How to play The Maids.”) The Grove Press 
1982 re-edition of The Maids and Deathwatch, for instance, still uses excerpts from Sartre’s 
essay on The Maids (from the appendices to Saint Genet) as an introduction, rather than either 
(or both) of Genet’s own notes on the play. Here again the publishing industry colludes with 
an academic or institutional division of knowledge (or “practice”), as between theatre artist 
and “theorist”.  
458 Genet’s experience with Blin was positive; without doubt his vision was also sharpened, 
however, by his negative experiences of working with both Peter Zadek on The Maids and 
Peter Brook on The Balcony.  
459 Corvin and Dichy, pp.815-16.  
460 Corvin and Dichy, p.816; for reviews of the production, pp.1070-1073; and Edmund 
White, Genet, London: Picador, 1994, p.352. Genet maintains the fiction of the play’s origin 
(thus writing out of account Cocteau’s role, for instance) in a later reference, in which he 
nonetheless restores Jouvet’s name: “Louis Jouvet was a famous actor in France in the late 
forties...” (A Prisoner of Love, trans. Barbara Bray, London: Picador, 1990, p.90).  
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Despite giving Genet a new platform – and even a pretext for Sartre to engineer his 
being awarded a new literary prize – the production was not received on Genet’s 
terms but Jouvet’s, as a curtain raiser to the Paris premiere of a play by the recently 
deceased, and very much established, Jean Giraudoux.461 To Genet’s distaste, the 
world of these performances’ “society” audience was typically read into that of the 
stage world of Madame and her maids in his play, as if intended to “reflect” it (with 
Madame’s dresses in the production produced by Lanvin, a society couturier), rather 
than re-imagining the “ritualistic and rhetorical possibilities” of either world.462 As is 
evident from his remarks about actors, for Genet “stage” and “society” were quite 
opposed. Indeed, in his later letters to Roger Blin (reflecting on his production of The 
Screens), Genet writes explicitly: “If we oppose life to the stage, it is because we have 
the feeling that the stage is a place adjoining death...”463 In common with the other 
theatre artists discussed here, Genet rejects the way in which critics’ presumptions 
(concerning motive, for instance) informed interpretation of his plays (as much as 
they did of his own persona). Furthermore, critics typically attempt to reduce a plot to 
its story – a relation that all of Genet’s work aims, rather, at making more complex. 
As Genet later writes, introducing George Jackson’s letters from prison (as he might 
equally have done his own): “Every authentic writer discovers not only a new style, 
but a narrative form that is his alone and that he tends to exhaust, drawing out all its 
effects for his own purposes...”464  
 
Genet’s diatribe against “actors and theatre people” (amongst whom perhaps he also 
intends his former patron, Jean Cocteau), as obscuring his “purposes” as a playwright, 
is significant not in terms of personalities, however, but for the particular terms in 
which it is expressed. These fundamentally oppose a theatre where “everything 
happens in the visible world and nowhere else”, and which “too exactly reflects the 
visible world”, to “a ceremonial play [that could be] exquisite... and close to 
invisibility”.465 It is this interplay between the visible and the invisible that informs 
                                                
461 Edmund White, Genet, London: Picador, 1994, p.346. 
462 Ibid., p.352 and p.351. 
463 Corvin and Dichy, p.846. 
464 Jean Genet, “Introduction to Soledad Brother” in The Declared Enemy, trans. Jeff Fort, ed. 
Albert Dichy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p.49. 
465 Corvin and Dichy, p.816 and p.818. 
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the values ascribed by Genet to the appearance of the actor, not least in regard to the 
possibility of a poetic (rather than a “realistic”) language for the stage (not only in its 
“dialogue”, but in its whole “verbal architecture”466). This alternative use of language 
was largely obscured in the early productions (and, indeed, is often ignored in 
performances even today). Rather than “exhibitionism” or “masquerade”, what Genet 
wanted to see in an actor was “a sign charged with signs”.467 
 
All of this appeal to a theatre guided by the “Orient” follows in the train of theatrical 
practices already advocated by many in Paris, from Jacques Copeau to Gaston Baty; 
and, as already discussed in chapter one, from Craig to Artaud.468 What makes 
Genet’s use of such thinking particular is its association for him with the dead, 
already in this transitional text, as he begins to define his own sense of theatrical 
practice, specifically with regard to the fundamental question of the actor’s presence 
or appearance. The issue is not then the appearance of this or that actor (whether or 
not “famous in his day”), but the terms in which this appearance is to be thought. 
While Genet repeats the standard reference (associated with, or “after”, Craig) to the 
marionette as a figure for such a concept of the actor,469 it is his reflections on the 
human figure modelled by Giacometti, while sitting for his own portrait, that gave 
Genet a new orientation in his own, unrealised project of a theatre of death.470  
 
At the heart of the 1954 manifesto letter (seeking to pre-empt any traditionally 
“theatrical” reading of his plays471), however, Genet evokes the Eucharist as a model 
for thinking about the relation between actor and audience; that is, in, and for, a 
theatre of the relation between the visible and the invisible.472 In the Eucharist rite, 
                                                
466 This phrase appears in Genet’s later text The Strange Word..., in Corvin and Dichy, p.883. 
467 Corvin and Dichy, p.816. 
468 The key texts of both are also included amongst the “five works” which encompass the 
history of theatre practice in Jean-Louis Barrault’s “reflections on the theatre”, published in 
1949 (and in an English translation by Barbara Wall, London: Rockliff, 1951, p.50). 
469 Corvin and Dichy, p.817. 
470 Of an anticipated cycle of seven plays in this project, only The Screens (itself originally 
entitled Death) was produced [White, op. cit., p.450]. 
471 Simply “reading the play,” he declares, “will convince” the reader of the playwright’s 
declared “dislike” of theatre (“in general”), p.815.   
472 See the epigraph to this section of the chapter. Corvin and Dichy remind us (in a note to 
the text) that Genet had served as a choir boy, close enough to the priest to hear the wafer 
snap in the mouths of those taking communion (n.6, p.1324, re p.817; also, n.8, p.1162). 
Edmund White quotes another chorister’s later observation of the then nine year old Genet: “I 
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something is shown which, as an “object” of worship, is not meant to be seen – the 
meaning of which is concealed in being revealed. The Host, as a sacrament, is neither 
an image nor an idol, but is the occasion for a theatre of “appearance” (of its 
monstrance).  
 
In their notes to this essay (in the Pléiade edition of Genet’s Théâtre complet), Michel 
Corvin and Albert Dichy propose that: “If Genet underlines the words ‘appearance 
appears’, it is doubtless to draw attention to the different sense of each of them, in a 
kind of oxymoron in which the first is given a negative value – it is just appearance – 
and the second a positive value: to appear is to be revealed, to be manifested.”473 
Rather than dividing neatly between noun and verb, however, this “oxymoron” 
perhaps oscillates (like the aesthetic “in theory”), maintaining an ambiguity between 
what would otherwise be simply identified with what it is not.  
 
While Genet is hardly concerned with the “real presence” of the Host (in a theological 
sense), the relation between presence and appearance – in the actions (the “service”) 
of both “actor” and “audience” – remains a question of a visible invisibility, of the 
invisible in the visible. It is not simply that the “visible appears” (as one would 
expect), but that the “invisible appears” (as a challenge to theatrical thinking, as 
concerns the actor especially). The Host (which, quite literally, appears to disappear) 
is perhaps “just” a wafer (as Genet writes, “a simple white wafer”); but it is also an 
emblem of appearance, of presentation – the Elevation – for an audience who do not 
see it, whose gaze is lowered, “since all heads are bowed”.474 The Host is not an 
immaterial or material presence theatrically (rather than theologically), but both 
simultaneously for all the participants.  
 
The make believe of this ritualised enactment is not that of an illusionistic theatre, 
then, but of a public complicity concerning an object’s appearance as “theatre”. Genet 
relates this “communion” to an anecdote of Sartre’s concerning a performance, in a 
                                                                                                                                      
can still hear his voice in church when he was a choirboy, reciting perfectly and with the 
greatest seriousness the Latin text” (Jean Cortet, in White, p.29). White also draws on Our 
Lady of the Flowers to evoke Genet’s impression of – and disillusionment with – the mass 
(which is also at play in Elle).  
473 Corvin and Dichy, p.1322. 
474 Corvin and Dichy, p.817. 
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prisoner of war camp, of “a French play put on by soldiers, mediocre actors”, 
“evoking some theme – revolt, captivity, courage? – and the distant Motherland was 
suddenly present not on the stage, but in the room.”475 It is this “theatre of shadows” 
in the room, rather than any nostalgic “Motherland” [la Patrie], that moves Genet in 
Sartre’s example476; and he goes on to offer an example of children’s make believe 
(after an allusion to what theatre could be for the Mau-Mau), as a basis for a theatre 
that, in contrast to the “celebrity” world of brightly lit “premieres” (pace Jouvet and 
Cocteau), he could be entranced by.477  
 
In the children’s game, as Genet evokes it, bodies are animated by what can be 
imagined. One need not stage the representation of “night”, if – with a word – one can 
simply “play” it. Moving by the rules of this “night” the children animate its darkened 
world – in broad daylight. As discussed in previous chapters, this relation between 
individual and environment (as that between image and event [Blanchot]) echoes that 
between animism and automatism. In his reflections on “the problem of locating a 
phenomenon in normal consciousness that corresponds structurally to the framework 
of [a] patient’s morbid world”, Eugène Minkowski proposes, concerning “lived 
space” and the distinction (or the lack thereof) between the “ego” or individual and 
“environment” or milieu, that: “Darkness is not the mere absence of light; there is 
something positive about it... Light space is eliminated by the materiality of objects, 
[while] darkness touches the individual directly, envelops him, penetrates him, and 
even passes through him...”478 In consequence, he suggests that “one could almost say 
that while the ego is permeable by darkness it is not permeable by light.”  
 
The consequences of this quite fantastic observation for thinking about theatre are 
manifold. Suffice it to note here that rather than holding up the lantern that would 
signify a Midsummer’s Moon (not to mention using the lighting apparatus of theatre 
in the electrical age) the whole body can play this night that pervades or “passes 
through” it, in whose image the invisible becomes visible (without being graspable). 
                                                
475 Corvin and Dichy, p.818. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid., pp.818-19. 
478 Eugène Minkowski, “Lived Time”, quoted in Roger Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychasthenia”, trans. John Shepley, in October 31, Winter 1984, p.30. [Minkowski, Lived 
Time, trans. Nancy Metzel, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.427.] 
 198 
Rather than “acting” at night-time (reacting to the elements of a representational 
scene), the body is animated by the very “image” of night in its own behaviour.479 The 
animation of the body evinces the very sign of “night” as the event of its performance 
(as theatre).  
 
Relevant to the relation between noun and verb (“appearance appears”), as a potential 
signification of “the actor appears”, Corvin and Dichy draw on Genet’s later text The 
Strange Word... to note that the value or meaning of being “on stage” for Genet is 
more than simply the representation of an absence, but the making it present: 
“presence, that of the actor, for an absence, that of these ‘active symbols’ which 
escape immediate apprehension.”480 This absence is present, not just signified; where 
theatre’s “double” is not the representation of what is present elsewhere, but the 
evocation of that “nothing” that is the truth of (its) representation – where theatre 
“adjoins death”. As a “cause” for speech this is at the heart of Genet’s “aesthetic 
ontology,”481 as it becomes explicitly thought of during the 1950s as addressing the 
dead. It is this that distinguishes what is otherwise simply the very definition of the 
theatrical – as, for instance, in Anne Ubersfeld’s use of the Freudian “negation” in the 
analysis of the theatrical sign482 – within culture more generally, as it concerns the 
“phantasms” (pace Agamben on Warburg) that appear “on stage” as the doubles of 
human appearance.  
 
4. If Photography seems to me closer to the Theatre, it is by way of a singular 
intermediary (and perhaps I am the only one who sees it): by way of Death. We know 
                                                
479 The other side of this capacity to play “at night” is the anxiety often associated with actual 
night-time (and not only for children). Indeed, Freud’s essay on “The Uncanny” concludes 
with a reminder that “concerning the factors of silence, solitude and darkness, we can only 
say that they are actually elements in the production of the infantile anxiety from which the 
majority of human beings have never become quite free” [in Pelican Freud Library vol.14, 
ed. Albert Dickson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, p.376]. This relation to the 
“darkness” of desire and theatre would be the subject of another study. Suffice it note that the 
key difference with the game is perhaps the sense of isolation in relation to an environment 
contrasted with its social sense of environment. (This is, indeed, Freud’s own observation 
concerning an instance of childhood fear of “the dark” [in “Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality”, trans. James Strachey, in Pelican Freud Library vol.7, ed. Angela Richards, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983, p.147].)  
480 Ibid., p.1323. 
481 Ibid., p.1324. 
482 Anne Ubersfeld, Reading Theatre, trans. Frank Collins, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999 (section 3.4 specifically). 
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the original relation of the theatre to the cult of the dead: the first actors separated 
themselves from the community by playing the role of the Dead: to make oneself up 
was to designate oneself as a body simultaneously living and dead: the whitened bust 
of the totemic theatre, the man with the painted face in the Chinese theatre, the rice-
paste make-up of the Indian Kathakali, the Japanese Noh mask… – Roland Barthes483 
 
Barthes is evidently not the “only one” for whom “the way of death” has been 
significant for thinking about theatre. If not the nominal subject of his essay, this 
“singular intermediary” (as “the way of death”) is clearly its principal interest, which, 
even if not always in theatre, has always been seen in the photograph. This is evoked 
in the “unconscious thought” of its history by Benjamin, for instance, when noting the 
“necessary” association of the cemetery with exposure time in the early portraiture of 
David Hill. The Greyfriars Cemetery in Edinburgh, Benjamin notes, provided a place 
for the “quiet concentration” of the sitter, where “the procedure itself caused the 
subject to focus his life in the moment rather than hurrying on past it…”484 Hill’s 
photographed subjects, Benjamin suggests, “were at home in the cemetery”.485  
Photography, indeed, offers its own question as to what is seen in death, as the 
inscription (or “transcription”) of death within vision – as the “look” of the other, of 
their countenance, as the “likeness” of a human being. Barthes too identifies this 
contemplation of the body’s “passage into immobility” in sitting for a photograph 
(albeit with a much condensed time of “exposure”) as: “...that very subtle moment 
when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is 
becoming an object: I then experience a micro-version of death (of parenthesis): I am 
truly becoming a specter.”486 The photograph, like the stage, makes this intimation of 
the spectral visible – an effect of the frontal mimetic encounter of the prosopon in its 
alterity.487 
                                                
483 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, London: Flamingo, 1984, p.31.  
484 Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography”, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley 
Shorter, Selected Works, vol.2.2, eds. Michael Jennings, et al., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2005, p.514. 
485 Ibid., p.512. 
486 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, London: Flamingo, 1984, p.13-
14. 
487 In two examples that would be returned to a subsequent study to this thesis, Derrida is 
caught on film improvising the same “spectral” reflections as Barthes, as he addresses the 
image of Pascale Ogier in Ken McMullen’s Ghost Dance; and this “scene” of contemplation 
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Before turning to a consideration of the photograph in Heidegger’s commentary on 
Kant’s Schematism (below) – as the very faculty of being able to imagine concepts at 
all (considered, specifically, in the image of the death mask) – it is important to note 
what it is that Barthes proposes about theatre in this much cited paragraph from his 
essay. Fundamentally, there is a focus here on the techniques of appearance, as those 
of a “separation” between actor and audience (or community); making visible a 
“barrier” between them through make-up, for instance, as this figures the relation 
between the living and the dead. It is conspicuous that Barthes’ examples are of non-
European theatre (without any echo of Hamlet, for instance), but it remains a question 
as to what kind of “theatre” is meant – after all, this “oriental” turn (as already 
discussed in chapter one) is that of an occidental tradition. To think a concept of “the 
theatre of death” – even in the sense of “the only one who sees it” – requires that one 
has already engaged with such precedents as Craig, where this is not the literary 
theatre (of ghostly characters and “haunted stages”), but precisely a theatre of death. 
How the look or appearance of the actor is “made up” (or masked) – as one amongst 
several significations of dissembling resemblance between audience and actor – is 
addressed by those European theatre artists (Genet, Kantor, Müller, Castellucci, Nadj) 
whose practices (none of which is “the only one”) may be comparatively studied 
under the title of “the theatre of death”.488 
 
“If Photography seems to me closer to the Theatre,” Barthes writes, then closer than 
what? The essay speaks of theatre at this point in relation to painting, as the 
production of an image from which photography is distinguished. This reference to 
visual art is usually ignored in theatre studies’ citations of this passage, perhaps 
because it addresses how notions of “realism” (or, indeed, of representation) are 
embedded in those of technique and medium (not to mention what it is that makes of 
photography, and by comparison theatre, an art). Indeed, the difference that 
photography makes to an understanding of mimesis (in painting and theatre) is 
present from the very beginning of discussion of the “new medium” in terms of 
                                                                                                                                      
is also evoked by Genet’s reflections, whilst “sitting” for him, on the look of the painter, 
Alberto Giacometti. 
488 It is worth noting here also that the focus on twentieth century European art theatre for 
elaborating this concept of theatre – oriented by the provenance of its title – should not be 
thought of as exclusive of other historical practices, to cite both Noh and Butoh, for instance.   
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aesthetics. Baudelaire, for instance, condemned photography as an “insult to both the 
divine art of painting and the sublime art of the actor,”489 while Craig too refused to 
accept this new art of visibility as any kind of model for theatre.490  
 
For Barthes, however, the contrast with painting brings out an association of theatre 
and photography, in the sense of a “here and now” (in relation to what is visible) that 
is nonetheless permeated with the “there and then” (a relation to what is invisible in 
the image). In this association of photography and theatre, an art of theatre is related 
to its “origins” (the “first actors”), where the thought of theatre and death is 
condensed into that of a “theatre of death”. As we have seen, this is true for both 
Kantor and Genet, with the separation of actors from the community, “by [their] 
playing the role of the dead”. Here “actors” stand in for the dead, rather than play the 
role of Death (as in the Mystery Plays, for example). This is not so much the 
description of an historically attested, modernist practice in relation to a mythical one 
(pace Craig’s invocation of ancient Indian temples), however, but the identification of 
a common cultural thought in addressing the mimetic work of art. Furthermore, the 
relation between the theatrical and the photographic is crucial for any consideration of 
theatre research, where the “material” of study poses a question of the relation 
between aesthetics and ontology (already touched on in the discussion of Adorno and 
Fischer-Lichte in the previous chapter).  
 
The relation of the medium to aesthetics – as a question concerning the ambiguity of a 
“likeness” of human being (as resemblance or dissemblance) – is significant, not least 
because Barthes’ discussion is a reflection on what it means to see a photograph, as a 
testimony to the “life” of the spectator (of their emotion) in relation to the present 
absence that is figured in and by its image. In contrast to the “frenzy to be lifelike” in 
both mainstream theatre and photography, for Barthes photography may be viewed as 
                                                
489 Charles Baudelaire, “The Salon of 1859”, in Selected Writings on Art and Artists, trans. 
P.E. Charvet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.295. 
490 Edward Gordon Craig, “The Actor and the Über-Marionette”, in On the Art of the Theatre, 
ed. Franc Chamberlain, London: Routledge, 2009, pp.30-31. A view of this ongoing debate in 
the 1930s is given by Benjamin, in his second “Letter from Paris”, championing Gisèle 
Freund’s study of photography in France in the nineteenth century, not least in relation to the 
arguments of the surrealist poet, Louis Aragon (Benjamin: “Letter from Paris (2): Painting 
and Photography”, trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings, vol.3, eds. Howard Eiland 
and Michael Jennings, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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“a kind of primitive theatre, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a figuration of the motionless 
and made-up face beneath which we see the dead.”491 This analogy concerns the 
conditions of and for seeing: how, indeed, does one see “the dead”? How and why 
does this analogy with the “primitive theatre” (pace Murray) address the experience 
of the photographed, as that of the technologies (including theatre) of human 
visibility?492 The photograph is not simply “of” the dead; it produces an image of the 
living as (if) dead – a possibility that then belongs to human appearance, as this was 
previously associated (according to Barthes) with theatre.  
 
In addressing the dead, Barthes’ essay is exemplary in evoking a personal “cult” of 
their image within modernity. The essay famously turns around an image – a votive 
image for Barthes’ own memory, kept “in front of me, on my work table... 
sanctified”493 – that falls under a private taboo against public exhibition.494 In an echo 
of animist belief, the medium of the image is itself emotionally identified with the 
figure, or person, of whom it is – in appearance – an image, whose look it “captures”, 
“takes”, or, as Heidegger writes, “transcribes” [eine Abschreibung].495 Here, 
fundamentally, we find a curious revaluation of the sense of an indexical “realism” – 
as, paradoxically, an image of the “after life”, in which the photograph (in the light of 
its look) has become a relic (in a private cult of memory). Like Benjamin, André 
Bazin relates this to surrealism, remarking that photography as “an hallucination is 
also a fact”.496 This is the very ambiguity, concerning the “material and psychical 
realities” (pace Freud) of actors and the dead, that was discussed in section one of this 
                                                
491 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, London: Flamingo, 1984, p.31-2. 
The example of the “tableau vivant” and the question of “medium” receives widespread 
discussion in the critical reception of James Coleman (which would also be the subject of 
subsequent study to this thesis).  
492 Artaud, by contrast, offers an extraordinary testimony of the face as “an empty force, the 
field of death” [“The Human Face”, in Watchfiends and Wrack Screams, trans. and ed. 
Clayton Eshleman, with Bernard Bador, Boston: Exact Change, 1995, p.277]. 
493 Roland Barthes, Mourning Diary, trans. Richard Howard, New York: Hill and Wang, 
2010, p. 220. 
494 “I cannot reproduce” it, Barthes writes; for the reader there would be in it “no wound”, 
Camera Lucida, p.73. As an essential register of the after-life of “an event lived as an image” 
(Blanchot), the figure of the wound is also invoked by both Genet and Barba, and touches 
upon the very condition of knowledge that this thesis addresses (pace Warburg).  
495 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p.66; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973, p.93.  
496 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”, in What is Cinema? vol.1, trans. 
Hugh Gray, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, p.16. 
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chapter. As concerns the place of the dead, Heidegger’s “example” of the photograph 
(below) relates, similarly, to the ancient Roman conception of the imago,497 as a 
materialisation of the “look” rather than its metaphorical evocation. With this 
question of mimetic technique we return to the fundamental issue of what is (or is not) 
“life like” in the appearance of the dead. 
 
Both Barthes and Heidegger write of the photograph in the light, so to speak, of an 
“impression” made or taken in the form of a death mask. This is explicit in 
Heidegger’s text (discussed below), albeit drawing from an unmentioned source (at 
least, as Jean-Luc Nancy proposes) – Ernst Benkard’s Das ewige Antlitz (loosely 
translated as “Undying Faces”), which “presents photographs of the death masks from 
the collection of the Schiller National Museum of Marbach.”498 In Barthes another 
such intertextual reference is implicit (at least, as Colin MacCabe proposes) – drawing 
on André Bazin’s “meditation on the relation between photography and death, 
particularly in relation to family portraits” in his 1945 essay on the ontology of the 
photographic image (reprinted in 1958 and 1975).499  
 
In a footnote to this essay, discussing the relation between painting and photography 
(in which what is at stake is the notion of “likeness”), Bazin writes: “There is room, 
nevertheless, for a study of the lesser plastic arts, the molding of death masks for 
example, which likewise involves a certain automatic process. One might consider 
photography in this sense as a molding, the taking of an impression, by the 
manipulation of light.”500 This minor history – of the “lesser plastic arts” – is the 
subject of Julius Schlosser’s study of wax portraiture (already referred to in chapter 
                                                
497 “The imago guarantees that the deceased will be present on earth after his funeral. This 
presence is real, and has nothing to do with the presence/ absence of images that merely 
resemble him... For the imago is, strictly speaking, neither the wax mask nor the wax of the 
mask, but, as we have seen, a form detached from the corpse and transmitted to the wax” 
(Florence Dupont, “The Emperor-God’s Other Body”, trans. Brian Masumi, in Michael Feher 
(ed.), Fragments for a History of the Human Body, pt.3, New York: Zone, 1989, pp.413-414). 
This relates, of course, to the discussion of wax works within popular cultural “survivals” in 
chapter two. 
498 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005, p.91. 
499 Colin MacCabe, “Barthes and Bazin: the Ontology of the Image”, in Writing the Image 
After Roland Barthes, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1997, p.75. 
500 André Bazin, op. cit., p.12. 
 204 
two), where we find this earlier form of Heidegger’s “transcription” in what Schlosser 
calls (with Vasari) “casting from nature”.501 In fact this notion goes back to testimony 
in Pliny, and offers precisely an example of what Lacoue-Labarthe identifies as a 
“typological” conception of mimesis, itself grounded in a metaphysics of the 
distinction between active and passive, form and matter.502 The relation of this history 
of “likeness”, or technique of mimesis, with theatre is explicit in the tradition of the 
ancient Roman funeral mime (discussed previously, and with Belting in chapter one), 
to which Genet also famously alludes.  
 
The relation of the face, or rather of its look or countenance, to the very concept of an 
image is given in the example with which Heidegger reads Kant’s Schematism; an 
example, which – as Jean-Luc Nancy notes – is “essential”, not least because it goes 
without any comment by the “thinker of ‘being-toward-death’”.503 To clarify “the 
Being of image [des Bildseins]” in “what Kant discusses under the heading of 
‘Schematism’”,504 Heidegger offers an account of the three temporal senses of the 
“image” [Anblick (Bild)]: as an impression of present [Bild], past [Nachbild], and 
future [Vorbild] possibilities of appearance.505 In this context, Heidegger writes of the 
transition from the first sense – of “what shows itself (‘this-here’)” – into the second, 
that: “the image is always an intuitable this-here, and for this reason every likeness 
[Abbild (“literally ‘image from’”] – for example, a photograph [Licht-bild (in 
Heidegger’s own note), literally a “light-image”506] – remains only a transcription 
[Abschreibung] of what shows itself immediately as ‘image’ [Bild]”507; that is, the 
                                                
501 Julius Schlosser, “History of Portraiture in Wax”, trans. James Loughridge, in Ephemeral 
Bodies: Wax Sculpture and the Human Figure, ed. Roberta Panzanelli, Los Angeles: Getty 
Research Institute, 2008, p.236. 
502 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Typography”, trans. Eduardo Cadava, in Lacoue-Labarthe 
Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p.126. 
503 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005, p.92.  
504 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p.65; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973, p.93. 
505 Ibid., p.65/ 92. 
506 This is in contrast to the more familiar Aufnahme; or, indeed, more simply Bild, for a 
photograph.  
507 Heidegger, op cit., p.65-6/ 93. 
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photograph offers an “after-image” [Nachbild (“‘copy’, literally ‘after-image’”)] of 
that which presents or shows itself in its image.508 
 
Barthes tells his reader that the so-called “winter garden” photograph (that he will not 
reproduce in his book) features his mother aged five, in the company of her brother 
aged seven. The image is found by Barthes, as it were, to belong to his memory; an 
image that pre-dates his own birth, but in which he sees something of his relationship 
with his mother’s look – or (in the vocabulary of Levinas) her countenance as it 
“shows itself in its image”.509 This photograph is inscribed in the essay as witness to 
the existence, for Barthes, of this look after her death; that is, to an enduring of their 
relationship, her look having been withdrawn from life, in already being given to 
death, as it were, by the photograph, even before his own birth as its witness. (This 
recalls the suggestion of Derrida’s, addressing the age of the photograph, that “we 
owe ourselves to death”.) This “look” then exists, although its subject is dead. The 
“look” does not belong only to its subject, but to the spectator; the after life of the 
seen is what animates the seer. There exists something in the art or technique of 
mimesis (to which the photograph testifies in its modernity) that is no more reducible 
to representation than is a cadaver (pace Blanchot’s “two versions of the imaginary”). 
Just as we imagine the fiction of Cordelia’s breath in Lear, we imagine Barthes’ sense 
of what is not “showable” (even if woundingly visible) in a photograph. With this 
“stillness” of the image, by which we are animated, moved, or touched, we might 
suggest that the proto-cinematic gesture is not so much the casting of a death mask (in 
Heidegger’s “transcription”), but the practice – when people died at home, and were 
visited there before burial – of stopping the clocks at the time of death. This relates to 
theatre, where “real time” and “event time” are identified in the experience of an 
audience, as a “time out of time”, from which we “return” to the everyday.  
 
Distinct from Barthes’ critical concern with the photograph as an anonymous medium 
of death (where, nonetheless, a particular instance touches the spectator to the 
                                                
508 Heidegger’s discussion here can be contrasted with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s remarks on 
“Plato as Portraitist” (trans. Jamey Findling and Snezhina Gabova, in Richard Palmer (ed.), 
The Gadamer Reader, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), on the nach/ vor-bild, 
specifically, p.311; and on photography, specifically, p.317.  
509 To relate this to the question of countenance, and “look”, in the Castellucci production 
discussed in chapter three would be for another occasion, addressing what remains “auratic” 
in the age of technological reproducibility. 
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quick),510 Heidegger’s “schematic” concern (as it were) with the photograph seems 
untouched by the thought of a “dead person”, with the paradoxical allusion to their 
death mask as an anonymous image. Where Barthes tries to capture something of the 
dead person’s presence in the “transcription” of absence that is “punctual” (or 
wounding), Heidegger adduces what is universal (for the schema is the very condition 
of thought abstracting from images). Photography is emblematic here (at least, within 
a certain “common sense”), as Bazin writes: “All the arts are based on the presence of 
man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence.”511  
 
Nonetheless, Heidegger’s account allows us to reflect on Barthes’ example of the 
Winter Garden photograph, as: “according to the meaning of the expression ‘image’ 
hitherto delimited, making-sensible means on the one hand the manner of immediate, 
empirical intuiting, but on the other hand it also means the manner of immediate 
contemplation of a likeness in which the look of a being presents itself” (that is, in 
which it endures, in its Nachbild; a “present” that inscribes absence)512 – thanks to 
which comparison (or “a world”) is possible. In its “after image”, the past discloses a 
present future. The past becomes visible in and as a present that it never was, a sense 
of being seen that Barthes calls a “theatre” of death.  
 
The further meaning of the image in its survival (as superstition), which Heidegger 
proceeds to address – in which it can show something (of human being) “in 
general”513 – is exactly what Barthes’ writing wishes to resist. In Kantor’s theatre of 
death productions (The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole) “a kind of tableaux 
vivant” gets staged, regarding the generic photograph of a school class, or a company 
of soldiers (from the First World War). It is on the basis of the image “in general” that 
the question of the look informs “the making-sensible of concepts”, the “look of [its] 
possible likenesses”, in Heidegger’s (modern) reading of the Kantian Schematism – a 
                                                
510 Barthes writes, for instance: “Contemporary with the withdrawal of rites, photography may 
correspond to the intrusion, in our modern society, of an asymbolic Death, outside of religion, 
outside of ritual...”, Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard, London: 
Flamingo, 1984, p.92. 
511 André Bazin, op cit., p.13. (This can be compared with both Maeterlinck and Obraztsov, 
reflecting on the puppet rather than the actor, in chapter one.)  
512 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p.66; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973, p.94. 
513 Martin Heidegger, ibid. 
 207 
process of which, however, there can be no “transcription” as such (“the concept is 
also essentially not capable of having its likeness taken” [der Begriff ist wesensmässig 
nicht abbildbar]514). It is in this aporia (of the photographic analogy) that the question 
of the theatre archive (and its study) re-appears. What is it that so appeals to be 
remembered in certain images of Kantor’s performances? What is their actors’ 
“likeness” [Abbild] to – for the concept of the theatre of death – as an event, albeit as 
“still-ed” (in their Nachbild)? As remarked (with Amelia Jones and Philip Auslander) 
in chapter one, this “theatre” – in its concept “of death” – can be theorised as it has 
been photographed; that is, theorised in the light of, or “after”, its image [Lichtbild].  
 
Jean-Luc Nancy offers various reflections on the example of Heidegger’s reading of 
Kant, drawing attention to his example of the death mask – “the Gesicht (face) of one 
without Sicht (sight), such is the exemplary image”515 – without however commenting 
on the very example of the “example”. What makes of something an example? What 
aspect of its “aspect” gives it to such use – in the “Morgue”, for example, where Rilke 
writes of those whose “eyes beneath their eyelids have averted/ their gaze from 
outwardness to that within”?516 How can a person be seen, for instance, not as or for 
themselves (a subject) but as either “dead” or as “an actor”, in or as the uncanny 
mimesis of their own appearance? Perhaps it goes too far to suggest an analogy 
between the Schematism and the stage (as Heidegger does between the Schematism 
and the exposure or “transcription” of the photograph), which would re-inscribe the 
analogies of this thesis into questions of an historical-philosophical critique.517 In its 
possible impossibility, however, this is something that the following chapter will 
explore with the theorisation of theatre by Kantor – not least in the very possibility of 
being able to conceive of this theatre in its “after image”, in the very possibility of its 
“example” as the study (or concept) of the “theatre of death”.518  
                                                
514 Ibid. 
515 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, op. cit., p.24. 
516 Rilke, “Morgue”, in Selected Works: Poetry, trans. J.B. Leishman, London: Hogarth Press, 
1980, p.166. 
517 How analogy operates in the method of critique that construes the necessity of the 
Schematism would be a topic for further study. 
518 Despite the scepticism concerning etymology in the previous chapter we might note that 
“schema” is a word used for mask (also signifying shade and phantom) in the middle ages – 
alongside the double sense of the Latin larva and masca, signifying both mask and ghost, 
where this pagan vocabulary is mediated for the Christian era by Augustine (Jean-Claude 
Schmitt, Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2001, pp.230-31). 
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The Theatre of Death: The Uncanny in Mimesis – Part Three 
 
Chapter 6: Tadeusz Kantor – An Avant-Garde of Death 
 
And this is how there began a ten-year era of two of my productions The Dead Class 
and Wielopole, Wielopole, which were to give testimony to the true nature of my 
heretical ideas. It was the era of my own avant-garde. The avant-garde of: the 
recollection of the past, memory, the invisible, emptiness and death.  
– Tadeusz Kantor519  
 
So far this thesis has addressed the “theatre of death” not so much in terms of an 
historically specific theatrical practice, as of a concept for comparative research 
within the history of theatre studies; or, more specifically, as a concept of and for a 
theoretical (or paradigmatic) iconography of human appearance – as that of an actor 
within this particular art practice. The mimetic figure of “the actor” has been 
addressed in anthropological-aesthetic terms as a “likeness” that refers to a model or 
paradigm – in this theatre specifically – of “death”. Examples of this figure, or 
paradigm, discussed so far have included Craig’s über-marionette and Artaud’s 
“animated hieroglyph” (in chapter one), and Genet’s “sign charged with signs” and 
Kantor’s “live effigy” (in chapter five). Rather than taking the title of the “theatre of 
death” as a single, composite whole, the thesis has considered how, both historically 
and theoretically, a concept “of death” distinguishes this concept of “theatre”. It has 
indicated a minor tradition of theatrical practice(s) within the larger field of European 
cultural history, in which a particular sense of the mimetic has been distinguished by 
the thought “of death”; for example, in terms of the photograph, discussed by both 
Heidegger and Barthes. 
 
The preceding chapters have considered the question as to how a mimesis of death (as 
an experience of the uncanny in and of human life) has been thought of theatrically 
(not least, as a question of theory), as a site where the dead make an appearance – not 
as ghostly characters belonging to the interpretative staging of literary drama (a 
metaphorical hauntology), but in the very figure of the actor, who represents the “life” 
of the stage specifically as opposed to that of the auditorium (a mimetic hauntology). 
                                                
519 Tadeusz Kantor, “A Classroom”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, ed. 
Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.228.  
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The actor (as paradigm or imago of human appearance in this theatre of death) is a 
figure for the concept of the opposition (as theatre) between “this world” (a material 
extension of the auditorium) and that of “another” (an aesthetic, indeed metaphysical, 
alternative to the auditorium). The space in between (participating equally in the 
similarity and difference of the terms in this opposition) is “itself” a philosophical or 
theoretical figure of and for mimesis, which Lacoue-Labarthe indicates by the 
paradox of the “undecidable ‘itself’”. This mimetic uncanny appears “between” the 
various theoretical oppositions that gloss theatrical practice (pace Barthes and 
Stengers), as between the rational and the superstitious, the sacred and the mundane, 
the fictional and the real. What lies between, theatrically, “is” – in and as its 
appearance – not simply an opposition, as between (either-or) appearance and being, 
but its unsettling, in the actor’s mode of existence (as an imago hominis) on stage.  
 
In this “theatre” (as Barthes observed), it is ultimately the metaphysical relation 
between the living and the dead, or the animate and the inanimate, which is figured by 
the actor’s appearance opposite an audience – as each appears both similar to, and yet 
distinct from, the other. Here the question of these paradigmatic oppositions is 
transformed through the analogies and aporia of a concept of theatre, as that “of 
death”. Borrowing a title of Warburg’s (alluding to Goethe520), the present chapter 
then addresses “the problem in between”, as it appears as a question of theatre in 
Kantor specifically – through his references to “barrier”, “closed work”, and 
“demarcation line” (also translated as “dividing line”), as well as his own “presence” 
on stage, which already presages the “death” of the Cricot 2, as the immanence of its 
future in the past. As proposed in the Introduction, the “theatre of death” is not the 
description of a past theatrical practice, but a research into the iconographic, 
mnemotechnical, material, and metaphysical possibilities of its concept. In the 
understanding of different artists – including Kantor – its meaning has always still to 
be produced (or invented) by, rather than derived from, its potential concept. It is this 
that gives the possibility of comparing these different artists’ practices, as if they were 
addressing each other.  
                                                
520 Aby Warburg, “The Problem in Between”, trans. David Britt, in The Renewal of Pagan 
Antiquity, Los Angeles: Getty Institute, 1999, pp.727-28. The German, however, speaks more 
literally of “the middle” – das Problem liegt in der Mitte – rather than “in between” 
[dazwischen]; ibid., p.777. 
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Part three of this thesis, therefore, offers further refractions of the concept, as it is 
evidenced in Kantor’s work specifically. Crucially, this approach maintains the 
tension between the implicit “completion” of this work (as if it were now in and of the 
past, available to analytical description) and its enduring challenge to historical 
thought – precisely to be thought, as a concept of theatre. Here the caution proposed 
in the Introduction – not to subsume the parts of the analogy offered in the thesis title 
into a single statement, but rather to maintain the incompleteness marked by the colon 
between its elements – concerns the “example” of what this concept might mean in, 
and for, an understanding of Kantor’s theatre. Themes that will recur in the following 
sections, as variations of its analogies and aporia, include: the “living” archive in the 
example of the Cricoteka; the theatrical instance or “presence” of actor, object, and 
photograph; the after life of these in relations between performance and exhibition; 
ideas of “demarcation” and “participation”; and, in place of a conclusion, Kantor’s 
image of “the return of Odysseus”.  
 
I. What is remembered of the Cricot 2 theatre practice – between actors, objects, and 
photographs? 
Given that it is the concept that allows for a reading of Kantor’s eponymous “theatre 
of death” manifesto, as distinct from this concept itself being read simply in terms of 
the manifesto (as though in an extended paraphrase), how does Kantor’s theatre 
practice allow us to think of this concept of “theatre” specifically, as a question of its 
art, in the image (or thought) “of death”? While “answers” to such a question may be 
sought primarily in The Dead Class (the production which the manifesto was written 
to accompany), much could also be learnt from the last Cricot 2 productions (I Shall 
Never Return and Today is my Birthday) – as these offer their own (theatrical) 
interpretation, by Kantor himself, of the precedent already proposed by (or, indeed, 
of) such a theatre of death.  
 
With respect to the posthumous performances of Today is my Birthday, as a testimony 
to Kantor’s “presence” without his being present (the company fulfilling 
commitments to the many co-producing venues), this question of understanding 
“death” in the theatre of the Cricot 2 has been historically contentious amongst those 
of its “representatives” still living. Here the example of essays by Guy Scarpetta have 
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provided a screen for questions about Kantor’s legacy between the members of the 
company and the custodians of its archive, the Cricoteka, such as Anna Halczak.521 
With these last productions, however, we have examples of how the avant-garde of 
Kantor’s theatre (of death) – in the 1970s – was remembered a decade later, in their 
theatrical after life, as part of the Cricot 2 company’s own performance history. They 
offer an example of the mnemotechnics, as it were, of the Cricot 2’s own pathos 
formulae, in (and of) performance, in contrast to the exhibition work to which the 
archive is dedicated. This (ongoing) tension – discussed with Klossowicz and Fischer-
Lichte in chapter four – is not the least of what makes Kantor’s “theatre of death” 
specific (in comparison with Genet and Müller, for instance), as it informs the very 
possibility of research into its potential concept.  
 
The transmitted pathos of the late performances is not that of the (literary) ghosts 
invoked, for instance, by North American scholars of the major theatre tradition, in 
which actors are thought of in terms of metaphors attributing “life” to fictional 
presence(s), to their roles or characters on stage.522 What returns in the Cricot 2, 
rather, is an embodied “repertory” of actor-characters, which (in Kantor’s terms) “are 
defined by the attributes of the place (a cloakroom, for example), or a specific idea 
(the idea of a journey, for example).”523 Starting with The Water Hen in 1967, this 
cast of “characters” is applied to, rather than derived from, Witkacy’s plays in the 
Cricot 2 performances. For example, amongst the “parade of characters” that Kantor 
reviews in his retrospective essay My Work – My Journey (1988) is “the Wandering 
Jew with the Trumpet of the Last Judgement wrapped in a black mournful 
                                                
521 This is touched on by Miklaszewski (in the “Postscript” to his Encounters with Tadeusz 
Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, pp.150-51): “This marked the first 
schism in the group, [between] the actors... [and] the ‘scholarly’ position associated with the 
Cricoteka...”; and is discussed by Scarpetta in the essays “Remous posthumes” and “L’autre 
scène” in his Kantor au présent, Arles: Actes Sud, 2000 (pp.185-203). 
522 One could chart an institutional history of this invocation (“after” Derrida’s “hauntology” 
of Marx’s spectres) in the mutual referencing of publications between such scholars as Blau, 
Carlson, Roach, and Raynor. It is worth noting that metaphors of the “natural” (the vital, the 
authentic, and the true) in expressive (distinct from “dead”, “lifeless”, or “artificial”) acting 
change their values historically – so that actors as opposed (by their partisans) as Garrick and 
Kean can both be lauded for their performances as living embodiments of the passions (as the 
terms by which these are described take on new, and even opposed, meanings). [See, for 
example, Nicoletta Caputo, “Performing the Passions”, in Assaph 24, 2010.]  
523 Tadeusz Kantor, “Cricot 2”, in Kobialka (ed. and trans.), Further On, Nothing, p.115. 
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emballage”524 – an emblematic figure of the “idea of journey” from The Water Hen 
production, which reappears in the 1979 production Where are the Snows of 
Yesteryear? 
 
Crucially, the “idea” of many of these actor-characters is that of the object which is 
their attribute, an object that has its own existence in and for an archive – the 
Cricoteka – as (in this case) of this pathos of “journey”. The object is the model 
“actor” of an idea (neither a puppet nor a living actor), that represents “itself” beyond 
any particular performance in which it makes an appearance. Although photographs 
are the principal vehicles for this pathos in its after life, the object itself retains its 
own “theatricality” (not necessarily associated with a human figure). The emballage 
of the Trumpet of the Last Judgement, for instance, reappears in Kantor’s “theatre 
without theatre”, not as a document (costume or prop) but as a “character” itself, 
another emblem of “the lowest rank”, which can still be seen by audiences in 
exhibitions – as, for instance, the 2011 Brussels show, The Power of Fantasy: Modern 
and Contemporary Art from Poland, which marked Poland’s first Presidency of the 
EU.525  
 
Another example of the after life of Kantor’s theatre in exhibitions can be seen with 
the school bench and pupil figure that Kantor made as part of The Classroom 
installation for the Présence Polonaise show at the Pompidou in 1983, and recently 
included, for instance, in the 30th Council of Europe Art Exhibition (albeit in a version 
that is on loan from a private, German collection, rather than the Cricoteka). The 
theme of this exhibition is “The Desire for Freedom: Art in Europe since 1945”, 
exploring the complex evidences of the “core values of the Enlightenment – freedom, 
equality, and human rights” in both “democracy and socialism” (where the “and” still 
                                                
524 Tadeusz Kantor, “My Work - My Journey”, in Further On, Nothing, trans. Michal 
Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p.20.  
525 The emballage appears in a photograph on p.14 of the catalogue of the exhibition 
(mentioned already in chapter two). The symbolic importance of this first EU Presidency, as a 
new turn in the “geo-political reality” of Polish history, cannot be underestimated. It also 
marks the end of the beginning of the post-1989 change of horizon for thinking through an 
understanding of Kantor’s work (discussed in the Introduction and returned to at the end of 
this chapter); a change not only in the distance from the history of Kantor’s own “life time”, 
but also as a change in the historical sense of that “life time” itself. As we move further away 
in time the sense that a “life” is the compass to understand an historical period (the “short 
twentieth century”) becomes less evident, as it passes out of generational memory. 
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implies an “or”). Kantor’s figure appears in the section, curated by Michail 
Schischkin, under the title of “Horrors and Darkness”, where it is suggested that the 
figure is connected not simply to memories of childhood, but “the dramas of the 
twentieth century” (with the rather paradoxical proposal that “death had stolen [the 
class’s] future”).526 
 
The “return” of various object-characters on stage in the Cricot 2 productions 
manifests the break made (beginning in The Dead Class) with the various anti-
dramaturgical strategies developed for working with Witkacy’s plays, from the 1961 
Little Country Manor production on. Although the material-spatial concept of this 
production had its own after life as The Wardrobe, the conception of the actor-
characters themselves (distinct from this “attribute of place”) was not yet as fully 
autonomous from the playwright as it would become. (The first Cricot 2 production, 
in 1956, with The Cuttlefish offers a different relation again between the visual and 
theatrical arts, mediated then by the participation of Maria Jarema and offering a 
“return” of an aesthetic seen in the Clandestine theatre.) Where Witkacy’s plays had 
offered a “pre-text” for performance (as in the “Zero theatre” and “Happening 
theatre” years), now – after 1975 – these autonomous “characters” (with their object-
attributes) became the work-“text” of the Cricot 2 theatre itself.  
 
In the case of The Dead Class, these characters were introduced by Kantor in the 
production’s programme (given their residual association with Witkacy’s play 
Tumour Brainiowicz527) with a “warning” that:  
 
And since all this is happening in a theatre, the actors of The Dead Class – 
loyally sticking by the rules of theatrical ritual – take on some roles from a 
play. However, they seem to attach little importance to them; their acting 
appears mechanical, borne onwards by little more than the momentum of 
general habit; we even get the impression that they ostentatiously refuse to 
                                                
526 Monika Flacke (ed.), Verführung Freiheit: Kunst in Europa seit 1945, Dresden: Sandstein 
Verlag, 2012, p.111.  
527 Stanislaw Witkiewicz, “Tumour Brainiowicz”, in Witkiewicz: Seven Plays, trans. and ed. 
Daniel Gerould, New York: Martin Segal Theatre Centre, 2004. 
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acknowledge the fact of role-playing and are simply repeating somebody 
else’s lines and imitating movements...528  
 
While the pre-existing, written element – as embodying the past in the present – 
would seem, from the point of view of traditional theatre, to offer an occasion for the 
Cricot 2’s early researches into the potentials of a theatrical art (informed also by 
Witkacy’s own aesthetic-theoretical writings), the company’s later researches play 
with their already existing plastic figures (or “characters”), as embodying the past in 
the present theatrically, rather than literarily or interpretatively. This also signals a 
shift in the actor’s paradigm in the after life of Kantor’s theatre of death – from its 
initial “avant-garde” productions of The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole to 
those of its own performance archive. As discussed in the Introduction, Kantor is at 
pains to remind the audience of the theatrical creation, rather than literary derivation, 
of the actors’ “characters” in the “dramatised séance”, adding to his Note in The Dead 
Class programme a warning against searching for textual sources (in Witkacy’s 
Tumour Brainiowicz) for the actors’ roles: “By trying to fill in the missing fragments 
[of Witkacy’s play text] to gain full ‘knowledge’ of the play’s plot [i.e. that of the 
production, The Dead Class], you would be displaying nothing but the unreasonable 
pedantry of a bibliophile. That would be the simplest way to destroy the all-important 
sphere of feeling.”529 
 
In Krzysztof Plesniarowicz’s analysis, the post-1975 period of the Cricot 2 
productions is characterised by a shift from the use of a literary-dramatic pre-text 
(from Witkacy) to a photographic pre-text (what Plesniarowicz calls “photographic 
plates of memory”). This elaborates Kantor’s “discovery” of, or research into, a 
“theatre of memory” – as he describes the 1985 production of Let the Artists Die – 
following the example of the “historical Daguerrotype” in The Dead Class. In an 
                                                
528 Tadeusz Kantor, “Characters in The Dead Class”, trans. Karol Jakubowicz, in Twentieth 
Century Polish Theatre, ed. Bohdan Drozdowski, London: Calder, 1979, p.137. (The heading 
“warnings” occurs in the programme notes, trans. M. Dabrowski, Krakow: Krzysztofory 
Gallery, 1975, n.p.) The relation of the characters to the literary elements in the production is 
discussed in Kantor’s “Director’s Notebook”, extracts from which are translated by Kobialka 
in Further On, Nothing (see, for example, Kantor’s “small digression and explanation”, 
pp.262-64).  
529 Tadeusz Kantor, “Characters in The Dead Class”, op. cit. This caution applies to the 
academic researcher too, of course (pace the discussion of “documents” and theatre history in 
chapter four).  
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interview with Kobialka, Kantor addresses this new stage in the Cricot 2’s dramaturgy 
(where this “photographic” memory material replaces a play text as a model for the 
actor-characters):  
 
[T]his change had nothing to do with a sentimental return to the past, nor was 
it triggered by the fact that I was getting old; I was interested in a formal and 
theoretical aspect of this phenomenon – in how our memory functions. Our 
memory does not create linear plots but le cliché [French for a photograph 
negative]. These negatives are taken out of memory in an accidental way. 
They are mixed together; figures are transparent and one can be seen through 
another. Let the Artists Die is an example of this process. The Owner of a 
Cemetery becomes the Dish Washer...530  
 
As Plesniarowicz highlights, this marks a fundamental shift in thinking through the 
theatrical relation between fiction and reality in Kantor’s work, as concerns the 
model, or paradigm, of and for the actor. For Plesniarowicz, the photograph is 
emblematic (both materially and metaphysically) of the form (dramaturgically and 
scenographically) that the existence of the dead takes, theatrically, after 1975.531 
Whilst similar concerns have been discussed in this thesis with respect to the 
photographic (with Barthes, for instance, in chapter five), the focus here is rather on 
the mimetic model or paradigm of the actors’ image, in relation to which the question 
of the theatre of death is to be developed as that of its archive, in the concept of which 
the photograph provides an instance but not the source.532 
                                                
530 “Let the Artists Die? An interview with Tadeusz Kantor,” with (and translated by) Michal 
Kobialka, TDR 30.3, Fall 1986, p.180. The “historical Daguerrotype” in The Dead Class is 
discussed by Kantor in his “Director’s Notebook”, translated by Kobialka, in Further On, 
Nothing, op. cit., pp.259-60. (The photograph as a key to Let the Artists Die is elaborated also 
by Kobialka, with reference to Kantor’s production notes, in Further On, Nothing, pp.303-
305.) 
531 All this bears upon the emotion-experiment relation discussed in the Introduction. 
(Plesniarowicz also makes an association with Boltanski, as well as the inevitable connection 
with Barthes.) 
532 A comparative example in terms of both Plesniarowicz’s and Bablet’s analyses could be 
made with the use of an historical school photograph from Jedwabne in the 1930s by Tadeusz 
Slobodzianek in preparing his play Our Class (although its organisation of the relation 
between past and present is completely different to that of the Cricot 2 productions). The 
photograph is reproduced on the centre pages of the National Theatre programme, for the 
world premiere production of the play in London, and is discussed (as also the associations 
with The Dead Class) by Teresa Murjas, “‘I suggest a Night at the Theatre, Mr. Cameron’: 
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The relevance of photography to the later stages of the Cricot 2 work is also discussed 
in an essay by Denis Bablet, who notes that although Kantor did not himself use it as 
a medium for his creative work, photography is acknowledged in his theatre as a 
“living [or vital] element of our mythology of death”.533 As Bablet remarks, the aspect 
of the photographic that is recalled is not the instantaneous capture of an image (the 
characteristic “snap” of the twentieth century), but the long exposure and the pose 
characteristic of the nineteenth century.534 This modern pathos formula – of being 
subject to time, in a technology producing a new human attitude or “look”535 – is 
manifested not simply in individual portraits (as they become generic in a mass 
medium), but in social rituals of the photographic (Studio) image. The photograph 
frames forms of social relation (as a group portrait) in the class photo or the photo of a 
company of soldiers, for instance. In the early twentieth century, this commemorative 
framing of social relations also includes the specifically theatrical “cliché” of the 
author reading aloud his play to the assembled cast.  
 
In these tableaux, the memory of an individual is abstracted into a generic image (of 
“the lowest rank”) taken by an anonymous photographer (distinct from the named 
images of the Nadar studio, or of August Sander’s portraits, to which Barthes and 
Benjamin devote their reflections). These photographs already constitute their own 
categorisation, as a ready-made (archivable) framing of “life”, which also 
characterises modern industries of mass “death”. (The military unit is subject to the 
same logistical identification as its replaceable matériel. Indeed, the relation between 
the technical capture of the group photograph and the machine gun is one of the most 
                                                                                                                                      
Memory, History and Responsibility in Our Class,” in Contemporary Theatre Review, 21.4 
(2011); and by Bryce Lease, “Ethnic Identity and Anti-Semitism: Tadeusz Slobodzianek 
Stages the Polish Taboo”, in TDR, 56.2, Summer 2012. The Slobodzianek text (in a version 
by Ryan Craig from a literal translation by Catherine Grosvenor) is published by Oberon 
Books, 2009.  
533 Denis Bablet, “Kantor and Photography”, in “Tadeusz Kantor 2”, Les Voies de la Création 
Théâtrale 18, Paris: CRNS Éditions, 2005, p.263. 
534 Ibid., p.264. This could also be compared with Rosalind Krauss’ discussion of the 
emergence of photography as a “theoretical” rather than “historical” object between two 
essays of Benjamin’s (1931 and 1936), reiterating the modernist question of the medium 
discussed with Bazin and Barthes at the end of chapter five (Krauss, “Reinventing the 
Medium” in Critical Inquiry, vol.25, n.2, Winter 1999, p.291).   
535 Such a human image (or “portrait”) is “new” in the sense of its medium, at least, with its 
distinct means of (re)production and dissemination culturally. 
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striking images of Kantor’s theatre of death productions.536) The image in which these 
individuals appear exists without them, even as they are its ostensible subject. In 
modernity, then, the question of a “likeness” arises in the very production of an image 
“of” death. This “likeness” is not made “after the life” – as formerly with the death 
mask – but is taken serially (or, as it were, “shot”) during a person’s lifetime (which is 
thereby divided into temporal frames).  
 
Crucially, these questions concern the medium in which the image of the theatre of 
death is transmitted – the image of the living actor’s appearance, in and for its concept 
– as it offers an allegory for the aesthetic claims of the archive (between performance 
and exhibition), which also introduces questions of “authorship”.537 These inform 
theatre research (in theory, at least, if rarely in practice) concerning its “objects” of 
study. In a project entitled “The Author”, Konrad Pustola, for example, presents a 
question concerning the very claim of this title in the reproduction of three “versions” 
of ostensibly the same photograph, “documenting” Kantor’s 1967 Panoramic Sea 
Happening.538 The three examples of this iconic image – a photograph taken by 
Eustachy Kossakowski – include the different captions by which each previously 
published instance identifies “the work”, and thereby attributes authorship.539 In the 
first instance, this is: “Tadeusz Kantor, Panoramic Sea Happening, beach at Osieski, 
1967”; in the third, it is: “Eustachy Kossakowski – Sea Concert (Panoramic Sea 
Happening by Tadeusz Kantor), 1967”; while in the second, the caption is written 
over the base of the image (rather than below it, outside of its frame): “Eustachy 
Kossakowski/ Edward Krasinski in the Panoramic Sea Happening by Tadeusz 
                                                
536 Friedrich Kittler notes that Samuel Colt – of “the revolver that is now named after him” 
fame – was a technical forerunner of the cinema (of “shooting” a film), in his lectures on 
Optical Media (trans. Anthony Enns, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, pp.145-46). The 
application of seriality in capturing stills (“taking stills”, as one might a life) is discussed in 
chapter one of Siegfried Zielinski, Audiovisions (trans. Gloria Custance, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1999), with the examples of a “photographic shotgun” model of 
1884 and a “photorevolver” model of 1892.  
537 We might recall this being volubly pronounced at the Paris conference cited by 
Klossowicz, in chapter four, with Kantor’s particular intonation: Mon théâtre est imorrrrtel! 
538 Konrad Pustola, “The Author”, in Piktogram, n.5/6, 2006, pp.10-13. 
539 This image is the iconic survival of the event, in contrast, for example, to other 
photographs taken by Jozef Piatkowski [reproduced in Stegmann (ed.), Fluxus East, p.28]. 
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Kantor/ Poland 1967.” This is then followed by a copyright mark, attributing the 
reproduction to “Nouvelles Images S.A. and Eustachy Kossakowski, 2000”.540  
 
Kossakowski’s name (to cite only his example) in fact belongs to an understanding of 
“Kantor’s theatre” (especially the Happenings) in its after life, at least up until 1970, 
when he emigrated to Paris, together with Anna Ptaszkowska, one of the founders of 
the Foksal gallery. The break up of the Foksal triumvirate (Mariusz Tchorek 
emigrated to England at the same time) was in no small part affected by Kantor’s 
denunciation of “participation” in relation to a space representing artists, challenging 
the curators’ own questioning of the “theory of place” with which they had begun.541 
Discussing Kossakowski, in relation to an exhibition in Warsaw in 2008-09, Adam 
Mazur notes: “The fact that the exhibition presents Kossakowski’s photographs of 
Kantor’s performance seems to emphasise the figure of Kantor more than that of 
Kossakowski, who would probably have made a different selection for his own 
exhibition.”542  
The question of the archive in choosing what images represent whose work is 
fundamental to the possibility of any such research project as the present one. Even 
taking account only of Kossakowski’s “Kantor” images, amongst a body of work that 
gives him a place in the history of post-war Polish art in his “own right”, opens the 
question of how such photographic “collaborations” are themselves part of what 
constitutes that very history of art. As Mazur writes:  
Is it not possible that Kossakowski’s documentation made Kantor’s work a 
work of art? And further still, how would Galeria Foksal’s archives and 
                                                
540 This demonstration may be compared with Adam Mazur’s narrative account of this same 
image: “The Happening was Kantor’s, the photos Kossakowski’s, while the sea is conducted 
by Krasinski in tails. One photograph and three artists entwined in an artistic embrace. The 
photo is so captivating that it turns up in the most surprising places – for example, on a bag of 
crisps. Kantor, the ‘elite artist’, could surely never have imagined such popularity. Most 
likely, he would never have aspired to it either. After all, Kantor is no Andy Warhol.” (Adam 
Mazur, Who is the Creator?, lecture at Warsaw Musuem of Modern Art, 2009, accessed on 
the Kossakowski website [http://www.eustache-kossakowski.com/bulletin01_uk.html], no 
page numbers.)  
541 This is the subject of an article by Pawel Polit in Artmargins, “Warsaw’s Foksal Gallery 
1966-1972: Between Place and Archive” [available on their website: www.artmargins.com] 
to which we will return.  
542 Mazur, op. cit.  
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history look if it had not been for Kossakowski’s photos? To what degree have 
these iconic pictures shaped our perception of the events so crucial to Polish 
art? Did they not contribute to the mythologisation of the latter half of the 
1960s and of the circles so deftly photographed by Kossakowski?543 
 
And yet, like Craig (and Baudelaire) before him, Kantor discounted any possibility 
that photography could have a status comparable to his own performance art, despite 
its iconic after life in this medium.   
 
II. What particular conditions of production of the Cricot 2 are remembered in 
exhibitions? 
Under the title of Art and Memory, an exhibition devoted to Kantor at the 2003 
Prague Quadrennial was introduced by Lech Stangret, on behalf of the Cricoteka, 
with the observation that: “Every Tadeusz Kantor exhibition is simultaneously a new 
attempt at establishing the principles to showcase a multi-layered, multi-faceted 
oeuvre.”544 For the purposes of the particular exhibition, however, Stangret cites only 
two fields (familiar from Klossowicz’s proposal, in chapter four) in which Kantor’s 
“genius was most apparent: theatre and painting.”545 This reduction of the “multi-
faceted” to two aspects, separated by location – with “the emphasis on fine art” at the 
Czech Museum of Fine Arts and “the focus on theatre” at the Strahov Monastery – 
was familiar even in Kantor’s lifetime, to note only the 1976 visit of the Cricot 2 to 
the Riverside Studios and the simultaneous “Emballage” exhibition to the 
Whitechapel.546  
 
More intriguing than this demarcation of creative “disciplines” identified with and by 
their “products” (painting or performance) are the Cricoteka exhibitions where the 
audience has to engage with what the difference between these might be – as part of 
                                                
543 Ibid. 
544 Lech Stangret in Tadeusz Kantor: Art and Memory, Prague: Czech Museum of Fine Arts, 
2003, p.4.  
545 Ibid.  
546 Nicholas Serota, “Tadeusz Kantor at the Whitechapel”, in Tadeusz Kantor: Interior of 
Imagination, Jaroslaw Suchan and Marek Swica, eds., Warsaw: Zacheta National Gallery of 
Art, 2005; and Nicholas Serota, “Emballages at the Whitechapel”, in Kantor Was Here, 
Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius and Natalia Zarzecka, eds., London: Black Dog Publishing, 
2011. 
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the “after life” of the Cricot 2. What is interesting here is how the curators of these 
exhibitions raise rather different questions to those posed by academic scholars of 
theatre studies. Nonetheless, it seems that Kantor, as a theorist, is typically displaced 
by curators and critics – who nonetheless continue to cite his writings, as if thereby 
“transparently” (re)presenting his work historically; as if the artist-theorist had simply 
offered them literal descriptions of the past of the Cricot 2 theatre, distinct from 
conceptually oriented (and thus critical) varieties of its (re)construction.  
 
Here we enter upon a paradox of Kantor’s insistence on the “living archive” – a term 
used by the curators of the Foksal Gallery in 1971547 – in terms of the particular 
history of the “theatre of death”, and its appeal to the “avant-garde” in Kantor’s 
denunciation of “participation” at the Foksal Gallery in 1969. The various objects, 
documents, and videos of the Cricoteka are to be present(ed) (or curated) as the past; 
they are no longer “material” and certainly not to be re-used. The Cricoteka represents 
an authorship – this is what is exhibited – even where this is surrogated by a curator, 
composing accompanying labels, or by a television director, such as Andrzej Sapija. It 
is for sure that the particular edit of a video seen during Kantor’s lifetime is not open 
to re-doing, whether by one of the Cricot 2 actors or by another artist, who was 
perhaps not even born when Kantor died.  
 
But perhaps this is not the real question concerning the “matter” of theatre memory. 
To use the terms with which Barthes addresses “knowledge” of the photograph, the 
real question concerns what cannot be reduced to the studium of authorship; that is, 
the punctum of an encounter. What is the metaphysical shock transmitted still by 
certain photographs of Kantor’s performances? Barthes’ questions of methodology 
apply in theatre studies – where the issue concerns what testimony to theatre is being 
offered. What thought of theatre is being (re)produced in the work of its 
historicisation? How does the “living archive” resist the sense of “death” associated 
with cultural memory, where (in Luiza Nader’s reflections on Zofia Kulik’s archive):  
 
As Derrida argues, the archive’s driving force is the drive of death, which not 
only leads to the annihilation of memory (understood both as remembering, 
                                                
547 Wieslaw Borowski and Andrzej Turowski, “The Living Archives”, in October, vol.38, 
Autumn 1986, pp.61-62.  
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memorising, as well as recollecting) but also to a radical deletion of all that 
cannot be incorporated in the memory. However, it would be impossible to 
construct an archive without the death drive, or desire in other words. Archive 
is an aporetic structure: it always works against itself.548 
 
The question of the archive – as it had been proposed by Kantor in the late 1970s – 
contrasts with the biographical claims made, for instance, by Jan Kott and Guy 
Scarpetta for what could be thought of as “living” in the theatre of death (as 
testaments from those who knew him personally). While these claims attest to the 
very question “of death”, or of the dead, in the Cricot 2, they do so in respect of 
Kantor’s life (as a surrogate for the critic’s own), rather than to the theorisation of his 
work (as already constituting an “archive” of its concepts). At the time of Kantor’s 
death, Kott repeats an image from his earlier evocation of The Dead Class, as if 
denying (in the Freudian sense) the very situation that he is addressing by 
apostrophising Kantor as a theatrical Charon-figure who “always returns” because 
(paradoxically) he never disappeared, being “always present on stage from beginning 
to end in all his performances”.549 This “always” – with its undifferentiated claims 
about Kantor’s role on stage – is, in a critical sense, false; it testifies more to the 
thought of theatre and death for a critic such as Kott, than that of death in Kantor’s 
theatre. 
  
As with Guy Scarpetta’s appeal to Lazarus,550 Kott’s Charon figure serves as a 
reminder to be wary of resonant analogies for what remains a specific aesthetic 
practice, including a specific archival project. Kantor’s own appearance(s) on stage 
offer more than simply an occasion for critics to apply classical metaphors of memory 
reviving the dead. They are to be compared rather with the appearances of the other 
Cricot 2 “characters”, objects, or emballages – including Kantor’s own classical 
figuration of Odysseus, to which we will return at the end. With these roles, the Cricot 
2 – in contrast to the major theatre traditions – created its own repertoire of stage 
                                                
548 Luiza Nader, “What do Archives Forget?”, trans. Ewa Kanigowska-Gedroyc, in Christine 
Macel and Natasa Petresin-Bachelez (eds.), Promises of the Past, Pompidou Centre, 
exhibition catalogue, Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2010, p.224. 
549 Jan Kott, “Kantor, Memory, Memoire”, translated by Jadwiga Kosicka, in NTQ, No. 28, 
November 1991, p.302 and p.301. 
550 Guy Scarpetta, “Un art lazaréen”, in Kantor au présent, Arles: Actes Sud, 2000, pp.203-
210. 
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figures. Indeed, as the theatrical project of the Krakow Group Artists’ Association, its 
conditions of production – informing its “repertory” – fundamentally distinguished 
the Cricot 2 from other theatre companies.  
 
This relation between an artists’ association and theatre research not only repeats that 
of the pre-war Cricot company and the first Krakow Group of artists (1933-39), but 
also that between the clandestine Young Artists Group and the Independent Theatre 
company during the Occupation, both of which had Kantor at their heart.551 As 
August Grodzicki noted, in his 1979 “official” survey of “Polish Theatre Directors”: 
 
The Cricot 2 Theatre has always been unlike any other theatre, not only in the 
artistic sense, but, in Poland, also in the way it has been organised. It is not an 
institution, nor is it a part of the general system of state-supported theatres. 
Kantor once said, “When I have an idea, I simply work it out.” He works it out 
with a group of actors and painters on irregular and rare occasions at the 
Krzysztofory Cellar in Krakow. Then he travels with his productions or 
séances around the world. He is an independent artist who has fully retained 
the right to his own vision and views of the world.552 
 
With the Cricot 2 researches, the fictional (or the illusionary) is no more subordinated 
to the theatrical than the reverse (as is usually the case, and is also still the implied 
                                                
551 The “Young Artists Group” continued after the War, and Kantor organised exhibitions for 
the Group in 1945 and 1946. The original Cricot theatre company was founded in 1933 by 
Jozef Jarema, Wladislaw Dobrowolski, and Anatol Stern. Miklaszewski cites Jozef Jarema on 
the aims of the original company: “The Cricot group was founded on the initiative of painters: 
which is to say that the specific expressive form of the Cricot’s theatricality is the powerful 
element of plastic art in the staging... The action on stage is apprehended above all visually. 
The eye is the main agent of our perception of theatricality.” There was an unsuccessful 
attempt immediately after the war to revive the Cricot, with a production in 1945 of Tytus 
Czyzewski’s play The Death of a Faun, directed by Dobrowolski, with designs by Kantor (the 
play having been first performed by the Cricot in 1934). [Grupa Krakowska, exhibition 
catalogue, with an essay “Avant-garde tradition and Traditional Avant-garde” by Hanna 
Wroblewska, trans. Pawel Skalinski, Warsaw: Zacheta Gallery, 1996, p.72 and p.145; and 
Miklaszewski, op. cit., p.1 & p.5; and Daniel Gerould, “Tadeusz Kantor”, in PAJ, 4.3, 1980, 
p.29.]  
552 August Grodzicki, “Tadeusz Kantor”, in Polish Theatre Directors, trans. Lucyna 
Tomaszewska, Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1979, p.124. In a text about the Cricot 2, 
Kantor writes that: “The need to put a production together is dictated by an urgency to 
express an idea, which is processed for a long time, then slowly matures, and, finally, 
demands and is ready to be materialised...” (“Cricot 2 Theatre”, trans. Kobialka, in Further 
on, Nothing, op. cit., pp.110-111.)  
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demand of Witkacy’s own use of stage directions). In the juxtaposition of these 
different “realities” – the fictional and the theatrical, the pre-existing and the present – 
the autonomy of an art that is not simply identified with either its literary or its 
performance medium becomes manifest in (and as) the “signature” work of the Cricot 
2. As Kantor describes this: 
 
In the 1950s, when the emergence of the phenomenal texts of the avant-garde 
artists was equated with the emergence of a new theatre, Cricot 2 Theatre put 
forth the idea of the avant-garde theatre, which was not circumscribed by the 
staging of the avant-garde literature (usually this was done with the help of 
traditional stage means). The possibility of resurrecting the avant-garde, Cricot 
2 Theatre practiced in a purely theatrical domain, in separating the theatrical 
work of art (a production) from its slavish representation of a literary text. In a 
theatre practice this signified a rejection of a method of “illustrating”, 
reporting, representing the plot of the play through a stage action, and a need 
to employ a new method. This new method is the process of creating parallel 
tracks which do not illustrate, explain, or interpret each other, but 
“correspond” to one another through pointed dynamic tensions.553  
 
As an example of this, it is revealing to contrast Kantor’s 1963 production “of” 
Witkacy’s play The Madman and the Nun (addressing the playwright’s suggestion of 
“showing... a madman’s brain on stage”554) with the earlier production by Wanda 
Laskowska, designed by Jozef Szjana, in 1959. In Daniel Gerould’s account, 
Laskowska’s production, at the Teatr Dramatyczny in Warsaw, was “the first of 
Witkacy’s plays to reach the professional stage in Poland after the Second World War 
and the period of enforced socialist realism.”555 (The implication here that, within the 
record of official theatre history, the Cricot 2’s The Cuttlefish in 1956 was, as a purely 
“artistic” production, “unprofessional” might well have appealed to Kantor.)  
 
                                                
553 Tadeusz Kantor, “Cricot 2 Theatre”, trans. Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, op. cit., 
p.114. 
554 Witkiewicz, “Theatre: An Introduction to Pure Form”, trans. Daniel Gerould, in The 
Madman and the Nun, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968, p.295. 
555 Daniel Gerould, Witkacy, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981, p.213. 
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The centrepiece, literally, of Kantor’s production was what he called the Annihilating 
Machine – an animated (or, rather, automated) ‘sculpture’ of folding (readymade) 
wooden chairs, piled on top of each other. Once set in motion – heaving up and down, 
expanding and contracting, with a loud clatter – the machine negated the actors’ 
embodied expressivity through its repetitive, mechanical action. In an anticipation of 
Kantor’s own subsequent role on stage, the object prevented an audience envisioning 
the play’s fiction of time and place through any scenic ‘illusion’. Under the concept of 
“zero theatre” – negating the standard interpretative hierarchy of theatrical means – 
Kantor’s ‘mechanical’ dramaturgy adopted the resources of the readymade.  
 
While Kantor’s Annihilating Machine is described as supporting, or indeed imposing, 
the ‘non-acting’ of the performers, we might be tempted to read this apparatus 
symbolically in terms of the situation (“an insane asylum”) that the play describes. It 
is instructive, therefore, to compare Kantor’s scenario – a ‘non-design’, in traditional 
terms, like the ‘non-acting’ it intends – with that of his contemporary, Józef Szajna. 
From photographs of this production, we can see that while the setting and the actors 
appear highly stylised, the frame remains that of playing ‘on a stage’ – with all its 
‘given’ formalisations of background and foreground – complete with appropriate 
scenic objects, such as the bed and the clock that are referenced in the play text (albeit 
both appearing monstrously out of human scale). In addition, there are strange 
sculptural objects, suggestive of the metaphysical and poetic aspirations of which the 
play speaks, and the Guignol conventions for showing the violent interplay between 
these aspirations and confinement in an insane asylum – the play’s principal theme – 
are clearly present. For all its creative sensitivity to Witkacy’s dramaturgy, however, 
both the design and the actors’ work remain bound to the dissembling reality of “the 
stage”. Kantor’s machine, by contrast, starts with this as the very reality to be 
challenged (negated or reduced to zero), not only spatially, but also dynamically with 
the machine’s repetitive action, contrasting the actors’ expressivity with an effect of 
mechanical ‘meaninglessness’.556 
 
                                                
556 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Zero Theatre”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey Through Other 
Spaces, p.69.  
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Unlike Szajna’s design concept, the ‘zero theatre’ resists reading the stage, in the 
image of the play’s protagonist, as an interpretation of the mutual violence between 
repression and liberation.557 The Annhilating Machine might appear, then, to serve for 
any text, or at least for any instance of a ‘zero theatre’ production. But Kantor’s stage 
machines, with rare exceptions, were only ever used in conjunction with specific texts 
(which, then, allows for their ‘quotation’ in the later Cricot 2 production I Shall Never 
Return). That the Annihilating Machine is not used in any other production but 
appears rather as an object in Kantor’s subsequent project, the ‘Anti-Exhibition’ (held 
in November of the same year, also at the Krzysztofory Gallery), suggests that it 
models questions of performance as posed by the particular production rather than by 
the play. It presents the theatrical object as itself a work of art; not, then, an ‘artefact’ 
(a scenographic scale model) documenting the interpretation of a stage space derived 
from literature, but a model that ‘annexes’ the reality of a performance, even for that 
of an exhibition and thereby for a new audience.  
 
Reflecting on ‘the work of art and the process’, Kantor speaks of this exhibition in 
terms of an ambition to resist the presentation of ‘finished’ or ‘completed’ works. 
Preferring to speak of a ‘junk room’ collection of what remains of the working 
process, Kantor presents the ‘scraps’ or ‘remnants’ that would ordinarily be excluded 
by the ‘professional’ standards of an exhibition (in 1963). “The germ of my concept 
was to reject the idea of a complete and finished work of art, to discard the feeling of 
satisfaction derived from the denouement, and to focus on attempts and nothing but 
attempts!”558 Here the Annihilating Machine plays its part, performing the paradox of 
the artist’s concept in forestalling a ‘completion’ in (and by) the past tense. Kantor 
                                                
557 By contrast, Gerould and Durer quote Szajna’s own description of “how he made the cell 
[of the insane asylum] into the interior of Walpurg’s [the protagonist’s] mind”: “The cell in 
Witkacy’s The Madman and the Nun is represented by a wall that surrounds the hero of the 
play and the objects that appear in the niches, a large moving head that spies on him, an 
automatic clock with the mechanism pulled out of it and the swaying symbol of unspecified 
biological form. The rocking lamp and the turned-up volume of the ticking of the clock are 
attuned to the mounting frenzy of the ‘madman’s’ monologue. They help define the emotion 
indirectly and by allusion. Acting on the principle of psychograms, the props penetrate to the 
levels that often escape direct and rational rules, increasing tension.” (Gerould and Durer, 
“The Madman and the Nun: Introduction”, in Witkiewicz, The Madman and the Nun and The 
Crazy Locomotive, trans. Daniel Gerould and C.S. Durer, New York: Applause Theater Book 
Publishers, 1989, p.4.)  
558 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Work of Art and the Process”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in A Journey 
Through Other Spaces, p.127.  
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writes: “The fact that the perception of the creative act takes place only when the 
process ceases might be puzzling. This perception is limited only to the 
‘consumption’ of the product, which is presented to us in the form of a book, an 
orchestral performance, or an exhibited painting”; that is, in the ‘artefacts’ of the 
creative act, just as with the documents supposed of the history of theatrical 
production.559 
 
The relation between performance and exhibition – which would become a tension 
between the Cricot 2 and the Cricoteka after Kantor’s death – serves to show why 
Kantor is, in August Grodzicki’s terms, “an independent artist” rather than a “theatre 
director” (in the sense of Dejmek, Swinarski, Wajda, and even Grotowski). The 
professional theatre director struggles, for instance, with an interpretation of Hamlet, 
where the theatrical “conscience” is caught in a trap of its “own conceits”.560 At least, 
that is the case for “real” directors, given that the merely professional ones show little 
interest in the promptings of such a conscience.561 Despite its association with major 
playwrights (including Genet and Müller), the minor tradition of the theatre of death 
has an oblique relation to the dramatic heritage within European mimetic practices, as 
these require interpretations that address the ghosts that normally confer (authorial) 
legitimacy on its professional “theatre” (pace Blau, Carlson, et al.).  
 
Replying to Miklaszewski’s observation that, in twenty-eight years the Cricot 2 
“made no more than ten new productions”, Kantor distances his work from the 
conditions of mainstream theatre practice, insisting:  
                                                
559 Ibid., p.125.  
560 This applies even to the Wooster Group and Liz LeCompte, whose production of Hamlet 
perhaps comes close to the concerns of the “theatre of death”, not least in the comparison that 
can be made between with the way in which theatre critics have written about it and the way 
that art critics have written about the work of James Coleman (which will be the subject of a 
separate essay). [On the Wooster Group Hamlet, see W.B. Worthen, Drama Between Poetry 
and Performance, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005.] 
561 Kantor could be vehement in distinguishing his own practice from that of even the most 
eminent of such “theatre arseholes” amongst directors. As Kolankiewicz quotes Kantor (while 
expressing his own doubts about the very idea of a theatre prize being instituted, after 
Kantor’s death, in his name; let alone it being awarded to its first recipient, Peter Brook): “It 
was no avant-garde that all these theatre arseholes, all these Wajdas, all these Grotowskis, 
these Szajnas… I include even Peter Brook among them… He’s a son of a bitch… No, no, he 
definitely is a son of a bitch…” (Leszek Kolankiewicz, “Kantor’s Last Tape”, trans. Paul 
Allain and Grzegorz Ziolkowski, in Contemporary Theatre Review, 15.1, February 2005, 
p.36.)  
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But they are not ‘new productions’. We focus less on the ‘presentation’ of a 
theatrical work of art than on the shaping of our own material and the structure 
of our theatre, so that working in a situation and a new aesthetic, concepts like 
‘premiere’ and ‘repertoire’ have lost their meaning. As far as these ‘results’ of 
theatre work are concerned, we should speak rather about different ‘stages’ 
which have been defined by these results.562  
 
After the turn away from working with a pre-existing text (by Witkacy), and the 
productions “after” the theatre of death, a final stage in the history of the Cricot 2 
occurred with Kantor’s own death in 1990; with the company becoming a theatre 
without theatre, a theatre “of death” in a new sense. This has also to be addressed in 
relation to its specifically Kantorian example of a “living archive” – the Cricoteka – 
which is associated with the history of Kantor’s other major collaboration, the Foksal 
Gallery. While the Cricoteka is a theatre “without theatre” in the sense of actors, it is 
not, crucially, without an audience – through its exhibitions and publications. One of 
the key questions of this thesis is why (and, indeed, how) Kantor’s example of the 
theatre of death has remained a source of fascination long after it ceased to be 
performed, such that its practice could still demand conceptual elaboration.  
 
After a short-lived company (under the leadership of Andrzej Welminski) of “Actors 
of the Cricot Theatre,”563 the ensemble would be remembered in the form (“already”) 
anticipated by Kantor in its “living archive”, through installations, replicas, and 
exhibitions. Although the members of the company – who were, after all, the devising 
“co-authors” of its productions – still wanted to work, the Cricot 2 would become its 
own “theatre” of death together with Kantor himself. This precedence of death 
separates the actors from the characters of the Cricot 2 productions and exposes an 
issue that is part of the history of the archive – the exclusion of the still living 
participants from its concept (“of death”), as from its “theatre” (without theatre); that 
is, as the subject of the work that the archive supports (such as theses, like this one, 
                                                
562 Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 
2002, p.101. (Also, Kantor’s account of the “structure of the Cricot 2”, trans. Kobialka, in 
Further on, Nothing, op. cit., pp.110-111.) 
563 Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 
2002, pp.151-2.  
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rather than new performances). Remembered (and studied) in the absence of new 
productions, the Cricot 2 ensemble is represented by the Cricoteka, where the images 
of its characters (like puppets no longer in use) still exist, without the actors.564  
 
According to Plesniarowicz, Kantor’s coinage of the name Cricoteka: 
 
…comes from a blending of the name of the Cricot Theatre (an anagram 
meaning ‘it’s a circus’) and ‘teka’, derived from the ancient Greek théke, 
which means ‘a place for keeping something’. In contemporary Polish, this 
Hellenism can refer to a thematically uniform collection of archives, drawings, 
or articles – or to a sort of packaging of a collection of documents, arranged 
according to a given system. For Kantor, the institutional emballage of his 
own Cricot ideas was above all a metaphor for memory... ‘All our crises are 
caused by the failure to pay respect to memory.’565  
 
As noted with Klossowicz (in chapter four), this development of a theatre without 
theatre was, however, far from “obvious” in Kantor’s own lifetime and (as noted 
above) was a source of controversy concerning not only the posthumous 
performances of Today is my Birthday (which travelled the world for two years, 1991-
92), but also a revival by the then company of The Dead Class – without Kantor.566  
 
Leszek Kolankiewicz (describing himself “as a critic who had followed Kantor’s 
work closely”), while endorsing the decision to continue to perform the “final 
rehearsal” of Today is my Birthday, “also felt deep regret that the group could not 
                                                
564 To cite only the two examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the emballages of 
the Trumpet of the Last Judgment and the pupil and bench figure. “Theatre without theatre” 
was the title of an exhibition co-presented (and the catalogue co-published) by the Museum of 
Modern Art, Barcelona, and the Berrardo Foundation of Modern and Contemporary Art, 
Lisbon, in 2007. According to the director of Barcelona museum, Manuel Borja-Villel, the 
exhibition “examines the way in which the theatrical has altered our perception of the nature 
of the work of art and its position in the division of the visible” (Borja-Villel, Manuel et al., 
(eds.), A Theatre Without Theatre, exhibition catalogue, Barcelona: MACBA, 2007, 
p.20).  
565 Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, 
Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2000, pp.294-5. 
566 This is referred to by Scarpetta, op. cit., p.187. These performances were undertaken “in 
Spain, the United States, Italy, and Czechoslovakia in 1991-1992” (Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, 
The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 
2000, p.142).  
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then say to itself ‘Enough is enough!’ with the same determination… If Tadeusz 
Kantor really created Kantor’s theatre, then Kantor’s death seems to be the natural 
end of this theatre’s activities. No other solution can be countenanced.”567 Of course, 
the question of the creation of this theatre is precisely what is at stake in the different 
claims concerning what is “open” or “closed” in the instance of Kantor’s “death” – 
not least as this touches upon the testimony of an archive as representative of the 
Cricot 2. Kolankiewicz frames his reflections on this period of the Cricot 2 without 
Kantor as definitive (“no other solution”), when he writes:  
 
Something else was striking: the inclination to leave matters open, which in all 
likelihood were closed. After all, artists should be able to finish the works they 
have begun. If Tadeusz Kantor really created Kantor’s theatre...568  
 
Given the example of the Welminskis still offering “Cricot 2 workshops”, however, 
perhaps what may be thought of as “open” or “closed” serves to remind us of what is 
in question concerning the creation of a theatrical art, rather than simply providing 
answers (or “solutions”). 
 
Nonetheless, in Kantor’s absence, the already present future past (“of death”) in the 
theatre of the Cricot 2 became a question of its archive, “living” in the work of its 
(potential) concept – in “the idea of the Cricot 2”, as the title of the first Cricoteka 
exhibition, in 1980, proposed. This work – of remembering, in theory rather than 
simply by description – is not that of citing or quoting an image of a performance (as, 
for instance, from The Dead Class in Slobodzianek’s own Warsaw production of his 
play Our Class569); still less is it an attempt to remake (or revive) a performance – of, 
for instance, The Dead Class – from its documentary after life. Remembering, “in 
theory”, is rather an engagement with this theatre’s survival in its concept, addressing 
what it is “of death” that is (still) to be understood as “theatre” in Kantor’s example 
(as distinct, say, from Grotowski’s).  
                                                
567 Leszek Kolankiewicz, “Kantor’s Last Tape”, trans. Paul Allain and Grzegorz Ziolkowski, 
in Contemporary Theatre Review, 15.1, February 2005, p.35. 
568 Kolankiewicz, ibid. Plesniarowicz cites Lupa’s recollection, concerning those actors who 
were dropped after the first version of The Dead Class, that they “always complained about 
how Kantor had a pathological aversion to recognising their contribution to the creative 
process” (Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, op. cit., pp.118-19). 
569 Teresa Murjas and Bryce Lease, op. cit.  
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As figured in the installation entitled The Classroom (made for the Présence 
Polonaise exhibition at the Pompidou Centre in 1983), a theoretical question of the 
“theatre” of The Dead Class (without live actors) is posed by Kantor through that of 
its visibility for the public. The exhibition of this object (which is also a spatial 
model) offers another view of a concept of theatre that is still in question through 
practice and with which we may frame a question as to what it is “of death” that may 
be drawn from Kantor specifically for theatre studies or for theatre history – whose 
“object” is supposedly, and paradigmatically, the “live” event.570 The aim here is to 
articulate a question addressing the ontology (pace Fischer-Lichte and Phelan, for 
example) of this phenomenon – as concerns theatre aesthetics – for which Kantor 
identified the concept “of death” as providing a possible answer, beyond that of the 
preceding Cricot 2 dramaturgies of “zero”, “Happening”, or “impossible” theatres. In 
Artur Sandauer’s terms (discussed in the Introduction), this aesthetic would explore 
how, after 1975, “the anti-theatre [of the Cricot 2] got transformed into the 
autotheatre”571 – as an example of what has been identified in this thesis as a distinct, 
minor tradition within theatre studies and its histories.  
 
III. What returns in the impasse between formalism and naturalism? 
As already noted, the question of theatre in the example of the Cricot 2 goes beyond 
its relation to text (with Witkacy), relating to the image (or paradigm) of “the actor”, 
as precisely a transformation of the body into an image, as an autonomous reality of 
the art of the stage – where, for Kantor, the “life” of both actor and stage appears in or 
as the “degraded [annexed, or poor] reality” of each other. The theatrical apparatus of 
each Cricot 2 production remakes the “pre-existence” of the stage specific to itself, 
the idea of which – realised in material objects – survives the appearance or animation 
of the live actors. Concerning this appearance (as discussed in the first two parts of 
this thesis), the fundamental aesthetic issue “of death” for such a theatre – as a 
question of mimesis within modernism, in an art of theatre – was (and thus remains) 
the impasse, in comprehending its medium, between naturalism and abstraction 
                                                
570 This is to repose the question of the “Annihilating Machine” from the 1963 production 
with The Madman and the Nun and the so-called Anti-Exhibition of the same year, and will be 
returned to later. 
571 Artur Sandauer, “Art After the End of Art”, trans. Anna Bartkowicz, in “Dialectics and 
Humanism”, The Polish Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 1985, p.135.  
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(between the body and its image). This is addressed specifically within the history of 
the Cricot 2 in the early 1970s, in contrast to Kantor’s previous production concepts. 
To cite (once again) Kantor’s declaration in the Theatre of Death manifesto: “Today 
these possibilities are neither an appropriate nor valid alternative. For a new situation 
and new conditions have arisen in art...”572  
 
Besides the acknowledgement of Happenings as already historical, what is “new” in 
the 1970s is the establishment of conceptualism, not least as the manifestation of a 
latent possibility of abstraction (as defined by contrast to “representation” or illusion). 
The sense that this opposition (fundamental to the modernist sense of art) was a 
misrepresentation of “realism” (in the visual arts) – and, therefore, implicitly of (and, 
indeed, by) abstraction itself – is explored by Meyer Schapiro, in an essay (of 1937) 
reviewing Alfred Barr’s famous catalogue book of MoMA’s collection of “non-
objective” painting.573 As already discussed, the impasse or aporia in this 
“alternative” – which Kantor views, in the 1970s, as “neither appropriate nor valid” – 
has provided an horizon of meaning across the arts in the twentieth century; including 
in theatre history between, for example, the pre-war Cricot and Reduta companies, 
and (post-war) between Kantor and Grotowski.  
 
This aporia is engaged within the history of theatre, as that of its avant-garde, where, 
as Sandauer suggests, it offers a seismograph of the culturally “new”, always pressing 
at the “end(s)” of art, at its “own possibility of existence”.574 The terms in which this 
impasse (as an “end”) of theatrical art is identified in the Theatre of Death manifesto 
offer an alternative to those more often proposed by Kantor – as already forming “a 
link between visual arts and theatre”575 – between constructivism and symbolism. It 
was this polarity that characterised Kantor’s pre-war “Ephemeral (and Mechanical) 
Puppet Theatre” performance of Maeterlinck’s The Death of Tintagiles – which was 
                                                
572 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Voy and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in A 
Journey Through Other Spaces, ed. Michal Kobialka, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993, p.109.  
573 Meyer Schapiro, “Abstract Art”, in Modern Art, New York, George Braziller, 1979, p.196; 
and Alfred Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, London: Secker and Warburg, 1975 [1936].  
574 Artur Sandauer, “Art After the End of Art”, trans. Anna Bartkowicz, in “Dialectics and 
Humanism”, The Polish Philosophical Quarterly, Spring 1985, p.128. 
575 “Let the Artists Die? An interview with Tadeusz Kantor,” with (and translated by) Michal 
Kobialka, TDR 30.3, Fall 1986, p.182.  
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revisited in 1987 as a Cricotage, The Machine of Love and Death, at Kassel for the 
Documenta 8 theatre festival (and subsequently touring).576 This production, 
reflecting on the puppet as a model of and for the actor, offers another example of 
practical theorisation “after” the theatre of death (as a reflection on its precedents), 
which subsequently informed the making of the new Cricot 2 performance in 1988, I 
Shall Never Return (premiered in Milan, alongside the Milano Lessons work with 
students).  
 
As with the Theatre of Death manifesto, historical content is given here – in the link 
between visual arts and theatre – to the seeming contradiction, in the representation of 
human appearance(s), between an avant-garde aesthetic and (if not “of”) an 
anthropological conservatism of death; in the confrontation between aesthetic form 
and the theatrical “material” of human bodies. Amongst the precedents of the minor 
tradition of this theatre “of death”, this fundamental aesthetic impasse was, for 
example, clearly evoked on the symbolist side (distinct from Meyerhold on the 
constructivist side), by Maeterlinck:  
 
We need... to completely remove living beings from the scene... Man can 
speak only on his own behalf; he has no right to speak for a multitude of the 
dead... It is difficult to predict what set of lifeless beings could take man’s 
place in the scene; the strange impression one experiences in the galleries 
where wax statues are exhibited, for example, for some time might have put us 
on the trail of an art which is extinct or perhaps new.577 
 
The dead are normally thought of as the guardians of tradition, of heritage and 
legitimacy – until, as evoked at the end of the Introduction, they are subject to a 
history of cultural elimination (with which some critics of modernism, such as 
                                                
576 Cricot 2 Information Guide 1987-1988, ed. Anna Halczak, Krakow: Cricoteka 1988, 
pp.65-101. 
577 Maeterlinck, quoted by Roberto Tessari, “Kantor’s Theatre: beyond Symbolism, to the 
symbol of the ‘lowest’ rank”, trans. Susan Finnel, in Tadeusz Kantor-Cricot 2: Photographs 
by Romano Martinis, Milan: Oedipus Editions, 2001, p.179. Besides his explicit interest in 
the typography and layout of his manifestos, Kantor’s engagement with Constructivism on 
the other hand is explicitly explored in his “Milano Lessons” (translated by Michal Kobialka, 
in A Journey Through Other Spaces, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp.207-
269). The relation between the cabinet of wax-figures and cinema (as between Schlosser and 
Balász) was discussed in part one of this thesis. 
 233 
Zygmunt Bauman, have viewed the avant-garde as being complicit). By contrast to 
symbolism, in the theatre of Witkacy (pace Kott in chapter one) – “on the trail of an 
art which is extinct or perhaps new” – the dead appear “in the scene” (on stage) like 
clowns (as “living corpses”), as much parodies as paradigms. The on-stage dead 
become associated, through Jarry and Guignol, with the avant-garde’s interest in 
circus and variety, seeing traditional artistic “eternity” in theatrical appearances of the 
“lowest rank”. This is one of the contexts within which to understand Kantor’s own 
sense of avant-garde (pace the epigraph to this chapter), looking backward to see 
ahead, envisioning the future in the past, reflecting on the theatre of death afterwards: 
“The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole... give testimony to the true nature of my 
heretical ideas... the era of my own avant-garde. The avant-garde of: the recollection 
of the past, memory, the invisible, emptiness and death.”578 
  
As discussed, this impasse in theatre history, as it conditions the thought of the actor 
in the major tradition(s) of European theatre (pace Barthes’s identification of its 
underlying antinomies), is addressed in terms of a model (of and for the) actor, which 
is identified by way “of death” – as a way to think of the art of the actor beyond the 
aporia of abstraction or naturalism. In his 1975 manifesto, Kantor cites Craig’s 
“answer” to the same aporetic question, albeit mistakenly identifying the über-
marionette with one side of the (“nature/ art”) impasse, rather than as itself already 
offering a means of going beyond it. The über-marionette is, precisely, a model (of 
and for the) actor, comparable to (as a precedent of) Kantor’s own “example” in 
proposing “the dead” as the aesthetic condition of human participation in an art of 
theatre – that is, as a “live effigy” (a paradigm or imago of and for human appearance, 
as an actor). 
 
In this art of theatre, with the question raised of its (mimetic) medium, there is a shift 
from the appearance of opposed terms (naturalism and abstraction, animate and 
inanimate, living and dead) to an appearance of the space (its figure) in between – as 
also between mimesis and metaphysics, which is of the definition here of the 
uncanny. The theatre of death becomes visible not in terms of one side of the 
opposition or the other, but in and as what occurs (in theory and practice) between 
                                                
578 Tadeusz Kantor, “A Classroom”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, ed. 
Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.228. 
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them: neither Schlemmer nor Stanislavsky, then, but “the theatre of death” – as a new 
stage of research for the Cricot 2 artists’ theatre in the 1970s. This situates the concept 
of the actor anew, beyond the appeal of and to a Happening theatre within the 
company’s history, as well as the precedents of its own “zero” or “impossible” 
conditions. Here then is the kernel of this thesis (pace Adorno): how does the 
abstraction of its concept comprehend an example in its practice? How are the three 
parts of this thesis to be read in relation to each other? How is Kantor’s articulation of 
this aesthetic impasse to be understood with respect to the founding distinctions of 
modernist art (in Worringer’s terms) between abstraction and empathy, between 
rationalism and animism, or between experiment and emotion (as discussed in the 
Introduction)? How and why is it in the name “of death” that this example of Kantor’s 
work broaches the concept of theatre specifically, addressing what is uncanny in 
mimesis – as an example in search of its concept, as a practice evoking its own 
theory?  
 
This history of theatre (and its “studies”) is not simply theoretical, therefore, even in 
the development of its concept. A “devouring” anxiety, like Kantor’s, about “theatre 
conventions” only producing their own kinds of “theatricality” – not least in the work 
of the actor, who may even “adapt” to the demands of artistic discovery, reinstating 
this impasse (as we have also seen with Harriet Walter in chapter one) – is also 
testified to by Kryzstian Lupa, who observes the process of theatrical re-
familiarisation even in the example of “Kantor’s actors”:  
 
They were great and tragic only when they did not know how to act, when 
they were dealing with issues beyond human possibilities. In The Dead Class 
and in Wielopole, it was not Kantor who ended. It was the actors who just 
learned to fulfil his demands without larger difficulties, and that is why his 
next pieces were... they were not discoveries. They were not overwhelming.579 
 
Lupa (who studied theatre in Krakow in the 1970s, and who was an assistant to 
Swinarski) recalls here the context of Kantor’s theatre of death productions, without, 
                                                
579 “Trip to the Unreachable”, Krystian Lupa interviewed by Beata Matkowska-Swies, trans. 
Dorothea Sobstel, in Theater, 41.3, 2012, p.66. (Working through the contrasts between 
Kantor and Grotowski on this subject would require another chapter of its own.) 
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however, referring to them in terms of this concept. Nonetheless, finding a return to 
such historical-theoretical points of reference by a theatre director is rare (and is no 
doubt due here as much to Lupa’s personal memory, as to any theoretical interest), 
where – for all that he is “well known” – Kantor’s researches, in their possible 
concept, seem largely “forgotten”, as if they were a mere eccentricity of his theatrical 
persona. This means that aspects of the Cricot 2 stage image are more likely to be 
imitated (as pastiche) than thought through (as art) by those who come “after”. As 
with Kantor’s reading of Craig, this concerns the truth of an aesthetic motive in 
acknowledging precedents (distinct from scholarly referencing). The aporia of the 
concept invite an attempt to understand or articulate the question that its “solution” or 
“answer” implies, rather than simply reciting the example of the latter as if this was 
given (whether historically or theoretically). 
 
Yes. Let us not forget Craig’s proposal – distancing the scenic figure from the 
living human being. Craig’s Über-marionette (or, as Kantor pictured it, a 
being positioned between a storefront mannequin and the ‘cadaver’ of Dr. 
Caligari) was supposed to cause a metaphysical alienating effect. On the one 
hand, it was an attempt to make an Art Object out of a living human being, 
deformed like other arts; on the other, a specific reaction to the ineptitude and 
lies of the traditional theatre regarding the actor reaching the truth of human 
expression...580 
 
IV. “Once again I am on stage...” How is Kantor’s theatre of death informed by the 
thought of demarcation and participation? 
At the premiere of the Cricot 2’s final production, at the Pompidou Centre in Paris, 
January 24, 1991, the cast announced Kantor’s posthumous presence (here in Michal 
Kobialka’s account):  
 
Before the actors entered the stage, a statement written by the members of the 
Cricot 2 Theatre had been read. The spectators were informed that what they 
were about to see was the last rehearsal of Kantor’s 1990 Today is my 
Birthday; that the recorded voice they would hear was Kantor’s voice, which 
                                                
580 Lupa, ibid., p.63. 
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had been recorded during the process of preparing the production; and that the 
chair standing at the table was Kantor’s, which now, in the light of his death 
on December 8th, 1990, would stay unoccupied during the performance.581 
 
Kantor’s absence is here apostrophised, in a paradoxical stopping of time (as used to 
happen with clocks in houses where someone had died). The performance is in the 
present – in Kantor’s absence – and yet, as a “last rehearsal”, in the past – in Kantor’s 
presence. This is suggested metonymically, by both an object (the chair) and a voice 
(the recording), as two distinct effigies of being (in space and time). Each offers 
traces of the body’s gestural signature, the one mimetically “abstract” (the evocation 
of an attitude or posture) and the other “uncanny” (as if the recording was the voice 
itself), but both signifying a physical absence.582 
 
The whole production resonates with this present(ed) absence – without which it 
would cease to be a Kantor-Cricot 2 event and become simply a production “of” 
Today is my Birthday. It is the artist’s (“director’s”) appearance that is the subject of 
the Cricot 2 production – staging the question of an art of theatre in the parallelism of 
actor and director on stage. Without the latter the former are simply “actors” – no 
longer the Cricot 2 ensemble, no longer collaborators in a theatre of the threshold 
between the living and the dead, in its mimetic evocation of that between the 
auditorium and the stage. 
 
The company’s statement to the audience provides a necessary frame for the fictional 
frames that were presented on stage – addressing the audience’s anticipation, the 
sense of the theatrical event (in terms of appearance(s) and applause), associated with 
Kantor’s person. No one else could play this “role” – the on stage double or “self-
portrait” (as played by Andrzej Welminski) is only possible in a “last rehearsal”, not 
in a new production without Kantor himself. Here the question “of death”, as it 
                                                
581 Kobialka, A Journey Through Other Spaces, p.365. 
582 Curiously, this scene is essentially as it was first rehearsed, according to Waclaw Janicki’s 
diary (February 1st, 1990, the first day of rehearsals): “Andrzej Welminski plays the part of 
Kantor. Here is how the situation will look: Kantor speaks to the audience at the beginning 
and then exits. A moment later Welminski, dressed as the Master, takes his place. That is the 
scene we rehearsed today. Kantor was satisfied.” (Janicki, “Diary”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in 
The Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism, Fall 1995, p.269.) 
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pertains to the actor in such a theatre, is disclosed in both its historical and theoretical 
truth. Here the difference that the “director” on stage makes for the “life” of the actor 
is clear – for the (annexed) reality of its fiction. Paradoxically the actor has “two 
bodies” on stage (the emblem of which is the mannequin), but not Kantor, who 
remains at the threshold of the stage, making visible, unsettling, the demarcation line 
between abstraction and naturalism. This appearance of the theatre artist “on stage” is 
precisely what distinguishes Kantor’s theatre of death from its precedent in Craig, for 
example. In his own death he became, as it were, simply an actor – played by 
Welminski, accompanied by the “mannequin” chair. Kantor’s theatre of death dies 
with him – and yet, in its concept, it survives the “life” of its actors. Without him, 
without the dividing line of his “theatre”, the actors no longer make visible the dead; 
save as they come to light in their iconographic afterlife, in that of the photograph, 
becoming the death into which they were born as these “actors”.  
 
The frames “on stage” in Today is my Birthday constituted a tableau evoking the 
space of “the artist’s studio”, related to a sequence of paintings presented in a 1988 
exhibition in Krakow (and, of course, since) in which the figure of the artist is 
presented in the medium of paint within the boundaries of a canvas – and, in some 
cases, in a material assemblage (for example, as mannequin parts) “stepping out” of 
that painterly frame. The very titles of these paintings – such as I have had enough. I 
am leaving this painting – offer an orientation for thinking anew Kantor’s concern 
with the threshold between the abstract and the symbolic in this last production, as a 
final reflection “afterwards” on what the theatre of death might have meant in the 
Cricot 2 specifically.583 As announced by the company, this stage(d) tableau is 
juxtaposed with Kantor’s disembodied voice, echoing from the theatre “speakers” – 
addressing the very question of the artist’s “presence”:  
 
Again, I am on stage. I will probably never fully explain this phenomenon 
either to you or to myself. To be precise, I am not on stage but at the 
threshold. In front of me, there is the audience.584 
 
                                                
583 Kobialka discusses these paintings in A Journey Through Other Spaces, p.380. 
584 Ibid., p.366. 
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However, the chair – as also his double, inside one of the frames on stage – has its 
back to the audience;585 “in front of me” is, in fact, “behind me”. But besides the 
spatial dividing line there is also the temporal. The audience is before or ahead of the 
artist, as is his death; each exists in anticipation of the other. The existential sense of 
the performance to come, of the expected “appearance” of the theatre artist, echoes 
with the sense of a failing in the judgement of “time”, which was already evoked in 
the Little Manifesto read to the audience celebrating Kantor’s receipt of the 
Rembrandt Prize in 1978 (evoking the scene of “the classroom”).  
 
After the artist’s on-stage double (played by Welminski) had fallen out of the frame, 
he approached the table next to the empty chair, took up a piece of paper and read out 
loud:  
 
Again, I am on stage. I will probably never fully explain this phenomenon 
either to you or to myself. To be precise, I am not on stage but at the 
threshold. In front of me, there is the audience – you, Ladies and Gentlemen – 
that is, according to my vocabulary, Reality. Behind me, there is the stage, that 
is, Illusion, Fiction. I do not lean towards either of the two sides. I turn my 
head in one direction, then in the other direction. A splendid resume of my 
theory.586 
 
Here the play of and with the demarcation line between reality and fiction, stage and 
auditorium, actor and audience, life and death is reiterated in its theoretical practice. 
In Kantor’s absence – it is over twenty years since his death – we have still before us 
the question of his presence on stage. The end of this performance began again, an 
hour later, with these same words: “Again, I am on stage. I will probably never fully 
explain this phenomenon either to you or to myself. To be precise, I am not on stage 
but at the threshold.”587 It is with this “threshold” that the concept of “the theatre of 
death” is concerned, as a commentary on the “barrier” that defined the world of – the 
stage for – the actors in The Dead Class. The audience (we ourselves, today) are 
                                                
585 This also recalls the staging of Odysseus’s “return” in 1944 (the talisman of Kantor’s 
theatrical history), where the actor sat on large gun barrel with his back to the audience. 
586 Ibid., p.367. 
587 Ibid., p.375. 
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“before” Kantor, in death (in the future of that past). The significance of Kantor’s 
presence on stage is as testimony to his “theory”, to his “reality” (his concept of 
reality), addressed to this future audience. The image of his presence on stage still 
conditions its afterlife, in the “metaphysical shock” of what is still uncanny in its 
particular encounter with theatrical mimesis.  
 
Paradoxically – perhaps – an insightful view of this “shock” comes not from one of 
Kantor’s celebrators, but from a self-declared “sceptic”. In 1985 (in the middle of the 
period of martial law in Poland), the Polish critic Andrzej Zurowski (who was at the 
time president of the Polish section of the International Association of Theatre 
Critics) offered a polemic (seemingly targeting his colleague Tomasz Raczek, as 
much as Kantor) regarding Kantor’s “presence on stage” – being especially critical of 
what he calls “the dangerous motif of Kantor-the-conductor”.588 Zurowski makes the 
pertinent observation that this “conductor” motif is made from the cloth of the 
emperor’s new clothes – far from “improvis[ing] it on the spot” the performance is 
“strictly defined beforehand”. For all Kantor’s histrionics, this costuming is that of the 
critics (for instance, Raczek) rather than that of the artist, for whom the devising work 
has been long (lasting over a year) and meticulous. Nonetheless, the vital experience 
of “feeling that the performance we’re attending is performed just for us; that another 
time it would be different, that it’s created especially for those who came to see it” – 
which Puzyna, Wajda, and Rozewicz, for instance, insist upon in their discussion (in 
1976) of Kantor’s presence on stage – is precisely part of what distinguishes his work 
from the possibilities of “‘normal’ professional theatre”.589 Curiously, this impression 
is attested to even after Kantor’s death, in what had by then become, indeed, a form of 
                                                
588 Andrzej Zurowski, “‘Pulling Faces at the Audience’: the Lonely Theatre of Tadeusz 
Kantor”, in NTQ, vol.1, n.4, November, 1985, p.366. The theme of “conductor” has become 
part of the “common knowledge” about Kantor. An early instance can be found in Konstanty 
Puzyna’s use during a conversation with Wajda and Rozewicz in September, 1976 (Polish 
Theatre Perspectives, 1.1, 2010, pp.346-7). In a conversation I had with Krzysztof 
Miklaszewski, however, I was informed that Kantor was indeed usually responding to a 
scene, rather than anticipating it – as a conductor would be.  
589 Konstanty Puzyna, Tadeusz Rozewicz, and Andrzej Wajda, “On Tadeusz Kantor’s The 
Dead Class”, trans. Duncan Jamieson and Adela Karsznia, in Polish Theatre Perspectives, 
1.1, 2010, p.347. 
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mystification, in a review by Mel Gussow, who also describes having “the impression 
of viewing the piece created before his very eyes”.590  
 
Zurowski recognises Kantor’s meticulous preparation – that of an artist for whom 
“improvisation” in performance (as distinct from an openness to “chance”), most 
explicitly after the return to the “closed form” of the theatre of death – was 
anathema.591 This reduces the critical image of “demiurge” to that of “an imposter”: 
 
He, Kantor – the creator rather than a stage character – seems to create the 
‘here and now’, a stage reality; yet the shape of this reality proves that it had 
been precisely formed beforehand. Aware of this, the spectator begins to 
perceive Kantor-the-creator’s gestures as pulling faces, as Witold 
Gombrowicz might have said.592 
 
Despite the slightly malevolent tone, Zurowski is rare in identifying precisely the 
ambiguous quality of Kantor’s stage presence – its relation to an “immaturity” (in 
Gombrowicz’s sense) in the role of “director”, here as “the destroyer of illusion”, of 
the actor’s thought-out art.593 Kantor himself draws from Ferdydurke in his 
notebooks, in working towards The Dead Class production:  
 
Centuries-old schoolboy’s pranks: making faces, twisting one’s body, 
contorting one’s face. Making faces is a strikingly effective weapon of 
immaturity against the ‘seriousness’ of adulthood, which often does nothing 
                                                
590 Cited by Lech Stangret (in a catalogue article for an exhibition celebrating the appearance 
of the The Dead Class in Spain), Gussow’s review is from the year after Kantor’s death 
(during the last year of the Cricot 2 tours): “In 1991, in his review of The Dead Class played 
by the Cricot 2 in New York after the artist’s death, the New York Times reviewer, Mel 
Gussow, said the play did not differ in any way from the ones performed in the previous 
years, even though the author was no longer present.” Nonetheless, “the author’s absence 
deprived him of the impression of participation in something unique, singular.” (Lech 
Stangret, “Kantor’s Trap”, trans. Malgorzata Musial, in Grzegorz Musial (ed.), Tadeusz 
Kantor – Umarla Klasa, Sopot: Panstwowa Galeria Sztuki, 2004, p.115.)  
591 In one of his conversations with Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Kantor distinguishes 
“improvisation” as “a terribly traditional” use of “contingencies” from “a much more 
dangerous element at work – the element of chance”, in Miklaszewski, Encounters with 
Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, p.11. 
592 Zurowski, op cit., p.368. 
593 Jan Klossowicz, “Tadeusz Kantor’s Journey”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in TDR, 30.3, 1986, 
pp.111-12. (This again recalls the Annihilating Machine of the 1963 Madman and the Nun 
production.) 
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more than mask its lack of sensitivity, feelings, imagination, or its 
ruthlessness, duplicity, emptiness...594 
 
While these reflections address moments of the actors’ work in The Dead Class, 
Kantor relished the assault of “immaturity against the ‘seriousness’ of adulthood” 
manifested in the sense of “illegitimacy” and “unprofessionalism” in the appearance 
on stage of “the director”, with its implication that the production remained 
“unfinished”.595 (It is, of course, the image of “the director” that is shown in its 
“immaturity” here rather than that of the production.) This is why the occasional 
imitation of such a role by later directors (such as Visniewski), as though it signified 
their “mastery” on stage, is indeed as embarrassing as Zurowski suggests (in the 
critics’ appraisal) of Kantor’s apparent “example”. In such “imitation”, the sense that 
Kantor seeks in the immaturity of pulling faces is reduced to its opposite, to a 
seriousness that is no longer shocking. “Making faces,” Kantor avers, “must pierce 
the audience like an arrow.”596 In all the hagiographic affirmation of the apparent 
familiarity of the last Cricot 2 productions, the sense of shock that characterised the 
theatre of death is lost, along with Kantor’s own irony about his stage persona, 
theatricalising the sense of “participation” in an image of the artist “that for others 
spells out an artistic poser” – “sitting at the table... all in black, elegant, black patent 
shoes, a scarf, a hat with a wide brim”.597  
 
Besides this self-haunting persona (that is annexed in the “final rehearsal” of Today is 
my Birthday), the division between the living and the dead (as between audience and 
art) is classically emblematised in The Dead Class performance by the presence of a 
little rope, itself annexed from the gallery. Indeed, together with the scenic machine 
or apparatus of serried, wooden school benches that proposes a “stage” for the 
performance, and which is autonomously exhibitable (with or without the mannequin 
children that were the actor-characters’ doubles in performance), this rope dividing or 
demarcating the audience space from that of the actors is key to the appearance of the 
                                                
594 Tadeusz Kantor, “From the Director’s Notebook – 1974”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in 
Further on, Nothing, ed. Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, 
p.245. 
595 Klossowicz, op. cit. 
596 Ibid., p.246. 
597 Tadeusz Kantor, “My Work – My Journey”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further on, 
Nothing, ed. Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.18. 
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“dramatised séance”. In the Krzysztofory Gallery, where the performance was 
devised, rehearsed, and first performed, the “stage” apparatus of the school benches – 
like the various objects associated with individual characters (a bicycle, a window 
pane, etc.) – already represents (or doubles) its use in live performance by its own 
“autonomous” reality, as if annexed temporarily for the performance, just as the rope 
plays a borrowed role, marking the appropriate distance of the public from the 
“tableau”.  
 
In Kantor’s own account these objects counter-pointed a surrounding “black hole, a 
void”: 
 
School desks are always in a Classroom. But it was not a Classroom – Real 
Place. It was a black hole, a void, in front of which the whole auditorium 
stopped. To make it worse, a rope functioned as a barrier. It must be that there 
existed a different barrier, one which is more powerful and terrifying...598 
 
Together these objects form a theatrical memento mori, enduring beyond the light, 
reflected from the actor-characters’ “look”, captured in Andrzej Wajda’s 1976 film of 
the production.599 The film offers not only the metaphysical-temporal schema of the 
photograph (the “nachbild” in Heidegger’s example), but also a technique – of focus, 
of angle, of depth of field (and thus foreground and background), of framing – to 
create an image of what was already anticipated as being memorable at the time of the 
performances.  
 
Concerning the demarcation of the visibility of The Dead Class (in its after life, 
beyond the “participation” in and of the séance itself), there is (as has been 
mentioned) the installation that Kantor made subsequently (in 1983), entitled “The 
Classroom: A Closed Work”, in which the cast of Characters that belong to the 
performance – “the Woman with the mechanical cradle”, “the Old Man with a bike”, 
                                                
598 Tadeusz Kantor, “Theatrical Place”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, ed. 
Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.365.  
599 Wajda’s film (made with Kantor’s co-operation initially) is a key document of this 
production’s after life. 
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“the Charwoman”, and so forth600 – has been replaced by the solitary figure of a 
schoolboy sitting at a single desk. This character-image, in which Kantor appears as 
the subject of this work601, was originally made for exhibition in 1975, after which it 
was cast in bronze as an installation for his mother’s grave (which would also become 
Kantor’s own in 1990). This new “model” of and for what is “memorable” – an 
abstraction afterwards – becomes emblematic for the relation between archive and 
performance, as it concerns the subject of Kantor’s accompanying essay on The 
Classroom, addressing the conditions of visibility of this work – by means of 
exhibition – after the theatre of death research into the (“closed”) space of and for The 
Dead Class performances (which were, nonetheless, still ongoing).  
 
As the relation between the Cricot 2 and the Krzysztofory Gallery changed during the 
1980s,602 the “theatre” (of death) becomes a “room” (of imagination) in Kantor’s 
reflections. And in the last Cricot 2 production, Today is my Birthday, the room 
suggests “the artist’s studio”, in an echo of an unrealised project of Wyspianski’s, “in 
which the figures in the studio of a dying painter step out of the preliminary sketches 
and step down off the drawings on the easels, come to life, and begin to speak.”603 
That they “speak” only as figures of the painter’s imagination points to the 
“impossible” life of the actors’ fiction (as has already been discussed, above, with 
Kolankiewicz; and in chapter four, with Klossowicz) – not least as a question of what 
comes forth from the archive (rather than the tomb).604 
 
The installation of The Classroom makes manifest the implication of the rope in the 
performance, playing with the potential (or the signification) of an aesthetic 
                                                
600 Tadeusz Kantor, “Characters in The Dead Class”, trans. Karol Jakubowicz, in Twentieth 
Century Polish Theatre, ed. Bohdan Drozdowski, London: Calder, 1979, p.138-40.  
601 The text for this image is provided by Kantor’s “little manifesto”, already quoted in the 
Introduction (and which is cited in Tuymann’s exhibition, The Reality of the Lowest Rank).  
602 On December 17th 1979, the Krakow Group ratified the separation of the Cricot 2 from its 
activities, with the Cricoteka opening in a separate space (at ulica Kanonicza 5), in January 
1980, as the official “home” of the theatre company. The Cricoteka’s first exhibition was 
organised by Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, under the title of The Idea of the Cricot 2 Theatre 
(Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black 
Mountain Press, 2004, p.123). 
603 Plesniarowicz, ibid., p.35.  
604 Scarpetta attempts (in contrast, for example, to Blanchot) to transcend the theatre of death 
by appealing to the “Lazarean art” of “Kantor in the present”, addressing Kantor’s “stage 
presence” [cf the “Epilogue” in Guy Scarpetta, Kantor au présent, Arles: Actes Sud, 2000]. 
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“visibility”, oriented by a “demarcation line”. The work is not simply something 
given to be seen, but is a stand-in for something that is not (and cannot be) present: 
that is, something to be remembered. It is a construction, a material fiction; and yet, in 
being fabricated and exhibited, it becomes a “real” document of the past, making 
visible for an audience, in an artwork, what cannot be seen by the audience, in an 
allusion to memory. The demarcation of the rope signifies a threshold, making visible 
the singular role of the artist (“director”) – as the only one who is able to “participate” 
in the “séance”, crossing the line between audience and performer, past and 
present.605  
 
The sense of the “closed work” (in its apparent contradiction to the Happening) had, 
however, already been suggested in Kantor’s contribution to the Assemblage d’hiver 
events that he initiated to accompany a new stage in the Foksal Gallery programme in 
1969 – following the curators’ text (in December 1968) addressing their own question 
“What Do We Not Like About Foksal PSP Gallery?”606 Pawel Polit describes 
Kantor’s “action” on the opening night (in January 1969), Typing Machine with Sail 
and Steer, in terms that orient an understanding of the contextual situation in which 
Kantor insists on the meaning of “avant-garde” in and for his theatre in the following 
decade:   
 
Surrounded by the audience Kantor typed his most important ideas regarding 
the nature of art on sheets of paper, rolled them up and locked them in a 
cylindrical container that was then suspended from the ceiling. During the 
performance he inscribed the following statement on the gallery wall: “Down 
with so-called participation.” With this statement Kantor effectively cancelled 
the concept of Place as it had been proposed by Mariusz Tchorek [in the 
founding manifesto of the Foksal Gallery in 1966]. What is more he brought 
about a theoretical split in the Foksal gallery community, demanding its 
                                                
605 Relating this to Benjamin’s evocation of the theatre “apparatus” (cited at the end of the 
Introduction) would perhaps take us further into a sense of what returns in the theatre of death 
than does Jan Kott’s apostrophising of Kantor (in his obituary) as a theatrical Charon (Kott, 
“Kantor, Memory, Memoire”, trans. Jadwiga Kosicka, in NTQ, vol.VII, n.28, Nov. 1991, 
p.301). 
606 This is included in Wieslaw Borowski, et al., “Foksal Gallery Documents”, in October, 
vol.38, Autumn 1986, pp.57-69.  
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members to choose between a model of art as an isolated message, on the one 
hand, and the formal idea of Place, on the other.607  
 
The concept of “isolated message” would be taken up by the new Foksal team – 
Borowski still, but now joined by Andrzej Turowski – in their subsequent proposal 
concerning “place” and “participation” for the Gallery, that of “living archives”. Not 
for the first time – nor for the last – Kantor’s sense of the demarcation line involved 
not simply a distinction between his own and others’ aesthetic commitments, but an 
active (not to say militant) opposition. It was, in fact, under the banner of the 
“demarcation line” that Kantor’s relations with the Foksal Gallery were founded, as 
the original curators participated in his first Happening (called Cricotage), at the café 
of the Society of the Friends of the Fine Arts in Warsaw, and again in Krakow, at the 
Society of Art Historians, in 1965 – under the title, precisely, of “A Demarcation 
Line”.608  
 
V. How does the past of Kantor’s theatre, with the “example” of the Cricoteka as a 
“living archive”, resist the claims of what is “post”-modern? 
Following the preceding chapters (in parts one and two of this thesis), we may read 
Kantor “after” a concept of the theatre of death – as much as (to begin with) reading 
this concept “after” Kantor. Not simply supposing that it is particular to Kantor, it 
becomes possible to consider how to read “the theatre of death” in Kantor particularly 
– in terms of his “model” example of and for the actor in the figure of the mannequin 
and the “live effigy”, and in the demarcation of actor from audience. Indeed, if the 
concept of the theatre of death, and its associated iconography of the actor, proposed 
in parts one and two, has any meaning at all, then it would have to be tested against 
such a reading of Kantor. The potential conceptual meaning of his manifesto is not 
                                                
607 Pawel Polit, “Warsaw’s Foksal Gallery 1966-1972: Between Place and Archive” (p.7). 
This article is available on the Artmargins website: www.artmargins.com.  
608 The first text (1965) of this “Demarcation Line” manifesto (in its English translation) is 
reproduced on p.140 of Kantor was here (Katarzyna Murawska-Muthesius and Natalia 
Zarzecka (eds.), London: Black Dog Publishing, 2011) and a photograph of Kantor painting 
the emblematic line is reproduced on p.142 (ibid.). The text was also reproduced as part of 
Kantor’s involvement in Richard Demarco’s presentation of Polish artists (“Atelier 72”) at his 
gallery during the 1972 Edinburgh Festival (ibid., p.36). Kantor’s Happenings are the subject 
of the essays and testimonies gathered by Jaroslaw Suchan in Tadeusz Kantor: Impossible 
(Krakow: Bunkier Sztuki, 2000). A brief commentary on the 1965 events is also offered, for 
instance, by Kobialka in Further on, Nothing, pp.78-81.  
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simply immanent in its writing, however, but dispersed through the contextual and 
historical conditions of its being, or becoming, readable – not least, in translation.  
 
Rather than simply citing Kantor’s own texts, then, in relation to questions applied to 
them, as if they illustrated a concept, such reading requires identifying what are the 
questions – “of death” – that these writings themselves pose concerning a concept of 
“theatre”. As this thesis proposes, the kernel of this concept – concerning the after life 
of its theatre – addresses a model (or paradigmatic) appearance of the actor; while its 
shell concerns the appearance of a “theatre” without actors, but still with an audience, 
in respect of its archive. It often seems, however, that commentary on Kantor – 
addressing this after life – regards his writings as if they themselves defined their own 
reading(s), as if research required merely their paraphrase. Indeed, too often they are 
read (and cited) as if simply describing a theatrical practice, rather than as offering a 
theoretical critique of what is to be thought through the concept of “theatre” in the 
first place. The “theatre of death”, then, concerns the very possibility of its 
theorisation in the historical example of Kantor’s work. 
 
Even the Cricoteka’s own exhibitions have relied almost exclusively on Kantor’s own 
writings about the Cricot 2 productions, often without distinguishing his later 
reflections (and even model reproductions of earlier, but since lost, objects) from the 
performances to which they refer – as if these writings and recreations were not 
themselves part of their own aesthetic-theoretical history. As Kantor himself 
observed:  
 
In art, the logic of a phenomenon’s successful development does not often 
coincide with a linear chronology... It is only later, after it is already over, we 
arrange the facts and events according to the logic of our time, following our 
cause and effect. All these explanations of the relationships between the ideas, 
my attempts at locating, defining, and analysing them, help me identify for 
myself my expanding past, discover its transformations, which may lead me to 
new solutions...609 
 
                                                
609 Tadeusz Kantor, “Theatrical Place”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, ed. 
Michal Kobialka, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.360. 
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Although Kantor’s work for his archive, alongside the development of his theatre 
making in the 1980s, undoes any simple historical reference to materials from the past 
being available to the present, this does not mean we need simply ignore the historical 
distinction entailed, for instance, in a commitment to the avant-garde. As with the 
later Cricot 2 productions, while Kantor is engaged with a (re)creation of the past (as 
an “avant-garde of my own”) this is still in the modernist image of what its future 
might be in the present (“after” modernism perhaps, but not “post-modern”).  
 
An exhibition about the Cricoteka’s own work of curating exhibitions – showing 
different instances of the way that models in the archive have been presented, for 
example, rather than simply re-presenting them as if these replicas were identical with 
their historical references – would be interesting. As concerns “authorship” in and of 
this archive (pace Kossakowski, discussed above), such an exhibition might take as 
its subject the work of other Cricot 2 collaborators (besides the actors), such as 
Eugeniusz Bakalarz (“the man who built the weird Kantor machines”610); Adam 
Kaczynski (“a Polish pianist, composer and propagator of contemporary music, who 
for many years worked together with the Cricot 2 theatre”611); Stanislaw Balewicz 
(“indefatigable impresario of artistic life in Krakow”612), who was the director of the 
Krzysztofory Gallery (on behalf of the Krakow Group) from 1958-1988; or of his 
successor, Jozef Chrobak (the archivist of the Grupa Krakowska613), who has curated 
many Kantor exhibitions (including recently, Tadeusz Kantor: Painting. Theatre, held 
in Vilnius, 2012).614  
 
Although the Cricoteka has published collections of contemporary reviews and 
articles (under the editorship of Anna Halczak), the record of Cricot 2 performances 
remains largely presented as (if) defined by Kantor himself. The problem here is that 
                                                
610 Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 
2002, p.151. 
611 Tomaz Tomazewski, “The Spectacle has ended, the Performance goes on!”, trans. Anda 
MacBride, in Jozef Chrobak and Justyna Michalik (eds.), Tadeusz Kantor: Painting. Theatre, 
exhibition catalogue, Vilnius: Lithuanian Art Museum, 2012, n.16, p.65.  
612 Miklaszewski, op cit., p.1. 
613 Under Chrobak’s editorship, twelve volumes of documents related to the Krakow Group, 
and four volumes on the preceding Grupa Mlodych, were published during the 1990s [cf 
Koloski, p.219]. 
614 Jozef Chrobak and Justyna Michalik (eds.), Tadeusz Kantor: Painting. Theatre, exhibition 
catalogue, Vilnius: Lithuanian Art Museum, 2012; and Hanna Wroblewska (ed.), Grupa 
Krakowska (exhibition catalogue), Warsaw: Zacheta Gallery, 1996, pp.77-78 and p.82.  
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these writings are often used historically (both curatorially and academically) as 
descriptions rather than as theorisations of these performances – as if they themselves 
did not already question the status of a “documented” or “described” past. As 
descriptions these texts are short on specific information, since they address the idea 
of a production rather than its practical process – a paradox that Kantor himself had 
already addressed in his 1963 “anti-exhibition”, and which animated his deeply 
polemical relations with the curators of the Foksal Gallery. When Krystian Lupa 
remarks that “we know how much Tadeusz Kantor’s actors rebelled against pointless, 
in their opinion, demands”615, this is a knowledge that largely falls outside of the 
resources for study that are available, in English translation at least, which tend 
towards hagiography of the “authorial” theatre artist (without even acknowledging the 
theorist). 
 
There has not been (so far as I know), for instance, a Cricoteka exhibition that has 
been curated with “explanatory” information derived from other authors, or by editing 
anew the existing documents, which would radically investigate the conditions of 
Kantor’s claims (in 1980) for the Cricoteka to be a “living archive”. This latter term, 
developed in polemics concerning the direction of the Foksal Gallery addressing the 
presentation of artists’ work616 (polemics that led to the resignation of two of its co-
founders in 1970), was already applied by Kantor to an exhibition, entitled “Living 
Archives, Twenty Years of the Development of the Cricot 2”, held at the 
Krzysztofory Gallery in 1976 (still as part of the Krakow Group’s projects).617 
Significantly, the founding, four years later, of the Cricoteka would have the effect of 
separating the Cricot 2 archive from that of the Krakow Artists Group.  
 
This development, which signifies a profound change in the history of the Cricot 2, 
was not without acrimony, following Kantor’s decision to curate a separate exhibition 
of “Painters from the Cricot 2 Circle” (who were then just as much from the circle of 
the Foksal Gallery) within the “Polish Avant-Garde 1910-1978” exhibition, organised 
                                                
615 “Trip to the Unreachable”, Krystian Lupa interviewed by Beata Matkowska-Swies, trans. 
Dorothea Sobstel, in Theater, 41.3, 2012, p.38. 
616 In Wieslaw Borowski and Andrzej Turowski, in “Foksal Gallery Documents”, in October, 
vol.38, Autumn 1986, pp.57-69. 
617 Hanna Wroblewska (ed.), Grupa Krakowska (exhibition catalogue), Warsaw: Zacheta 
Gallery, 1996, p.80.  
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by Ryszard Stanislawski (director of the Lodz Museum of Modern Art) in Rome in 
1979, where Kantor was also presenting his Cricotage, Where are the Snows of 
Yesteryear?618 The “division of space, calculated to the last centimetre by the 
contenders, two catalogues, two posters, two different arrangements,” is discussed by 
the exhibition’s Italian prime mover, Achille Perilli.619 Kantor’s unilateralism, and its 
attendant politics of exclusivity, was repeated when the exhibition transferred to 
Edinburgh that same year – where, as Warpechowski (one of the participants) 
reflected ironically, “Poles lunged at each others’ throats in faraway Scotland”.620 
 
This process of constructing “the past” begun by Kantor himself can be further seen, 
for example, in the editorial presentation by its translator, Michal Kobialka, of the text 
from which the title of this chapter is taken, as belonging to the years in which the 
experience it ostensibly describes occurred – even though the text itself explicitly 
states the retrospective nature of this “occurrence”, which it theorises. In the form in 
which it is most easily available to the Anglophone reader – Kobialka’s collection of 
translations in Further on, Nothing – it is editorially located in “1971 or 1972,”621 
transposing the past tense of the text’s opening sentence (“It was 1971 or 1972”) into 
the present of its writing, despite the fact that a later paragraph begins: “Recently, 
after ten years, during which The Dead Class toured the world…”622 – which would 
suggest that it was not written before 1985. In fact the text was written in 1983 (or at 
least published then), to accompany Kantor’s installation “The Classroom”, as part of 
the Présences Polonaises exhibition held at the Pompidou Centre that year. By 
interpolating the past tense (“it was”) in the opening sentence of his translation (where 
the Polish simply reads Rok 1971 lub 72 [“The year 1971 or 72”623], although the 
opening paragraph indeed offers a narrative in the past tense), Kobialka seems to be 
deciding between different “archive” possibilities (as these are suggested, for 
                                                
618 Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: 
Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.121 and p.123. 
619 Achille Perilli, “Kantor ab ovo”, trans. Susan Finnel, in Silvia Parlagreco (ed.): Tadeusz 
Kantor-Cricot 2: Photographs by Romano Martinis, Milan: Oedipus Editions, 2001, p.176.  
620 Warpechowski, quoted by Lukasz Ronduda, Polish Art of the 70s, Warsaw: Centre for 
Contemporary Art, 2009, n.36, p.129. 
621 Kantor, “A Classroom”, in Further on, Nothing, ed. & trans. Michal Kobialka, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p.226 (and also the Contents page). 
622 Ibid., p.229.  
623 Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, in Tadeusz Kantor – The Classroom: Closed Work 1983, ed. 
Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, trans. William Brand, Krakow: Cricoteka, 1995, n.p. 
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instance, by Chantal Meyer-Plantureux, between a “real memory transformed or [one] 
created by the imagination”624).  
 
There are many such examples of Kobialka editorially assigning texts to dates that are 
contradicted by their content, constructing an apparently archival chronology that is 
partly his own fiction – and partly, of course, Kantor’s. For example, a text by Kantor 
about the history of the Cricot 2 is editorially located “around 1963” by Kobialka in 
Further On, Nothing, while the text situates itself around 1975 (or later) in referring 
to 20 years of the company’s history. Here the researcher has at least to acknowledge 
what Luiza Nader notes, citing Hal Foster: “practices which have an archival impulse 
not only use but also establish archives, revealing their elements as simultaneously 
found and constructed, referring to facts but at the same time being fictitious.”625 
 
Where Kobialka subsequently quotes “The Classroom” text within his own 
commentary (accompanied by a photograph of what his captions describes as 
“Tadeusz Kantor’s model/ installation to The Dead Class – ‘A Classroom – A Closed 
Work of Art’ (1983)”), the decade referred to by Kantor is left out.626 It is as if 1983 
was the same as 1975, where the relation between the installation/ model (in quotation 
marks) and the performance-production (in italics), to which it ostensibly refers, goes 
without comment; as with the relation between the object-installation and the 
photograph, it is as if to speak of the one were simply to speak of the other. The 
preposition “to” that links both works in Kobialka’s photograph caption seems to 
suggest that the one is a given of and for research into the other, rather than that each 
poses the very question of the “visibility” of the other in time (“after the event”, 
whether as performance or exhibition, memory or construction) as art. It is, after all, a 
characteristic of art in the twentieth century to have called into question its relation to 
“documentation”, since at least Duchamp.  
                                                
624 Chantal Meyer-Plantureux, “Les objets de Kantor”, in “Tadeusz Kantor 2”, Les Voies de la 
Création Théâtrale 18, Paris: CRNS Éditions, 2005, p.239. 
625 Luiza Nader, “What do Archives Forget?”, in Christine Macel and Natasa Petresin-
Bachelez (eds.), Promises of the Past, Pompidou Centre exhibition catalogue, Zurich: JRP 
Ringier, 2010, p.225; cf Foster, “An Archival Impulse”, in October 110, Fall 2004. 
626 Michal Kobialka, Further on, Nothing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, 
pp.223-25. It is perhaps worth noting that, again, Kobialka makes an interpolation in his 
translation – adding “of art” to Kantor’s title “closed work” [Klasa Szkolna: dzielo 
zamkniete]; cf. Tadeusz Kantor – The Classroom: Closed Work 1983, ed. Krzysztof 
Plesniarowicz, trans. William Brand, Krakow: Cricoteka, 1995, n.p.  
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Before considering this event of “visibility” and the descriptive and/or theoretical 
time of its occurrence (as between performance and exhibition), it is worth noting that 
these observations are intended not so much as criticism of Kobialka (to whom so 
much of the access to Kantor in English is due627), as to point out how the concept of 
the theatre of death lies hidden in full view within the history of theatre studies, when 
the question of the object of such study is not addressed as that of its own research. 
After all, the transposition of past performance into the present tense of analysis (or 
even of theory) is one of the principal fictions of theatre studies. As has been explored 
in part two of this thesis, the object of study (as “the theatre of death”) concerns not 
simply what may be known of such a theatre (theoretically and historically), but how 
it may be known, afterwards (after the event) – if indeed the theatrical experience, in 
and of time, is (as is so often supposed) ephemeral or live; if this is not thought of in 
terms of the mnemotechnics of its practice(s).  
 
A specific criticism of Kobialka, as providing (as it were) an “archive” of Kantor’s 
writings in English, might, however, concern the characteristic rhetoric of his own 
commentary, where he often ventriloquises Kantor in the voices of post-war French 
theorists – as, in this instance, discussing The Classroom installation, Michel 
Foucault.628 Kobialka often continues a sentence reflecting on, or referencing, Kantor 
with a theoretical citation that is attributed only in an end note, leaving the impression 
that the cited remark is itself a direct commentary on the Kantor example or context 
being discussed in the main text. Kobialka’s association of Kantor’s work with both a 
post-modernist and a post-structuralist frame of reference is one which this thesis 
would resist (claiming, indeed, that Kantor’s work already resists it). Rather than the 
Baudrillard allusion in Kobialka’s article Forget Kantor, for instance, more pertinent 
                                                
627 An analysis of the history of translations of Kantor into English (and the particular 
readings that they propose) would make for an interesting essay in itself, particularly in 
relation to French editions (with their research agenda led by Denis Bablet). Besides the 
eclipse of the work of Piotr Graff, M. Dabrowski, and William Brand, another Krakow-based 
writer, Andrzej Branny refers in an article to a “bound typescript” of his own translations, 
entitled The Theatrical Place. A Collection of Kantor’s Metatheatrical Statements (Branny, 
“The Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor”, in Forum Modernes Theater, 1.1 (1986), p.72).  
628 Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, p.225.  
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would be to examine why contemporary Polish artists have, indeed, “forgotten” 
Kantor.629  
 
While it is a “given” of theatre studies that Kantor is (to be) remembered, it should 
also be remembered that he himself insisted on the avant-garde context within which 
such memory is significant; otherwise the Cricoteka would be in danger of relegating 
the Cricot 2 to being simply another part of an established theatre or art history. What 
does this “forgetting” tell us about the possibilities of remembering Kantor, of 
constructing histories of his work; not least, for a concept of the “theatre of death” as 
testimony to the “ends” of modernism? We need to engage with the way that Kantor 
himself had already addressed this question in his own lifetime by establishing the 
Cricoteka, alongside his condemnations at that time of an “official” or “pseudo-avant-
garde”. 
 
Fundamental to these questions of past and present – both remembered and forgotten 
(as already discussed in relation to Fischer-Lichte and Klossowicz in chapter four) – 
is the mode of “visibility” that is theatre, whether in its performances, documents, or 
theorisations. What is the materiality of this visibility – in which the aesthetic and the 
theoretical address each other?630 Condensed in the preposition “to” in the instance of 
a curatorial caption for a photograph (pace Kobialka’s citation of “Kantor’s model/ 
installation to The Dead Class”) the whole question of an archive and the possibility 
of a “theatre without theatre” (as a “living archive”) is inscribed in the references that 
constitute a thesis such as this one.  
 
                                                
629 Kobialka, “Forget Kantor”, in PAJ 47, May 1994. 
630 This question is at the heart of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, which underlies the whole of 
this thesis. In a review article about Edward Krasinski’s first US exhibition, Blake Stimson 
makes a similar point: “The ‘aesthetic moment’, Theodor Adorno wrote, is ‘not accidental to 
philosophy.’ By this he meant that aesthetic and conceptual relations to the world are deeply 
and closely intertwined in a manner made possible only by their difference: where the concept 
builds its claim to truth by analysis, by parsing the world into discrete, precisely defined 
elements, aesthetic response derives its conviction from the opposing impulse, from drawing 
together the diverse truths of the world – in principle, if not in practice, all of them – into a 
single unified affective response. Of course, not all pointed concepts rise to the standards of 
philosophy, nor do all woolly feelings qualify as aesthetic experience. The high bar for each 
is the other. The conceptual domain of philosophy is the measure of art’s rise beyond that 
which is not art, just as art’s aesthetic province sets the standard for philosophy” (Stimson, 
“The Line of Edward Krasinski”, in Artforum, November, 2003, p.149). 
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VI. How do claims for the autonomy of art resist those for their historical specificity – 
whether as avant-garde or anachronistic? 
For Kantor, any concept of theatre – as an art (rather than simply a professional 
practice) – is to be understood in terms of the avant-garde, itself an index for 
challenging expectations concerning aesthetic truth and historical reality. With respect 
to the discussion of Harold Segel’s allusion to “post-modernist” contemporaneity in 
chapter two, it is important to keep in mind that for Kantor the question of art history 
was not simply formalist, but deeply engaged with the conflicted conditions of and for 
aesthetic representation in the past century. As already noted, with Piotrowski’s 
proposal for a “horizontal history” of the avant-garde, in which centre and margin are 
always plurally relative, rather than vertically hierarchical,631 the universalist appeal 
of and for aesthetic “autonomy” has different meanings in the situation of Communist 
Krakow and Capitalist New York or Paris.632  
 
The engagement with the professed “autonomy” of art (the sense or meaning of which 
itself changes within the Polish context from the time of the Thaw to the 1970s) is 
fundamental to Kantor’s commitment to a generational relation with the inter-war 
modernism (and internationalism) of Witkacy and the original Cricot artists’ 
theatre.633 Kantor’s own ambitions embodied this commitment after the War, which 
could be publicly manifested again, after the years of mandatory Socialist Realism, 
with the founding of the Cricot 2 as the “unofficial” theatrical project of the 
subsequently founded (and officially registered) Krakow Group of artists (1957), 
itself a revival of the pre-war Grupa Krakowska, of which the first Cricot had also 
                                                
631 “This horizontal approach will have the effect of provincialising the West. I am not 
arguing that we should deny or negate the existence of the West, since its continuity is 
assured on many levels, for example as an artistic tradition, system of values, institutional 
infrastructure and an art market. What I am arguing for is a need to see Western culture not in 
terms of its hegemony, but its geographic specificity: as a culture of one of the regions of the 
world. This is the key to any horizontal approach. The revision of our discipline represented 
by Hans Belting’s call for ‘the two voices of art history’, cited at the beginning of this 
chapter, represents, therefore, just an initial step in a much more ambitious project of 
horizontal art history, a project that will lead to a geographic localisation of the West” 
(Piotrowski, Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: 
Reaktion Books, 2012 p.52; on the October book Art since 1900, see pp.25-26). 
632 Kantor received travel grants for residencies in Paris in 1947 (visiting there again in 1955), 
and in 1965 in New York, as well as receiving support for stays in other cities in the West, 
including Hamburg and Florence.  
633 On the original company, see Kobialka’s n.65, in Further on, Nothing, pp.505-6; and also, 
Koloski, Painting Krakow Red: Politics and Culture in Poland, 1945-1950, pp.217-20. 
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been the theatrical project. This was neither a museal interest in inter-war abstraction, 
nor a militant interest in a post-war aesthetic Degree Zero on Kantor’s part, but rather 
a concern for dialogue between past and present, between formism and informel, 
between Malevich and Matta.634 This dialogue within aesthetics bypassed questions of 
realism (with its overt political connotations in the (former) East), proposing a domain 
of “autonomous” activity that was not therefore manifestly anti-communist. By the 
1970s, however, a new generation of artists would push artistic engagement beyond 
this (former) avant-garde claim to autonomy, and Kantor himself would turn to the 
(newly “heretical”) idea of the “closed work”, with its affirmation of a private space 
(of “memory”) within social-cultural mnemotechnics. 
 
The sense of belonging to an historical, modernist internationalism – constructing (or 
“reconstructing”) a continuity across the trauma of the Occupation and of the Iron 
Curtain – offers the seeming paradox of an avant-garde tradition, of which the 
“theatre of death” marks the beginning of the end within the history of the Cricot 2. 
Crucially, this relates to the biographies of the Krakow Group artists’ own lives and 
their memories of pre-war (and thus also of pre-Communist) civil society.635 Indeed, 
Kantor’s founding manifesto for the Cricot 2 makes this motivation (in relation to the 
history of the short twentieth century) explicit:  
 
The Theatre takes the name of the Cricot 2, thereby perceiving itself as a 
continuator of the tradition of the pre-war theatre bearing the same name. 
Cricot 2 is an actors’ theatre, which seeks its new and radical methods of 
acting in contact with avant-garde artists. Cricot 2 Theatre puts forward the 
idea of theatre defined as a work of art, governed by its own autonomous 
existence, and opposed to a traditional theatre of thoughtless reproduction of 
forms, which has irrevocably lost the freedom and the power of action.636  
                                                
634 In the late 1950s, at least, Kantor referred to Matta, although by the 1970s this seemed to 
be a forgotten point of reference. (“Kantor did indeed refer... to Matta... as the ‘painter he felt 
closest to’ in a survey for The Cultural Review (May 12th, 1957)” [Plesniarowicz, The Dead 
Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004. p.53].)  
635 As a student in Krakow in the 1930s, Kantor had attended performances by the Cricot 
company (Plesniarowicz, ibid., pp.25-26). 
636 Tadeusz Kantor, “Powstanie Cricot 2” (unpublished ms, 1955), in Michal Kobialka, 
Further on, Nothing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, n.65, pp.505-06 
[translation modified in consultation with Kobialka].  
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While, as Piotrowski notes (in advocating a “horizontal history” of the European 
avant-gardes), during the Cold War associations with Western culture offered an 
alternative to the official cultural politics of the Communist regimes, this should not 
entail a conceptual assimilation to an art (or theatre) history identified with – and by – 
the former West.637 On the contrary, the concern of such a history (challenging the 
established “vertical” model) should be to explore the question of “how does the art 
of the margins change the perspective of the centre?”638 How does the sense of the 
major history change in the light of what it constitutes as a minor alternative?  
 
In the context of a thesis such as this one, which is researched and written in one of 
the “vertically” dominant European languages, this is to ask how to ensure that the 
work of translation – on which it depends – opens the thesis outward rather than 
simply drawing resources inward (for instance, as concerns the meanings of “avant-
garde”, or of the polemical relations between experiment and empathy associated with 
it). As posed in the Introduction, the question here of the relation between the object 
and the method of aesthetic research becomes that of how conceptual work in 
translation acknowledges its limitations as a work of translation.639 
  
The international context was always referred to by Kantor in Poland. In 1948 (before 
the full implementation of Socialist Realism as official dogma), for instance, in a 
lecture “on the contemporary painting of France” that he gave at the Artists’ 
Association in Krakow (having returned from a six month stay in Paris, from January 
to June 1947), he notes “a care for the future” in the West:  
 
                                                
637 This “horizontal” consideration of the Western avant-gardes is distinct from a vertical 
orientation by such Western viewpoints, as the latter produces a central-marginal art history. 
(It is no accident that Piotrowski’s articles have been published in Third Text, amongst other 
journals.) 
638 Piotr Piotrowski, Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, trans. Anna Brzyski, 
London: Reaktion Books, 2012, p.31. This is to engage with a history which is itself part of 
the Cold War legacy (pace Piotrowski’s reference to Eva Cockcroft’s discussion [in her essay 
Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War] of the 1961 MOMA exhibition of Polish 
“non-objective painters”, In the Shadow of Yalta, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion 
Books, 2009, pp.80-81).  
639 One might think that the prepositions “in” and “of” are in the wrong order here, but this is 
to acknowledge precisely that the conceptual work “of” translation is dependent upon pre-
existing work “in” translation. 
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The constant effort of moving forward, the effort of searching and discovery, 
which at first seems to us almost abnormal. It is the constant discovery of the 
new profiles of things and the world; the incessant, permanent regeneration. 
The young generation is poised between today and the future. The question 
asked of art is directed at them. This may sound paradoxical in our country, 
but the young generation in France is not being bred; it is being listened to...640 
 
Once the new aesthetic politics of a compulsory Socialist Realism had been instituted, 
by late 1949, the time for “listening” was officially over and this “future” foreclosed. 
Indeed, Kantor’s teaching position at the Academy of Fine Arts in Krakow (which he 
had held since October 1947) was revoked in February 1950.  
 
In contrast to those who, after the Thaw, would explore theatre through the latest 
literary developments of “the Absurd”, whether Mrozek and Rozewicz, or Ionesco 
and Beckett (translations of whom quickly appeared in the newly founded [in 1957] 
theatre journal Dialog), Kantor turned to Witkacy – without either assimilating him 
into, or applying to him, the new, “international style” of Absurdist theatricality. In 
this concern with the literary aspect of theatre, there is again a relation between the 
“local” (Krakow) and the “international” (Paris) that ought not to be read (even in 
translation) simply in terms of the canons of the (former) West. Even today it is 
almost impossible to conceive of Krakow (Witkacy and the Cricot, for example) as 
the international and Paris as the local.  
 
According to Plesniarowicz, Kantor’s interest in Witkacy’s “extravagant dramas, 
which had been rejected by the theatre,” began “just before the war”. Kantor had even 
attended a lecture by Witkacy on the philosophy of Pure Form at the university in 
Krakow, and remarked, years later, that: “Witkiewicz made an enormous impression 
                                                
640 Tadeusz Kantor, “On the Contemporary Painting of France” (1948), trans. Anda 
MacBride, in Tadeusz Kantor. Painting. Theatre, exhibition catalogue, Vilnius: Lithuanian 
Art Museum, 2012, p.118. There is a certain irony in Kantor’s “news from Paris”, where he 
speaks as representative of the “young generation” in Krakow (the Grupa Mlodych) in 
relation to the institutionally dominant Kapists (Komitet Paryski), the revived pre-war artists’ 
group of post-impressionists and post-Bonnard colourists, who had themselves studied in 
Paris before the War [Koloski, pp.214-215].  
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on me as a person.”641 Curiously though, the only reference I have found so far (in 
translation) to Kantor’s interest in Witkacy’s paintings is a remark made in an 
interview with Klossowicz, cited by Plesniarowicz whilst discussing Kantor’s 
encounter with Surrealism in Paris in 1947. Kantor is paraphrased as having been 
struck by the “resemblance” between paintings by Witkacy and those of 
“schizophrenics and drug addicts” (at an exhibition organised by the Surrealists) “ – 
which he had never been able to accept.”642 
 
In considering the appeal of the “avant-garde” in late 1950s theatre culture, it is 
important to bear in mind the fundamental importance of the literary within Polish 
theatre history, from the “established” end of the spectrum in the State repertory 
theatre, presenting the “national classics” (as Zygmunt Hübner observes643), to the 
“experimental” end, continuing a tradition of re-inventing Romantic dramas as 
contemporary theatre (as Flaszen remarks of Grotowski at this time). These examples 
present a major position in relation to the post-war concern with both what Ionesco 
termed the “tragedy of language” and what Flaszen calls the “total theatre” of “visual 
and technical effects”, trying to go beyond “rhetoric or illusionary theatre”. As 
Flaszen writes (in 1967), in terms which share their premise (but not their conclusion) 
with Kantor:  
                                                
641 Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, Aberystwyth: 
Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.27. 
642 Ibid., p.53-54. This could also be compared with Kott’s sense of situating Witkacy in a 
“dialectic of anachronism” with respect to the drug cultures of pre-World War One European 
“Bohemia” and mid-1960s American “counter culture” [Theatre of Essence]. It also offers an 
intriguing concern with an aesthetic “demarcation line” between art autre and art informel, 
behind which perhaps lies an anxiety concerning a distinction between pathology and 
creativity (pace Schapiro, Modern Art, New York, George Braziller, 1979, p.232 and pp.199-
200). 
643 Zygmunt Hübner, “The Professional’s Guilty Conscience: a Letter from Poland”, in NTQ, 
vol.IV, n.15, August 1988, p.223. Hübner’s own conflictual role within the theatre 
establishment is used as an example by Jerzy Tymicki in his report on Polish theatre leading 
up to and including the suppression of Solidarity under martial law (in TDR 30.3, Fall 1986). 
A stark example of the ambiguities of the “apolitical” position of “autonomous art” is 
provided by Kantor’s acceptance from the Jaruzelski regime of a state prize for “exceptional 
cultural achievement” in 1982. As Piotrowski notes, “when the majority of artists were 
boycotting the regime, Kantor’s willingness to cooperate clearly legitimised it” (Art and 
Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion Books, 2012, 
p.92; see also, Hübner’s Theatre and Politics, trans. and ed. Jadwiga Kosicka, Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1992, pp.209-210). It is curious that none of the principal 
monographs about Kantor in English discuss this mutual “recognition” of art and politics in 
this period.  
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The avant-garde has proved [the limitation of discursive content] in the 
theatre, but only in the realm of language and text. To be consistent, we must 
go further: to create theatre we step beyond literature; theatre starts where the 
word ends. The realisation that theatrical language should be autonomous, 
built up out of its own substance rather than the language of words, was a 
radical step already attempted by Artaud in his dreams...644  
 
In the 1950s Flaszen was a theatre critic in Krakow, and he evokes the newly founded 
Cricot 2 as emblematic of a “resurrected” cultural life following the Thaw:  
 
Here was a resurrected artistic Krakow, the traditional capital city of Polish 
bohemians, of innovative experiments, the cradle of the avant-garde. An 
artists’ revolt, with obvious political overtones, ostentatiously breaking chains, 
but with the perspective of going beyond a purely political rebellion. Moving 
towards the revolt of the creative individual, unpredictable, inexpressible in 
the language of journalism, in the semiotics of discourse.645  
 
This sense of the Polish October as unfolding on the Left Bank of the Vistula perhaps 
says more about Flaszen’s generation – who had often begun their artistic or critical 
activities committed to the new, post-war politics – than Kantor’s (who had continued 
their artistic experiments, albeit in private, during the Socialist Realist years). The 
Polish example, however, also points to the fact that claims to artistic “autonomy” (as 
“going beyond a purely political rebellion”) differed as much between the countries of 
the Eastern Bloc as between each of them and the existentialist “project” underway in 
                                                
644 Ludwik Flaszen, “After the Avant-Garde” (1967), in Grotowski and Company, trans. 
Andrzej Wojtasik and Paul Allain, Wroclaw: Icarus Publishing, 2009, pp.116-177. This “step 
beyond literature” had, of course, been already attempted by Craig (pace the discussion of 
precedents in chapters one). A similar discussion is had between Kantor and Miklaszewski 
(Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, pp.100-
101). 
645 Ludwik Flaszen, “The Children of the October Look to the West” (2007), in Grotowski 
and Company, trans. Andrzej Wojtasik and Paul Allain, Wroclaw: Icarus Publishing, 2009, 
p.36.   
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Paris, particularly with respect to what Piotrowski calls the “aestheticisation of Art 
informel in Poland”.646  
 
Of the contextual impact of existentialism and Art informel across the Eastern Bloc in 
the 1950s, Piotrowski writes:  
 
The popularity of existentialism, with its emphasis on the individual, 
subjectivity, inner experience and the problem of freedom considered from an 
individual rather than a collective perspective, was clearly a reaction against 
the institutionalisation of Marxism... The negative reaction of the party 
‘philosophers’ to existentialism, invoked with increasing frequency in Polish 
literary and philosophical discussions, made it even more attractive to the 
Polish intellectuals opposed to the regime. Because Art informel was 
connected in many ways with existentialism in the West and particularly in 
France, which was of great interest to the whole of Eastern Europe, interest in 
that philosophy created a climate favourable to the development of interest in 
the painting of gesture (and vice versa). In such a context, Art informel could 
be seen as a defence against the state-imposed collectivism.647 
 
In relation to Kantor specifically, Flaszen recalls of this time that “the elite of 
Krakow’s artists gathered around Kantor, a dandy and a magus” at the Cricot 2 
presentation of “an intriguing performance of The Cuttlefish by Witkacy – an author 
banned before 1956 – made in collaboration with eminent artists of Grupa 
Krakowska.”648 The new Krakow Group brought together those artists who had 
maintained their distance from the official post-war aesthetic politics in Poland, 
between the closing of the First Exhibition of Modern Art, organised by Kantor and 
Porebski, in Krakow and Warsaw in 1948, and the opening of the Exhibition of the 
Nine in Krakow at the end of 1955, which led on to a Second Exhibition of Modern 
                                                
646 Piotrowski, In the Shadow of Yalta, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion Books, 2009, 
p.78. It is indicative that Euro-Marxism is also called Western Marxism – to distinguish it 
from the Leninist-Stalinist ideology of state bureaucracy. (One might consider the question of 
“autonomy” through the lens of Milosz’s The Captive Mind, at the start of this period, and 
Miklos Haraszti’s The Velvet Prison, from the near end.)  
647 Piotrowski, In the Shadow of Yalta, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: Reaktion Books, 2009, 
p.73. 
648 Flaszen, op. cit., p.35. 
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Art in Warsaw in 1957, as these frame the years of Stalinist winter in the visual 
arts.649  
 
Up until the 1980s (before the development of the Cricot 2 into a “wandering 
troupe”), the audience-actor encounter of Kantor’s theatre was mostly mediated by 
the space of a gallery – the Krzysztofory in Krakow. This was not simply a place for 
exhibitions or productions, but also for rehearsals, for process. It was also a place for 
informal meeting, its distinct atmosphere animated by the artists who frequented its 
café and participated in its events. The relation between the theatre work and the 
public was therefore quite distinct from that of the official stages, which were directly 
subject to censorship of both repertoire and performance.650  
 
In an article (written in 1957) about the first production of the newly founded Cricot 
2, Zbigniew Herbert also testifies to the changing cultural climate. Bearing in mind 
that the play chosen – a revival of Witkacy’s The Cuttlefish651, written in 1922 and 
first performed as the very first production of the original Cricot theatre – offers a 
satire on the relation between art and patronage (from both politics and church), 
Herbert wrote:   
 
For the audience member who saw The Cuttlefish in May 1956, Hyrcania, that 
is, a country where a few infallible and unerring partake in the orgy of power 
and control over a society – ‘a flock of lost sheep’ – was neither an abstraction 
nor, unfortunately, a utopia. When the words of the syndicate of the hand-
made kitsch, which destroyed the paintings of the play’s hero, were heard 
                                                
649 See, for example, Koloski, pp.274-5 and pp.246-7; and concerning the 1949 party 
declaration on Socialist Realism, p.304. 
650 For discussion of theatre censorship in Poland, see Hübner’s Theatre and Politics, trans. 
and ed. Jadwiga Kosicka, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1992, especially 
chapters two and three. As Wieslaw Borowski rather wistfully recalls, concerning the relation 
between the Foksal Gallery, the café next door, and Henryk Staszewski’s studio in Warsaw: 
“It was a life between the studio and the café… Generally this pretty much represented the 
only places where one could feel free and speak freely” (trans. Ewa Kanigowska-Gedroyc, in 
Gabriela Switek (ed.), Avant-Garde in the Bloc, Warsaw: Foksal Foundation, 2009, p.151). 
The question of censorship is barely addressed in the Anglophone monographic commentary 
on Kantor. (While Kantor was clearly not identified with the cultural policies of the regime, 
his seeming “autonomy” with respect to international travel, for instance, distinguishes him 
from many of his contemporaries.) 
651 The Cuttlefish is translated by Daniel Gerould in Witkiewicz: Seven Plays, ed. Daniel 
Gerould, New York: Martin Segal Theatre Centre Publications, 2004. 
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from the stage, the banned artists seated in the auditorium looked at each other 
with understanding.652  
 
As the Thaw gave way to the era of “normalisation” (satirised by Tadeusz Rozewicz 
in his 1962 play The Witnesses or Our Little Stabilisation653), the Cricot 2 remained 
part of a tolerated margin of cultural politics in Poland – not part of the official theatre 
institutions (with their repertoires, and indeed their ensembles, supervised by the party 
censorship654), nor of the dissident culture (such as the Theatre of the Eighth Day 
company in Poznan655). Given the extra-ordinary example of the dissidents, it is worth 
recalling the ordinary conditions of “unofficial” civil and cultural life during the Cold 
War in the People’s Republic, where (as Piotrowski writes):  
 
Autonomy functioned in this context as a political slogan, even though it 
meant freedom from politics. It was also understood as a reaction against 
politicisation of the culture by the state, or more precisely its 
instrumentalisation by the communist party propaganda machine. As such it 
was seen as a necessity of artistic freedom, the basis of art’s right to be 
concerned solely with itself and, as an existential problematic, to be intimately 
concerned with the artist’s inner life, rather than the public sphere.656 
 
The ambiguities of this autonomy in the late 1950s, in relation to the previously 
banned work of Witkacy, can be seen in the fact that while the Cricot Cuttlefish 
performance, and the 1958 surrealist-grotesque Madman and the Nun by Wanda 
                                                
652 Zbigniew Herbert, “Cricot 2”, translated and quoted by Kobialka, in Further on, Nothing, 
pp.56-57. In a 2007 testimony about artistic life in post-war Poland, Flaszen notes of Herbert 
that “he had just had his debut after the October events”, referring to Gomulka’s rise to Party 
leadership after the death of the Stalinist First Secretary, Boleslaw Beirut, and the changes 
inaugurated at the Soviet Union’s famous Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 (Flaszen, op. cit., 
p.19; and on Herbert also, pp.25-26).  
653 In Rozewicz, Reading the Apocalypse in Bed, trans. Adam Czerniawski, Barbara Plebanek, 
and Tony Toward, London: Marion Boyars, 1998. 
654 Hübner, op. cit., pp.74-76. 
655 See the interview with the company’s artistic director, Lech Raczak, in TDR 30.3, Fall 
1986. In 2007 the company produced a “verbatim” performance – The Files – using material 
from their secret police files and the past performances that the censors had commented upon 
(a translation of which, by Bill Johnston, is published in Dramaturgy of the Real on the World 
Stage, ed. Carol Martin, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
656 Piotrowski, Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, trans. Anna Brzyski, London: 
Reaktion Books, 2012, p.82. 
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Laskowska and Szajna, went ahead as art theatre projects, an attempt to stage The 
Shoemakers in a politically critical manner in 1957 was stopped after the first night.657 
The possibility of artistic autonomy – a defining characteristic of the avant-garde – as 
a freedom from political action was uniquely recognised in Poland amongst the Soviet 
Bloc countries, so long as it did not trespass into a freedom of political action (at least 
as perceived by the censorship).  
 
The effectiveness of this position of “autonomy” (in relation to an aesthetic resistance 
to the political) was increasingly tested amongst Polish artists during the 1970s, 
however, up to the point of being conceived – by the authorities, at least – as 
becoming, indeed, politically oppositional. To contextualise the years of The Dead 
Class, with its iconography of the actor in a “theatre of death”, in relation to 
dissidents – rather than the turn to Schulz and pre-Communist cultural memory – 
might seem to take us “beyond” its concept, but for the fact that Kantor was himself 
engaged in a “politics” of public space, where the rarefied context of gallery 
representation necessarily engaged with the claims of the state in the aesthetic 
domain.  
 
Knowingly adept at “playing the game”, by not directly challenging its rules, the 
Krakow Group – like the Foksal Gallery – was an officially registered organisation, 
with the entitlements that this offered: “demonstrated by its quarters (provided by the 
state), financial support, paid staff positions and ability to engage in extensive 
international contacts.”658 This allowed them to present work without the constraints 
of “commercial” demands, within an enclave (albeit restricted) of artistic autonomy. 
Precisely because this autonomy defined itself as apolitical – at least in the sense of 
not being concerned to challenge the “leading role” of the Party – the Party made an 
exception in these few instances. Other galleries, however, did not enjoy this quasi-
official recognition. The Repassage Gallery in Warsaw (which included amongst its 
associated artists Zofia Kulik and Przemyslaw Kwie) and the Akumulatory 2 in 
                                                
657 Hübner, op. cit., pp.50-52. 
658 Piotrowski, op. cit., p.89. Both The Foksal Gallery PSP and the Krakow Group lodged 
themselves officially within the umbrella organisation of the Studios for the Plastic Arts 
(Pawel Polit, “Warsaw’s Foksal Gallery 1966-1972: Between Place and Archive”, p.3 
[available on the Artmargins website: www.artmargins.com]).  
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Poznan, for instance, both had to negotiate the relation between the local and the 
international under much more explicit pressures.  
 
As Jaroslaw Kozlowski, the prime mover of the Akumulatory 2, recalls: “During its 
nineteen years of intense activity [the gallery] met with a permanent ‘embargo’ on 
information in the media; even such basic information as that concerning the dates 
and hours of the opening of its exhibitions.”659 Kozlowski’s “NET” project of 1971, 
for instance – which was a means of exploring international exchange between artists, 
with its manifesto distributed in both Polish and English versions – had its first 
private exhibition in his flat broken into by the police.660 However, in 1977, the NET 
project produced the first Fluxus Festival in Poland, held at the Akumulatory 2 and 
“the only one instructed by Maciunas and independently carried out by local artists in 
Central Europe.”661 
 
It is a curious aspect of the denunciation of the “pseudo-avant-garde” by both Kantor 
and Borowski in the 1970s that it did not distinguish the work of such galleries, 
confirming in the eyes of contemporaries the – paradoxical – quasi-“official avant-
garde” status of the Foksal and its artists themselves.662 As already remarked in the 
Introduction, there is an echo of these debates in Donald Kuspit’s critique of the 
pseudo-avant-garde (under the title “cloning and coding”) in New York at the same 
time, as he cites Gaugin (in terms that could well have been written by Kantor): 
 
“In art,” Gaugin wrote, “there are only two types of people: revolutionaries 
and plagiarists. And, in the end, doesn’t the revolutionary’s work become 
official, once the State takes it over?” Plagiarists find it easier to appropriate 
yesterday’s revolutions, but the pseudo-avant-garde artist unwittingly makes 
the point that it is easier to plagiarise the reified idea of the revolution – as 
                                                
659 Jaroslaw Kozlowski in conversation with Jerzy Ludwinski, in Notes from the Future of 
Art: Selected Writings of Jerzy Ludwinski, ed. Magdalena Ziolkowska, trans. Alina 
Kwiatkowska, Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum, 2007, p. 203. 
660 Luiza Nader, “Heterotopy. The NET and Galeria Akumulatory 2”, in Fluxus East 
exhibition catalogue, Berlin: Künstlerhaus Bethanien, 2007, p.114. 
661 Petra Stegmann, “Fluxus East”, in Fluxus East exhibition catalogue, Berlin: Künstlerhaus 
Bethanien, 2007, p.35. 
662 Cf. Piotrowski, op. cit., pp.89-93. 
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inherently a falsification of it as a straightforward plagiarisation – than the 
actual one, which belongs to history.663  
 
Indeed, few artists have been as trenchant in their denunciations of others’ plagiarism 
than Kantor (not least with regard to Grotowski), but one effect of his polemical 
stance in the 1970s would, arguably, lead to his becoming a “forgotten” figure 
amongst a new generation of Polish artists, despite (or because of) the fact that he did 
not retreat from his own sense of an avant-garde “which belongs to history”. By 
defining the truth claims of contemporary art in terms of the present challenge of the 
past – as distinct, paradoxically, from the traditional avant-garde sense of future 
challenge – Kantor’s theatre (in a curious kind of anachronism, by returning to a 
“closed form” in 1975) adopted an apparently arrière-garde attitude, in a situation 
where the contemporary was (so he argued) all “avant-garde”.  
 
In the Theatre of Death manifesto, specifically, Kantor laments the generalisation of 
Duchamp’s example – as well as that of the Happening – as a “universal avant-
garde”.664 “We have lived to witness a process of remorseless banality and 
conventionality in the area of creativity,” he complains to Miklaszewski at this 
time.665 Aiming to resist what he perceived as a kitsch, “post modern” (conceptual) 
appropriation of the avant-garde – with its plagiarism and pastiche (what Kantor 
excoriated as “imitation, wheedling, coquetry, and psychological exhibitionism”666) –
he insisted upon on the “annexation of reality”667 (rather than the dematerialisation of 
the art work) in his own re-formulation of Duchamp, informed both by his 
experiences of the Occupation and (pace Sandauer) his reading of Schulz. Whilst 
supported by Borowski (and the Foksal Gallery), the return to the “closed work” 
                                                
663 Donald Kuspit, The Cult of the Avant-Garde Artist, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, p.111. Debate about avant-garde “traditions” (at least in the former West) could 
be referred to Harold Rosenberg’s 1965 identification of an “historicist turn” in the arts, as 
well as to Peter Bürger’s essays (Kuspit, p.107). 
664 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Theatre of Death”, trans. Vog and Margaret Stelmaszynski, in 
Michal Kobialka, A Journey Through Other Spaces, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993, p.110 (and also “The Impossible Theatre”, trans. Michal Kobialka, ibid., p.90 and 
pp.97-100).  
665 Krzysztof Miklaszewski, Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: 
Routledge, 2002, p.38 (and p.106). 
666 Tadeusz Kantor, “The Impossible Theatre”, trans. Michal Kobialka, in Michal Kobialka 
(ed.), A Journey Through Other Spaces A Journey Through Other Spaces, p.97.  
667 For instance, “The Impossible Theatre”, op. cit., p.96. 
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elicited sceptical comment from others however. Jerzy Ludwinski (equally concerned, 
as both critic and curator, with the seeming universalisation of “open art” by the 
1970s) remarked, for example, that: “The return to well-defined positions is, in my 
view, impossible. Tadeusz Kantor, in one of his recent interviews said that for him the 
closed work of art was important. I do not think it is still feasible.”668 
 
In Kantor’s theatrical work, it is significant that The Dead Class was the last Cricot 2 
production to draw literally on a play by Witkacy; the last to set its theatricality in 
juxtaposition with a “ready-made” form which itself presented the past in 
performance.669 In the introduction to his collection of “twentieth century Polish 
avant-garde drama”, Daniel Gerould uses the very example of productions of Witkacy 
to substantiate the suggestion that, by the late 1960s, “the avant-garde became 
mainstream”.670 Gerould’s discussion (written in 1977, following that of Jan Blonski 
(1970)) then addresses Grotowski, in terms that could, however, equally well apply to 
Kantor:  
 
In Poland there was a slight time lag in recognising Grotowski’s importance; 
at first the polish cultural establishment in avant-garde drama and theatre – 
itself virtually routine by the mid-1960s – found little of interest in what 
seemed to be marginal experiments outside the mainstream. However, 
Grotowski’s fame and influence in Europe and America, which came first, 
helped to bring him acceptance in Poland, where he had been at least tolerated 
and ultimately respected, even if he is not as widely known and admired at 
home as abroad.671 
 
Kantor’s own fame at this time was pre-eminently through gallery spaces (especially 
the Foksal), even for his theatre work. Only after the international success of the 
Cricot 2 productions in Paris and Edinburgh in 1973-75 would this begin to change. 
 
                                                
668 Jerzy Ludwinski, “The Aesthetic of Glue”, in Notes from the Future of Art: Selected 
Writings of Jerzy Ludwinski, ed. Magdalena Ziolkowska, trans. Edyta Supinska-Polit, 
Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum, 2007, p.74 and p.79. 
669 Kantor, “The Impossible Theatre”, op. cit., p.98. 
670 Daniel Gerould (trans. and ed.), Twentieth Century Polish Avant-Garde Drama, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977, p.84. 
671 Ibid., p.87. 
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VII. In place of a conclusion: how might “the return of Odysseus” offer an image of 
and for the concept of the theatre of death, in the testimony that Kantor’s appearance 
“on stage” offers to the short twentieth century? 
After 1975, maintaining his claim to artistic autonomy – evoked by the very name of 
the Cricot 2, in its relating contemporary art-theatre practice with an aesthetic-
historical legacy (or “legitimacy” even) that eschewed the cultural (historical) 
authority of the Communist Party – Kantor turned to an evocation of Polish civil 
society prior even to the (newly independent) 1919 republic, to the years in which 
Poland did not exist as a nation state (years in which the founding members of the 
Cricot 2 had been born).672 In this sense, the activity of the Cricot 2 was a site of 
transmission, of communication, of this cultural memory between the different 
generations involved in its activities. With The Dead Class, for instance, the issue is 
not so much an image of history as constructed by the production (the séance is not a 
“period piece”), but the evidence it offers of an historical imagination (or “memory”) 
in and of the time it was produced. As Kantor’s contemporary (and Schulz specialist), 
Artur Sandauer, for example, described himself (in 1982, during the period of martial 
law), in the third person: “His Polishness is Central European, Austrian. He was born 
under Franz Josef and was educated in a classical Galician Gymnasium.”673 In this 
context, Kantor’s classroom was not the setting for some “costume drama”, invoking 
various writers’ “memories” of the past in the present – but (as discussed in the 
Introduction) a “dramatised séance”.  
 
                                                
672 The implicit “oppositional” stance of this relation of the Cricot 2 to the national, political 
context may be contrasted with that of Grotowski’s “Theatre of the 13 Rows” and then 
“Laboratory Theatre”, in its appeal to the inter-war legacy of the Reduta company, where in 
the Socialist Realist years Stanislavsky was the officially prescribed theatre authority (as a 
Moscow sanctioned model). Grotowski’s research in the 1960s made a radical departure from 
the prevailing, professional standard of theatre practice – in the name of this pre-war Polish 
Stanislavsky legacy – and was no less “oppositional” therefore.  
673 Artur Sandauer, On the Situation of the Polish Writer of Jewish Descent in the Twentieth 
Century, trans. Abe and Sarah Shenitzer, Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 2005, p.97. 
Sandauer (who also became a member of the Krakow Group, in 1980 [Grupa Krakowska, 
p.81]) associates this Galician legacy with the pre-war writings of Schulz rather than the post-
war novels of Julian Stryjkowski (pp.93-97). Sandauer also wrote a fictionalised memoir of 
the pre- and inter-war shtetl life that he had known in childhood, entitled Notes From a Dead 
Town (1963) (discussed, for instance, by Jan Blonski in “A Jewish School of Polish 
Literature?”, in Polin, ed. Antony Polonsky, “From Shtetl to Socialism”, London: Littman 
Library, 1993, pp.475-7). 
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As narrated by Krzysztof Plesniarowicz in the biographical, opening chapter of his 
study of Kantor’s theatre as a “dead memory machine” (drawing on numerous 
interviews with him), Kantor was also educated in a “classical Galician Gymnasium” 
– the Kazimierz Brodzinski First Gymnasium, in Tarnow: “a four-hundred year old 
secondary school… where the nineteenth century philological-classical curriculum 
was still in place.”674 Through this teaching of Latin and Greek, Kantor reflects that 
he “was in everyday contact with mythology,”675 with a European classical 
mythology contrasting with the surrounding world of Catholic and Jewish cultures – 
and the relation between their different languages and Sabbaths676 – in the shtetls of 
the Polish countryside.  
 
This is the world, including its own “poor” models of Hapsburg schooling, evoked in 
both of Kantor’s “theatre of death” productions, The Dead Class (1975) and 
Wielopole, Wielopole (1980). The “return” to childhood – or, rather, a return of 
childhood – is not, however, the “by-product of… middle-aged sentimentality”.677 
With both Schulz and Gombrowicz, it offers a challenge to accepted forms of 
“maturity” (not to mention the canon of national “masterpieces” taught in 
classrooms). Reflecting on the aesthetic relation between the mannequin children and 
the actors in The Dead Class, Kantor observes, precisely, that: “It is the facticity of 
everyday life which kills our ability to imagine the past. This is the basis for all my 
thinking on this subject.”678  
 
The very title of Wielopole, Wielopole annexes the “real life” name of Kantor’s birth 
town, the Galician shtetl of Wielopole Skrzynskie, which he invokes somewhat 
mystically in an interview with Borowski:  
 
                                                
674 Kantor, quoted in Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William 
Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.17. 
675 Ibid., p.20. 
676 The different “rhythms” of the traditions of these cultures re-appear in Kantor’s later work, 
not least in Wielopole, Wielopole. As Milosz reflects: “The isolation of the Jews in this region 
was an old story. The reasons for it must be sought in differences of occupation (the Jews 
were merchants amidst a rural population) and of religion (the rhythms of Catholic and 
Jewish customs did not coincide)” [Native Realm, trans. Catherine Leach, London: Sidgwick 
& Jackson, 1981, p.92]. 
677 Miklaszewski, op. cit., p.36. 
678 Ibid. 
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It was a typical eastern small town or shtetl, with a large market square and a 
few miserable lanes. In the square stood a chapel with some sort of saint for 
the Catholic faithful. In the same square was a well near which Jewish 
weddings were held, primarily when the moon was full. On one side stood the 
church, the rectory, and the Catholic cemetery, and on the other the 
synagogue, the narrow Jewish lanes, and another cemetery, somewhat 
different.... Aside from its everyday life, the town was oriented toward 
eternity...679  
 
As ever with the shtetl, personal memory becomes provincial myth, emblematised in 
this poetic evocation of a Wielopole “oriented towards eternity”. After all, this was a 
Galicia of poverty and pogroms, as much as modernism and mysticism – a “land of 
improbabilities”, as the historian Larry Wolff calls it.680 The Polish-Jewish 
community was perhaps even more divided than the Catholics concerning the politics 
of modern cultural life, with Zionists, Bundists, and (atheist) Communists, laying 
different claims not to a mystical (Hassidic) or conservative (orthodox) “eternity” 
(pace Kantor’s vision of a moonlit square), but more mundanely to their “national” 
political future in Poland, as a constitutionally recognised minority.  
 
Even before the shtetls were destroyed during the Nazi Occupation, they were the 
subject of elegies. During the inter-war period “the vision of the shtetl” was that of “a 
form which continued to exist, but which in essence already belonged to the past.”681 
This past continues to haunt Polish “reality” and has become, in some ways, ever 
more “present” since the fall of communism – such that the Israeli film maker, Yael 
                                                
679 Quoted in Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. William Brand, 
Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.11. 
680 This is the title of chapter 8 of Wolff’s history, The Idea of Galicia, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010 (and where chapter 10 is entitled “Haunted Epilogue”).  
681 Eugenia Prokopowna, “The Image of the Shtetl in Polish Literature”, in Polin, ed. Antony 
Polonsky, “From Shtetl to Socialism”, London: Littman Library, 1993, p.325. “Like 
Slonimski, a severe critic of traditional Jewish culture before the War, who after the War 
lamented that never again would words of longing for Jerusalem be heard in Polish cherry-
orchards, they too [contemporary Polish writers such as Piotr Szewc] wish to see the 
picturesque and moving side of Jewishness, and also the exotic side: the warmth of spice 
shops, not to mention cinnamon shops, and haberdashers, the whirl of dancing Hasidim, the 
stillness of men poring over their sacred books” [ibid., pp.328-9].  
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Bartana’s project of the “Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland” was even chosen 
to represent Poland at the 2011 Venice Biennale.682  
 
But Kantor’s education in the classical world of mythology also contrasted with the 
newly independent Poland’s romantic and modernist heritage (manifested theatrically 
in productions by Leon Schiller and Karol Frycz particularly, with stage designs by 
the Pronaszko brothers, with whom Kantor in fact studied in Krakow in the late 
1930s).683 As described in the Introduction, this complex engagement in cultural 
memory is evident in Kantor’s lifelong fascination with the figure of Odysseus, with 
whom the past returns to the present to lay claim to a “home” from which he is exiled; 
and which, in Wyspianski’s play, has meanwhile become a reminder, or presage, of 
death. In this play, Odysseus reflects on his return to Ithaca: “I have found hell in my 
own country. I have come into a cemetery, and I am the gravedigger.”684  
 
A figure “displaced” in and from his own country, Odysseus’ journey resonates with 
both the nineteenth century Polish experience of occupation and exile and the post-
WWII state, haunted by deportations, exile, and a new form of political occupation, as 
well as by those returning (both physically and fantasmatically) from the war and 
from imprisonment. This Odysseus was, however, also an apparition from 
Wyspianski’s Krakow (connected to Vienna and Paris, rather than Moscow), from a 
“European” Poland before (and beyond) the post-war “borders” of the Eastern Bloc. 
At the end of his penultimate production – I Shall Never Return – Kantor reads, in his 
persona as “the artist”, fragments from the end of Wyspianski’s play, written into his 
director’s notebook (from his 1944 production of the Return), which reflect on the 
future present of death triumphing over a past present that it is impossible to return to: 
                                                
682 Yael Bartana, And Europe Will be Stunned, eds. Joa Ljungberg and Andreas Nilsson, 
Malmö: Moderna Museet Malmö and Berlin: Revolver Publishing, 2010; Yael Bartana, And 
Europe Will be Stunned, eds. James Lingwood and Eleanor Nairne, London: Artangel, 2011; 
and Volker Pantenburg, “Loudspeaker and Flag: Yael Bartana, from Documentation to 
Conjuration”, in Afterall, n.30, Summer, 2012. 
683 Tadeusz Kantor quoted in Krzysztof Plesniarowicz, The Dead Memory Machine, trans. 
William Brand, Aberystwyth: Black Mountain Press, 2004, p.17-20. 
684 Stanislaw Wyspianski, The Return of Odysseus, trans. Howard Clarke, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Russian and East European Series, vol.35, 1966, p.63. 
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“The boat of the dead! It is sailing into the hereafter, into oblivion. Wait! Save 
me!”685  
 
The evocation of pre-war, multi-ethnic Poland686 – symbolised by the relation 
between Catholic and Jewish Poles, as well local and international modernism – is a 
fundamental theme in the Cricot 2 work after 1975,687 but is already manifest in 
Kantor’s early adoption of the Schulzian vocabulary of a “reality of the lowest rank” 
(or of a “degraded reality”). The appeal of (and to) this historical memory, within that 
of an avant-garde aesthetics of the ready-made (or of what Kantor called “annexed 
reality”), is a key to the emotional power of the mimetic experiments of this theatre 
“of death”, in which the echoes of Central European multiculturalism and aesthetic 
cosmopolitanism continued to resonate within the “peace” of the Cold War.688 As 
Kantor says, in conversation with Krzysztof Miklaszewski (in 1981):  
 
Ever since the late fifties and early sixties, I have been locked in debate over 
all those ways of conceptualising the work of art and its uniqueness, with the 
state of artistic inspiration, with artistic functions of space, so as to replace 
them with a notion of reality. But something else concerns me, which is why I 
feel the urge to recall wartime, which is when I put art, and the work of art, in 
context for the first time. It was then that I understood (and my production of 
The Return of Odysseus bears this out) that in a ‘dense’ life situation a work of 
art ceases to have its own significance. So together with my fellow artists in 
the Underground Theatre, I sought an exit from this situation: one where the 
                                                
685 Ibid., p.71 (and also quoted, from “the programme notes to I shall never return”, in 
Kobialka, A Journey through other spaces, p.358).  
686 A province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Galicia is part of the heritage of the modern 
Polish Republic, now explored by such writers as Andrzej Stasiuk.  
687 In 1976, Konstanty Puzyna, for instance, called The Dead Class “a kind of homage or 
epitaph to a world that has already disappeared... an epitaph that is poignant and magnificent” 
(in Puzyna, Rozewicz, and Wajda: “On Tadeusz Kantor’s The Dead Class”, trans. Duncan 
Jamieson and Adela Karsznia, in Polish Theatre Perspectives, 1.1, 2010, p.344). 
688 Indeed, this endures, for instance, in the example of Luc Tuymans’ 2010 Bruges 
exhibition, The Reality of the Lowest Rank: A Vision of Central Europe (exhibition catalogue, 
Tielt: Lannoo Publishers, 2010). 
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art object could be replaced by a real-life object. And from that day to this, I 
have been possessed by the notion of reality.689 
 
This replacing of the art object with a real-life (“poor” or “degraded”) object underlies 
Kantor’s concern with the relation between actor and audience, past and present, the 
fictional and the material, the living and the dead, as well as with his own – theatrical 
– role in between. Here the question of mimetic co-presence – as that of an aesthetic-
anthropological “return” of the human figure, its “apparition”, in the annexation of 
“real life” on stage – becomes the material of an art of theatre, as that “of death”. In a 
characteristic juxtaposition of Schulz and Duchamp, evoking the aesthetic promise of 
the short twentieth century, the model (or paradigm) actor of this return belongs to 
what Kantor identified as the “reality of the lowest rank”.690 To speak here of an art of 
the theatre – as of death – is to speak of a “degraded” iconography of its pathos 
formulae. These formulae were not invented by Kantor, as if “original” to the Cricot 
2; they are, rather, surviving expressions of the “ephemeral” art of theatre, of specific 
precedents – and of their symptomatic return as an apparition, an image, of what is 
human within this modern art practice: the unsettling, mimetic pathos of the uncanny.  
 
                                                
689 Tadeusz Kantor, “Conversation” with Krzysztof Miklaszewski, in the context of the 
“Polish reality” (six months before martial law) in 1981, in Miklaszewski, Encounters with 
Tadeusz Kantor, trans. George Hyde, London: Routledge, 2002, p.82.  
690 All that has been discussed in this place of a conclusion can be found in Kantor’s own 
words in the texts “Independent Theatre” and “Theatrical Place”, in Michal Kobialka (trans. 
and ed.), Further on, Nothing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, pp.95-105 
and pp.329-367. 
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